Recently I again read the memoirs of Jean-Baptiste Barres, one of the superb series of books covering the Napoleonic period that have been published by Greenhill books. Jumbo Map (very slow: 369K) In the course of reading I became intrigued concerning Barres' description of his role in the Battle of Leipzig. This passage can be found on pages 180-187 of the Greenhill edition and unfold the events concerning Barres' command for the period 16th-18th October 1813. This passage raised some questions in my mind concerning the role and tactics of battalion and company level units in this period of the Napoleonic Wars. I offer to the readership my thoughts on this action and would certainly be interested in any feedback in order to clarify (or critique) my explanations of Barres' movements throughout the battle. In October 1813 Barres was a captain in the 3rd battalion, 47th Line. The 3/47th, along the 3/86th, made up the 25th Provisional Line Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 20th Division, 6th Corps. [1] I have been unable to verify, but have assumed, that Barres was in command of the voltigeur company given his background as a Chasseur of the Imperial Guard, and as a junior officer in the 16th Leger. One of the sources of manpower used by Napoleon to rebuild the Grande Armee in 1813 was entire battalions, or cadres thereof, of those regiments serving in Spain. The 3/47th had been in Spain with the 1st and 2nd battalions in late 1812, but had been recalled. Napoleon found that many of these 3rd battalions lacked the necessary numbers of officers and NCO's, so he set about scouring the Empire to to make up these numbers. Barres had also served in Spain with the 16th Leger, but on his return in early 1812, he was promoted captain and posted to the Ile de Croix. [2] He was one of the many officers who were scooped up and placed in the 3rd battalions to make up the cadres for the battalions on their way to join the Grande Armee. The make up of these 3rd battalions was from newly created cadres and the troops from the levy of the Classes of 1809-1812, the Class of 1814, (Senatus-consulte of 11th January, 1813), and the supplementary levy (Senatus-consulte of 3rd April, 1813). [3] Biographies By way of background a brief biography of the unit commanders provides a picture of the depth on experience that Napoleon still retained in the ranks of his senior officers. Colonel Christophe Henrion was in command of the 25th Provisional Line Regiment, first enlisting in 1793, by 1805 he was captain in the Chasseurs a pied. From 1808 to early 1813 he served as aide de camp to Prince Camille Borghese in Italy before taking up his command. He eventually commanded the 9th Voltigeurs, was wounded at Lutzen and unable to resume his command. He eventually commanded the 9th Voltigeurs, was wounded again at Dresden, and became a general de brigade in December 1813. His career under Napoleon ended at Waterloo as commander of the 4th Chasseurs a pied. [4] The 2nd brigade was commanded by General de brigade Joseph-Antoine Joubert, Joubert served throughout the Revolutionary Wars and served with the 64th Line in the Campaign of 1805-07. In 1808 he was promoted to colonel of the 30th Line, serving in Davout' s 3rd Corps. Promotion to general de brigade came in 1811. and he commanded the 2nd Brigade, 11th Division, of the 3rd Corps in Russia. [5] General de division Jean-Dominique Compans commanded the 20th Division. His career began in 1791 as a captain of volunteers. Throughout the Revolutionary Wars he held a variety of mainly staff positions and by 1799 was General de brigade. During the early campaigns of the Empire he again was given staff appointments as Chief of Staff of first the 5th, then the 4th Corps. In late 1808 he was appointed Chief of Staff to the 3rd Corps under Davout and in 1811 was given command of the 5th Division of what was to become the 1st Corps for the invasion of Russia. [6] The ambitious but experienced Marshal Marmont commanded the 6th Corps. It was one of the finest formations in the newly reformed Grande Armee consisting of 3 infantry Divisions of 38 battalions and 46 guns and a strong artillery reserve of 24 guns. Apart from the 1st/Joseph Napoleon (Spanish) and the 2nd/ Wurzburg, all units were French. By August a cavalry brigade consisting of the 2nd and 4th Wurttemberg Chevau-legers with horse artillery would also be attached. [7] The 3/47th, commanded by Major Fabre, fought at the Battles of Lutzen, Bautzen and Dresden, as well as many smaller engagements. Although Barres gives an interesting account of his part in these momentous events, it is to the Battle of Leipzig that I will now pass. Battle of Leipzig By the 15th October the 6th Corps was camped between Lindenthal and Radefeld where Marmont received orders from Napoleon to move his command southwards to a position between Leipzig and Liebertwolkwitz in order to add support to the planned French assault on the Army of Bohemia. Chandler puts the time of this order as 07.00 and further states that the 6th Corps was under way by 10.00. [8] Marmont would have passed the necessary commands to his corps to carry out this movement. As was usual practice the 20th Division being the 1st of the 6th Corps would have led the march. At approximately 10.00 the outposts of the 6th Corps towards Radefeld were driven in by the approach of Blucher's troops and Marmont halted his movement at Mockern. Barres stated that in the early forenoon