Infantry Deployments in Woods

INQUIRY BY KENNETH R. HAYNES JR.

There are two topics that are rarely addressed in discussions of eighteenth to nineteenth century tactics. Perhaps drill books of the period ignore them as far as I can tell.

(1) What were the positions of battalion and company officers in a column of route? The flags and drums?

(2) How could the regular companies of a battalion drawn up in close order, two or three men deep, advance through a body of woods and engage an enemy therein?

Many battles of the eighteenth to nineteenth centuries were fought in broken wooded terrain. With the exception of one very general article on this subject by Christopher Duffy, I have never seen the subject addressed. Even Brent Nosworthy's excellent Anatomy of Victory has nothing.

The British army deployed from an open order into little company columns called "double Indian files." Whether this column then deployed into an open order two or four deep line for combat purposes is beyond me. Several men from the wing sections of each company could have been thrown forward 20-30 yards as skirmishers.

Napoleonic armies in close order, shoulder to shoulder, could have opened ranks, then the men count off in threes. The ones became the pivot men as number two and three wheeled behind him. The three ranks would now be tripled to nine plus the file closer rank in the rear. This "wheeling by threes" is how I believe battalions in the War of the Spanish Succession prepared for advancing into woods. Each file would have some four to five feet between each other, ample room for winding a file of nine men between trees with minimal interference to one's neighboring files.

If a prolonged woods fight was inevitable, as at Abensberg in 1809, battalion commanders may have doubled or tripled their unit frontages before entering a forest. One section from each company could have been thrown forward "in great bands," while the other section followed as a reserve in loose files described above. As the drill books describe none of this (as far as I am aware) I suspect divisional commanders left such details to the judgment of regimental commanders. Does anyone have any better ideas or concrete knowledge?

On covering infantry in Woods:

EE&L has previously covered the subject of infantry in woods in several issues. For instance, see EE&L #2, A comparison of French and Prussian Tactics During the Campaign of 1806-07, and Some Comments on French Tactics at the Battalion and Company Level.

Comments on the statement that many battles of the eighteenth to nineteenth centuries were fought in broken wooden terrain:

In continental Europe, a relatively small number of battles were fought in broken, wooden terrain during the pertinent period of linear warfare preceding [2] the Wars of the French Revolution and the Empire. (The wars in North America were a different story.) Most of the major battles of the so-called linear period preceding our period of interest were fought on open ground. The reason is simple. The strict drill and training of the line infantry limited warfare almost exclusively to battles in open country.

With the Wars of the French Revolution and the Empire (the Napoleonic era hereafter), we see an increase in the frequency of battles in wooded terrain. However, during that period none of the major battles were fought in wooded areas with a few exceptions, mainly during the Campaign of Poland in 1807 (Golymin) and during the early part of the Campaign of 1809 in Bavaria (Thann, Abensberg, etc.).

After the Napoleonic Wars, the incidence of such fighting increased but that is beyond our scope here.

Question 3, On infantry in woods:

A key and critical point is the kind of woods we are talking about. Very few accounts, if any, mention the type of woods in which infantry operated, and yet that is very important. Also important is the time of the year in which troops were engaged in woods. During the winter or early spring, the woods were denuded of leaves which greatly increased visibility and the possibility of maintaining better control.

There are some very open woods with very light underbrush. Obviously, that kind of wood does not present any major problem for troops operating in it, at least in some kind of column formation and perhaps open order.

As soon as infantry entered denser woods (differences not only in the density of the trees themselves but also underbrush density), it was simply impossible to maintain the rigid shoulder-to-shoulder order of the line or column. The infantry unit had to open up. The critical point was that despite all the efforts of the officers and NCOs, infantry entering denser woods experienced a loss of control that was incompatible with the rigid drill of the Frederician linear school that still prevailed in most armies during the early Wars of the French Revolution and of the early Napoleonic period. In addition, rank and file training did not cover that type of situation resulting in further confusion. Hence, standard infantry maneuvering in woods was impossible.

