This is the first of two articles describing a Napoleonic campaign and battle played in the Winter of 1995. Arne Rostad and Phil Jones have been running increasingly larger actions at Historicon and Cold Wars over the last couple of years. In order to produce interesting table-top encounters, they have been adding more and more elements of campaigning and Kriegspieling into their pre-game preparations. This time, in preparation for Cold Wars, a full blown mini-campaign was fought over an area 80 miles by 60, using meticulously crafted maps based upon Nineteenth Century originals and some more recent (though largely unchanged) examples. In this piece, the campaign will be described, and next time the resulting major battle will be presented. Background and Campaign Rules The scenario chosen was an adaptation of the Smolensk phase of the 1812 campaign in Russia. Adjustments were made for available troop types and numbers, but the basic mission was similar to the one Napoleon (here, Jim Mauro) faced: lying at Vitebsk, with the main Russian army concentrated at Smolensk, he was to seize the opportunity of trapping Barclay (Matt Delamatter) and Bagration (Jim Stathes), before they could again elude him. For the Russian generals the charge was straightforward enough- defend the Holy City of Smolensk. Presuming off-map flanks to be secure, the two commanding generals set to their work. The form of Kriegspieling used only required that army commanders be appointed in advance. Beyond a basic distinction between French and Russian, players who we knew would be at Cold Wars were brought in to make wing or corps decisions on an as-needed basis. Smolensk Campaign Map, Large (very slow download: 173K) Smolensk Campaign Map, Jumbo (very slow download: 702K) Napoleon and Barclay provided wing and corps orders (by telephone!) directly to the umpires, who kept track of time and moved the formations on the maps, reporting when a formation reached it's destination unmolested. Only when a decision point was reached- such as a formation encountering an enemy or having other cause to make a report (e.g. do you repair a blown bridge or seek an alternate route)- would another player be brought in. Commanders were forbidden from talking to anybody but the umpires, without the express permission of the latter. The umpires used their sense of inherent military probability (IMP) to minimize the number of decision points. IMP is a concept used in military planning to anticipate the most likely reaction of a general in a given situation, taking all the known variables into account and dismissing those that would be unknown to the decision-maker. This has the effect of reducing the number of times a player has to be asked to make a decision, maintains the "fog of war" and dramatically speeds up campaign play. This latter point is not insignificant, since many wargamers have experienced that ubiquitous disappointment- the unresolved campaign. We managed to maneuver 250,000 troops across 5,000 square miles of terrain in one week and produce a dramatic situation that was fought out in one day. I doubt it could have been done so smoothly without using the techniques we employed (and I speak as one who has both run, and participated in, abortive campaigns in years past!). For those interested, an exposition of IMP was provided in the book Yours To Reason Why, by William Seymour (published by Sidgwick & Jackson, London, 1982)y. Used in wargaming, it places extra demands and responsibilities upon the umpires and requires that these individuals be experienced gamers with a particularly good knowledge of the period and the capabilities of the combatants. Poor decisions made by the umpires, unbeknown to the players, could quickly ruin the game. The trick is to give players just enough information that they can make a decision but not so much as to reveal more than is necessary. We also found that this had the added advantage of heightening their curiosity and, therefore, their interest in the project. We were very careful not to provide more information to a player than his historical counterpart would have had. Indeed, most decisions below army level were taken anonymously, with the player unaware of the identity of the historical general in whose name he was acting! Thus, a player might be told "Commanding a French cavalry corps, you are the spearhead of the northern wing of the army, a day's march ahead of infantry support. Arriving at the town you have been ordered