The following question was sent to me by Brett Gladman of Ithaca, N.Y. Could you give me some references to substantiate the use of woods as strong points with troops deployed in a formed and/or formed manner inside or on the edge of the woods? It is very frustrating at times to see a constant and systematic usage of woods by certain gamers. I can not find any data substantiating that apparently unrealistic habit. PARTIAL ANSWER TO THE ABOVE QUESTION by Jean A.Lochet We have here a very difficult question and, in our answer, we'll be partial and far from exhaustive. Reliable references on troops deployed on the edges of woods are difficult to obtain. In these comments, we'll only consider regular line troops and we'll assume that most light troops were trained to fight in woods. Hence, what follows is strictly related to line infantry. At EEL, we know the frustrating feeling generated by some gamers constantly searching for the systematic usage of woods during a battle. If woods were occasionally used by some belligerents for a defensive purpose, they certainly were not used constantly. We can even go a step further by pointing out that woods were systematically avoided by certain armies. That was the case of the Prussian army in 1806, which, with the exception of its light troops (note 1), regularly avoided woods (and villages). Before the reforms following the Campaign of 1806, their concept of battle (note 2) simply avoided the deployment of the line infantry on ground other than open space. The very same can be said about the Austrian line infantry who were not very comfortable deployed in any loose order especially in woods and apparently avoided them. During the Campaign of 1809, the only use of woods by the Austrian line infantry was during the battles of Teugen-Haussen and Eckmühl (note 3). Troops were deployed on the edges of woods and not to any particular advantage. The following is a quotation from Jim Arnold in Crisis on the Danube, p. 161 concerning the Battle of Eckmühl : "Spearheaded by the 108th Ligne advancing in column, his men swarmed through the woods toward Sanding. French small units tactics were much superior to the Austrians in this broken wooded ground..." and on p.217: ".... While the Jägers and the Grenzers fought well, they were usually bested by the French. Friant, whose Division fought woodland brawls for three consecutive days, referred to the open-order training of his light troops when he wrote: 'The voltigeurs officers justified again and again the excellence of their institution.' He noted that his skirmishers constantly obtained tactical superiority over the Habsburg light troops...." The very same is said by Petre in Napoleon and the Archduke Charles. Note that the French voltigeurs mentioned above were not light troops per se but the light troops of line regiments which is slightly different. The voltigeurs proved time and again to be superior to the Austrian skirmishers of the line regiments and even to Grenzers or Jägers as quoted above. In addition, we see entire line regiments like the 57th and 108th dissolving entirely into skirmishers. The same is true during the Campaign of 1806. As a matter of fact, during the early Napoleonic campaigns, the French were really the only Continental power (note 4) willing to systematically engage their line infantry in woods when it was to their advantage. Surprisingly, the Russians were more willing to engage their line troops in woods. We find several instances in which Russian line troops secured woods and made strong points out of them. For instance, during the Campaign of 1806-07, during the crossing of the River Wkra by some of Davout's troops, the Russians had constructed numerous abatis in the woods in the eastern arm of the Wkra (note 5). There are many other examples of Russian troops establishing defensive positions in woods (note 5). For instance, Labaume's Relation circonstanciée de la Campagne de Russie en 1812, mentions defensive positions taken by Russian infantry in several places: (1) p. 68, at Ostrovno, Russian infantry was established in a wood (apparently on the edges of the wood) and resisted the assaults of the 92nd of the Line. (2) p.82, at Bobruisk, on the Berezina, a combat developed at the edges of the woods. (3) Perhaps the best documented intention of placing Russian troops in woods (and obviously on the edges of the woods) can be found in the same work. On p.131, Labaume relates that, on the Russian left, Kutusov had placed Tutschkoff's corps (the IIIrd) and the Moscow Militia in ambush in the thick edges of and in woods. That is confirmed by Roger Parkinson's The Fox of the North (note 6), p. 140: "...And now Kutusov learnt that Tuchkov's (note 7) troops, which had been ordered to be concealed to ambush such an attempt, had been taken out into the open where they would be exposed to far greater numbers of French. Kutusov's deception plan had been ruined -- only later would he learn that Bennigsen was responsible for this alteration..." Using woods as a defensive position is also covered by Clausewitz in On War. Clausewitz mentions that woods could be used as defensive positions advantageously. These instances are only a short overview of some references dealing with line troops formed on the edges of woods. There is little doubt that on some occasions, the French and the Russians did it. The 1806 Prussians did not and the Austrians only reluctantly. However, there is little doubt that truly trained light troops set up ambushes in woods and on the edges of woods on numerous occasions. Anyhow, historical evidence does not appear to support a regular diet of deploying line troops on the edges of woods. Perhaps, the solution is to limit the practice to the nationalities mentioned above but only under specific conditions. For the other countries, we might limit the deployment of troops in woods and on the edges of woods exclusively to light troops. Once again, coverage of the question is very sketchy and far from exhaustive. The topic begs to be covered much more extensively. Complementary information would be more than welcome. Any takers? Notes Note 1: We are speaking here of the light battalions such as Fusiliers or Schützen. Note 2: The Prussian concept mandated the use of the linear system and the oblique attack. Note 3: See Jim Arnold, Crisis on the Danube, Paragon House, New York, 1990, pp. 85-93, p.217 and p.249. Note 4: I don't feel competent to cover the British army's ability to fight in woods. Note 5: Journal du 3eme Corps and translation of same in Rogers, Napoleon's Army, Hippocrene Books, New York,1974, p. 156. Another good source is Petre Napoleon's Campaign in Poland, 1806-7. Note 6: The Fox of the North, The life of Kutusov - General of War and Peace, David McKay Company, New York, 1976. Note 7: Note the different spelling of Tuchkov in the French account by Labaume. Such differences are not unusual. Back to Empire, Eagles, & Lions Table of Contents Vol. 2 No. 1 Back to EEL List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1993 by Emperor's Headquarters This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com