NOTE FROM THE EDITOR The following article is a somewhat streamlined version of the article published in EE&L 82 (pp16-22, Vol. 1). It is a quick analysis of Bressonet's authoritative book on the Campaign of 1806 "Etudes tactiques sur la Campagne de 1806". The translation of the "conclusion", i.e. the last part of Bressonet's work (not available in English) is to be found elsewhere in this issue. SOME COMMENTS (a) Bressonet's book is an extremely good one, but it is not about minor tactics. It is about grand tactics and the handling of Divisions or brigades. The eyewitnesses he quotes are Regimental commanders and above - not the intra-battalion creatures who give us so many excellent ` tactical snippets' from the very front line of British battles of this era. Nor is Bressonet himself anxious to elaborate his theories at this level: his targets lie elsewhere (and in this it must be said he is typical of the `Section Historique' writers of his days - apart from the shining exception of Colin). Conclusions: Beware of Bressonet when it comes to the details of minor tactics. (b) Bressonet was writing at the very moment when firepower was starting to become important at last. He died in 1908 and his book appeared posthumously in 1909 - i.e. long after the French army had procured the `Soixante Quinze' (note 1). What more natural than that he should tend to a `firepower' view of Napoleonic tactics, and especially because Colin had already done so in the very same `Section Historique' of which Bressonet formed part? Bressonet must surely have known Colin' s work and been influenced by it: compare La Tactique et la Discipline (1902) with Etudes Tactiques (1909) and you will find that identical sections of Foucart's Campagne de Prusse (1887-90) are quoted (and more fully by Colin than by Bressonet). Writers like Colin were offering an alternative to the `bayonet' school in the politically volatile atmosphere of France just before WWI. We tend to forget that the `bayonet' school was politically as well as militarily important at the time, but it was. Colin and Bressonet must have known that their historical statements about Napoleonic tactics carried a contemporary importance which is hard for us today to comprehend (unless, that is, one has tried to write a book about such an apparently `military' and `neutral' subject as the importance of von Manstein's tank tactics for modern armies! That is real education, I can assure you). Conclusion: Bressonet was probably just as commited to an extreme view of tactics as de Granmaison himself, albeit on the opposite side. (c) On the other hand Bressonet never did write any proper conclusions. That is a common fault on posthumous works - the author has no opportunity to cogitate deeply about his discoveries an tell us what he thinks they really mean! Conclusion: Do not make generalisations about Bressonet's supposed `conclusions', but look deeply into what he actually said. Let us therefore now do a bit of that: (d) In his coverage of Saalfield Bressonet describes the following French attacks: Skirmishing by Suchet's van around Garndorf (10 am). Skirmish and artillery fire followed by a counterattack in column by the 34th of the line moving through Beulwitz village. This leads to scrappy skirmish around Costen village (around 11.30 am).  Skirmishers get into Saalfield town almost unopposed (about noon). 64th of the Line relieves the skirmish line of the 17th Leger and the regiment makes an enveloping attack on Crosten. Formation not stated (Ipm). This attack was very successful and reinforced by a devastating cavalry charge. Skirmish attack by 40th and 34th regiments against the woods and buildings around Aue (1pm). Hence at Saalfield, the picture painted by Bressonet is very much one of aggressive French skirmishing in pretty close country. The skirmishers need supports behind them, to give them impetus, but it hardly seems to matter what formation these are in. The fluid use of cavalry by the French is the other outstanding feature of this battle. They do seem to have found ground sufficiently open for their manoeuvres, and timed their interventions very prettily. Conclusion: The French of 1806 believed that long firefights by clouds of skirmishers exploited by cavalry were the best way to defeat the Prussians. (e) At Jena Bressonet describes the following attacks: Skirmishers seize Cospeda on 13th October leading to a scrappy firefight all the rest of the day. Claparede's attack on Closewitz early on 14th was intended to be an echelon of deployed lines, but it got lost in the fog in very difficult uphill going and led to an incoherent firefight: "l'obscurite du brouillard derobant les objects environnants et s'opposants a toute manoeuvre." (p.135) i.e. "the fog was so thick that it dissimulated all objects around preventing any maneuver". The entire Division seems to have been cramped together in a gully, making a highly dense target - effectively a `monstrous column' . It apparently considered making some charges, but in the end made none. This situation was de-blocked only after two hours, when Prussian ammo was getting low and the French had inserted fresh skirmishers around the flanks. As the sun breaks through the mist the 34th regiment makes a counter-charge on a Saxon attack, with two battalions in line advancing with fire. This is successful and exploited by other units. It is a very rare case of a line attack owing its effect to a few vollies rather than protracted skirmisher fire. St. Hilaire meanwhile captures woods east of Closewitz by skirmish attacks. About 10am St. Hilaire receives a Prussian attack near Lehesten: he absorbs it with skirmishers in front then counter-attacks with columns on the flank, and destroys it (including an