For over twenty years we the Editors of EE&L have played a home grown rules system for Napoleonic Land Battles. Our system emphasizes historical accuracy to a point where it possibly could not gain wide acceptance by the wargaming populace. But for our little club these ever-evolving rules work just fine. To insure our isolated, eccentric band is somewhat on the right track with our rules, we recently sponsored a Napoleonic event at the local winter convention, Cold Wars 95.
Some of the major items in our rules include the following:
Real time movement/operations: Our game is resolved in ten minute segments. We have painfully calculated the time required for each maneuver, etc. in order to use real time. There is no turn sequence, players maneuver troops, change formation, write orders, fire and engage at any point in the segment in any order they wish. The amount of distance traveled and/or tactical formation changes allowed is calculated on what a unit could historically do in 8 minutes (allowing 2 min. for the various inefficiencies).
For example a battalion could (within the parameters of its orders) march for 3 minutes, change formation for 2 minutes and march for 3 minutes to complete a full segment. Events that span multiple segments like combats, grand tactical deployments and orders transmission are rounded up so they begin or end in complete segments.
Chain of Command
The chain-of-command (COC) in the issuing of orders: Simply put, the transmission of orders on the Napoleonic battlefield took a long time. An order moving up or down the COC is read, written and/or responded to (ex. 6:00 PM) in one segment the order travels at least one segment (6:10PM), then is read, written and/or responded to (6:20) at the next level in the COC. Orders traveling from the army-level commander to a brigadier (the tactical element of our game) takes at least one hour and just as long for a brigadier situation to reach Army H.Q. A brigadier's orders are carried out by his command on the segment after they are issued. Players cannot deviate from the orders issued by their superior, they must request new orders and wait the required response time. [1] (However, they may engage in defensive moves but only if attacked.)
Grand tactical deployment: Forces arrived on the battlefield in road column. It was a very time consuming process to shake out a brigade or Division into combat formation. Formal orders must be issued to deploy and our charts show how many segments are required to get in battle formation. These timings are based on the size of the forces and the grand tactical formation desired.
Reduced tactical control: Once an attack is coordinated through all the parameters above, and is launched upon the enemy (usually from outside artillery range) it's destiny is no longer in the player's hands. The written orders of the attacker and defender (or historical precedence when orders are poor) determine combat odds, and not the creative maneuvers of one battalion. [2] When a section of the battlefield is engaged (very rarely do we have single battalion combats) the duration of the combat is rolled. (10 to 30 minutes) The winner is not determined until the rest of the field reaches the segment of the engagements resolution.
To give all players a taste of each facet of our system required a scenario that forced both commanders (CIC) to deploy their forces with limited information and then adjust their battle plan as better information reached their H.Q. We found a suitable historical instance after Smolensk at the Battle of Valoutina-Gora, August 19, 1812 pitting Ney's French 3rd Corps against Tuchkov Russian 3rd Corps. The scenario was not an exact recreation of the historical battle.
There were 4 players to a side. Each player commanded one or two brigades of infantry or cavalry. Most players also held a senior command position. (Division or Corps Command) Senior positions were assigned so that no player ever issued orders to another command under his control. Each side began the battle with a vanguard consisting of a brigade of infantry and cavalry on the field. Each sides remaining troops would enter the field in column of route, during the first few segments of the scenario. One of the liberties the Corps commanders were given was choice as to which road the off-board commands would arrive on the field.
The forces on the battlefield were deployed for the 10:00AM segment. Orders were pre-written on all command sheets (brigade, Division and Corps) for 9:50AM, so all commands would have operating orders for the start of the game. Division and Corps commanders were given their current intelligence reports by which they could begin issuing new orders and messages up and down the chain of command.
The scenario required the Russians to prevent the French from controlling two of the three roads on their side of the field. The French had to aggressively capture the ground held by their counterparts. The terrain presented a number of defensive positions for the Russians to choose from. Aside from the troops already on the field (who were nearly engaged), both sides were at liberty to develop any plan of action, though commanders were cautioned to allow adequate room for deployment and appreciate the time necessary to issue orders to distant commands.
