Tabletop Wargame 1809 The following battle was fought with EEL rules which are an attempt to use real time in a wargame rather than a conventional turn system. In addition (1) the rules allow any maneuver or formation that was practiced during the Napoleonic period; (2) orders are transmitted to Divisions, brigades and regiments through the chain of command, eliminating (or at least greatly minimizing) the helicopter effect (since orders can only be issued as a function of what a commander legally knows, which is a great deal less than what he sees on the table top). (3) In the past, some readers have commented on our battle reports mentioning that, for some of them, the reports were uninteresting as these readers had no knowledge of the rules used. There is some truth to that statement. But let us ask a question. When one reads a battle report in a reasonably detailed history book, does one know the rules used by the antagonists? Of course not! Realism was the set of rules used. The same approach should be used in reading our battle reports since our rules are an attempt to recreate true Napoleonic battles in which events are taking place by using real time, real formations, and real transmission of orders,with real transmission time, through the chain of command. So, our battles should reflect pretty much how a Napoleonic battle took place. In the footnotes, we provide explanations where necessary (we welcome questions). (4) The fact of using real time (broken down into 10-minute segments) allows us to be precise about timing the beginning of charges, ending combats, etc.. (5) We don't have such a thing as a turn. Instead, all the actions are broken down into 10-minute segments.... By the way, we should have our rules available around the beginning of 1993. Battle of Alt Gernsbach Bridge by the EEL staff The time is early April, 1809. The Austrian offensive is in full swing trying to defeat the French army before it can concentrate....General Jessop is given the command of a hastily thrown together formation to destroy or better yet, capture the bridge at Alt Gernsbach on the River Traun in an attempt to stop the progress of the Austrians. What Jessop does not know is that the Light Division of the VIth Corps reinforced by a cavalry regiment from the Ist Corps had captured the bridge at dawn but, contrary to Austrian practice, had neglected to secure it (note 1). As a matter of fact, as the reader will find out in what follows, the Austrian deployment was somewhat unorthodox and rather puzzling. One may wonder what was in the mind of FML Vincent when he deployed his troops. (1) THE AUSTRIAN DEPLOYMENT: The Austrian commander had the VIth Corps Light Division as it stood at the beginning of the Campaign of 1809. That is as follows: DIVISION FML Freiherr von Vincent Brigade GM Dollmeyer von Provencheres (1) 4th, 5th, 6th Vienna Volunteers (3 battalions) (2) Grenz Regiment #5 (2 battalions) (3) Chevau-léger Regiment #3 (8 squadrons) (4) 1 3-pdr Brigade battery: 8 guns 1 6-pdr Cavalry battery: 6 guns Brigade GM von Nordmann (1) Grenz Regiment #6 (2 battalions) (2) Hussar Regiment #7 (8 squadrons) (3) Chevau-léger Regiment #6 (8 squadrons) (4) 1 3-pdr Brigade battery: 8 guns 1 6-pdr Cavalry battery: 6 guns The Austrian commander deployed his troops as follows: (1) Grenz Regiment #6 at point "G1" with one battery. (2) Grenz Regiment #5 at point "G2", with the 3 battalions of Vienna Volunteers and 2 batteries. (3) Chevau-léger Regiment #3 at "G1". (4) Chevau-léger Regiment #6 and Hussar Regiment #7 at "G2". (2) THE FRENCH DEPLOYMENT: The French commander had a small provisional corps composed of the following: Infantry: Elements of Claparède's Division (note 6) comprising: Brigade Jarry (1) Tirailleurs Corses (1 battalion - 980 men) (2) Tirailleurs du Pô (1 battalion - 980 men) (3) 4th battalions of 17th, 21st, 26th and 28th Léger (each batt. of 4 companies - 480 men) (4) 1 8-pdr battery (8 guns) Brigade Lesuire: (1) 4th battalions of 27th, 39th, 59th, 69th and 76th of the Line (each batt.. of 4 companies - 480 men) (2) 1 8-pdr battery (8 guns) Cavalry: Light Cavalry Division (General Montbrun) Brigade Jacquinot: (1) 1st Chasseurs à cheval (3 squadrons) (2) 2nd Chasseurs à cheval (3 squadrons) (3) 12th Chasseurs à cheval (3 squadrons) Brigade Piré: (1) 8th Hussars (3 squadrons) (2) 16st Chasseurs à cheval (3 squadrons) Brigade Pajol: (1) 5th Hussars (3 squadrons) (2) 7th Hussars (3 squadrons) (3) 11st Chasseurs à cheval (3 squadrons) 1 6-pdr horse battery (6 guns) Jessop's command reached the line A-B at 9AM and was deployed as shown on MAP 3. His infantry had already been formed in columns of divisions at deploying distance. Some Austrian vedettes could be seen from that line. Thus, Jessop had now a hint that the Austrians had very likely the bridge at Alt Gernsbach. At 9AM, Jessop sent 4 cavalry patrols to discover the Austrian whereabouts. At the same time, he formed a column consisting of Pajol's cavalry and Jarry's infantry brigade. That task force was to move directly toward Alt Gernsbach