effective cavalry exploitation). The 36th regiment storms "Nerkewitz" (p.151) in column and deploys on the far side. The first French attack uphill against Vierzehheiligen is by the 40th regiment with plenty of artillery support. Formation not stated, but probably line. French repulsed, which persuades the enemy to evacuate the village! Ney's attack with cavalry supported by two battalions in square. The infantry eventually enter the Isserstedt woods as skirmishers. At 10.30am the fog lifts and "the Prussians could now see in front of them the skirmishers lines, followed by small infantry columns,etc. ." Ney next occupies Vierzehnheiligen unopposedformations not stated. Then 16th Leger and 14th Line advance on the Issersteedt woods in platoon columns to the left, with one battalion en tirailleurs (in skirmish order). There is a long firefight which the French win by 11.30. The 16th Leger is later rallied into columns to move up on the right and deploy into a defensive line at musket range of the enemy. Meanwhile Lannes makes an elegant attack on the other flank with 103rd regiment advancing frontally in line as 100th regiment files to the flank then wheels up into line around Krippendorf mill. This attack has initial success against the enemy infantry, but is pushed back in disorder by cavalry. Around 11.30 there is an attack by 16th Leger and 105th regiments deployed, using an alternation of fire and movement supported by mobile artillery and covered by skirmishers. As this force came to `pistol range' of the enemy it "charged in skirmish order" ("se precipita en tirailleurs"), or in other words it lost close order and degenerated into a thick skirmish line. This defeated the enemy. Around 1.15pm there is an attack of about a dozen French battalions in thick skirmish lines followed up by columns. The Prussians break. South of Isserstedt Desjardins launched an attack uphill with one battalion in line and one in column, all covered by skirmishers. Prussian cavalry was repulsed and their infantry support ran off. Finally there is a Ruchel's doomed attack at the end of the battle, which a French counter-advance seems to have caught in a fire trap on three sides. After a firefight lasting a quarter of an hour the Prussian retire. Jena was a much bigger action than Saalfield, although the battlefield seems to have been almost as compartmentalised by slopes, villages and woods. The picture Bressonet paints is once again one of massed French skirmish attacks supported by either lines or columns, with possibly a preference for line when ground is open. On a couple of occasions however, we see genuine line attacks which rely on close-order volleying or `advancing fire', but mostly the idea of the formed bodies seems to be to feed the skirmish lines or to break down into skirmish lines themselves. Conclusion: The French in 1806 did rely on a 'firepower' theory of tactics, even though that was not the only option open to them and was not the theory which they followed in some other campaigns. Bressonet reveals himself as a supporter of the 'firepower' school insofar as he accept this without question - and in fact scarcely pauses to examine it at all. Where Bressonet seems to differ from Colin, however, is that he pays much less attention to the idea of close order tactics for the assault. Where Colin tries to say the French line wanted to deploy and give volley fire in the assault, Bressonet shows the fire being delivered much more by skirmishers. This sounds convincing to me, and I would extend it further by pointing to the British opinion of the French as "great waster of ammunition". But if Bressonet is interpreted as following Colin in the `close order volley' then I disagree. The French did not usually want to deploy their columns to give vollies, but to feed the skirmish line. That is rather a crucial difference from Colin' s theory. That point has become clearer to me on re-reading Bressonet. If we interpret Bressonet's view on minor tactics in these terms, then I think he has a lot to offer us. He certainly shows us many French attacks in the famous "skirmish line followed by columns" configuration, so it would be wrong to assume that the French regarded the columns only as a formation for manoeuvre. Nor - at Jena and Saalfield at least - does Bressonet seem to make any mention at all of the effect of artillery in forcing deployment. What it does show is that the Prussian had lots of battalion guns - presumably of light calibre - but that they were almost invariably captured by direct assault. What a shock the French must have received in 1807 when they were confronted by the Russians with a really heavy artillery! (f) Of course, I agree that the French did not need to deploy if they were not in danger from Prussian infantry or artillery - but that hardly explains away the occasions on which they did not deploy when there was a threat. What is not shown is that the French had any particularly strong views about what formation constituted `the best formation for the job in hand' apart from their all-pervasive faith in skirmishers, skirmishers and more skirmishers again! (g) Finally, I cannot resist reminding of my favorite story from Bressonet (p.143) to the readers that deny the effectiveness of skirmishers . It just shows how accustomed to skirmishing was the Saxon grenadier battalion Hundt. At about 9.30 on the morning of Jena, this doughty military formation ran away in confusion when (wait for it!) they saw their own skirmishers retiring through them, and mistook them for Frenchmen! Note 1: Note from editor, we are speaking of the famous French 75mm gun which was the standard equipment for the French and U.S. armies during WWI. 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