I have always been somewhat dismayed by the relative paucity of field trials and experimental data from the horse and musket period. For an era that has sometimes been called the "Age of Reason," when siege operations were conducted with mathematical precision, and when theorists sometimes described strategy and tactics in terms of geometry, relatively little has survived in the way of actual test data regarding the movement and firing of troops in the field. Perhaps the officer corps was just not professional enough to be interested in such matters. Or, perhaps the basic parameters were so well known, based upon experience on the drill field as well as in battle, that no one felt such matters worthy of record.
In any case, I recently came across some test data that I have not seen referenced in contemporary Napoleonic literature and which I thought I would share with the EE&L readership. The source of this information was William Duane's The American Military Library, or Compendium of the Modern Tactics. Embracing the Discipline, Manoeuvres, and Duties of Every Species of Troops...Adopted to the Use of the Militia of the United States, published in Philadelphia in 1809.
William Duane was an important figure in early American military literature. A militia officer, he joined the regular army as the Lieutenant-Colonel of the U.S. Army Rifle Regiment during the Anglo-American war scare of 1807. Duane decried the poor state into which the American army and militia had fallen since the War for Independence, and he launched a literary crusade to bring what he considered the best of European military science to America. He particularly believed that the French infantry regulations of 1791 represented the epitome of contemporary military thought, and throughout his subsequent career he championed its adoption in America.
Duane's first endeavor in this regard was to commision a translation of the 1791 manual that he published as The System of Discipline and Manoeuvres of Infantry...Established for the National Guards and Armies of France (Philadelphia, 1807). He republished this translation in 1809 as part of a broader, two volume work titled The American Military Library, a wide ranging digest of military history, theory, tactics, and drill.
Upon the outbreak of the War of 1812, Duane published The Handbook for Infantry, an extreme--many thought too extreme--abridgement of the French 1791 regulations. In March 1813 the War Department adopted the Handbook as the official manual for the Army of the United States. Though the work had many critics, sufficient demand existed to warrant the production of nine editions in two years.
In 1814 Duane further supplemented the Handbook, first by issuing a set of clarifications and plates, and later by publishing The System of Infantry Discipline: According to the Regulations Established for the Army of the United States, 19 March 1813, an enlarged translation of and commentary on the French 1791 regulations. This last volume had a short life, as the War Department replaced all of Duane's writings with a new French-based infantry manual prepared by General Winfield Scott in February 1815.
Test Results
Returning to the subject of this essay, Duane's most important work, The American Military Library, presented the results of a series of military tests conducted by the author. Duane regarded his trials as fairly unique, despite the fact that they required no more than a handful of men, a drill field, and a stopwatch to execute. Such was the state of American military science upon the eve of the War of 1812.
The first test involved a timed, competitive shoot between two equally skilled men, one encumbered by a full pack, the other outfitted in light order. Interestingly enough, though the man in light equipment got off a few more shots than his competitor, Duane found no appreciable difference in either the rate of fire or accuracy of the two men.
In additional tests, a single trained marksman from a Light Infantry company (Duane did not say whether the participants in his trials were regulars or militia) was able to fire 18 fairly well aimed shots in 5 minutes (an average of 3.6 shots per minute) and 36 shots in 13 minutes (an average of 2.77 shots per minute). One must remember that these results were achieved by a single, unthreatened man rather than by a unit under battle conditions. Duane further noted that when asked to fire as rapidly as possible, the participants in his trials could only fire 25 rounds before the heat of the barrel compelled them to hold their weapons by their slings. After about 10 additional rounds, the heat of the barrels prevented the soldiers from firing their weapons at all.
From individual target firing, Duane progressed to a series of trials in which he studied the time it took an attacker to reach an objective, as well as the number of rounds a defender was able to fire at his advancing opponent. Live ammunition was apparently employed, with the advancing party moving off to one side of the defender's muzzle in order to avoid the risk of generating real casualties in these mock engagements.
Before discussing these tests, we should first note one significant problem with the data. Throughout the report Duane related distances in yards. Unfortunately, his time/distance ratios do not make sense, as his soldiers consistently cover great distances in what would appear to be too short a time. This discrepancy is puzzling, since Duane states that he premeasured and marked all distances and timed everything with a stopwatch. The discrepancy is somewhat alleviated if one interprets the "yards" as "paces," yet even this does not seem to account for the time/distance problem. It is my guess, and it is only a guess, that Duane's distances represent feet, not yards. Nevertheless, I have chosen to present Duane's data in yards, just as it appears in the original work, with the suggestion that readers mentally replace the term "yards" with "feet."
