French dragoons have been qualified by many English language historians[1] as being neither good infantry nor cavalry. Yet, historical accounts abound with many instances in which they performed their dismounted function as well as their mounted duties. One of the brilliant actions performed by the Dragoons in a dismounted function was the little known seizure and holding of the bridges at Namur after the battle of Waterloo by a Division of Grouchy's dragoons.
The following wargame was inspired by Grouchy's Dragoons at Namur. In addition, the game was designed to offer both sides with all the tactical options offered to Napoleonic generals.
by the EE&L Staff
The period of this scenario can be any time during the Napoleonic period in which a brigade or Division of French Dragoons was available to the French High Command. Our game takes place in 1809 simply because we had the troops of that period handy and one of us had finished painting the dragoon regiments which were part of the Army of Italy in 1809. Hence the following plot....
The French high command was informed that the Austrians intended to pass an important wagon train through the town of Lauterburg on the River Lauter. It was decided to intercept the convoy and at the very least to prevent it from crossing the river by simply blowing up the stone bridge in that town. But first that town had to be captured and held until a ton of blackpowder could be set to blow the bridge.
So, quickly, an ad hoc formation was formed with two brigades of infantry taken from Massena's Corps and a Division of Dragoons from the Army of Italy and placed under the command of our own General Bill Jessop.
Jessop's main command arrived on the would-be battlefield from the east, by the roads parallel to the River Lauter, atributary of the Danube, in columns of route in the following order:
(1) Pajol's cavalry (eight squadrons) followed a parallel road on the north side of the river and at 7:00 a.m. had reached a location on the road from Strausshausen to Manshausen, as shown on the map, between the Mertzwald and the Kirchenhugel. General Cosson's infantry was following Pajol's cavalry in columns of route. The French right wing was under the command of General Huard de laCourte-Cuisse.
(2) Colbert's cavalry (nine squadrons) and General Ledru's infantry were deployed on the north side of the river, south of the Mertzwald. The light cavalry was ahead with one regiment just west of Klein Lauterburg. This ad hoc Division was under the command of Claparede.
(3) On the road from Strausshausen to Klein Lauterburg, came St. Germain's Dragoon Division with the first regiment approaching the Klein Lauterburg bridge. It is also along this route that the powder wagons would arrive hours later.
At 7:00 a.m., cavalry patrols revealed to Jessop that the Austrian train, escorted by cavalry and infantry, was progressing toward Klein Muhlebach obviously on the way to Lauterburg by the northern road and had reached Manshausen. A second strong Austrian column apparently comprising a significant force of all three arms was also progressing toward Lauterburg by the road from KleinMulhebach to Lauterburg.
Jessop had strict orders to occupy Lauterburg with St.Germain's Dragoons and hold it until a small wagon train with acompany of sappers could reach that town with the necessary powder.[2]. Thus, he issued his orders accordingly. Colbert's cavalry would send six squadrons a head of the dragoons toward Lauterburg and one regiment (three squadrons) toward the gap between the Gratzwald and Schonwald. Claparede's infantry would follow by passing through the gap between the Klein Lauterburgwald and the Mohrwald. Huard's formations would protect the French right and deploy between the Mertz Farm and the Kirchenhugel.
At 7:00 a.m., the Austrian cavalry patrols reported that they had spotted numerous French cavalry supported by infantry on the road from Strausshausen to Klein Lauterburg (with light cavalry already across the river) and a second mixed force on the road from Strausshausen to Manshausen. So, FML Karecki immediately issued his orders for the day. FML von Gilbert would move with his command toward the Mertz Farmand Klein Lauterburg to occupy as much French attention as possible, while the train (directly escorted by a single battalion) and the balance of FML Karecki's command would move toward Lauterburg.
The action began at 7:00 a.m. Initially, both sides were very aggressive. FML von Gilbert, relieved from the escort of the wagon train and savoring the offensive nature of his orders, decided to move his command through the gaps between the Schonwald, Marshausenwald and Kirchenwald. His cavalry moved between the former and his infantry between the latter gap.
The French right under General Huard laCourte-Cuisse, had been ordered to move toward Manshausen, prevent enemy access to Klein Lauterburg and support the right flank of Claparedes command. At 7:10, both side's advances resulted in a light cavalry clash between two Austrian squadrons and three French. After a short combat (10 minutes) the Austrians were pushed back and both sides deployed their commands on this eastern part of the battlefield.
