During the night of October 7, 1806, eighteen boats manned by Royal Navy personnel rowed into the bay which fronted the French port city of Boulogne. Their mission was to test a new weapon against enemy invasion barges sitting in the harbor. This was the second such effort made against the port using the same weapon, the first attempt having been aborted in November of the prior year due to rough seas and high winds.
The armament used in this, the first successful service trial undertaken by the British, was the Congreve rocket. Two hundred were fired in thirty minutes, and within the first ten minutes of the initial barrage flames were observed ashore. [1]. Thus was the operational use of black powder rockets introduced into Western European warfare.
The creator of this revolutionary technology was Sir William Congreve, 2nd Baronet (1772-1828), an English gunnery officer and inventor serving in the Hanoverian Army but later assigned tothe British Artillery school in Woolwich.
Indian Rockets
Congreve had heard about the crude bamboo war rockets developed and used against his fellow countrymen by the Indian Hyder Ali Prince Mysore, and later his son Tippu Sultan. Employed en masse, these normally inaccurate tools of war became dramatically more effective as demonstrated in the battles at Seringapatam during 1792 and 1799. [2] In the last campaign, Tippu utilized a rocketcorps of 5,000 men launching thousands of missiles. Their effect was especially and keenly felt by the 33rd Regiment of Foot and its young colonel, a certain Arthur Wellesley. [3].
Inspired by the stories coming out of India, Congreve began to experiment privately with rockets. His own story of invention begins:
"In 1804 it first occurred to me that the projectile force of the rocket might be successfully employed, both afloat and ashore as a military engine, in many cases where the recoil of the exploding gunpowder made the use of artillery impossible." [4].
Soon after, Congreve began to buy rockets to be found on the London market, but discovered that their maximum range was no greater than 600 yards. This compared poorly to those used by the Indian natives which employed metal cylinders to contain the combustion powder. Although the hammered soft iron used in India was primitive, the bursting strength of the container of black powder was very high. The iron construction created a greater internal pressure, with a resultant thrust of the propulsion jet. Indian rockets had a optimal range of three-quarters of a mile. They were launched after lighting either by being hurled into the air or skimmed along hard, dry ground. [5].
Do-It-Yourself
Dissatisfied with the available projectiles found in Britain, Congreve invested his own money - "several hundred pounds" - in order to build his own rockets. The result was a flying bomb that could travel 1,500 yards. Congreve then applied to the Master General of the Ordnance Department (that Part of the British military which had exclusive control over artillery and engineers and conducted all arms researchand development) for permission to have some large rockets built at Woolwich.
With the government laboratories at Woolwich at his disposal, Congreve created a device 40-1/2" long with a stabilizing stick 16' in length which reached a range of 2,000 yards carrying a six pound explosive charge. [6] These rockets were made from layers of paper filled with an incendiary composition. [7]. As soon as he successfully test-fired his latest rocket, Congreve went to work standardizing its construction and improving production techniques.
In the spring of 1806, Congreve was producing a 32-pound missile ranging out to 3,000 yards. It had a sheet-iron case carrying a 7-pound charge of incendiary material. The metal rocket body was equipped on one side with two or three metal loops into which a 15' long guidestick was inserted and crimped firm. Launching was from collapsible A-frame ladders. In addition to aerial bombardment, they could and were often fired horizontally along the ground. [8].
After 1806, the paper bound heads were placed by thin sheet-iron cases, the largest being 8" in diameter and weighing three hundred weight. Incendiary-heads (or shells) were made out of cast iron cases with three or five holes drilled into them, and filled with combustible material and fuse holes loaded with black powder. The heads would normally hold 25 to 50 pounds of explosives; the medium pattern would carry round shot or shell, and the 24-pdr could be equipped to carry canister which burst in the air over the target. [9].
A natural development of rocket research produced other rocket types. Signal-rockets and parachute-flares which could illuminate an area for up to ten minutes were designed and used to good effect on sea and land. Even shoulder-fired rockets were attempted, but the end of theNapoleonic Wars caused a waning of interest in all types of rockets.