to, you find cossacks marauding around, and the town and woods on fire. What do you want to do?" (In this case, the player showed admirable restraint, merely informing his superiors and awaiting further orders). Players can ask for clarification, but how much they are told is up to the discretion of the umpires ("It's none of your business" was an oft-used phrase!). The other advantage of this system is that players do not identify with a particular formation which may not be present on the day of battle. In our scenario, they generally had no idea which units they were making decisions for! Despite this, they reported that they were delighted with the way the process worked. As one said "I knew great events were afoot- but I had no idea what they were!" One last note on campaign "rules". When the umpires made decisions on behalf of corps commanders, they would automatically send a dispatch to the appropriate commander in chief. However, players making decisions were left to their own devices- some remembered to report back, while others were less fastidious about such niceties- often to the frustration of the commander in chief (and the subsequent delight of the umpires!). French Forces and Intentions In this scenario, Napoleon commanded an army of about 130,000, in 7 corps, divided as follows: Imperial Guard (Bessieres): Old Guard Division; Young Guard Division; Guard Cavalry; Reserve Artillery Three French Infantry Corps (I- Davout; II- Oudinot; III- Ney)- each of 3 French Divisions (III Corps substituted a Bavarian Division for one French), a corps cavalry Division and reserve artillery. Saxon Corps (VII- Reynier)- 2 Saxon Divisions and corps cavalry. Two French Cavalry Corps (I- Nansouty; II- Montbrun)- each of 3 divisions, 1 light and 2 heavy. Each corps also had five horse artillery batteries attached. The plan was to move East from Vitebsk in three columns, sending Nansouty and Oudinot on the northern route; Montbrun and Ney on the central route; and the Guard, Davout and Reynier on the southern route. The goal was to link together at Khomino (see Campaign Map), and then march as a united army via Krasny to Smolensk. This plan bore some similarities to the original but, as we shall see, it relied upon a compliant enemy and maintaining close supporting distances between formations. Starting from Vitebsk on August 1st, the French initially made good progress. Nansouty pushed up through Batsuki and Siluyakovo to Poryeche (his intended destination) unopposed. Oudinot followed and established himself at Siluyakovo, informed by Nansouty that Poryeche had been raised by cossacks and that the surrounding woods were ablaze. This was of little concern since this was, after all, a diversionary exercise on the part of the French. Montbrun headed for Derobiske and hence to Liozno and Rudnya (his target). Ney learned from Montbrun of the absence of enemy as he brought his III Corps up to Liozno. Meanwhile, Napoleon, with the Guard, Davout and Reynier, set out for Koopti, Polovicki and Babinovitichi. By the end of August 2nd, all formations had reached their appointed destinations. Other than a few cossacks to the North, there were no signs of the Russians. Russian Forces and Intentions One reason for the absence of Russians was of their own making. On August 1st, no orders were received from Barclay (Bagration was presumed to be in compliant mood at the time!). Without orders, the day passed in polishing equipment and sunbathing (when an umpire gives you a deadline for receipt of orders, it is best to meet it!). On the 2nd, however, the Russian Bear roared into life. Barclay commanded an army of some 140,000. These were divided into seven Infantry Corps (numbered I-V, VII and VIII) and three Cavalry Corps. Each Infantry and Cavalry Corps contained two Divisions (except the VIIIth Infantry, which had three). A further two Divisions of cossacks were available, commanded by Platov and Illowaiski. In addition, the Guard Light Cavalry Division and the Artillery Reserve were attached to the Guard Infantry Corps (V). Total artillery disposition numbered 652 guns. Platov's cossacks were sent North to Mamoshki and Poryeche with orders to lay waste to Poryeche, set fire to the woods in that region, and watch for approaching French formations. Wittgenstein's I Corps, with two dragoon brigades in his van, was sent South via Lubnya to Krasny, en route for Khomino. Illowaiski's cossacks took the central road to Katyn, Ordovka, Lyubavichi, and eventually