by the direct road with the order to destroy or take the bridge. He held the rest of his command awaiting the information to be brought back by the cavalry patrols. The first patrol was sent on the direct road to Alt Gernsbach pushing aside in the process some Austrian vedettes and reached the bridge at 9:20. The bridge was unoccupied and an old farmer told the patrol that a strong Austrian force of cavalry and infantry had crossed the bridge at dawn and moved down the road to Ulm. The 2nd patrol moved straight ahead and by 9:10 spotted an Austrian battery on the edge of wood A and reported its findings at 9:20. The 3rd patrol also moving straight ahead, spotted a large group Austrian officers on the hill and reported its findings also at 9:20. The 4th patrol, moving on Jessop's left, spotted 2 infantry battalions deployed on the small hill (see Map 1, location "G1") and also reported back at 9:20. Jessop started to have a clearer picture of the foggy situation. Apparently, the enemy was deployed straight ahead of him but he still had no idea of the whereabouts of the Austrians on his right since his 1st patrol had not yet returned. However, he knew that the large wood probed by cavalry vedettes was not occupied. Jessop immediately decided his course of action. By 9:30, he issued he following orders to his different brigades (note 2): (1) Lesuire's infantry with cavalry now on the left was to follow Pajol and Jarry on the road to Alt Gernsbach. (2) Piré's cavalry was to move toward the woods and protect the troops moving on the direct road to Alt Gernsbach. Jessop, in spite of the still unclear situation, had chosen to ignore the two infantry battalions spotted by its 4th patrol and to concentrate on his objective: the bridge at Alt Gernsbach. (3) THE EVENTS AFTER 9:20: At 9:20, after some vedettes had reported that the French were moving toward Alt Gernsbach, the Austrian commander decided to move the bulk of his forces, both cavalry and infantry, toward the center plain in order to cover Alt Gersnbach. The closest infantry to the bridge was Grenz Rgt.#6 (2 battalions and a 3-pdr battery) which could not reach the bridge until around 10:20. The Vienna Volunteers (3 battalions) and Grenz Rgt. #5 were farther away and could not reach the bridge until much later. By 9:40 AM, the Austrian cavalry had reached B and started to deploy after spotting the French cavalry at "3". Pajol's cavalry had reached point "3", where he spotted the Austrian cavalry at B in the process of deploying. Pajol did the same and sent his horse artillery battery onto the small ridge (point "5"). At 9:50, both sides decided to charge. Pajol was outnumbered but had decided to charge to gain time and allow the French infantry coming up the road to move onto the ridge and deploy there (note 3). The French had only 6 squadrons and the Austrians aligned 8 squadrons in the first line. Pajol decided to charge with only 4 squadrons keeping 2 in reserve. The French horse battery welcomed the Austrian cavalry with canister. Despite that support, Pajol's four quadrons were overwhelmed by the eight Austrian squadrons and were defeated after a short 10 minute struggle. They withdrew behind their two reserve squadrons to reform (minor defeat). The time was 10:20. During the cavalry battle, Jarry's infantry had moved onto the ridge, deployed in columns of divisions at deploying distances, the 1st battalion next to Pajol's horse battery and his last battalion anchored on woods "?". Jarry's own artillery was deployed between the 2nd and 3rd battalion. Jarry's position was a very strong one, with his battalions ready to form square (note 4) and supported by two artillery batteries. As the eight Austrian squadrons withdrew to reform at 10:20, another 4 Austrian squadrons decided to charge Pajol's 2 reserve squadrons. However, the two French batteries on the ridge opened a deadly fire against the enemy's cavalry which threw it into disorder. The 2 French squadrons struck the disordered Austrians and after a short struggle (10 minutes) managed to rout them (note 5). The time was now 10:30. By 9:40, the Austrians in the center had moved the 3rd Chevau-léger Rgt. (8 squadrons) in front of wood "" and threatened to charge Piré's scouts. These scouts withdrew. Pire´ moved his entire brigade toward the center (point "9") as the 3rd Austrian Chevau-le´ gers moved in that direction. 