The Army of Lord Ferdinando Fairfax 1642-1645 A Small Study of a Provincial Force

The Army of
Lord Ferdinando Fairfax
1642-1645

A Small Study of a Provincial Force

by Dave Evans

One of the least studied forces throughout the history of the First Civil War and arguably one of the important of the small armies that fought over the provinces in England and Wales. Amongst it's successes have to be the defence of Hull in 1642 - 43, the part Sir Thomas's Horse played in the destruction of Lord Byron's forces at Nantwich, the siege of York and the battle at Marston Moor, the sieges of Pontefract, Scarborough, and Newark, the continued blocking of the King's army before and after Naseby and the harassment of the King after the Royalist collapse at Naseby up to Rowton Heath.

What made-up this army is almost completely unknown, articles on many of the small actions in the north give officers named in reports but rarely uncover any information on the organisation of the army under Lord Fairfax. The size of his army is rarely clear, numbers of forces given at any time are frequently only part of the total force, such as the 22 companies of Foot, 7 Troops of Horse and I Troop of Dragoons Lord Fairfax had to hand in December 1642 at Selby. Three regiments of Horse at Brotherton in September 1644, or the six regiments of Horse, four regiments of Foot and one regiment of Dragoons involved in the sieges of Helmsley and Knaresborough in the Autumn of 1644.

Virtually all of the first full year of action in Yorkshire seems to be clearly the work of perhaps less than 3,000 men all told. Yet Lord Fairfax was, on paper, Commander of the forces of eleven Counties. Commissions issued by Lord Fairfax in 1643 and 1644 name the Counties of Northumberland, Cumberland, Westmorland, Durham, Yorkshire, Lancashire, Cheshire, Derbyshire, Stafford, Nottingham and Lincolnshire as being under his command.

It does appear from pay petitions starting in 1644 that Lord Fairfax held the rank of Lord General of the North, this is backed up by letters from London in 1643, and bills of arms purchased in Hull in 1642. In theory Lord Fairfax could have been able to command nearly 15 - 20,000 men. In practise the local force of each county within his command did their own thing. Sir John Gell in Derbyshire, Sir William Brereton in Cheshire, Col.John Hutchinson in Nottinghamshire, and Col.Edward King in Lincolnshire all handled the problems within their counties before any outside consideration. Indeed Gell in Derby clashed frequently with Lord Fairfax, Sir William Brereton and Col.Hutchinson. Unlike the Ordinance of 1645 there are no signs of a co-ordinating or controlling committee, and little real co-operation.

The two clear indications of co-operation prior to the Ordinance of 1645 are Marston Moor in 1644 when perhaps three of the Lancashire regiments marched into Yorkshire. Col.George Dodding claims to have taken 1,200 men , 5 troops of Horse and I troop of Dragoons into Yorkshire for 17 weeks. The earlier march into Cheshire under Sir Thomas Fairfax, ending at the Battle of Nantwich, is a case of compulsion under orders from London, with no secure base to hand that could hold Sir Thomas Fairfax's horse for Winter in Lincolnshire being a crucial factor in Sir Thomas's mind.

During the Spring of 1645 Lord Fairfax deployed two regiments of Horse in Cheshire to support Brereton, although this deployment was a source of constant problems as both commands refused to accept responsibility for the regiments upkeep. The siege of Skipton in 1645 brought forces from Lancashire again into Yorkshire with some seven companies of Foot and a Troop of Horse becoming involved. This time there seems to have been no problems with pay or supplies to these forces, this may not be a sign of logistical support having been sorted out but more a sign that no evidence either way has been found!

However a deposition from the Major of Col.Christopher Copley's regiment of Horse, Major George Gill, indicate that some of the Yorkshire regiments roamed very widely, places in Lincolnshire, Lancashire, and Nottinghamshire being named. Col.Copley's own Troop accounts give the place of origin of all the troopers, and range just as widely, including one West Country man.

The high point of Lord Fairfax's Yorkshire army is probably the early spring of 1645 when the army may have reached its maximum strength of perhaps 10,000 men in 15 regiments. The new ordinance of Association of July 1645 reformed the army to five regiments of Horse, one regiment of Dragoons and seven regiments of Foot, the newly modelled army was to last another two years before being absorbed by the new standing army.