Babinovitichi. This left six infantry and three cavalry corps (less the detached dragoons). Leaving one Division of VIII Corps as garrison in Smolensk, Barclay ordered Baggavout's II Corps to follow Illowaiski and establish himself at Ordovka. In a bold move, he assembled all the remaining cavalry, over 22,000 men with 84 horse guns, and sent them toward Rudnya on three converging marches: I Cavalry (1st Cuirassier Division; 1st Cavalry Division) via Volokovaya and Inkovo; II Cavalry (2nd and 3rd Cavalry Divisions) directly up the Smolensk-Vitebsk road; III Cavalry (2nd Cuirassier Division; 4th Cavalry Division- less detached dragoons; and Guard Light Cavalry Division attached) via Katyn, Ordovka and Yeliseyevka. Tuchkov's III Corps was to follow II Cavalry toward Rudnya, while the rest of the army (IV, V, VII and VIII Corps) marched to a position around Volokovaya and began to throw up earthworks. First Blood- and a Nasty Surprise! Smolensk Battle Map 1, Large (very slow download: 169K) By the end of August 3rd, Nansouty and Platov had discovered each other around Poryeche. Neither took any action, the Russians surrendering the town after achieving their goal of destroying it and firing the woods. The only other contact was around Rudnya. Late on the 2nd, Montbrun had arrived at Rudnya, reported the town clear and was awaiting new orders. In the last light of the 3rd, he encountered Russian cavalry approaching from the East, but nothing to be alarmed about. On the 4th, however, Montbrun's 7,500 men found themselves assaulted frontally by two Russian cavalry Divisions (II Corps, 6,500), supported by a grand battery of 84 horse artillery guns (Barclay had formed this from the batteries attached to the cavalry Divisions). Shortly after this action began, Montbrun was informed of more Russian cavalry moving on his right rear (III Corps, 7,500, coming up from Yeliseyevka). Realizing his predicament, the French general ordered his Divisions to pull back toward Liozno and sent word to Marshal Ney- just as a third Russian cavalry formation (I Corps, 6,600, coming due West from Inkovo) appeared on his left flank. Orderly retreat became headlong panic, as the French were assailed by three times their number, including the cream of the Russian cavalry. The French cuirassier Divisions were able to extricate themselves with difficulty, thanks to the sacrifice of their light Division: even so, total corps casualties were in excess of 30%. Falling back toward Liozno, they encountered Ney's corps light cavalry Division and a brigade of Bavarian infantry moving up to support them. While Ney could not have known this when he ordered them forward, these troops were entirely inadequate to stem the tide of Russian horsemen. Both formations suffered terribly, the light cavalry losing 50% and the Bavarian infantry ceasing to exist, pinned by cavalry and battered by artillery in square, the survivors were ridden down. Only when Montbrun's formations arrived in Liozno was there any respite. Unwilling to engage a French infantry corps deployed in a good defensive position, the blown and tired Russian Divisions reined in and fell back to regroup. The remnants of the French II Cavalry Corps were now able to reform and rest behind Ney, West of Liozno, but their ordeal meant that they were effectively unable to do anything for the next three days. Meanwhile, Napoleon was oblivious to these developments. After reaching Babinovitichi on the 2nd, he had paused to receive word from his other formations. Hearing nothing to disturb him, he set out on the morning of the 4th for Khomino. With Davout leading, followed by the Guard and the Saxons, he was pursuing his original plan. Orders were issued to Oudinot and Nansouty to concentrate at Liozno, and for Ney and Montbrun to head for Lyubavichi, thence Khomino, once Oudinot had reached Liozno. Of course, in the absence of radio communication, Oudinot did not learn of this until early on the 5th, so it was a tired II Corps which arrived at Liozno that night. Nansouty was even further off, so would not move until August 6th! As for Ney and Montbrun, clearly their orders had little meaning by the time they arrived- II Cavalry had been very roughly handled, and forced to fall back 10 miles, while III Corps had lost an infantry brigade and some cavalry and was staring at 20,000 Russian horsemen! Barclay Assumes the Central Position Smolensk Battle Map 2, Large (very slow download: 166K) But where was the Russian