In the end, Congreve had developed a unique weapons system which bridged the gap between musketry and cannon fire. All along, Congreve had continued to improve his creation and expand its variety. By 1815 rockets fell into three classes:
Heavy: 8", 7", and 6" diameter headswith 24', 22', and 21' sticks respectively, used as incendiary or for explosives for long range (2,100 to 2,500 yards) attacks;
Medium: 42-pdrs, 32-pdrs and 24-pdrs and
Light: 18-pdrs, 12-pdrs, 12-pars and 6-pdrs.
The 32-pars being the lightest bombardment rocket and the heaviest field rocket.
Although rockets possessed many of the traits of artillery, they were free from the encumbrance of that weapon. Roads made no difference to its mobility, wherever a pack horse or infantry man could go, the rocket could go. Far less than the dozens of horses a normal artillery battery required (and the tons of oats and hay essential for feeding them )were needed by a rocket unit. Also, the weight of such an outfit's bombardment was considerable: four rounds a minute from each of the ten rocket brigade's launching frames was the norm undercombat conditions. Maximum ranges were from one-half to two miles, depending on the size of the rocket.
The first successful employment of Congreve rockets in war was carried out against the French port of Boulogne. The actual objective of the raid was the invasion barges located in the harbor, but these were not touched during the attack. What was hit, with great damage inflicted, was the town itself.
Fired too much to the left of the harbor, the British missiles passed over the ocean basin and struck houses and property on the water front and center
of the city. Fires from the rockets burned for over fifteen hours after the assault. Not long after this, Napoleon, impressed by the harm done by this new English weapon, offered a reward to any French inventor who could reproduce Congreve's weapon; none ever did. [10]
The next operation that saw the Congreve rocket in action took place at the bombardment of the Danish capital of Copenhagen, by the British. Here over 4,000 rockets (mostly 32-pdrs like those used at Boulogne the year before) rained down on the city and burned most of it to the ground. Two years later, in the bombardment of Flushing, again by theEnglish, such havoc was wrought by the rockets that the French commandant there, General Monnet, made a formal protest to the Master General of the Ordnance Department, Lord Chatham, against their future use. [11].
As effective as the Congreve rocketproved it self to be at Flushing, its supreme triumph was won in 1813 at the Battle of Leipzig. For what was to be the "Battle of the Nations" - the final struggle to free Germany from Napoleon's control -Austrian, Russian, Prussian and Swedish armies faced the French Emperor before the city of Leipzig for three days (16th - 19th) in October 1813. Among those troops serving with the Swedes was a contingent of British soldiers: one hussar regiment, one rocket troop and two horse artillery troops, under the command of General Waldmoden. [12].
The English rocket unit, under Captain Richard Bogue, had been attached to the Swedish Crown Prince Bernadotte's bodyguard with an understanding it could be used on days of battle more liberally than the rest of the force. It was composed of about 172 men and officers, used the 12-pdr rockets created in 1810 and carried 840 missiles, most of which were loaded on the men's personal mounts. [13].
Walmoden's force was detached to attack a French column under General Pecheux crossing the Elbe, at Gorda, on their way to Magdeburg, on October 16. Walmoden struck, being well supported by the rocket troop, which caused panic in the enemy ranks. Pecheux's men were routed off the field. [14].
On the 18th, Bogue's unit, designated as the 2nd Rocket Troop, and raised in 1813 [15] fought in front of the village of Paunsdorf, to the west of Leipzig. He was supporting with projectiles the advance of the Prussians on the village. His rockets so demoralized the French defenders that they fell back from the town, and after another barrage from his troop, they retreated further to the east.
As the French left the village, Bogue led in pursuit the dragoon squadron that was escorting his men and weapons, but was soon killed by musket fire. He was followed in command of the rocket troop by Lieutenant T. Fox Strangeways for the rest of the fight. The lieutenant so impressed Alexander with his handling of the rocket force, that the Czar awarded him the badge of the Order of St. Anne at the conclusion of the battle! [16].
As reports of the activities of the rockettroop filtered out of Germany, the Britishgovernment hurried rocket contingents toother major theaters of war - NorthAmerica and the Iberian Peninsula. Rocketunits were employed in many of theactions seen in the War of 1812 betweenthe young United States and the BritishEmpire: Lundy's Lane, North Point, FortMcHenry, and New Orleans, to name afew. One battle, at Bladensburg, Maryland(August 24, 1814), was a notable successstory in the use of Congreve rockets.
