One of the first tactical formations encountered by any Napoleonic historian is the square, the only formation in which infantry could count themselves secure from being over-ridden by a cavalry charge. Much has been written about the square and its properties, so that repetition here would be of little value. Occasionally, however, variations are encountered which throw a new light upon even such old a theme as this, especially when it is considered that the formation described below was employed for the first time, apparently unpracticed, actually in battle; and was instigated by a staff officer more junior than any of the battalion-commanders or seconds-in-command of the units involved. James Shaw was educated at the Military College at Marlow (itself quite an unusual training, given the lack of formal military education for the majority of British subalterns at this period), and joined the 43rd (Monmouthshire) Light Infantry in 1805 at the age of 17, learning his regimental duty under personal direction of Sir John Moore. He served with his regiment in the expedition to Copenhagen in 1807 and in the early Peninsular War, until 1809 when he began his career in the staff as A.D.C. to Major-General Robert (Black-Bob) Crauford. Shaw was present at Crauford's side when the general received his mortal wound at Ciudad Rodrigo, and then joined his regiment. Even at this early stage of his career, Shaw seems to have been interested greatly in the development of tactical formations, as a considerable proportion of the brief memoir of his Peninsular service is concerned with the action near Villa de Puerco on 11 July 1810, when a tiny body of French infantry successfully resisted a British cavalry attack. The French detachment of about 200 men of the 61st Line, commanded by a Captain Gouache, was lying down in standing corn until the cavalry was within pistol-range, when the little square stood up and fired. The first charge upon this square was made by a troop of the 16th Light Dragoons and another of King's German Legion Hussars, and the second charge by a squadron of the 14th Light Dragoons; both were beaten off by the steady musketry of the 61st, who were thus able to extricate themselves from a seemingly hopeless situation, and withdraw to safety. At least two British observers (Shaw himself and Thomas Brotherton of the 14th Light Dragoons) remarked on the unusually high discipline of the infantry, of such a degree that in the first charge a staff officer, Capt. Campbell, and the second Brotherton himself, both fell within feet of the square yet were able to escape as not one Frenchman broke ranks to move out and bayonet them. The losses of the cavalry totaled 32 (including the 14th's colonel, Neil Talbot, who was shot eight times and fell dead actually onto the square), whilst Gouache's detachment lost only three men, one dead and two "much mutilated by our sabers"(1), though Shaw believed that they suffered no loss whatever. The incident seems to have impressed Shaw considerably, perhaps in part because he was the officer who reconnoitered the square before the first attach was made. At Waterloo Shaw, still only a captain, was Assistant Quartermaster-General to Baron Alten's 3rd Division. When the French dispositions became clear on the morning of 18 June much disquiet was felt about the comparatively exposed position of the Division, vulnerable to Artillery fire and to the cavalry which could be seen massing in the French lines. Alten and the Prince of Orange discussed for some time how the Division should be arrayed, until Wellington himself arrived and remarked, "Form in the usual way", and then rode on. Alten remained unhappy at the prospect, so Shaw (despite his lowly rank!) inquired if the general would allow him to form the Division in a new manner. Presumably he explained his idea, for Alten immediately assented and left Shaw to draw up the Division as he wished, surely a most singular occurrence. Shaw explains his reasoning: "The principles and considerations which guided me in making the formation were as follows: The French cavalry had on the 16th, proved itself very formidable at Quatre Bras in its attacks upon the third division. That cavalry, in immensely augmented numbers, was now forming opposite the division, and the ground between them and us presented no natural obstacle whatever. It was at the same time evident, from the way in which the French guns were taking up their ground, that the division would be exposed to a severe artillery fire. It was, therefore, of the highest importance that the formation of the division should be such that its passing from line into a formation for resisting cavalry should be as rapid as possible; and that the re-formation of the line should also be made rapidly. To carry these views into effect, the strong battalions formed each an oblong on the two center companies, and, when the battalions were weak, two were joined, the right-hand battalion of the two forming left in front, and the left-hand battalion right in front, each in column of companies. The fronts of the oblongs were formed by four companies; the rear faces of the oblongs were formed by the outward wheel of subdivisions. It will be observed that, when a battalion forms oblong in this manner upon the two center companies, the formation is made in less that half the time in which it would form square on a flank company..." Accordingly, the Division was arrayed in two line of oblongs, in what Shaw termed "exchequer" fashion, i.e., the second line of oblongs covering the gaps between the battalions of the first line. Reading from left to right (viewed from the rear of the British position), the first line comprised five oblongs, each presumably with a two-company frontage until "squares" were required, when oblongs of four-company frontage were formed; in the following order: (1) 1st Light Battn., King's German Legion (Lt. Col. Busche) (2) 5th Line Battn., King's German Legion ( Lt. Col. Linsingen) (3) Luneberg Light Battn. (Lt. Col. Klenke) (4) Combined oblong of Field-Battn. Verden (left) and Field-Battn. Bremen (right) (Lt. Col. Langreke) (5) Combined oblong of 2/73rd Foot (left) and 3/30th