So, who fought in denser woods? For all practical purposes, the fighting here was left to the light troops. Light troops had been raised primarily to be used for the "small wars" but occasionally found themselves forced to fight on the battlefield.

Light troops [3] in woods fought in open order or as skirmishers. One of the most celebrated of such events took place as early as the Battle of Fontenoy where the French Arquebusiers de Grassin in the woods of Barry faced and held off a much larger Anglo-Hanoverian force. [4]

Brent Nosworthy in Anatomy of Victory, pp.210 to 216, covers very well the genesis of light troops in the French and Austrian army. Nosworthy continues with the practical usage of light troops in the French Army during the Seven Years War and lists pertinent points which are quite enlightening on the use of skirmishers in woods, etc. For instance, on page 341 we find that: "Skirmishers started to be used more and more frequently during the War of the Austrian Succession. Independent Light corps were deployed in forests where they would sometimes fight a la debandade (the entire corps fighting as skirmishers)." We find that the formations used by the French Light Infantry during the Seven Years War were very similar to formations and tactics currently used by the French Light (and Line) infantry during the Napoleonic era.

The fact that troops were disordered as soon as they entered denser woods is well represented by most miniature wargame rules, which automatically consider troops entering woods in open order. The French unofficial Regulation of 1798 for light troops sanctions that point and even goes a step further. It mentions that the third rank was useless for troops in open or skirmish order and acknowledges the need for infantry coming out of a woods to reform.

In all the Continental armies, with the notable exception of the Russians, light infantrymen in skirmish order always operated in pairs. That is documented in the source given above as well as by Davout's instructions dated 16 October 1811 concerning skirmishers and partially reproduced in George Nafziger's Napoleon's Invasion of Russia (pp. 24-26).

It was not very different from the tactics of light troops during the linear period. Consequently, during the Napoleonic era, infantry operating in denser woods were in substance a form of skirmisher, i.e., fighting in open order a la debandade. In many instances, the French deployed entire battalions-known as Tirailleurs en grande bandes-in open order [5] but these battalions were not in dressed lines or in columns (although there are some instance of infantry moving through woods in columns).

The French did not hesitate to commit their Line regiments in woods when circumstances required, and, on occasion, entire line battalions and regiments were completely deployed in open order. This employment was beyond the ability of most other Continental Line Infantry in the early part of the Wars of the French Revolution and of the Empire.

How did French infantry operate in woods? The Journal du 3eme Corps, pp. 137-138, provides us with several good examples. One of the best took place during the Battle of Golymin (25 December l807):

"....During the time the cavalry deployed and moved forward, while the Russian cavalry was retreating toward Golymin and the Russian infantry was preparing to defend the woods in the front of the village, the 2nd battalion of the 13th Leger, the 13th and 30th regiments of the Line were formed in battalion columns [probably in columns of divisions at deploying distances, JAL], the second brigade under General d'Honnieres following.... Around 3.30, the 1st brigade having been formed, General Morand directed the columns to attack the Golymin woods. The voltigeurs took post ahead of the columns which were then deployed in echelons by divisions to follow the voltigeurs into the woods. The enemy made a strong resistance. It ended discarding their knapsacks and charged with the bayonet, but the fire and the audacity of the voltigeurs and the battalions forced them to abandon the woods leaving behind a great number of dead and 4,000 knapsacks.

The Marshal seeing the enemy withdrawing on his right, ordered General d'Honnieres to turn the woods and to advance on the road from Golymin to Pulstusk. As night was falling, to avoid any useless deadly encounter, General Morand's troops took position on the edges of the woods within musket range of the road from Golymin to Pultusk, hence denying it to the enemy; the dragoons were placed behind in reserve...."

The above is very interesting since it gives us one of the rare examples describing the formation of an entire French brigade attacking a wood. The voltigeurs were deployed ahead and the columns were deployed in echelons of divisions [6] (i.e., two companies frontage) prior to their entrance into the woods, probably because a frontage of two companies was all that could be well controlled in woods. Note that:

(1) the woods were probably not very dense and denuded of leaves (the operation was done on 25 December);

(2) the deployment in echelon allowed the combined fire of the skirmishers and the battalions to take place. That fire and the audacity of the voltigeurs and of the other companies of the battalions repulsed the Russians from the woods.