Landing from the Chesapeake Bay in August 1814, a force of 5,400 veteran British troops were directed to capture the American capital at Washington, D.C. Encountering 7,000 United States soldiers five miles from their objective, the English advance-guard of 1,500 opened the fight at Bladensburg with a bayonet charge supported by Lieutenant John Lawrence's rocket detachment, the only artillery support with the British during the first part of the battle. [17]
Mostly raw militia, the Americans were terrified at this strange new weapon, and their worst fears were confirmed when Lawrence was able to place a salvo of missiles directly on two United States regiments preparing to counter-attack the Redcoats. The American regiments "simply dissolved." They began "running to the rear, disbanded as if by some prearranged signal." [18]
During the second half of the battle, when the British came up against U.S.forces made of sterner stuff, the rocket detachment played no part in the eventual British victory due to its commander being shot down and put out of action.
Bladensburg was arguably the most potent use of Congreve rockets during the War of 1812, and after that example, a wave of fear about their possible uses wept every city in the United States.
Rocketeers and their equipment were also sent to join Wellington's army during his Peninsular campaigns, though little is known about their activities until the passage of the Adour in 1814.
A rocket detachment under a Captain Lane, made up of forty enlisted men and officers, did vital service in supporting Sir John Hope's crossing at the tidal mouth of the Adour River below the French city of Bayonne on February 23, 1814. [19]
The British bridgehead across the Adour was thinly held and awaiting reinforcements when it was approached by a very superior number of Frenchtroops preparing to attack. Lane's defensive rocket fire was so effective that it "smote the French column, and it [theFrench] fled amazed, and with a loss of thirty wounded." [20] Another account of this event states that the rockets "new to the enemy, happened to burst correctly in the head of the approaching column, and threw it into such disorder that the commanding officer ordered instant retreat....' [21]
On April 10, 1814, rockets again played an unusually effective role in combat, this time at the Battle of Toulouse. There, while defending the southern half of the important MonteRaveRidge, the French infantry brigade of General Rey broke and fled west evenbefore pressure was applied by the Britishinfantry facing it. The rout was apparentlycaused, at least partly, by a shower ofCongreve rockets thrown at the positionby rocketeers attached to the English 6th Division. [22]
A different story of the event states that Rey's men were being led down the Monte Rave slopes to attack the British when they halted after their flank was exposed to enemy musket fire. The stopped French column was then hit at its front end by rockets and "other projectiles" and thrown into disorder. The French lead regiment fled back up the ridge, followed shortly by the rest of the brigade. All this resulted in the abandonment of an important redoubt on Monte Rave by its garrison, and the retreat of yet another French brigade further to the left. [23] Monte Rave was soon there after occupied by the British with the result that the French position at Toulouse was seriously compromised.
Waterloo
Waterloo was the next, and the last, battle to see the use of Congreve rockets in Europe.
Part of the Anglo-Allied Army which was present for the combat at Waterloo was Captain Edward C. Whinyates' troop of Royal Horse Artillery. A unit attached to the cavalry corps at the start of the Waterloo Campaign, Whinyates' command consisted of six officers 175 enlisted men , five 6-pdr guns and section of rockets. [24]
The rockets used at Waterloo were an improved model designed in 1815. Congreve, in that year, had mounted the guide stick along the central axis. The rocket's propulsive jet issued through five equally spaced holes instead of one. The forward portion of the guide stick, which was screwed into the rocket, was sheathed with brass to prevent burning. These center-stick mounted missiles were significantly more accurate than what had gone before, and had the added advantage of being able to be fired from thin coppertubes. [25]
The rocket troopers at Waterloo were dressed like the other horse artillery formations, i.e., in the pre-1812 light dragoon uniform. Each mounted man carried three or four rocket sticks on the right side of his horse, and some troopers also carried more rockets in their horseholsters. Every third trooper carried a small trough on his saddle bag on which the rocket was laid when fired. [26]
On the retreat of the Anglo-Allied forces from Quatre Bras on June 17th, the rocket troop disobeyed orders and remained with the rear guard in hopes of seeing some action. [27] Their wish was granted at the bridge at Genappe when they engaged pursuing French cavalry and artillery at a range of 200 yards, separated only by the narrow Lys River.