The following commands were involved in the engagement:
Division Friant
Division (task Force) Huard
CIC Tuchkov
Division Doctorov
Division Neverovsky These were the standing orders under which the Corps commanders were operating at the start of the battle. The writer of the message and the time it was sent is referenced as is the receiver and it's arrival time:
Berthier (6:30AM) to Ney (7:00)
"Enemy formations have been detected on the Moscow road. Aggressively pursue the enemy and harass his withdrawal. The Emperor feels you should encounter light opposition as the enemy has abandoned Smolensk. Imperial H.Q. shall remain this day in Smolensk."
Barclay (6:00AM) to Tuchkov (6:30)
"The First Army's withdrawal has been delayed, so we must slow the French pursuit. Your Corps shall break off from the army column and march along the Moscow road towards the enemy pursuit, so to prevent incursions on the main body. Supporting troops will be made available as necessary, though we shall not offer a full battle at this time. Your Corps will act as rear guard once the army clears Gordinorva."
Corps commanders would write more detailed massages to their subordinates. Note that in our system orders can be challenged by opponents at any time and may also be scrupulously interpreted by the referee. Each player's command pack included copies of all messages sent and received between dawn and the scenario's start at 10:00AM. For example, the following message was at Tuchkov's headquarters for the Corps commander to respond to at the game's beginning:
Doctorov (9:10) to Tuchkov (9:30)
"Sir, Brigade Sievert's cavalry is deployed to support the flanks of the jager Brigade Dolstoy. Our outposts have encountered the lead elements of the enemy advance. The enemy cavalry is attempting to turn our right, as such, we are redeploying accordingly. General Dolstoy's jagers are deployed before the Tarnopol Estate and a French infantry column is approaching along the main central road."
Both Corps headquarters began the game off-board, so the Corps commanders had to write their 10AM orders via map, without studying the tabletop.
The Russian Plan:
The Russian commander elected to maintain a forward position around the W3 wood. The advanced guard would delay the French approach as long as possible. The main battle line, including all of the line infantry brigades, would advance forward, on the double, and deploy to hold a line extending from their right, in front of W2, to their left, on W5, and centered on the Tarnopol Estate and the Tarnopol Hill.
The French Plan:
The French plan of attack was to pin the Russians on their left, then as soon as their on-board infantry brigade deployed, launch an attack toward the jager position. These attacks were to attract enemy reserves to the Russian right and center. The decisive attacks would hit the Russian left, from the infantry Division Friant marching to the field. This force, supported by Corps reserve artillery, would turn the Russian left.
Initial Russian deployment:
The combat started at 10AM as both sides, incompletely deployed, came under visual contact. At that time the Russians had only a vanguard on the field that consisted of a brigade of jagers and a cavalry brigade. The brigade of jagers was in line on the center road (3 battalions in the 1st line and a 4th Batt. in column in the second line). Their right flank was resting on W3. On the opposite side of W3 on the north road, was a brigade of 8 squadrons deployed in 2 lines, supported by a horse battery. At that time, 2 infantry brigades of the Russian command entered the battlefield by the center road, [3] in columns of route.
At 10:10, the two last Russian infantry brigades entered by the right and left roads in columns of route to deploy upon command and advanced to their designated positions.
Initial French deployment:
General Huard had been given the command of a task force [4] consisting of a Cavalry brigade (9 squadrons) under Jacquinot and of Grandeau's infantry brigade (5 battalions). At 10AM, the French cavalry brigade was in column of route advancing on the north road from Vinkovo and deployed on 3 successive lines each of 3 squadrons. Grandeau's brigade, also in column of route, on the center road, began to deploy on two lines of columns of Divisions at deploying distances (3 battalions in the 1st line and 2 on the second line). One of Friant's brigades entered at 10:00AM on the south road, his second brigade would enter at 10:10 on the central road.
The French advanced upon the Russian forward position with Brigade Grandeau arriving at (line 1) on our map at 10:20. On the northern flank, each side was eager to come to hand and the first cavalry charge was launched at 10:30. After a brief 10 minute combat, the first 3 French squadrons were routed by 4 Russian squadrons. [5] This was a bad beginning for the French. The Russian cavalry withdrew and reformed behind its 2nd line as more French cavalry was prepared to renew the offensive.