army? While Napoleon only learned that Russian cavalry were at Liozno on the 4th, his adversary knew much more. Having identified a French cavalry corps at Poryeche, a second at Rudnya, and Ney's corps at Liozno, Barclay had located over 40,000 Frenchmen. By the 5th, he learned from Illowaiski that Davout had left Babinovitichi on the 4th, followed by the Guard and the Saxons, and that this column of at least 60,000 was heading South-East toward Khomino. From these dispositions, Barclay surmised that this was Napoleon's main push. Unaware of Oudinot, he concluded that Ney's corps was isolated, and could be destroyed before help could be brought up. Except for the II Cavalry Division, which was to retire to Yeliseyevka, the cavalry were to remain in place, pinning Ney and scouting North to Kolskyi and South to Gorbova. Illowaiski's cossacks were to reconnoitre North from Babinovitichi, to Polovicki and Derobiske, while one brigade was sent toward Khomino to make contact with the rear of Napoleon's force. Platov continued to observe Nansouty at Poryeche, patrolling as far as Zhizhitsy, shadowing any French movements. Having sent a weak Division of IV Corps back to Smolensk, Barclay had attached the remaining Division and five batteries (60 guns) to Tuchkov's III Corps, and this formation was ordered up to Liozno with all speed. V Corps was to move on Rudnya, while Bagration took the VII and VIII Corps cross country to Yeliseyevka. II Corps was ordered up from Ordovka to Lyubavichi to block any relieving force from the South. There was little word from Wittgenstein's I Corps, but they were now presumed to be somewhere West of Krasny, heading for Khomino. Ney and Montbrun were in serious trouble. By the morning of the 6th, the Russians were in position to attack. Napoleon was completely ignorant of the threat. Having arrived at Khomino early on the 5th, his advance troops had chased off Wittgenstein's dragoons and he had contented himself with gathering his strength around the town and waiting for the approach of Ney. He did not take the overthrow of Montbrun as indicative of a major thrust, and did not even order a reconnoitre of the road to Lyubavichi- an action which would have resulted in the identification of Baggavout's II Corps. He knew there were cossacks to his rear, but that hardly posed a concern. Still unaware of the location of a single Russian infantryman, he did not anticipate that his foe was so far from Smolensk. As for Wittgenstein, he had fallen back on Krasny as soon as he learned of the numbers of French around Khomino, finding himself in the unenviable position of being 30 miles (by any decent roads) from the nearest friendly formations, and South of a major river. Battles at Liozno and Lyubavichi Since Oudinot had only arrived at Liozno late on the 5th, Ney delayed his departure for Lyubavichi until the early hours of the 6th. Even so, by the time Tuchkov's formations appeared before Liozno and began to bombard the town, it was Oudinot's II Corps, not Ney's III Corps, whom they attacked. Already half-way to Lyubavichi, Ney decided to press on with his objective, and leave Oudinot to hold the army's left flank alone. Oudinot did have Montbrun's damaged formations in support (Nansouty being a day away to the North), but these were still in a weakened condition and could not be expected to perform much service. While the initial Russian attacks were not pursued with much vigor, the arrival on the scene of a furious Barclay changed the tone of the engagement. With over 200 cannon, the finest line formations, and unlimited cavalry, Tuchkov pounded Oudinot and Montbrun throughout the afternoon of the 6th. However, the Marshal would not be defeated. Though forced to cede the town, his battered corps nevertheless fell back in good order and spent the night in the field, about three miles to the West of Liozno. Smolensk Battle Map 3, Large (very slow download: 163K) The Battle of Liozno was not the only event of the 6th. Since Ney had ignored the sound of the guns and stuck to his orders, his corps was on a collision course with Baggavout's. Rushing forward from Yeliseyevka, Prince Bagration ordered Raevsky's VII Corps and II Cavalry Division to move due West from that town, to intercept Ney, while he personally led Baggavout's II Corps North toward Liozno. Borosdin's VIII (Grenadier) Corps was to remain at Yeliseyevka. The French were in dire trouble, but the Russians were still being very cautious, hardly believing their