Ed.Note: The "READER'S FORUM" section is intended to deal with readers comments on previous articles or on short subjcts. A QUESTION ON RUSSIAN INFANTRY FORMING SQUARES BY HUGHES JOHNSON Our small wargame group is using our own set of rules with 5mm figures. Our rules are in constant evolution. One of our members wants to penalize Russian infantry for forming square. To substantiate his claim he quotes an old letter he received years ago from an authoritative wargamer (at least at the time). In short, the letter says that "at Eylau, the Russians were so slow in forming square that they had to lay down to receive the French cavalry charges." Was Russian infantry really that slow? Do you have any information that could help us in solving that problem? A SHORT ANSWER TO THE ABOVE PROBLEM BY THE EE&L STAFF That is an interesting one! We are often surprised by some conclusions. Firstly: To be objective and taking Eylau as an example, to generalize that the Russian infantry was very slow in forming square is to ignore an extremely important fact: it is the extremely poor visibility conditions that prevailed at Eylau. The charge of the French Reserve Cavalry took place during a snow storm, which reduced the visibility to near zero. So, under such conditions it is not surprising that the Russian infantry could not spot the French cavalry in time to form squares. Secondly: The data we have at hand does not substantiate the alleged slowness of the Russian infantry. In EE&L 93, (Volume 1) pp.5 to 19, we published an extensive article on Russian infantry drill authored by George Nafziger called "The Russian System of Maneuvers". As one can see, that article does not substantiate that Russian infantry was slower than the French.... Following is the pertinent part of George's article on the Russian infantry: "Finding a period Russian drill regulation is something that I have yet to do. What follows is based on the 1837 Russian Infantry Drill Regulation, School of the Battalion. It clearly shows that the Russians followed the linear tactics of Frederick the Great as well as eventually adopting many French maneuvers from the Regulation of 1791. Warfare did not evolve significantly between 1800 and 1838. Indeed the Crimean War was the last war fought with truly Napoleonic tactics. The tactics shown in the Russian 1837 regulation were decidedly Napoleonic. A quick glance at the illustrations in this article will show that to any casual observer. I cannot state specifically when these maneuvers were adopted by the Russians. When a date is given in the following article for the use of a formation that is based on readings in other documents which mention that formation or maneuver. At best, these dates are a guess. It is not my intention to say that these maneuvers were absolutely, positively used during the period. Indications as to battalion level tactics in military histories are generally poor. This article is intended to be an indication of what the Russians probably did during the Napoleonic wars based on an analysis of what they definitely did in 1837. ORGANIZATION Though there were some changes in the structure of the Russian infantry battalions between 1802 and 1815, the fundamental structure remained unchanged. Each company had 3 officers, a cadet, 7 non-commissioned officers, 3 drummers, and 141 soldiers. This meant that the company had a total of 50 files. When used as a maneuvering formation the company was redesignated as a division. Figure I shows the formation of a Russian infantry company or division. Dimensions & Speeds No source was found that provided the interval allocated to the Russian infantryman, so the the standard 22" interval will be used in all calculations. A division had a total of 50 files, giving it a standard distance of 92 feet. The Russians had three march paces: 1.)Tchyi Szag - 6070 paces per minute, 2.) Skoryi Szag - 100-110 paces per minute, and 3.) Udwonyi Szag - 140 - 160 paces per minutes. All three cadences were executed with agoosestep marching style, which made the higher rates very fatiguing. The Udwonyi Szag was a later development and definitely not used for maneuvering. Source documents used for this part of this study do not explicitly state which of the other two paces was used, but enough indication is given to suggest that the Skoryi Szag (100-110 paces per minute) is the rate that was used. Authoritative sources indicate that the standard pace of the Russian infantryman was slightly over two archine (14 inches per archine) or 30 inches long. Using this pace the Skori Szag (105 paces per minute average) advances at a rate of 92 feet per minute and could cover the division (tactical name for a company) interval in 0.9 minutes. SQUARES There were three principal types of square used by the Russians. The first form of square, Figure A, was formed with division faces of a single rank. Figure B is the second method of forming this square. It is best described as a "follow-the-leader" square. The 3rd (or 6th) platoon faces inward and marches forward, tracing the sides of the square to be formed until it is in its final position on the back side of the square. It must march three platoon intervals, which is not significant. However, the accordion affect is going to significantly impact this very long formation. Each platoon will double its length and the last platoon to move (the 1st and 8th) won't move the 3rd (and 6th) are already in their final position. It is best explained in this manner. As each platoon moves out it will stretch to a division length. When the head of the 3rd platoon is at its final position its tail will still be a full division interval behind it. The 2nd platoon will also be at a full division interval. This means that the 2nd and 3rd platoons will be four (4) platoons long when the head of the 3rd platoon is in its final position. If you count platoon intervals backwards from the final position of the 3rd platoon, we find that the head of the 1st platoon is still two (2) platoon intervals from its final position. Not only must the head of the platoon march two (2) further intervals, but the rear of the 1st platoon must march one (1) further interval. This means that the maneuver requires seven (7) platoon intervals of movement. This requires 3.2 minutes. Figure C shows the second method of forming this square. In this method on the left flank the 2nd and 3rd platoons wheel and march directly backwards until they are perpendicular to the the original line. The longest advance is made by the 1st platoon. The 1st platoon then marches via a flank march directly to the its final position. This hypotenuse is two (2) by two (2) platoon intervals and is a total distance of 2.8 platoon intervals. It then marches into its final position a full platoon interval and one further interval should be allowed for accordion affect. The total maneuver requires 4.8 platoon intervals or 2.4 division intervals. The maneuver requires 2.5 minutes.  