After the misfortunes of 1805, the Emperor Francis gave a free hand to his brother Charles to rebuild the Austrian military system. Archduke made many significant improvements too numerous to enumerate here (see note 1), such as the abandon of the strict linear tactic and the introduction of the Corps system in the Austrian army, greatly improving the maneuverability of the army. Hence, the Austrian army of 1809 was an immense improvement over that of the previous wars of the French Revolution and of the Campaign of 1805. Why did Austria not succeed in 1809? The reasons are many and too numerous to fully examine here. However, there are several significant facts that prevented the new and reorganized Austrian Army to be as good as that of the French. Charles waited until February 2, 1809, far too long, to implement the corps system, i.e. practically on the eve of the war with France. That was a radical step. As Jim Arnold (Arnold thereafter) mentions in Crisis on the Danube, p. 34,: "the Austrian army had never maneuvered in corps-size formations; its generals had never commanded such a force; and the staff never administered such a complex unit." Napoleon had introduced the corps system in the French army by making a miniaturized small army (which he named corps) numbering anywhere from 15,000 to 30,000 combatants and comprising a balance of the three arms: infantry, cavalry and artillery. According to Chandler: "The 'corps d'armé e' was the pre-eminent executive instrument of French conquest and military success during the Napoleonic wars" (see note 2). By having the three arms operating together under a single command, a corps had a balanced tactical structure that allowed to fight very efficiently (see note 3). In other words, a corps had enormous military potential. However, to be led efficiently and get the most out of their enormous military potential, army corps needed competent leaders. Charles in that aspect was not very well served and had - practically speaking - no generals that could be compared with the French generals leading the French corps (see note 4). That was not Charles' fault. Before the campaign, he was neither free to choose his corps commanders or to dismiss any for incompetence or insubordination. The top Austrians generals had received their assignments basically on seniority and birth rather than ability. During the critical initial phase of the Campaign, Hiller, did not make any serious effort to reestablish contact with Charles after he was cut off and did seek direct orders from the Emperor of Austria. In addition, with some exceptions, many Austrian generals preferred the relative comfort of headquarters and the security of leading from the rear rather than the rough going with the vanguard. Perhaps the fact that, in 1809, the average age of all Austrians generals was sixty-three, was somewhat of contributing factor to that state of affairs which could not work in Charles favor. Immediately after the initial Ratisbonne phase of the campaign, Charles had realized the many army deficiencies. He made major organizational changes before fighting around Vienna at Essling and Wagram. By that time, he had replaced three of his corps commanders among which was Hiller, his notorious insubordinate corps commander. Hiller simply detested Charles and his hostility toward him started at the beginning of the campaign when he openly questioned the army's commander's judgment. Such a discord could only lead to disaster. The French were also plagued with jealousy and rivalry among the marshals (see note 5) but Napoleon was there to keep everyone in line see note 6. In addition, the Austrians were sadly inexperienced with the corps structure placing a greater demand on the staff. Unfortunately, in 1809, the Austrian staff was simply not up to snuff either! Petre's Archduke Charles and Napoleon (Petre thereafter) p. 29 evaluate the Austrian staff as it follows: "The staff seemed to consider that their best qualifications consisted in mathematical knowledge, good writing, topography, etc. and they believed that therein lay the secret of the French success. Their tactical qualifications were slight, and when Charles, in the spring of 1809 attempted to vitalise his staff by broad measures, it was too late. The arrangements for issuing and forwarding orders were very inferior." Consequently, the Austrian army, in spite of great improvements, was greatly handicapped when compared to the French army even if that army included a great a number of troops somewhat below the previous French standards (see note 7). Arnold, pp. 35-36 further comments on the Austrian staff: "Organizationally, all of this represented an improvement over past Hapsburg practice. Yet an army can be no better than its leaders, and here the Austrians remained gravely deficient. Their inexperience with the corps structure placed heavy demands on the staff, an dthe Hapsburg staff structure was quite simply not up to the test. At the top, Karl's two ranking staff officers, Grunne and Mayer, hated each other. Their quarrel nearly consumed army headquarters until Karl relieved Mayer of command after the chief of staff finaly commited one too many alcohol-induced indiscretions a bare seven weeks before the war began. Beneath these worthies were an insufficient number of trained staff officers. Those who were trained had received instruction in mapping, mathematiques, horsemanship, drawing, and penmanship, subjects hardly relevant for practical strategic and and tactical battlefield maneuver. The inability of the staff to translate paperplans into combat reality was a crippling disadvantage. Staff ineptness is well illustrated by an occurence later in the campaign, when the army was maneuvered around Vienna. As it fought on a flat plain that served as the traditional army maneuver ground and thus was more familiar to the army than any other area of Europe, Karl requested a map. After considerable fumbling, the staff produced a map for an entirely different ares. Finally, overcentralization, in which army headquarters sent very detailed orders to each units, meant that the army would be slow to respond either to tactical opportunities or to emergencies." Staff work played an important role in the campaign especially during the first phase of the battle. The French staff functioned relatively smoothly, (with some occasional errors), while the Austrian staff was plagued with slow transmittal and slow response to orders. That was a strong factor in the Austrian defeat. In addition, at the Army level, the Austrian staff and Charles himself were very slow in issuing orders down the chain of command. By the time of Wagram, the Austrian staff, in spite of the above reported flaws, at the army level had somewhat improved and the flow of orders from headquarters was somewhat faster and smoother. Charles issued orders at midnight on the first day of the battle as reported by Petre , pp. 362-363: "Towards midnight Charles issued his orders for the continuation of the battle on the 6th July. He now determined to make an early attack with his right wing on the corps of Masséna, and his orders were to the following effect. III. corps (less one brigade left on the heights of Stammersdorf) to advance by Leopoldau on Breitenlee against the left flank of the French marching towards the Danube. Grenadiers to move with the same object on Süssenbrünn. Cavalry Reserve between Aderklaa, with its left on the Russbach at Wagram. II. to hold on to the Russbach position to the last, and, as the III. gained ground, to cross the stream. A heavy artillery fire was to be maintained against the French. IV. corps to attack the French right. V. corps to hold Am-Spitz and other posts on the Danube opposite Vienna. Great silence was enjoined, in order to conceal the movements, the earliest of which was to be Kolowrat's (III. corps) at 1 A.M., whilst the advance of the I. corps was to begin at 4 A.M. The Archduke Charles himself would be with the I. corps. Rosenberg's attack on Davout was also to begin at 4 A.M." As seen above, these orders reached the Corps commanders on time for them to rearrange their troops and set the ordered attacks in motion. The above is only a quick overview of the Austrian staff system during the Campaign of 1809 and is far from exhaustive. However, it points out one of the main causes of the Austrian defeat especially during the initial opening phase during that campaign. Note 1: For further details, see Petre Archduke Charles and Napoleon and/or Jim Arnold Crisis on the Danube. Note 2: Chandler: Dictionary of the Napoleonic Wars, p. 158. Note 3: Napoleon claimed that a Corps could fight a force several times its number until help came or night came. Note 4: FML Hohenzollern could be considered as a possible exception. Note 5: In the absence of Napoleon, the rivalry of the French marshals in the Peninsula, also had very adverse consequences. Note 6: At Wagram, Napoleon did not hesitate to relief Bernadotte from his command and banish him from the French army. Note 7: Of the Confederation of the Rhine contingents serving with the French army during the Campaign of 1809, only the Wü rttemburgers and the Hessians performed to the higher standards of the French army. 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