Brigade Grandeau continued its advance on the center road. By 10:40, Grandeau was on a (line 2), some 600 yards from the Russian jagers and deployed into line, unlimbering his artillery to prepare the enemy for the pending assault. On the east and west horizons, march columns approached the battlefield.
At 10:50, a new cavalry clash ensued on the same spot as the first and this time, the French were victorious (minor defeat in a 10 minute combat). The Russians withdrew to reform on their second line. Little more needs to be said about the cavalry action on the northern side of the field. With the initial rout, the French horsemen were not strong enough to gain ground on their opponents. Inconsequential light cavalry actions continued in this front the remainder of the day.
Around this time, commander Grandeau became tentative, choosing to bombard the Russian jagers without engaging. This was a fine strategy as the jagers had no artillery to respond with. However by not advancing, this brigade was now occupying the ground Division Friant had to deploy upon and advance through to achieve his Division's objectives. This delay gave the Russians time to deploy their line infantry brigades on their selected positions.
Division Doctorov anchored Russian right with a brigade occupying the Wood 2 Hill, it's second brigade was deployed to the left-of-center, with its left anchored on the Tarnopol Estate. Division Neverovsky elected to interpret his CIC's orders as aggressive ones and elected to deploy portions of his Division further forward. Brigade Miravich deployed in and around the Tarnopol Estate with one regiment sent aggressively forward to occupy the north and south ends of the ridge line west of the estate. The final line brigade deployed on the south side of the Tarnopol Estate and across the south road.
By 11AM, the French second Division under Friant which had entered by the south and central roads in columns of route, had deployed each brigade in columns of Divisions at deploying distances on 2 lines. By this time, Friant had reached line 3, and continued his advance. Friant's orders were to head for the Tarnopol crossroad with his right brigade and the estate with his left.
At 11:10AM the Russian Jagers, under increasing pressure and suffering casualties, withdrew behind the Russian main battle line. They did so, only after requesting and having received, the order to do so at 11:00. The jagers became the Russian reserve, deployed behind and to the right of the Tarnopol Hill.
At 11:10, the French and the Russians forces on the southern front were advancing from their respective positions upon the ridge west of the estate. Two encounter engagements took place on the north and south ends of the ridge. In both engagements, the isolated Russian battalions were at a significant disadvantage. The southern action lasted 10 minutes. The north battle lasted 30 minutes. Both Russian battalions withdrew toward their parent brigade to reorganize behind the estate.
At 11:30, a single French battalion from Grandeau's Brigade, charged a Russian battery that had taken position near the estate. The battery fired canister and took refuge in the estate while the infantry in that Estate opened fire on the French battalion. The French tried to assault the Estate but after a brief attempt suffered a major defeat in doing so. With this defeat the French elected to bombard the estate. By noon it was ablaze and the Russians evacuated in haste. Half of the French infantry (part Grandeau, part Friant) and 3/5 of their artillery was tied up via their orders to secure the estate.
Friant's right brigade (Lesuire) was finally in position to engage the far left of the Russian line. At 11:40, a brief close combat (10 minutes) developed in which the Russians were defeated. They withdrew to reform on a (line 4) with their left flank on the W5 wood. Brigade Lesuire continued his advance on the southern flank.
At 11:40, Brigade Grandeau made it's first significant effort in the center and engaged part of the Russian line North of the estate and inflicted a minor defeat (10 minute combat). The disordered French did not pursue, as they found themselves in a precarious situation for the Russians on the W2 Hill posed a serious threat to their left flank. [6]
At noon, the Russian jagers launched a counterattack in the center, north of the estate. Also at noon, the French launched another attack on the south road. The Russian CIC committed his only reserve unnecessarily to the center because his subordinate failed to inform him of the dire threat to his left. Had we continued this could have been decisive, unfortunately we were out of time.