Foot (right) (Lt. Cols. Harris and Bailey respectively; the latter's' regimental rank was major, the battalion's commanding officer, Lt. Col. Hamilton, having been wounded at Quatre Bras) To the rear of these oblongs, four more oblongs were arrayed: (6) 6th Line Battn., King's German Legion ( Lt. Col. Schroeder) (covering the gap between the 1st Light and 5th Line Battns., K,G.L.) (7) Combined oblong of Field-Battn. York (left) and Grubenhagen Light Battn. (right) (Lt. Col. Wurmbe) (covering the gap between the Luneburg Light Battn. and the Bremen/Verden oblong) (8) A Nassau Battalion, not part of the 3rd Division but detached by General Kruse upon Shaw's request (covering the gap between the Bremen/Verden oblong and the 73rd/30th oblong). It is interesting to note how this detachment became associated with the 3rd Division; Shaw realized that he had insufficient troops to form a second line of oblongs, so seeing the Nassauers apparently uncommitted elsewhere informed Kruse of his plan and asked of he might borrow a battalion, "but saying to him at the same time, that I had not the slightest authority for asking him to do so. With a frankness that showed the true spirit of the man, he at once said that he approved and would adopt the formation." (9) Combined oblong of 33rd Foot (left) and 2/69th Foot (right) (Lt. Col. Elphistone and Col. Morice respectively) t(o the right rear of the 73rd/30th oblong). The remainder of the 3rd Division's troops were not drawn up on the main position: The 2nd Light Battn., King's German Legion was posted in La Haye Sainte, and the Hanoverian Feld-Jager corps was deployed in a skirmish-screen between that position and the main line. The formation into oblongs was made when attacks were imminent; under ordinary conditions, the battalions were deployed in line (so as to present the shallowest targets for artillery, as oblongs with two-company frontage and thus greater depth would greatly increase the effectiveness of roundshot striking the front, which would thus carve through several companies, one behind the other, instead of striking only a single company in line), whilst under cannonade, Shaw notes, the battalions lay down in the usual manner. While hostile troops approached, or when the battalions might be required to advance, the oblongs were formed. In the former case, the formation of a "square" was accomplished with great rapidity, and no matter what the strength of the battalion, the flanking sides of the "square" were ordered to be formed of only one company, four deep (which Shaw states was accomplished by "the two subdivisions of the company... formed the one behind the other"), so that the resulting "square", with an ordinary battalion of ten companies, would have the front and rear faces of four-company frontage, and the side faces of the equivalent of half-company frontage, a very different formation from that normally regarded as a typical "square." For the advance, Shaw notes, the oblong was equally efficient in the greater cohesion possible by advancing in what was practically a column with two-company frontage: "the oblong formation being adopted will enable a line of any magnitude to advance in order of battle for any required distance in the most perfect order, until so near the enemy's artillery that deployment becomes necessary, which, from the formation on the two center companies, would be more rapidly made than from any other." From the traditional (though much over-simplified) viewpoint which has the "typical" Anglo-French infantry action consisting of a British line repelling a French column in "the old style" (to use Wellington's expression), Shaw's use of oblongs similar to the French infantry column is something of a reversal of the accepted order of things! Nevertheless, the formation was a complete success at Waterloo, though presumably the formation of "squares" in this manner - apparently not attempted prior to the day of the battle - depended upon a considerable degree of discipline on the part of the battalions concerned (which included, as will be noted, not only reliable British, K.G.L. and Nassau units but also less-experienced Hanoverians). And, as Shaw notes, it was presumably not only his view alone that the array of oblongs in "exchequer" form "seems to be the best order of battle that can be adopted," as he states "it is to be observed that the formation was made under the observation of his Grace [Wellington], and that his allowing it to remain unchanged stamped it with his sanction." Regarding the discipline needed for squares to remain steady, it is worth noting, perhaps that such close formation was only really essential when the enemy was in close proximity; at other times a degree of unsteadiness would not necessarily be fatal. As Mercer observed at Waterloo, the Brunswick square "next to me was so broken that there were gaps in every face, which the officers and sergeants were endeavoring to close by pushing the half-stupefied boys together;" yet thanks to this perseverance of their officers and N.C.O.'s and the near support of Mercer's guns, the square held form when the French charged. (2) James Shaw received a brevet-majority for Waterloo, and eventually rose to the rank of lieutenant-general. He married in 1820 and assumed his wife's name, so that his book (published posthumously following his death in March 1865) was issued under his "new" name: Notes on the Battle of Waterloo, Sir James Shaw Kennedy, K.C.B., London 1865, from which the above quotations by Shaw are taken (pp. 22-23, 98-102 concerns his arraying of the 3rd Division at Waterloo.) Although his later career was considerably distinguished, nothing matched the extremely unusual circumstance of a very junior staff officer requesting and being given control of his entire Division at the commencement of a major action! Footnotes (1) Sir Thomas Brotherton's reminiscences are most accessible in A Hawk at War, ed. B. Perrett, Chippenham 1986; quote p 23. (2) Mercer to H.M. Leathes, 14 March 1859; in Reminiscences of Waterloo, ed. H.M. Leathes Jr., privately published, London & Beccles, n.d. but c. 1870(?), p. 9. 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