apparent luck. By leaving VIII Corps behind, Bagration was guarding the left flank of the army (given that they had little idea where Wittgenstein was), alert to a French drive on Ordovka and maybe Smolensk itself. However, 10,000 Russian Grenadiers were thus unavailable on the 6th, watching for phantoms, and would not be able to intervene in the momentous events of the next day either. Ney encountered Bagration and Baggavout at 2 p.m. and both forces launched major attacks as soon as they were deployed for action. However, by 4 p.m. Ney was aware of first the Russian cavalry and then Raevsky bearing down on his left flank. In desperate straits, he called off his attacks, flung the already mauled Bavarian Division and corps cavalry at these new Russians, and began a rearguard action back up the road he had just come down, heading for Liozno. With Baggavout pressing him all the way, Ney was forced westward, away from the road, when still several miles South of the town, but poor coordination between Barclay and Bagration meant that he was not caught between the Prince pushing North and Barclay pushing South. Indeed, this may have saved the French. Falling back through a forest at night, Ney lost many stragglers to go with his casualties from the action and withdrawal, but he was able to link up with Oudinot. Thus, two battered French corps and a weakened cavalry corps would at least present a united front on the 7th. Moreover, Nansouty was now at Kolskyi, expected to be up to Oudinot by 7 or 8 a.m. that day, and help MUST be coming from Napoleon in the South. The Marshals consulted and, rejecting the idea of a retreat on Vitebsk, decided their best course lay in a pinning attack the next morning, engaging the Russians and allowing their master time to appear in the rear of their enemy and destroy him. They were encouraged in this plan by the confident tone of Napoleon's messages to them and his declared satisfaction at their tenacity. (Note: these two actions, Liozno and Lyubavichi, were conducted by different umpires who made no reference to each other beyond time-keeping. Hence, while we both knew of the other battle, we could not be swayed in our thinking by events on the other field which would not have been known to the participants in our own sector. However, processing each battle in two hour time blocks enabled us to keep pace with each other in case events on one field impinged upon the other. This same technique would later be employed at Cold Wars to keep two tabletop battlefields, separated by several "miles", in action simultaneously) The French Respond In fact, help was on it's way. Realizing the predicament faced by half his army, 25 miles to his North, Napoleon had ordered Davout and the Guard to Lyubavichi late on the 6th, leaving the Saxons to hold Khomino. By the time it was too dark to march, Davout's leading formations were still five miles short of their goal, with 45,000 Frenchmen strung out behind them. The next morning would see a desperate race as they hurried northward to rescue their valiant comrades around Liozno. Actually, things were even worse than they seemed. In front of Liozno, Barclay now had Baggavout's II Corps and Tuchkov's overstrength III Corps, as well as six cavalry Divisions and close to 300 guns. The Guard and Artillery Reserve (V Corps, carrying 130 guns) was ordered up from Rudnya, and could be expected to reach Liozno by mid-morning on the 7th. Some five miles South of Liozno, Raevsky had sited his VII Corps in a superb defensive position, where the road Napoleon would be taking ran through a narrow gap between heavy woods- barely room for him to form up the 72 guns of his corps, screened by cossacks and supported by two almost untouched Divisions! Prince Bagration had called up the VIIIth Corps from Yeliseyevka to join Raevsky, and with 25,000 troops on a very narrow front the Russians believed they could prevent Napoleon's intervention in the main battle. Even Wittgenstein was approaching: having crossed the Dnepr, he was forced marching toward Ordovka and requesting further orders. While a gap of roughly 15 miles separated the two French wings, almost the entire Russian army was concentrated between them! August 7th was going to be a long day for the French. Back to Empire, Eagles, & Lions Table of Contents Vol. 2 No. 14 Back to EEL List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1995 by Emperor's Headquarters This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com