General Colbert was not inactive with his light Cavalry, and as ordered moved a regiment (three squadrons) toward the gap between the Schonwald and the Gratzwald and, at 7:20, found it occupied by some Austrian infantry deployed on a line of divisionmasses.
The Austrian cavalry under the direct command of FML Karecki moved forward on the road from Klein Muhlebach to Lauterburg. At 7:20, that command reached point (A) between the Gratzwald and the Gratz Mill and spotted St.Germain's Dragoon Division, which had moved in columns of route on the road to Lauterburg and was by now close to that town. Karecki also spotted Colbert's two other Light cavalry regiments. Karecki hesitated to charge the numerous French cavalry with his sixteen squadrons of light cavalry.
(What Karecki did not know was that the dragoons had the imperative order too ccupy Lauterburg and its critical bridge, until relieved.)
So, the stage for the battle was now set.
At 7.30 a.m., on the southern battlefield, St.Germain deployed a regiment of dragoons and his horse battery in front of Lauterburg to protect the occupation of that town by his other three regiments which were promptly dismounted and dispersed to assure the defense of the town. The French Light cavalry (six squadrons) deployed on a line marked as (F1) on the map at a respectful distance from the Austrian cavalry battery. The Austrian cavalry did the same, apparently awaiting their supporting light infantry brigade to come up. A battalion of French infantry entered the Gratzwald.
At about the same time, on the east side of the battlefield, the French had deployed in line, north and east of the Mertzwald about a thousand yards from the Austrian line which now included infantry deployed on two lines in front of the Manshausenwald.
At 7:40, von Gilbert launched an attack in the east with two battalions (one of Grenz and one of Vienna Volunteers). That attack came under the fire of two French artillery batteries and the Austrians suffered heavy casualties which did not deter them from putting up a hard fight against the French. But the French had only suffered long range artillery fire and were much less disorganized than the Austrian attackers. After a 20-minute firefight the Austrians were routed. The Austrian second line held and the French kept their position.
At 8:10, three battalions of French (General Ledru's) infantry supported by an artillery battery, deployed in the gap between the Klein Lauterburgwald and the Gratzwald. In the center the Austrian line infantry brigade, still in divisionmasses, continued its slow advanced toward Ledru's French line, pushing back the harassing French cavalry regiment. The French light cavalry withdrew at 8:40 a.m. allowing the Austrians to properly deploy and position their brigade artillery battery and their artillery reserve of two 12-pdr batteries. To the east, the French occupied the Mertz farm with a battalion of infantry.
At 8:30 Cosson deployed a battalion and an artillery battery on the little hill between the Mertz Farm and the Klein Lauterburgwald and placed two cavalry regiments in that gap. Artillery fire was exchanged between the French and the Austrians which concentrated the fire of the two 12-pdr batteries on the Farm. In the south, two battalions of Austrian Landwehr infantry crossed over the GratzMill stream and moved toward the non-fordable River Lauter.
At 9:00 a.m. after bombarding the MertzFarm, two battalions of Austrian infantry deployed in line, launched an assault against that farm. But as soon as these two battalions came within musket range of the farm, two squadrons of French cavalry that had been hiding behind the small hill charged them and sabered one of the unfortunate battalions which, surprised at that short range, was unable to form square. That battalion's rout was pursued for a short distance by the victorious squadrons, the infantry battalion losing in the process some 30% of its effectives. The other battalion succeeded in entering the farm, but after a fierce 30-minute struggle was also routed.
From the first saber clash through 9:30, the Austrians had failed to make any impression any where with the exception of a steady advance in the center. The center advance (which contained the Austrian main infantry contingent) was now stalled, as any further push toward Lauterberg would be flanked by the French battalionin the Gratzwald and the French combined force south of the Mertz farm.
At 9:30 an event of some importance took place, the French wagon train with the powder necessary to blow up the bridge at Lauterburg had reached Stausshausen and was expected to reach Lauterberg at 11:00 a.m.
At 9:40, FML Karecki, apparently reassured that the three French Dragoon regiments had dismounted to occupy Lauterburg and were out of the way, found himself strong enough and decided to charge with ten of his sixteen squadrons, while another lone squadron attacked the French horse battery that had been deployed south of the Gratzwald. Colbert immediately counter charged with his nine squadrons, the lone mounted Dragoon regiment staying in reserve.