One of the first rockets to be launched struck a French artillery piece, killing some of the crew and causing the remainder of the entire battery to be abandoned!
Unfortunately, most of the other rockets that were sent forth against the enemy "on arriving about the middle of the ascent, took a vertical direction," while some actually turned back upon their firers, and in one case chased a British horse artillery officer down the road before exploding! [28]. (The officer was lucky enough to escape injury from this "friendly fire.")
La Haye-Sainte>
On the 18th, Whinyates' troop was stationed about 200 yards to the left of the Brussels Road and in front of La Haye-Sainte. From there, his men, leaving their artillery pieces behind, went forward to support, with rocket fire, the charge of the British cavalry against d'Erlon's infantry, and to counter the threat of approaching enemy horses. They moved back to their original position after the charge ended. In this encounter, Whinyates used all his gunners as rocketeers and divided them into thirteen rocket sections. [29] During the battle of June 18th, the 2nd Rocket Troop fired 52 missiles. [30]
Losses to the rocket unit at Waterloo were severe, including the wounding of its commander, Whinyates and Lieutenant Strangeways, of Leipzig fame.
It would be well to conclude this brief survey of the development and use of the Congreve rocket during the Wars of Napoleon with some of the reasons why the weapon was not fully embraced by the British military, and there fore not entirely supported or promoted in its use.
First, the weapon, even by 1815, was not a very accurate one. This is not to say that its range was poor and did not compare well with most of the artillery pieces of the time. In point of fact, the range factor never seemed to have elicited unfavorable comment from the Army. What did weigh heavily against Congreve rockets and their use in the field was the problem of delivering their pay loads onto the intended targets. And even in this regard the problem was minimal when the target was a town or amedium or large area. Perfect examples of their destructive effect on such objectives can be seen at the Battle of Leipzig in 1813, as the French were leaving the city on October 19th; or at the siege of Bayonnein 1814.
Effectiveness
What made the effectiveness of the ocket on the battlefield so problematic was poor crew performances. Until 1808 Congreve's invention was exclusively a naval weapon. The army never even saw one until two years later. Being a naval tool, the techniques of firing and crew training were developed by that service using specially drilled sailors and marines to man and operate the devices. An example of how that training paid-off was noted above in the description of rocket use at Bladensburg. The Battle of NorthPoint (September 12, 1814) outside Baltimore, Maryland is another example of how rockets could be used to good effect when properly handled by competentmen. [31]
When rockets, usually without crew or experienced officers to man them, were sent to Wellington in the Peninsula in 1810, their performance was poor, or at least suspect due to a lack of technicians on hand to operate them. The result was a disinclination on the part of Wellington's army to use the rockets. Consequently, little training was spent on their operation which would have improved their effectiveness and thus their standing in the eyes of the army leaders.
Further, the choice of men to run the rocket service in the Peninsular Army did nothing to enhance its performance. When pressed by the government to use rockets, Wellington allowed junior officers and enlisted men (usually the outcasts of their parent units) with no technical background to crew his rocket sections. The result was predictable: for the most part miserable shooting, poor maintenance of equipment and lack of military discipline plagued the rocketeers under Wellington.
The showing of the rocket units in the Peninsula stand in stark contrast to the trained rocket troops present at Leipzigand Waterloo. It can only be guessed at as to what this weapon could have accomplished if Wellington had given ithis full backing during the fighting in Portugal and Spain.
Secondly, the Duke of Wellington himself was a prime obstacle to the employment of Congreve rockets in the army - or at least in any army he commanded. The Duke was a man with very little interest in the technical side of war or new inventions. He never felt that wartime was the proper moment to "alter the equipment of the army or to try experiments. " [32] Not surprisingly, he was little impressed by the Congreve rockets introduced into British service after 1806.
