Back in ECWN&Q 34, John Barratt, referring to the Ireland of 1649, stated that the "Irish Confederacy do not seem to have a great deal of ordnance". (ECWN&Q 34 "Civil War Artillery Train".) I must admit that I would once have agreed, but years spent reading about and refighting battles have led me to realise that the Confederates did have plenty of artillery, but did not have a need for a great deal of ordnance. Through what follows I hope to show the limited need for artillery at the time as well as detailing some of the ordnance that the Confederates had access to.
ARTILLERY USAGE
In all the major field engagements ( Benburb, Dungan's Hill, Knocknanuss, Rathmines & Scarrifliollis ) the Confederates had less artillery than their opponents. But their opponents did not have much to start with. ( Up till August '42, the Ulster Scots army had only one small gun.) [1] The reasons for the limited usage of artillery are threefold: effectiveness; transport and availability. To take transport first: there was no significant road network in Ireland at that time.
In 1649, it led to Cromwell shipping his artillery train along the coast and up rivers. The Confederates had also used boats to transport guns. Colonel Garret Barry brought a demi-cannon by water to help in the capture of Askeaton castle in Limerick in 1642 [2]
Later, in 1649, Sir Phelim O'Neill led a force of seven boats and one bark containing two field guns onto Lough Neagh. [3] He raided the British settlements in Clandeboy before he was surprised and the two guns were captured. Properly fortified towns or castles that were away from navigable waterways could expect to be left alone by artillery. Such places tended to surrender as a result of starvation or treachery.
Garrisons found it easier to change loyalty if their new commanders were of the same religion. Thus Inchiquin's Munster garrisons had no difficulty transferring to parliament in '44, but largely refused to ally them selves with Catholic confederates in '49 as he did.) Transporting artillery overland required precious horses. But what horses were available were snapped up as cavalry mounts. Oxen were the only substitute. They moved at a slower rate than horses and required greater numbers to drAw the same gun. But unlike horses, they could live off the land they marched through. (Cavalry required foraging parties to bring in fodder.) Open were used by all the combatants: Ormond used them to draw artillery for his assault on New Ross in 1643. [4]
Confederates used oxen captured at Ross to transport artillery landed at the port of Dungarvan; Monro's artillery at Benburb were mostly ox-drawn as they still were when Owen Roe brought them in triumph to Kilkenny. Such slow moving artillery trains could easily fall prey to enemy raiding parties. The lack of defined safe zones made them more vulnerable. Even in England, Cromwell only began moving his siege train cross-country later in the war when the routes would be secure from Royalist raiders. In rougher terrain, pioneers were employed to clear roads for the artillery, such as Owen Roe did in 1647 when his men cleared a path across the Curlew mountains.
[5]
Artillery effectiveness on the outcome of a battle was limited. At Benburb, Monro's guns caused only one Confederate casualty. As in England, battlefield artillery were deployed in fixed roles and the course of the battle soon left them in useless positions. I only know of one battle in Ireland whose outcome was decided or significantly influenced by artillery. At Portlester in 1643, Owen Roe defended a ford and a mill with two field guns. He is reputed to have personally sighted the gun which fired a six pound shot that killed the opposing commander, Lord Moore and resulted in the much larger Government force quitting the field. [6] But that was a fluke. No where in Ireland was artillery deployed along Swedish lines or to Swedish standards. It is no wonder that on the field of battle, artillery were of most significance as trophies for the victor.
Availability of artillery I'll come back to later.
In siege warfare artillery placed an altogether more important role. Ireland was densely populated with castles, fortified towns and tower houses. In Limerick county alone there were 400 castles in 1500. [7] At the start of the rebellion, most castles were undefended. Not only were there not enough British settlers to man them all, but there was an acute shortage of weaponry, So at the start of the rebellion, most castles fell because the defenders were caught unaware. Even modern forts like Charlemont fell through surprise. But once word spread, defences were organised. The government employed master gunner Thomas Stuteile to strengthen the defences of Dublin castle.