The Austrian cavalry, which had been badly disorganized by the two French artillery batteries, was defeated (minor defeat). The single squadron attacking the French horse battery was badly disorganized by the short-range canister fire and could not complete its charge. The French cavalry, disorganized by the combat, did not pursue and withdrew through the intervals and reformed behind two battalions of line infantry supporting the position at (F1).
In the east, seeing that the French infantry had redeployed west, away from the Mertzwald line it previously occupied, FML Gilbert advanced his infantry forward at 9:50 a.m. At 10:20, a Grenz battalion entered that wood where it came in contact with a French battalion. After a 20-minute combat the French were expelled from that wood. So far, this was the first Austrian victory of the day.
At 10:10, finally the Austrian artillery was able to set the Mertz Farm afire and the French battalion occupying the farm complex, evacuated it and withdrew into Klein Lauterburg. That unfortunate battalion had suffered 50% casualties because of the steady Austrian artillery fire[3] and the combat with the Austrian infantry.
Was the French east flank crumbling?
Aside from artillery fire, nothing took place until 11:00 a.m. when FML Karecki was wounded and replaced by FML von Gilbert.
At 11:00 a.m., the French launched afresh battalion upon the Austrian Grenz battalion that had taken possession of the Mertzwald, and after a 20-minute combat, expelled it from the wood. The Grenz retreated behind the Kirchenhugel. At Lauterburg the French train of explosives had arrived.
At 11:10 in the south, the 2nd battalion of Grenz #5 Regiment moved in column of divisions to attack the Gratzwald and stopped about 300 yards from its objective. It was followed by the 1st battalion. The wood was occupied by a French battalion which immediately deployed on the edge of the wood. At 11:20, the Grenz deployed into a line and attacked the French. A lively fire fight ensued and after a 30-minute combat, the Grenz recoiled (minor defeat) to reform behind the Gratz hill.
Across the entire field, the French and Austrian artillery exchanged fire. The Austrian superiority in the center slowly silenced their French adversaries, but an aggressive coordinated assault toward Lauterburg was never ordered. At 11:20 French gunners gained some revenge, as a caisson, part of the Austrian battery in position to the south on the Gratz Hill, exploded destroying a gun and a howitzer.
At 11:50, the second Grenz battalion deployed into line and also attacked the Gratzwald and slowly pushed back the French battalion occupying the wood. After a 30-minute combat, the French were finally expelled from the wood.
But in the meantime, a significant and decisive event had taken place in Lauterburg. At 11:50 a.m., the Dragoons had started to move out the town and by 12:10 p.m. they had completed their evacuation. Then by 12:20, the French sappers blew up the Lauterburg bridge.
The French mission was completed and General Jessop decided to withdraw his command by the same way he had come.
The battle for the Lauterburg bridge started at 7:00 a.m. The Austrians did not achieve their objective of passing the wagon train over the Lauterburg bridge since the bridge was destroyed by the French at 12:20 p.m., hence effectively ending the battle.
The battle lasted some five hours. A quick look at the battlefield shows where the Austrians went wrong.
Their objective was to pass their wagon train over the bridge at Lauterburg. Yet, on their right flank, i.e., in the vicinity of the gap between the Gratz Hill, the Gratzwald, and Lauterburg we only find the cavalry (sixteen squadrons) and only two Grenz battalions and three Landwehr battalions supported by a single artillery battery. And this infantry was not engaged untill 11:10 a.m. when one Grenz battalion was committed to take the Gratzwald, an operation that was completed only at 12:20 p.m., after the bridge at Lauterburg had been blown up by the French.
As clearly shown on the map, the bulk of the regular Austrian infantry (six battalions among which was IR #4, the famous Deutschmaster Regiment) as well as the bulk of the artillery (three batteries, among which were two 12pdr. batteries) were deployed in the gap between the Gratzwald and the Mertz Farm. Von Gilbert's force - a sizable force of five battalions and eight squadrons - was active between Schonwald and the Kirchenhugel and pressured the French right.
It is rather obvious that the Austrian deployment was flawed from the beginning and that the Austrian commander misunderstood his objective. An Austrian victory depended on the quick seizure of the bridge and of the town of Lauterburg or at least the ground in front of Lauterburg (i.e., between that town and the Gratzwald) to prevent the French from occupying it. (It was obvious that the occupation of the Gratzwald woods - now a key position- by the Austrians would have been imperative.)