Both sides fought a very good battle and made very few tactical mistakes. The Russians played very conservatively by deploying in a central position and by quickly withdrawing their jagers before Grandeau could get at them, hence forming a much needed reserve. The French could have probably ignored the estate and applied greater pressure on the Russian southern flank, but that is a matter of personal judgment. The French would have probably won the battle as they were in a position to outflank the Russian left by the south flank with two brigades (10 battalions) and could not be opposed by sufficient Russian forces.
All Corps and Division commanders commented, that they had very little control of the combat, due to the time delays involved in changing orders the fact that someone else had written your orders. [7] Once players warmed up to sending orders and messages, the papers were flying around the table. At one point, I had 6 Russian messages in hand all in route to various commanders. The Russians stayed in better communication with each other and this was one reason the Russians had the better of the day. It was a successful test, the responses and comments we received from the players were encouraging. A very small step was made in educating the masses as to the difference between wargaming and historical simulation. Vive la Difference!
French:
(a) One provisional task force under Huard (called a Division in the text) consisting of:
1 Light cavalry brigade: 9 squadrons, 1 horse artillery battery and 1 infantry brigade with 5 battalions, 1 6-pdr foot battery
(b) 1 Division consisting of 2 brigades each with 6 battalions. Total 12 battalions, plus 1 6-pdr foot battery and 1 6-pdr horse battery.
(c)Artillery Reserve: 1 12-pdr batteries.
So, the French had a total of 17 battalions at 720 men each.
Russians:
1 Light cavalry brigade: 8 squadrons, 1 horse artillery battery
The Russian infantry consisted of 2 Divisions (total 20 battalions) one consisting of 3 brigades: 1 brigade of Jagers (4 battalions) 2 infantry brigades each of 2 regiments at 2 battalions each (4 battalions per brigade) total for the Division: 12 battalions. The second Division consisted only of
2 infantry brigades each of 2 regiments at 2 battalions each (4 battalions per brigade) total for the Division: 8 battalions.
Each Division was supported by 1 6-pdr battery and 1 12-pdr battery. (Each Russian battery includes 8 guns and 4 Licornes.)
Basically the Russians had 20 battalions at 600 men each.
This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web.The Scenario
French III Corps: CIC Ney (12 Lb res)
Brigade Lesuire (inf)
Brigade Desailly (inf)Brigade Grandeau (inf)
Brigade Jacquinot (cav)Russian III Corps:
Brigade Sievert (cav)
Brigade Libovich (inf)
Brigade Olsufiew (inf)Brigade Dolstoy (jagers)
Brigade Miravich (inf)
Brigade Stranovski (inf)Both Sides Initial Plans:
Deployments
The First Combats:
The Battle
Conclusions:
Notes:
[1] This was partially our fault, since we forgot to tell the French cavalry commander that he could deploy his cavalry on 2 ranks of equal force (or place 6 squadrons on the first line and only 3 in the second line) or detach 1 squadron from a regiment to the 1st line, etc.
[2] That point alone brings the develoment of a battle to a realistic evolution. A brigadier (and/or a Division commander) usually can not change his orders to take advantage of an event he is witnesssing because of the famous helicopter effect. Such a commander is simply bound by his orders and that alone is almost suppressing the helicopter effect, hence injecting realism in the development of a battle. Remember commanders in the field had very little controls. With many conventional rules (of course there are exceptions) wargamers usually have immense control.
[3] The Russian commander had the choice of entering his command on either one of the 3 roads. His choice was to have his first two brigades available enter by the middle road to achieve a central position.
[4] That Task force is called Huard's Division thereafter.
[5] Of course, a senior commander can take command of a critical sector but he can not be everywhere on the battlefield and in order to intervene directly, he must be aware of the situation in that sector and not move there in response to the helicopter effect!
[6] Brigade Grandeau had suffered from artillery fire by the northern half of the Russian battle line and was partially engaged against the estate.
[7] However, we must point out that the time delays involved were not greater than the time delays involved on the battlefield. In addition a Division commander could shorten a critical order transmission time by getting in direct contact with his brigadier, etc. In this game we did not penalize the Russians with a slower order transmission speed.
<3>Forces involved:
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