[8]
Modern fortifications, such as those of Derry, were easily prepared. Limerick fell to the Confederates early on, providing a recently fortified town which served as a secure base through the war. Older castle and town walls were strengthened by the addition of earthworks and gun platforms. At Clonmel in 1650, Hugh Dubh O'Neill, defended reinforced old town walls sufficiently well to give Cromwell his bloodiest nose in Ireland. Galway is an example of a town whose defences were brought up to modern standards by the Confederates. Most forts or castles were not capable of withstanding artillery and so the mere appearance of a field gun caused many to surrender, others waiting until fire was opened. Major sieges were not common. Most armies lacked the resources necessary to stay in the field long enough to starte a garrison into submission. The Confederates used the most extensive siege works seen in Ireland when they besieged Duncannon fort in 1645. Nicholas Lalloe, EngineerGeneral to the Confederation, oversaw the siege with a pattern of saps first seen on the continent the previous year. [9]
In 1642, Phelim O'Neill used a system of trenches to besiege Dungannon before a tunnel was dug to undermine the walls. [10] Elsewhere, Confederates used sows to protect troops undermining walls. If it seemed feasible, a direct assault might be attempted. At Dysartenos in Co. Laois, Owen Roe's men scaled the ramparts in an assault in 1646. [11]
It is often stated that the failure of the Confederates to seize Dublin ensured their ultimate defeat. But the inference is often taken that they never had the means by which they could attack Dublin. But what saved Dublin was not a lack of resources, but a lack of will.
Their failure to deal decisively with the Ulster Scots & Munster British, meant that the Confederates could not afford the luxury of a prolonged siege of Dublin. The Wexford privateers loyal to the Confederation could have enforced a blockade of Dublin, but the field army could have been called away at and time to deal with a northern or southern flashpoint. An unco-ordinated assault was tried in '47, but although most of Dublin's outlying forts fell, the city was untouched.
There is ample evidence that the Confederation had access to large amounts of ordnance, including heavy siege guns, even as the early stages of the rebellion. The only material shortage appears to have been in gunpowder. Dublin castle was the main source of manufacture of powder, but it could not meet wartime requirements. Prices soared in '42/'43. [12]
But the Confederates managed to import powder into the south of the country. O'Neill's Ulstermen subsisted on small rations from the south, captured powder and that which they bartered food for with their enemies. With a centralised effort and through husbanding resources, the Confederates could have met the powder demands of specific campaigns. ( A large quantity of powder was needed for a siege as evidenced by Cromwell firing almost 100 shots in order to effect a breach in the walls of Kilkenny.) [13]
In 1643 the Leinster Confederates had an artillery train. In 1644 CastlehaYen left his artillery train in Charlemont as he & Owen Roe attempted to conduct a co-ordinated campaign against the Scots.As for this artillery, the Confederates had three main sources: capture; importation and manufacture.
Captured guns were the initial source of the Confederate artillery trains. Phelim O'Neill capture three heavy guns at Newry in 1641, the largest of which had to be left behind because it was off its carriage. The other two were used in an unsuccessful assault on Lisburn before being dumped in a bog hole. Initially the Confederates seemed to lack expertise in the use of guns as well as knowledge of carriage building. In Limerick in 1642 Garret Barry captured three pieces one of which was a 32 pounder. [14] ( Compared with the largest gun used by Cromwell in Ireland which was a 48 pounder.) [15] Also in '42 Ormond lost one gun to the Confederates at a meeting on the river Barrow. [16] Later Owen Roe O'Neill captured six ( or more?) brass field guns at Benburb. It is possible that two were heavy enough to be classified as siege guns. Even as late as 1650 the Confederates were still capturing guns. Michael Jones had to abandon the siege of Duncannon in 1650 and left two brass cannon behind. [17]
Wexford was the main Confederate port through the war and was the route through which most guns were imported. Much of what was landed was left in the hands of the Leinster or Munster Confederates, with the Ulster army getting precious little. In October '42 a ship from Flanders arrived in Wexford and off loaded muskets, 200 barrels of powder and three bronze field pieces. [18] Spain provided more guns in Easter of '43: two iron 24 pounders and one Spanish iron mortar. In 1648 four demicannons arrived from Spain. A French ship was blockaded in the Shannon Estuary by parliamentarian ships. It unloaded three guns before doing battle. Two parliamentarian ships were sunk and eight guns were recovered from them.