Besides his rather closed mind to innovation, Wellington faced a continual short-fall of conventional artillery for his army between 1808 and 1814. This prompted him to block any attempt to divert resources away from obtaining regular artillery. Thus, when it came to properly crewing and supplying rocket detachments, Wellington turned a blind eye and hoped the problem, i.e., the rocket units, would go away.
In fact, Wellington never wanted this new weapons system to begin with. The government pushed this armament on him in 1810, and he was ever after resentful about it. Summing up his feelings about rockets in 1814, the Duke remarked: "I only accepted the battery (the rocket unit) in order to obtain the horses. I do not want to set fire to any town, and I do not know of any other use for the rockets." [33]
Opinions
Wellington's bad opinion of the worth of the rockets was reinforced by the observations of key subordinates. Sir John Hope, one of the Peninsula corps commanders, informed his chief that rockets "may be useful, but when they have an elevation given them, they appear a most uncertain weapon." [34]
More damning was the report of the army's commander of horse artillery, the noted artilleryman Augustus Frazer. Hestated that during the Adour operation, in spite of contributions made by Lane's section during the crossing, the lack of crew training and problems with weapons main tenance would no doubt prevent a repeat of such sterling service by the rocketeers in the future. [35]
A third factor which impeded the use of Congreve rockets by the army centeredaround the fact that the organization exercised little control over rocket units.This command fell to the Ordnance Department, which included in its of ficesan engineer of ficer who commanded all artillery troops including the rocketeers. The Department was also in charge of research and maintenance of artillery, issuance of weapons and ammunition, providing medical care for its members inthe field, and controlling all promotions forits officers and enlisted men. [36] In short, anarmy commander, even one of Wellington's prominence, had to tread lightly when dealing with such independent formations within his command, for they could always go overhis head and complain to London.
For a man with Wellington's temperament, such a situation was viewed as intolerable; if he could not control something he would simply ignore it at best, or, at worst, deprive the disruptive influence of any activity which would give them cause to complain to its parent organization. In the case of rocket detachments, the Duke saw to it that their employment was limited and their achievements downplayed.
Lieutenant George Gleig, an officer of the 85th Regiment of Foot serving in America during the War of 1812, noted the potential of the Congreve rocket in action. He observed that its terror affect was its greatest asset against raw and experienced soldiers alike, before which few wouldstand. [37] If so, the tentative acceptance and halting support for the Congreve rocket by the English Army may have delayed a revolutionary change in warfare, and certainly, at least, proved to be anopport unity wasted.
Side Bars On Impovements in Gunpowder, Family Connections, and Pior Development.
Glover Richard G., Peninsular Preparation: The Reform of the British Army 1795-1809. Cambridge, UK:Cambridge University Press, 1963.
"Technology of War: MilitaryRockets." The New EncyclopediaBritannica, Vol. 3, 15th Edition.
Longford, Elizabeth, Wellington: TheYears of the Sword. New York, USA:Harper and Row, Publishers, 1969.
Congreve, Sir William, A Treatise of the Congreve Rocket System. London, UK:Hargrove Printers, Ltd., 1827.
Wise, Terence, Artillery Equipment of the Napoleonic Wars. London, UK:Osprey Publishing, Ltd., 1979.
Watson, Richard, Anecdotes of the Life of Richard Watson, Bishop of Llandaff.London, UK: Hamilton Publishing House,1817.
Haythornthwaite, Philip J., Weapons and Equipment of the Napoleonic Wars.Dorset, UK: Blandford Press, Ltd., 1979.
Hofschroer, Peter, Leipzig 1813: The Battle of the Nations. London, UK:Osprey Publishing, Ltd., 1993.
Congreve, Sir William, Details of the Rocket System. London, UK: HargrovePrinters, Ltd., 1814.
Petre, Francis L., Napoleon's Last Campaign in Germany-1813. New York,
Park, S.J. and Nafziger, G.F., The British Military: Its System and Organization, 1803-1815. Cambridge,Canada: Rafm Co., Inc., 1983.
Lord, Walter, The Dawn's Early Light.New York, USA: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc.,1972.
Caffrey, Kate, The Twilight's Last Gleaming: Britain vs. America, 1812-1815.New York, USA: Stein and Day Publishers, 1977.