When the Russian battalion was in an Attack Column and wished to form square there were two methods of forming square. Figure D shows the first of the two variants of this second square. The second square formed from the Attack Column is shown in Figure G. It was formed from the Attack Column at a close interval and was very similar to the post 1812 Prussian square. Figure D was formed from an Attack Column at the half platoon interval. When it was to form square the second and third divisions broke into quarters. These half platoons would wheel outward towards the nearest flank and double up, forming the flanks of the square. The rear division would simply advance and close in the rear of the square. The longest maneuver was made by the half platoons in the center of the column that wheeled (0.39 division intervals) and then advanced 0.25 division intervals. The total maneuver was 0.64 division intervals. The4th division only had to advance0.25 division intervals. The maneuvers of the innermost half platoons requires 0.6 minutes. Figures E, F, and G show the final method of forming square from Attack Column. This square was formed from an Attack Column at a Close Interval. This interval was so close that there was only sufficient space for another three ranks, plus file closers, to fit between the divisions. Very clear evidence exists to support this form of square being in use in 1810 during the wars with the Turks. Against the Turks this formation and maneuver would be worthwhile, however, against an European army this formation had serious handicaps. If threatened from the flank it could only form square. It would be unable to form a line perpendicular to the column head. As a result, this it does not appear to have been in particularly common against the French. In this method of forming square the central divisions again broke into half platoons. The outermost or flank half platoons marched forward just sufficient to clear the innermost half platoons. Once clear the innermost half platoons marched directly to the flank. In its final form, it is nearly identical to the 1812 Prussian square formation. However, unlike the Russians, the Prussians did not form this square from a Column of Divisions at Close Interval. As the facing movement of the inner half platoons and the advance of the flank half platoons should take about the same time and are not of a very significant time interval. The real time is absorbed by the innermost half platoons flank march. As with the Prussian square, only the first three files really have to be in place for the square to be effective so the accordion effect is irrelevant. The total maneuver, then, requires 0.25 division intervals or 0.2 minutes. The last square, shown in Figures H, was most definitely the oldest type of square used by the Russians in 1837 and very definitely dates to the time of the Seven Years War. The 1837 Regulation indicates that it was formed from a Column of Platoons at a Full Interval. Examining this square indicates that it cannot be formed using the system of doubled ranks established in the Prussian 1788 Regulation. This square was formed by halting the head of the column and doubling the first two platoons. The next four platoons would advance and wheel outwards doubling up and forming the flanks of the square. The last two platoons then advanced until they closed the rear of the square. This system is quite similar to the system used by the French and the Prussians for converting a column into a square. It is likely, then, that this system had been used for quite some time and probably dates to before 1800. The time required for the inner platoons to take position are less significant to the defensive nature of the square than the outer platoons they need not be in position for the square to be considered formed. Indeed, the key is when the 8th platoon is in place. The 8th platoon must advance a distance slightly less than six platoon intervals. This requires 2.7 minutes. The square described in Figures E, F, and G has not been included in this table, not because it was not used during this period, but because it was, according to historical sources, used solely against the Turks. The sole surprise in this comparison is that the Russian system of forming square shown in Figure D is faster than the French system of forming square. Other than that it shows the anticipated slower system of maneuver. Starting Formation Ending Formation France 1800-1808 Russia Time Required Low Time Required High Time Required Low Time Required High Column Line 1.9 min 3.1 min 2.1 min 6.8 min Column Square 1.7 - 2.5 3.9 Line Column 1.3 3.0 1.9 5 2 Line Square 4.7 - 0.6 3.9 Starting Formation Ending Formation France 1805-1815 Russia Time Required Low Time Required High Time Required Low Time Required High Column Line 1.5 min 2.7 min 2.1 min 6.9 min Column Square 0.5 1.6 2.5 3.9 Line Column 1.5 2.4 1.9 5.2 Line Square 1.6 - 0.6 3.9 BIBLIOGRAPHY Bujac, E., L'Armee Russe, son histoire, son organization actuelle, Paris, 1894 Canski, J., Tableau statistique, politique, et moral du system militaire de la Russia, Paris, 1833 McClelland, G.B., Report of the Secretary of War, Washington, 1857 Russian General Staff, Voinse Ostav' o P'khotnoe Sdozh'b, Kniga I, Stroevoe Sdozh'b, Chasshe III., St. Petersburg, 1837 Zweguintov, L'Armee Russe, Paris  Back to Empire, Eagles, & Lions Table of Contents Vol. 2 No. 2 Back to EEL List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1993 by Emperor's Headquarters This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. 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