According to Zvegintsov, [7] the Golymin woods was initially occupied by Major-General Scherbatov and the Kostromvski Musketeer regiment and four guns, but, in our opinion, were likely reinforced, which would account for the 4,000 knapsacks captured by Morand's troops.

Another example can be found in the Journal du 3eme Corps, p. 251. It is the report of the temporary commander of the 33rd of the Line (Chef de bataillon Thoulouze) to his Division commander General Friant on the actions of that regiment during the Battle of Golymin. The translation of the pertinent part of the report follows:

"...the regiment received the order to move on the right of the enemy... and when there quickly sending the voltigeurs, grenadiers and the 1st company of fusiliers, as ordered by General Lochet, as tirailleurs in the woods to dislodge the enemy. These four companies were commanded by the commander of the 1st battalion. The regiment kept moving on the enemy's right and was able to cut off its line of retreat by crossing over a wood at the ready. The enemy could only escape because of the night and the wooded terrain. The four companies deployed as tirailleurs, taking advantage of its withdrawal, fell on the enemy, captured three guns, killing gunners, taking prisoners and continued the pursuit until 8 p.m. The regiment fell back, deployed into line in front of the village and remained there...."

A similar situation developed at Auerstadt, where General de Brigade Kister detached four infantry companies, deployed in skirmish order, under a Engineer captain to clear the woods on the extreme right of Spielberg.

Note that Davout's infantry also deployed entire regiments and brigades of line infantry during the Ratisbon campaign in 1809 [8] in a similar fashion.

During the early Napoleonic period, most Continental line troops avoided combat in woods with the exception of the French and the Russians. The extreme to which avoiding combat in woods was taken was reflected in the Prussian army of 1806, which avoided localities because the line infantry could not maintain order there. During the Campaign of 1806, the Prussians left the occupation of and fighting in woods and similar localities to their Prussian light troops [9] (Schutzen, Jagers and the like) for all practical purposes.

The Austrians did not want to lose control of their line troops. For the most part, they preferred to avoid woods and any broken terrain which could only disturb the alignment of their line or highly regulated deployments. Hence, they chose to fight whenever possible in open country with their line troops leaving the fighting in woods to their light troops. We'll cover a few examples from the 1809 campaign in the near future.

Our information presented so far is rather sketchy and incomplete. Besides the article by Christopher Duffy mentioned above, there are some useful referenxces to infantry combat in woods. Very few authors bother to explain how infantry was handled in woods. So we have no choice but to make do with what we have.

In a future issue, we'll have the pleasure to present a lengthy article, "Skirmisher Tactics in the Napoleonic Wars," authored by George Nafziger which covers the skirmishing tactics of the main antagonists. This article will include the training of Russians Jaegers to fight in woods and some official regulations.

However, the fact remains that infantry in denser woods in summertime was used in open order and was unable to perform complicated evolutions. Apparently, most authors assume that everyone knows and agrees that most battles were fought on open ground. But it should not be surprising as many authors have either very little or no knowledge of tactics, a subject they consider irrelevant, and, consequently, do not bother with battlefield tactics.

Footnotes

[2] It is difficult to understand what took place during the Napoleonic period without a prior knowledge of the basic tactics of the linear period.
[3] EE&L #, p.47.
[4] Anatomy of Victory, p. 214.
[5] See Bressonet's Conclusions in EE&L #2.
[6] We have translated the original French text which is not in agreement on several points with Colonel H.C.B. Roger's interpretation of that text provided on p. 169 of his Napoleon's Army (translation errors are easy to make) which reads:

The cavalry were closely followed by the 1st brigade of Morand's 1st Division, consisting of the 2nd battalion 13th Regiment, the 17th Regiment, and the 30th Regiment. Behind the 1st brigade came the 2nd Brigade under General d'Honnieres. At about 3:30 p.m. the 1st brigade formed into battalion columns, each battalion in column of companies.