Frazer, Sir Augustus S., (edited by Edward Sabine), Letters of Colonel Sir Augustus Simon Frazer, K.C.B. Commanding the Royal Horse Artillery in the Army of the Duke of Wellingtonduring the Peninsular and Waterloo Campaigns. London, UK: Longman, Brown, Green, Longmans, & RobertsPublishers, 1859.
Napier, W.F.P., History of the War in the Peninsula and South of France from A.D.1807 to A.D.1814, Vol.5 New York, USA: Redfield Publishers, 1856.
Oman, Charles, History of the Peninsular War, Vol. 7, Oxford, UK: The Clarendon Press, 1930.
Fortescue, Sir John W., A History of the British Army, Vol. 10, London, UK:MacMillan & Co., 1920.
Bowden, Scott, Armies at Waterloo.Arlington, TX, USA: Empire Press, 1983.
Siborne, H.T., (editor), Waterloo Letters. London, UK: Lionel Leventhal,Ltd., 1983.
Mercer, Alexander C., Journal of theWaterloo Campaign. London, UK: PeterDavies Publishers, 1969.
Rothenberg, Gunther E., The Art ofWar in the Age of Napoleon.Bloomington, USA: Indian UniversityPress, 1978.
Wellesley, Arthur, The Dispatches ofField Marshall the Duke of Wellingtonduring his various Campaigns, compiled by Lt. Col. J. Gurwood (12 volumes).London,UK: John Murray Publishers,1834-1838.
Wellesley, Arthur, Supplementary Dispatches, Correspondence, and Memoranda of Field Marshall Arthur Dukeof Wellington, K.G., Vol.6. (Edited by his son the Duke of Wellington). (11volumes). London, UK: 1858-1864
Gleig, George Robert, The Campaigns of the British Army at Washington and New Orleans in the Years 1814-1815.London, UK: John Murray Publishers,1847.
Back to Empire, Eagles, & Lions Table of Contents Vol. 2 No. 10 This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web.
Picture: A size comparison between a mounted trooper and 12-pdr. rocket tube.
Congreve's Work
Practical uses of the rockets in the Napoleonic Wars
What then is the verdict on Congreve rockets and their use during the Napoleonic Wars? As a weapon of siege warfare they did well. Used tactically on the field of combat, their record is mixed,the difference between success and failure being determined primarily by the experience and skill of their various crews. But the striking examples of their success hinted at what could have been achieved if the technology had the time to improve,and if the conservatism of the Army could have been overcome.
Bibliography
End Notes
[1] 1. Glover, p.70
[2] 2. "Technology of War: Military Rockets,"Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol.3, p. 561.
[3] 3. Longford, pp. 62-63.
[4] 4. Congreve, p. 15.
[5] 5. Technology of War, p. 561.
[6] 6. Glover, p. 69; Congreve, p. 16
[7] 7. Wise, p. 19.
[8] 8. Glover, p. 69; Technology of War, p.561.
[9] 9. Havthornthwaite, p.89.
[10] 10. Glover, p.70.
[11] 11. ibid, p.70.
[12] 12. Hofschroer, p.27.
[13] 13. Congreve, p.87.
[14] 14. Petre, p.287.
[15] 15. Caffrey, p.117.
[16] 16. Petre, p.364.
[17] 17. Lord, p.126.
[18] 18. ibid,p.128; Caffrey, p.237.
[19] 19. Wellesley,p.413.
[20] 20. Napier, p.131.
[21] 21. Oman,p.335; Fortescue, p.501.
[22] 22. ibd, p.481.
[23] 23. Fortescue, p.85-86.
[24] 24. Bowden, p.226.
[25] 25. Technology of War, p.561.
[26] 26. Siborne, p.207-208.
[27] 27. Mercer, p.148.
[28] 28. ibid, p.153.
[29] 29. Siborne, pp.203-204; p.207; p.210.
[30] 30. Bowden, p.266.
[31] 31. Gleig, p.87.
[32] 32. Rothenberg, p.80.
[33] 33. Wellesley, p.389, Vol. 6.
[34] 34. ibid, p.389, Vol.6.
[35] 35. Frazer, pp.411-412
[36] 36. Park, p.10; Rothenberg, p.177.
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