his unit passed through a suburb of Leipzig. They passed the city on the right, making for the village of Holzhausen, where they had been ordered to report. Barres does not mentions the rest of his Division or even his brigade or regiment. From Marmont's report of the battle, some of the 20th Division took part in the fighting around Mockern. It would appear at least that the 3/47th had not received Marmont's orders to halt, but had in fact continued to march to the point to which it had been ordered. Barres arrival at Holzhausen must have occurred before midday for he comments that shortly after his arrival "a thousand guns in battery burst forth simultaneously". I am assuming that his cannonade was that of the great battery formed by Drouot between the 2nd and 5th Corps to the south. This battery, supporting a French counterattack along the entire Wachau front, commenced after 11.00am and before midday when the French infantry columns advanced. Barres continues that a general of the 11th Corps ordered them "forward toward a wood of large extent, and to dislodge the enemy therefrom". The use of the word "ordered them" does not provide a clue as to whether the order was given to the brigade, regiment or battalion commander. The wood they were ordered to attack was likely that to the west of Klein Possna. The evidence for this is that Barres states that the 3/47th was on the extreme left of the army which would indicate a position on Macdonald's left. Napoleon's orders to Macdonald were to take the Kolmberg and advance on Seifertshain, thus turning the Allied right in conjunction with the general advance along the Wachau front. With Marchand's 39th Division of the 11th Corps advanced on the Kolmberg, Ledru des Esaart's 31st Division marched against Seifertshain, and Gerard's 35th Division was ordered to take Klein Possna. It would be necessary to take this position in order to anchor the left flank of the 11th Corps. In assaulting this wood the 3/47th was obviously supporting Gerard' s attack. B arres states "the wood was attacked by the six companies in six different places; owing to my place in the line of battle I found myself the most remote", i.e. in the far left of the line of battle. The indication here is that the battalion carried out a broad assault in a dispersed formation. There is also a hint that the company commanders had more freedom of action than would normally be the case. This would be due to not only the dispersed formation but the 3/47th being removed from his normal chain of command. Opposing the French were Prussian and Russian cavalry under Zeiten and Pahlen respectively and Austrian infantry. Using Esposito's Napoleonic Atlas as a source [9] the closest Allied infantry were most likely to be those belonging to Klenau's 4th Austrian Corps. Barres identifies his opposition in the wood as Croats. The only Croatian troops belonging to Klenau's Corps were those in Baumgarten's Brigade, consisting of 2 battalions of the I st Wallachian-Illyrian Border regiment (Grenz), although Barres could also have been referring to a battalion of the 1st Wallachian Border Regiment in the same brigade. [10] Barnes company entered the wood in skirmish order. He states "I soon dislodged the Austrian Croats whom I met there, but as I advanced I met with more more resistance, and when my fire was hot there were distinct shouts of Don't fire, we are French, then when I ceased fire, they fired on us." Barres describes the wood as dense with thick undergrowth which reduced visibility. Scouting forward himself, he discovered the position of what he calls a Croat battalion by drawing its fire. He continued "I shouted to my skirmishers to advance, and once surrounded by them, I had the charge sounded. Then we advanced with more confidence, paying no more attention to shouts of Don't fire ". This attack would seem to be divided in two phases. An unformed initial assault that drives in the Croat outposts. As the Croat fire intensifies the advance is slowed and develops into a firefight which ends in confusion caused by the Croats using the French prisoners as a "ruse de guerre". After consolidating their position, the French launch into another advance, still unformed, which drives the Croats from the woods. The plain being clear except for the retreating enemy, Barres ordered his company to advance on Klein Possna which was occupied by Austrians and Cossacks. The Allies were driven from the village after a firefight. This firefight lasted for fifteen minutes which seems short given that the Allied troops had the protection of the village. One explanation may be that the Austrian troops had been recently been driven back by the French and had still not recovered their equilibrium. The French showing a determination to push forward was enough to drive back the already shaken Austrians. There is no hint in Barres' version that he was aided by friendly troops in the vicinity. Having taken the village, again Barres advanced in pursuit of the retreating enemy, but was forced to withdraw back into the village by the presence of large numbers of the enemy. Barres halted his men in the village to rest and have a meal so that they might withdraw after nightfall. Given the recent argument in EE&L concerning pursuit and orders, the movements of B arres throughout the 16th is intriguing. I will state here that I am in complete agreement with Jean Lochet over the issues. However, it would seem that Barres, due to