The following officers all appear to have commanded regiments under Lord Fairfax, some of them continuing to command regiments under Col.General Syndham Poyntz, in some cases command is inferred from letters and orders from the north, and has not yet been confirmed by pay petitions or other proofs.

HORSE

DRAGOONS

FOOT

It appears to have been a common practise that many commanders added Troops of Horse and Dragoons to their Foot regiments, such as Col.John Bright, Col.George Dodding, Sir John Savile, Col.John Hutchinson and Col.Thomas Chomley. This list of 78 commanders does not equate to 78 regiments, at least three commanders changed from commanding Foot regiments to Horse regiments. At least six commanders took-over regiments as their first Colonel left Lord Fairfax or were put out by the Self Denying Ordinance, however, at least two commanders were ignored, or given exception from, the S.D.O., Lord Fairfax and Sir William Brereton. one regiment was raised for service in Ireland. Possibly 2 commands were semi-honourary. This does not claim the existence, no matter how briefly, of 78 regiments but does point out that at least 78 men were placed in command of units or groups of units large enough to need a regimental level command staff. Some of the given officers may have commanded units for only a few months before losing out to re-organisations in local politics.

How the Northern forces were equipped is left almost completely blank, very few clues exist in secondary sources, yet the primary printed sources can uncover a few surprises.

HORSE

From very early in the war Lord Fairfax sought to arm his Horse very heavily. The first clue is in the report of Capt.Withrinton in October 1643 from the siege of Hull (Thomason Tract E71/22) where he describes Lord Fairfax's Horse as 50 to 60 Troops of Horse all "..very good.." and ".. extraordinarily armed..". What Capt.Withrinton means by that remark is unclear, unless taken as a comparison with his own experience of the arming of Royalist Horse. Hidden amongst SP28/250/311-314 is a list of purchases made by Sir John Hotham, Lord Fairfax and the Committee of the county of Lincoln. Between them they purchased 682 pistols, 645 carbines, 364 swords, 180 saddles, 180 sets of armour, and 14 trumpets. The pay petitions of three Horse officers, Captain Nicholas Greathead, Captain William Luddington, and Captain Thomas Oates make it clear that large sums of money were given to Troop captains to buy pistols, carbines and swords, £ 525 in one case. In July 1644 William White, the agent for Lord Fairfax in London requested 1,000 sets of armour for troopers.

The accounts of Col.Robert Duckinfield number 66 brace of pistols, 35 carbines, and 63 sets of armour. The accounts of Col.Thomas Chomley mention the purchase of 22 swords, 15 brace of pistols and 4 carbines, the accounts of Captain Henry Westby mention the replacement of 19 brace of pistols, 9 carbines, and 2 "Poleaxes", the accounts of Col.Christopher Copley add 13 brace of pistols and 9 carbines to replace lost weapons. Major George Gill's accounts mention the purchase of "pot, back and breast" for his troop.

Throughout 1643 to 1645 the House's of Parliament ordered the issue of 1,400 sets of armour, 1,000 swords and 600 brace of pistols for Lord Fairfax's forces. Col.James Mauleverer, commissioned by the Earl of Essex to raise 8 Troops of Horse in 1642 was paid f2,520 for arms. The accounts of Major Henry Lillburne number the pistols, swords and saddles issued to troopers under his command. Col.John Ponsonby, who offered to raise a regiment of Horse for Ireland was given 100 brace of pistols, 100 saddles and 250 sets of armour to equip his regiment with.

The Earl of Manchester signed a warrant in December 1644 issuing 100 sets of armour, 100 saddles and 50 brace of pistols, some £ 300 worth, to the Troop of Captain Henry Markham of Col.Edward Rossiter's regiment. Further evidence exits in a list of 116 Officers still owed pay arrears, of the 46 Captains of Horse listed not one advanced less than £ 300 for "Horses and arms".

It therefore seems clear that the Northern Horse aimed to be armed with a brace of pistols, a sword and a carbine each, with some attempt being made to supply armour to the troopers. It does seem possible that much of the armour at first came from Trained Band sources, Yorkshire being capable of raising nearly 400 Horse under the Trained Band levy. Lord Fairfax clearly came very close to arming all of the Horse under his command, directly or indirectly.