In the first test, a single light horseman was directed to "attack" a well-manned light 6 pounder 600 yards (feet?) away. The cavalryman was instructed to follow what Duane regarded as normal procedure for an attack: i.e. the cavalryman was to walk the first 200 yards, trot the next 150 yards, and then "gallop" (I believe "canter" would be a more accurate description of the gait) for 170 yards, before launching himself into a full "charge" (ie. a gallop) for the final 80 yards to the objective. The entire process took 115 seconds, during which the 6 pounder fired no less than 13 rounds!
No doubt such a rapid rate of fire would be hard to replicate under true battle conditions, yet the test results do indicate the surprising number of rounds a well trained crew might be able to execute during an emergency. On the other hand, Duane also acknowledged that a full unit of cavalry would not travel as fast as a single horseman, so that the number of artillery rounds that such a unit might expect to take from an efficient 6 pounder might indeed approach the test results.
Attack
Duane next instructed the cavalryman to "attack" a single, well trained light infantryman at 400 yards (feet?). Again, the horseman went through the normal sequence of paces, trotting the first 150 yards, "galloping" the next 170 yards, and finally "charging" for the last 80 yards. The entire process took 49 seconds, during which the infantryman fired 3 times, the last shot being delivered at only 10 yards. Duane noted from this the value of holding one's fire during a cavalry charge, since the first of the three shots was given at a great distance and would undoubtedly have been ineffective. Better to hold one's fire and get off only 2 rounds (Duane suggested the first round be fired at 250 yards (feet?) and the second at 25-30 yards) than to attempt to fire 3 shots.
From cavalry, Duane moved on to infantry attacks. He had a single infantryman advance over 250 yards (feet?) of open ground toward a lone defender. The attacker marched the first 170 yards at the "ordinary" rate of 100 paces per minute. (An American pace was 24 inches. 100 paces per minute was technically "quick" time, but Duane considered it to be the "ordinary" rate at which American infantry should march.) He then covered the final 80 yards at the "quickest," or double quick time, of 120 paces per minute. The attack took 90 seconds, during which the defender fired his musket 5 times. Duane repeated the experiment, this time with the lone infantryman advancing upon the 6 pounder. The soldier advanced 175 yards (feet?) at the "ordinary" rate before breaking into double quick time for the final 75 yards. The advance required 102 seconds, during which time the energetic cannoneers fired 13 rounds.
Duane acknowledged that units travelled more slowly than single men, and for that reason he repeated the infantry experiments using an entire company of 60 light infantrymen. The attacking infantry were formed into three ranks and marched as before--first in "ordinary" time before breaking into a "charge" to cover the final distance. In attacking an infantry position in the open, the company covered 250 yards (feet?) in 145 seconds, during which time the lone defender fired 7 shots with his musket. Finally, Duane had the same company advance 250 yards (feet?) over a hard, smooth beach toward a light 6 pounder. The advance took 157 seconds, during which time the redoubtable gun crew got off 14 shots.
A summary of Duane's firing times follows. Remember, these were under ideal conditions, using either a single marksman or one artillery piece manned by a crack crew.
| NUMBER OF ROUNDS | NUMBER OF SECONDS |
|---|---|
| Light 6 Pound Cannon | |
| 13 | 115 |
| 1 | 102 |
| 14 | 117 |
| Musket | |
| 18 | 300 |
| 36 | 720 |
| 3 | 49 |
| 5 | 90 |
| 145 | |
SOURCES:
Duane, William. The American Military Library, or Compendium of the Modern Tactics. Embracing the Discipline, Manoeuvres, and Duties of Every Species of Troops...Adopted to the Use of the Militia of the United States. Philadelphia: 1809.
Graves, Donald. "Dry Books of Tactics: U.S. Infantry Manuals of the War of 1812 and After, Part I." Military Collector and Historian 38: 51-61.
Back to Empire, Eagles, & Lions Table of Contents Vol. 2 No. 14
Back to EEL List of Issues
Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List
© Copyright 1995 by Emperor's Headquarters
This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web.
Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com