Shipwrecks also provided guns for the Confederacy. Five guns were salvaged from a Dutch East Indiaman when it sank off DungarYan. Five more were salvaged off the 'Hopewell' when it foundered off Wexford. The Confederates encouraged privateers to operate from Wexford and during the course of the war they are credited with capturing at least 250 ships. [19] Although not recorded, these must have provided many guns for the Confederation. Initially the Confederate navy had seven or eight ships with up to 24 guns apiece. By late 1642 the navy was 30 strong. The ship which brought Owen Roe to Donegal in '42 was an 18 gun Dunkirk frigate. The Marquis of Antrim's ships included two 16 gun frigates, one with 15 guns and a smaller one. Rinuccini owned a 14 gun frigate. Whilst essential to maintain a supply route to Europe, if the armies were short of guns surely they would have started to strip their own navy?
There were two foundries in government hands at the start of the rebellion. Richard Boyle had a foundry in Co. Waterford casting medium pieces . [20] Flanders specialists ran a foundry in Laois in which Ormond had an interest. [21] The Confederates had a foundry in Tyrone. British forces operating from Derry and including one artillery piece attacked the foundry and destroyed it. A Confederate cannon-foundry is believed to have operated in Killeen, Co. Meath. [22] A home produced gun was used by the Confederates in their assault on Castle Coote. Another ironworks was run by them in Co. Kerry but their is no evidence of guns being cast there.
So how many pieces of ordnance did the Confederation possess? A rough idea may be gained from the number of pieces that the Cromwellians captured at the end of the war. Galway fell in 1652 and gave up 12 guns including four 18 pounders. Wexford yielded almost 100 pieces. Add to these the two guns lost by Phelim at Lisburn in '42, the two lost by him on Lough Neagh in '49, the four demi-culverins lost by Preston at Dungan's Hill in '47, the two 'whole' cannon, three demi-cannon, one 12 pounder and smaller guns lost by Ormond & the former Confederates at Rathmines and you begin to see the colume of ordnance the Confederates had. By 1642 they had veterans who knew how to use them but lacked a unified command. By the time the enemies of Parliament had united in '49, the time for offensive deployment of artillery was gone.
[1] p76 'The Military Revolution in Seventeenth-century Ireland' by Rolf Loeber & Geoffrey Parker in 'Ireland from Independence to Occupation' Ed. Jane H Ohlmeyer, Cambridge 1995
This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web.SIEGE GUNS
ARTILLERY AVAILABILITY
CAPTURED GUNS
IMPORTED GUNS
SHIPS
MANUFACTURING
QUANTITIES
NOTES
[2] Loeber & Parker, op. cit., p74
[3] p189, Friar 0 Mellan Journal in 'Duiche Neill' number 10
[4] p122, 'O'Neill and Ormond', Diarmid Coffey, Dublin 1914.
[5] Loeber & Parker, op.cit., p76.
[6] Duiche Neill, p164.
[7] p29, 'The Military Revolution' Geoffrey Parker, Cambridge 1998.
[8] p85,'Castles and Fortifications in Ireland 1485-1945' by Paul Kerrigan, Cork 1995.
[9] p126, 'Celtic Warfare in the 1640's' by Padraig Lenihan in 'Celtic Dimensions of the British Civil Wars', Ld. J.R. Young, Edinburgh 1997
[10] Duiche Neill, p153
[11] Duiche Neill, p186
[12] Loeber & Parker, p74
[13] p373, 'The New Model Army' by Ian Gentles, Oxford 1992
[14] Loeber & Parker, p74
[15] Gentles, p360
[16] Duiche Neill, p178
[17] Gentles, p369
[18] Loeber & Parker, p75
[19] Loeber & Parker, p86
[20] Loeber & Parker, p70
[21] Duiche Neill, p155
[22] Loeber & Parker, p74.
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