his circumstances was forced to react completely on his own initiative. What is also surprising is that he continued to advance and pursue, subsequently losing contact with the reminder of the battalion, instead of holding his position in the wood as originally ordered. He does state that he rallied his company before advancing into the village, but does not say he was ordered to advance. Barres's excuse for the further advance was that he was emboldened by his success. It is unfortunate that he does not mention more THE AREAS IN WHICH BARRES' BATTALION WAS ENGAGED BARRES' LIKELY MOVEMENT FROM KLEIN POSSNA TO SCHONFELD IS MARKED ON THE MAP of the events happening further away to his immediate vicinity, but it is understandable that in the heat of the battle his whole attention was focused on what was happening immediately around him. The next orders received by Barres were just before nightfall when General Gerard stopped at his bivouac, listened to his report and ordered him to remain in his position. He was later reinforced by cavalry, probably from the 1st Cavalry Corps who was supporting Macdonald. Barres spent the 17th taking various measures in trying to locate his battalion by asking passing commands or sending out NCO's. He eventually located it in Holzhausen. After the assault on the woods the remainder of the battalion had returned to their starting point at Holzhausen. On the 18th Major Fabre assembled the officers in order to decide whether to return to the 6th Corps. The assembled officers agreed to this action as "it was more suitable to go an and fight in the ranks of the 6th Corps to which we belonged and in which we were known to the generals, than to remain in the 11th, to which we found ourselves attached without knowing why, and where no one paid any attention to us. " This passage shows us the importance of command control , and the results that are incurred when command control breaks down. The officers have an idea of what they are to do and know their senior officers. Taken out of the environment confusion occurs as can be evidenced by the wandering of Barres company on the 16th. This passage also infers that the 3/47th separated from the Division on the 16th when it was recalled. Being on its own at Holzhausen it was added to Gerard's Division for its assault on Klein Possna. The battalion moved on the Parthe by the Duben road and rejoined the 20th Division which was on the right of Schonfeld supporting the artillery. Further evidence that the 3/47th was separated from the Division on the 16th is offered by Barres' comment that both Marmont and Compans were glad to see them arrive due to the strength of the battalion. It had not suffered through the bloody fighting that had occurred at Mockern as Marmont held off Blucher's advance. Barres continues "As soon as we arrived our thin column was ploughed by the enemy's balls. Officers and soldiers fell like ears of corn before the reaper's sickle. The cannon-balls ploughed through our ranks from the first to the last, each time sweeping away at least thirty men when they took the column full on. The officers who remained were doing nothing but go from the right to left of their squadrons to make them close ranks toward the right, drag the dead and wounded out of the ranks, and prevent them from massing together or wheeling round on themselves". The 3/47th must have stood under fire supporting the guns from at least 2.00pm to 4.30pm. It was at 2.00 pm that Langeron first attacked Schonfeld supported by a superior number of guns than the French. Standing in column the 3/47th suffered heavily, and was probably withdrawn at 4.30pm when Lagrange's 21st and Friedrichs' 22nd Divisions were forced to abandon Schonfeld and the French guns were silenced. [11] The heavy nature of the fighting is evidenced by the roll call that night. Out of the more than 200 men with which Barres states he started the campaign, he had less than twenty left. More than half this number were lost in this action around Schonfeld. The withdrawal of the battalion signaled the end of Barres role in the Battle of Leipzig. His description of the battle offers insights into the experiences of a junior officer and his company in a major action. As I have alluded to during this article, the intriguing questions are how the battalion became separated from its parent formations and the way in which Barres conducted himself during the 16th October. I recommend to all readers Barres' memoirs. Good memoirs by a Frenchman translated into English are hard to come by. FOOTNOTES [1] Bowden, S., 1990, Napoleon's Grande Armee of 1813, p.256. [2] Barres, J.B., 1988, Memoirs of a French Napoleonic Officer, p. 159. [3] Bowden, op. cite. p.44. [4] Six, G. 1934, Dictionnaire Biographique des Generaux et Amiraux Francais , p. 569-570. [5] Six, ibid, p. 607. [6] Six , ibid, p. 257-258. [7] Bowden, op, cite, p.218, p.258. [8] Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon, p.923. [9] Esposito, A Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars, Map 142. [10] Order of Battle reproduced in Miniature Wargames by Peter Hofschroer in his article on the Battle of Liebertwolkwitz. [11] Petre, F.L., 1912, Napoleon's Last Campaign in Germany - 1813, p.366-367. Back to Empire, Eagles, & Lions Table of Contents Vol. 2 No. 2 Back to EEL List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1993 by Emperor's Headquarters This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com