FOOT

Again the initial clues come from reports of the fighting in the north, the storm of Leeds in January 1643 (E88(19) and (23)) and the fighting at Hull in October 1643 (E71(22)). The storming of Leeds was conducted with 600 musket ".. of Sir William Fairfax's regiment.." and 1,200 Clubmen. A sortie from Hull was made by 2 bodies of 500 musket and a body of 500 townsman and sailors on October 9th 1643. In both cases the distinction is made between musketeers and Clubmen or townsmen. Sir Thomas Fairfax's memoirs of the First Civil war partly blame the defeat at Seacroft Moor on the routing of the "..countrymen..", exposing his foot to the Royalist Horse. If his foot had been secure from the Royalist Horse before the countrymen ran away why were they exposing when the countrymen ran ? The simplest answer could be that the pike element of his force was provided by semi - irregular forces, i.e. the "..countrymen.."

The bill of purchases in Hull during late 1642 number 2,401 muskets and 1,969 pairs of bandoleers. Over the years 1643 to 1645 Parliament ordered 7,050 muskets for Lord Fairfax, who had requested 1,500 muskets in March 1645 and complained of a shortage of muskets. Col.John Lambert wrote to let Col.General Poyntz know in May 1646 that 3,000 muskets were on order for the Northern forces. Sir William Brereton had requested 1,000 musket or Firelocks in the spring of 1645. The accounts of Col.Thomas Chomley number 392 muskets and 3 Firelocks, along with 490 pairs of Bandoleers. Col.Cholmey makes the only mention of pikes purchased found yet with 263 brought for the regiment he raised in late 1644 for the siege of Carlisle. Col. John Hutchinson mentions the replacement of 16 muskets, 3 Firelocks and 3 pairs of Bandoleers in his accounts.

It does seem likely that Lord Fairfax tried to keep his men clothed, the musketeers at Leeds being described as grey coated. Lord Fairfax's letters in the spring of 1645 to Sir William Brereton ask Brereton to supply £ 300 worth of cloth to the two Horse regiments in Cheshire. The Committee at York had to find £ 4000 from their own credit to give the army winter coats in 1645, whilst 2,000 men impressed in August 1645 were ordered to dressed in coats of "..yallow bayes..". The accounts of Col.Copley's Troop include one muster roll where the men were paid in cloth, from two and a half to six ells per man.

In all the uncovered evidence there is very little mention of pikes,swords or armour for infantrymen. It therefore seems probable, in view of the reports from the north that either Lord Fairfax's Foot were heavily musket armed, using Clubmen and countrymen to provide pike cover or pikes were made locally. The second suggestion is perhaps the most dubious on the grounds that until late 1644 Lord Fairfax had few secure fixed bases of operations and few secure areas in which to make pike heads and shafts.

The first suggestion is somewhat radical, but could be argued to reflect the difficulty in arming men with muskets and a wish to keep such musket-armed men well-trained and under control, the difference between asking a group of men to clump together under fire and keep horses at shaft-length away and training men to keep in order under fire and returning fire frequently and correctly.

In the evidence presented the field army of the 2nd Lord Fairfax is arguably well-equipped and reflects a belief in the value of firepower and its use for the infantry. It is also shown to be larger than usually suggested. Perhaps further research will finish the jigsaw.

SOURCES

Calendar of State Papers: Domestic 1643 - 1647
House of Lords Journal 1643- 1647 House of Commons Journal 1643-1647
Thomason Tracts; E51(11), E53(12),E53(19), E71(15), E71(22), E88(19), E88(23), E95(9), E104(13), E126(5). are the most useful in guessing at the forces under Lord Fairfax
The Fairfax Correspondence: R.Bell
The Three sieges of Pontefract: G.Fox. (flawed but useful)
State Papers 28:
SP28/128 part 10, part 11, part 15
SP28/133 part 2 (100-109), part 3, part 4, part 5 part 6 and 7
SP28/250/pt 2/311 - 314 SP28/140 part 13
SP28/34/112 - 121
SP28/35/759 - 762
SP28/42/943

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