The Austrian initial deployment was geared for that by the game designer. He had placed the sixteen squadrons of the Austrian right on the road from Klein Muhlebach to Lauterburg some 700 yards ahead of Klein Muhlebach. Behind that cavalry was Kottulinski's infantry brigade and the bulk of the artillery. On the immediate left of Klein Muhlebach was the light infantry consisting of five battalions of infantry (two battalions of Grenz with three Landwehr battalions) and a single 6pdr battery. That command could easily be deployed toward the gap between the Gratzwald and the Shonwald. Von Gilbert's initial mission had been to escort the train but was freed from that duty as it reached Manshausen.
The French had a serious deployment problem. The bulk of their force had to go across the Klein Lauterburg bridge and the difficult terrain around it. The Austrians were aware of that but did not take advantage of the situation.
There is little doubt that at 7:20 a.m. Karecki's initial decision not to charge the French cavalry with his sixteen squadronswas influenced by the presence of the Dragoons. But at 7:30, these dragoons (less a regiment) had entered Lauterburg and at that time the Austrians had sixteen squadrons facing ten French squadrons (six of light cavalry and four of Dragons) and in spite of that temporary superiority, the Austrian cavalry did not charge. Even if defeated, the Austrians would have gained the time for the six infantry battalions of Kottulinski's brigade to come up and occupy the ground between the Gratzwald and the Gratz Mill. During that time the two Grenz battalions would have been able to secure the Gratzwald which was a key position ignored by the Austrian commander.
In addition, the deployment of the other three batteries on that sector would have been a serious obstacle to the French. The result of the cavalry combat[4]. would have been secondary.
But Kottulinski's infantry was not there. Instead, it had been deployed in the gap between the Gratzwald and the Mertz Farm and was wasted against the Mertz Farm. Von Gilbert's force would have been sufficient to occupy that gap and still maintain pressure on the French right.
The combination of these two tactical errors doomed the Austrian chance for victory. They had lost their opportunity to concentrate their forces - to achieve superiority - in the critical sector in front of Lauterburg. In war, a lost opportunity is seldom rewarded by victory.
Unfortunately, besides their timely occupation of Lauterburg, the Dragoons were not involved in the battle.
(1) Von Gilbert's Force:
One Cavalry regiment, one 6-pdr cavalry battery, two Grenz battalions, three Vienna Volunteer Battalions, one 3-pdr battery, one Landwehr battalion to escort the train.
(2) von Karecki's main force:
Two cavalry regiments with sixteen squadrons, one 6-pdr cavalry battery, one light infantry brigade with two Grenz regiments, three Landwehr battalions, and one 3-pdr battery, and one infantry brigade (Kotulinski) with six battalions, one 6-pdr battery, and two 12-pdr batteries.
(1) North forces: General Huard de laCourte-Cuisse
Pajols' cavalry brigade: eight squadrons, one 6-pdr horse battery; Cosson's infantry brigade: six battalions, one 6-pdr foot battery.
(2) Center forces: General Claparede
Colbert's cavalry brigade: nine squadrons, one 6-pdr horse battery.
Ledru's infantry brigade: six battalions, one 8-pdr foot battery
(3) South forces: General St. Germain: four Dragoon regiments (sixteen squadrons), one 6-pdr horse battery.
River, Bridges, Wagon Train and Dragoons
The Battle for the Lauterburg Bridge
Discussion and criticism of the battle:
Austrian forces at Lauterburg
French forces at Lauterburg: C-i-C General Jessop
Notes
[1] See for instance Sir Charles OmanStudies in the Napoleonic Wars about the obscure action at Bukersdorf in February 1807 in which six freshly remounted Dragoon regiments on captured horses under General Milhaud were routed by a Russian Hussar regiment.
[2] The mining of the bridge would take a full hour and the wagon train with the powder was still far away and could not reach Lauterburg before 11:00 a.m. That train was un escorted with only a company of sappers to mine the bridge. The train could have easily been captured if the Austrians had sent a single squadron to scout the road from Strausshausen to Klein Lauterburg.
[3] The farm was bombarded for over an hour by two 12-pdr and one 6-pdr batteries and set afire by howitzer fire.
[4] At 7:30 a.m. the odds of that cavalry combat were heavily in favor of the Austrians.