Dr Christopher D. Hall's timely British Strategy in the Napoleonic War, 1803-15 (Manchester: U.P., 1992; ISBN 0-7190-3606-2; pp. 12 + 239. £ 35.0), must certainly be admired and applauded not only for the breadth of its subject-matter, but also for the depth of its sources and primary research. Let there be no mistake; this is an extremely scholarly work which shows an insight that is some streets ahead of the majority of modern writings on Napoleonic themes... and indeed a few doors further on than most of the rest. The present reviewer, for example, could not wrong- foot it on the military or naval aspects with which he is most familiar; but was delighted to find there was also an equally rich vein of political and economic analysis to set alongside them - let alone a seemingly endless succession of minor operations, near-operations or aborted operations of which he had scarcely even heard. The global sweep of world affairs as perceived from London or Bath was undoubtedly a very different proposition from the tactical niceties of the battle line as seen from Cape Trafalgar or the Lines of Torres Vedras; and this book admirably highlights the differences between the two. The author starts off, perhaps even a little too brutally, by straight-away getting to grips with the nub of the British problem throughout the whole saga of these (only too numerous) French wars: namely the shortage of manpower. Finding manpower demanded reserves of political will, money and allies which were in only too short supply; and so it was that George III's wars turn out to have been fought on rather more of a shoestring than is generally recognised. It even transpires - as would be fully appreciated only after 1945 - that maintaining a global colonial empire already involved rather more concrete liabilities than it did assets or income. This illuminating discussion is then gradually expanded into a consideration of finance, supply, the availability of shipping and a host of other intriguing factors... and finally the all-important Westminster politics themselves. We are led clearly and sympathetically - first thematically and then chronologically - through the many convoluted twists and turns of policy between the ambivalent Pitts or Grenvilles; the determined Richard Wellesleys or Charles James Foxes; the mutuallyantagonistic Cannings, Castlereaghs or Sidmouths; the uninspiring Liverpools, Percevals or Barhams, and then through to the spasmodically mad king and his, at least a little peculiar, Prince Regent. What a crazy mix-up it all makes, by comparison with the seemingly placid coalition of 1940-45, on that other famous occasion when Britannia stood alone! If there is a criticism of this book it must lie in the occupational hazard afflicting most doctoral theses (not excluding the present reviewer's own); namely an over-narrow concentration upon the subject at hand, to the exclusion of wider considerations. The paradox is that although Dr Hall's work is actually a broader-based and more 'War and Society' synthesis of its era than most of its predecessors, it nevertheless remains almost silent on the British strategy of either the 1790s or the 1820s - both of which subjects are surely very relevant to the central theme. Thus the reader looks to the bibliography in vain for Rodger's War of the Second Coalition; for Corbett's Some Principles of Maritime Strategy; or for Strachan's Waterloo to Balaklava. In particular the author appears to be misled, doubtless by the plausibly omnipresent Basil Hart, into mistaking the overwhelmingly strong 'continental' obsessions of British strategy in the 1790s for mere 'indirect approaches' or 'costly Caribbean dabbling'. There really were no great fundamental changes in Whitehall's outlook between the Revolutionary and the Napoleonic wars; only some gradual shifts of emphasis. It should also be mentioned that the politics of the First Restoration and the Hundred Days are scarcely mentioned in this book, since although Dr Hall is anxious to stress the importance of the continent for British strategists from 1803 onwards, his main subject really ends with Napoleon's first abdication. (This review will also appear in English Historical Review) Back to Empire, Eagles, & Lions Table of Contents Vol. 2 No. 3 Back to EEL List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1993 by Emperor's Headquarters This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com