10:10, both opponents clashed and the Austrian cavalry suffered a minor defeat. It withdrew to reform. Piré's cavalry did not pursue. At the same time, on the extreme French right at point 10, Pajol charged 4 Austrian squadrons (3rd Chevau-légers) with 6 of his squadrons (11th Chasseurs and 5th Hussars). After a short struggle (10 minutes), the outnumbered Austrian cavalry was routed. The time was now 10.30, and Pajol had a clear view of the wooden bridge which was defended by 2 Grenz battalions (5th Grenz) supported by an artillery battery. Pajol reported the situation to Montbrun (his division commander). Montbrun, who was with Claparède, reported the sighting to the latter. Now, as both sides were busy moving infantry toward the bridge, the fighting ceased. The Austrians moved the 2nd battalion of Grenz regiment #6 on the edges and the 1st battalion deployed in divisionsmasses in front of the bridge. The Vienna Volunteers occupied woods 11. The time was now 11:10. The French moved the Tirailleurs du Pô and the Tirailleurs Corses through wood 12 and the rest of the French infantry on the right of wood 11. In addition, an artillery battery was unlimbered and, at 11:20 opened fire on the wood. At 11:30, the Tirailleurs Corses engaged the 2nd battalion of Grenz Regiment #6. A lively firefight developed, but, at 11:50, the 4th battalion of the 17th Léger a ttacked the Grenz in flank. That was too much for the Grenz and they withdrew (minor defeat). That combat took 30 minutes. At 11:30, Brigade Lesuire attacked wood 11 occupied by the Vienna Volunteers. After a short struggle (10 minutes), the Austrians were kicked out of the woods and routed. During that time, Piré had slowly moved his cavalry toward the center hill and was in a position to charge the enemy. At 12 o'clock, the French battery suffered a caisson hit and was silenced. Claparède now stripped the howitzers from two of his batteries and made a provisional battery to destroy the bridge. In addition, orders were issued to the different commands to make a general assault on the Austrians. That general assault took place at 12.30 and the Austrians were in no condition to repel it. They had to withdraw under the protection of their cavalry. The bridge had been too damaged to allow them to pass over and the Austrians had to withdraw on the wrong side of the river. The Austrian command was in fact split in two as the 2nd battalion of Grenz Regiment #5 was with its supporting battery on the other side of the bridge. Shortly after, the French captured the damaged bridge but did not pursue the defeated Austrians. (4) A BRIEF ANALYSIS OF THE BATTLE: As the situation developed, the French commander handled his command flawlessly. His deployment, especially the deployment of Jarry's infantry on the at 9:50, was excellent. No doubt the French commander was greatly helped by the poor Austrian deployment. From then on, the French clearly had the initiative as the Austrians struggled, to no avail, to shift their poorly deployed infantry toward the bridge in order to defend it. They were never able to arrive on time to stop the French outflanking movement on their left. The minute the French had deployed Jarry's infantry on the ridge (at 9:50), with the bulk of their infantry too far away, there was little the Austrians could do to prevent the French from taking the bridge. In addition, don't forget that the French infantry moved on the road toward the bridge and the Austrians cross country. The Austrian commander's mission was to hold the bridge until nightfall (7PM). It was a difficult but not impossible mission to achieve. A single battalion of Vienna Volunteers could have held the bridge. That would have left the Austrian commander with 4 Grenz battalions, 2 Vienna Volunteer and all the cavalry to delay the French who had only 2 battalions of good troops (note 6). With that force, the Austrian commander could have engaged the French around wood 1 and slowly traded ground for time with its superior infantry and more numerous artillery. So, we have here a typical case in which a battle was lost before it was started because of the poor initial deployment of the defender's forces. Note 1: The deployment was strictly the doing of the Austrian commander. As will be seen later, because of the poor initial disposition, Grenz Rgt #6 with its 2 battalions had to bear the bulk of the battle against greatly superior numbers of French infantry around the bridge. Note 2: The shortest time for orders to be issued by a commander-in-chief is 10 minutes. Hence, after receiving information at 9:20, Jessop could issue orders at 9:30. These orders could be implemented by 9:40. Note 3: Jarry was with Pajol and immediately assessed the situation with Pajol and decided to deploy his infantry on the ridge. Note 4: It takes only 30 seconds to form square from a column of divisions. Note 5: The Austrian cavalry involved in that charge had received artillery fire during the first charge which, when accumulated with the fire of the two batteries during the second charge, resulted in the combat value of the involved squadrons falling below 50% of their original combat value (CV value). When that takes place, the unfortunate cavalry is automatically defeated. In this case, it was routed. Note 6: The two good or elite battalions were the Tirailleurs Corses and the Tirailleurs du Pô. The rest were weak 4th battalions of Oudinot's Corps each consisting of 2 companies of conscripts added to 2 elite companies. Map Back to Empire, Eagles, & Lions Table of Contents Vol. 2 No. 1 Back to EEL List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1993 by Emperor's Headquarters This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com