Morand directed the brigade to attack the Golymin Wood. The skirmishers took post ahead of the columns which were now formed of double companies to follow the skirmishers through the wood. The enemy made a strong resistance, and finally discarded their knapsacks (a Russian habit) to charge with the bayonet. But the fire of the French columns and the activities of the skirmishers forced them to abandon the woods.

There are three very pertinent points of disagreement:

(1) the French text (reproduced below) does not mention that the battalions were formed in column of companies but simply in column of battalion (see our translation above) which could be a column of companies, divisions or attack. Very likely, the brigade was formed in columns of divisions at deploying distances which would explain what follows.

(2) At 3:30, the French battalions were no longer in columns but deployed (disposees en echelons par divisions) in echelon per division (each division consisting of two companies, which would make four divisions of two companies each) with the skirmishers ahead to follow the skirmishers in the woods.

(3) It is not the fire of the French columns and the activity of the skirmishers that forced the Russians out of the woods but (lefeu et l'audace des tirailleurs et des bataillons) the fire and the audacity of the skirmishers and of the battalions.

The pertinent French text reads: Pendant que la cavalerie se formait et se portait en avant, pendant que la cavalerie ennemie se retirait sur Golymin et que l'infantrie russe se preparait a de'fendre les bois qui sont en avant du village, le 2eme bataillon du 13e, le 17eet le 30e regiments, seformaient en colonne par bataillons, la 2e brigade sous les ordres du general d'Honnieres suivait.... Vers trois heurs et demie, la lre brigade etant formee, le general Morand en dirigea les colonnes pour attaquer le bois de Golymin. Les voltigeurs prirent la tete des colonnes quifurent alors disposees en echelons par divisions pour suivre les voltigeurs a travers les bois.... L'ennemifit une vive resistance. 11 finit par jeter ses sacs pour charger a la baionnette, mais lefeu et l'audace des tirailleurs leforcerent d'abandonner le bois....

I would like to point out that the translation of a military text is not the easiest thing to do and errors are easy to make [JAL].
[7] Zvegintsov gives a very sketchy account of the battle.
[8] For a good account of that campaign we strongly recommend Arnold's Crisis on the Danube.
[9] See EE&L# 2 pages 27 to 30. See also in EE&L #2, "A Comparison of French and Prussian Tactics During the Campaign of 1806-07 According to Bressonet" and EE&L# 5 Saalfeld in which the Prussian Jagers (i.e., light infantry) were the only infantry occupying the woods south of Saalfeld. The Prussians reforms after 1806 managed to change the thinking about skirmishers, which were used extensively by the Prussians in 1812 and in later years.

Bibliography

Davout, General (nephew of the Marshal) Operations du 3e Corps, 1806-1807, Calmann Levy, Paris. 1896.
Arnold, James, Crisis on the Danube, Paragon House, New York, 1990.
French Reglement de 1791. French unofficial Regulation of 1798 for Light Troops.
Nosworthy, Brent, The Anatomy of Victory, Hippocrene Books, N.Y.,1990.
Nafziger, George F., Napoleon's Invasion of Russia, Presidio Press, Novato, CA 1988.
Nafziger, George F., "Skirmisher Tactics in the Napoleonic Wars," to be published in a future issue of EE&L.
Regnault, General Jean, Les aigles imperlales.
Bukhari, Emir, French Napoleonic Line Infantry, Almark Publishing Co. 1973.
Rogers, Col. H.C.B., Napoleon 's Army, Hippocrene Books, New York, 1974.
Petre, F. Loraine Petre, Napoleon's Campaign in Poland 1806-7, Bodley Head, 1907.
Zvegintsov, V.V ., L 'Armee Russe, Paris
Paret, Peter, Yorck and the Era of Prussian Reforms, Princeton, 1966
Quimby, Robert S., The Background of the Napoleonic Warfare, New York,1957.