In the pamphlet "Marston Moor" released in the summer of 1994, I suggested that the combined Allied army of the Earl of Manchester,- the Earl of Leven and Lord Fairfax formed a battle line running from west to east Manchester Leven - Lord Fairfax. In this article I will attempt to justify that conclusion. The main part of my argument will focus on the actions of the 1st July and during the early part of the 2nd up to 7 p.m. that evening. Interestingly Col .H.C.B. Rogers suggests in his book " Battles and Generals of the Civil War " the same battle line when he covers Marston Moor.

The main primary sources used tend to be those printed in the Thomason Tracts. To these are added a number of letters by officers who took part in the action to one extent or another. These sources will be listed at the end of this article. By and large most authors plough right through the opening to the main meat of the source, the actual battle. In doing so they miss something very revealing.

All sources agree that the Allied army broke camp very early on the morning of the 1st July so as to concentrate in the face of Rupert's advance. Lord Fairfax's army crossed the Ouse in the Clifton area to the south of York. By early morning this task had been completed, so much so that the changing of the guard upon the walls of York that morning found the besieger's camp in front of them empty. Royalist Horse probing down the York - Selby road to find where the Parliamentarians had gone clashed with Lord Fairfax's rearguard under the command of Sir Thomas Norcliffe near Fulford.

Lionel Watson's letter is clear in that Manchester's army crossed the Ouse in the Poppleton area and concentrated in the area known to him as " Ousemoor now covered by the village of Poppleton. According to the unknown "W.H."'s account this was completed by noon, with the rear guard skirmishing with Royalist Horse out of York. From there Watson states that " Wee quartered at Long Marston and the towns about..." Robert Griffen's letter confirms this, saying " We quartered the night in Long Marston Moor .....

Where Leven's army moved to is unclear, not one Scots source mentions any place other than Marston moor or Tadcaster. Leading one to the conclusion that Leven )ust marched straight to the battle field. However, the Royalist source that mentions the clash near Fulford was of the opinion that Lord Fairfax's men were on the march to Knapton. It is therefore possible that Leven and Fairfax concentrated their forces in the Knapton area.

However, all three generals did met in Long Marston that night so it is also probable that the Scots concentrated near Long Marston - Rufforth.

It seems that Allied commander's first plan was to block the Knaresborough - York road about three miles from York and thereby prevent Rupert reaching York. The Allied General's dispatch tells us that they planned to met Rupert as he marched from Knaresborough and thus "..drew out the armies to met him..". With the same idea still in mind they marched "..the same night.." to Long Marston. Thomas Stockdale's letter to John Rushworth clearly states that all three armies marched to Hessay moor, a village about two miles north east of Long Marston. Sir Thomas's own account confirms this with the lines and Hessa Moor .. being appointed the rendezvous, the whole army drew thither..".

Thus by late afternoon on the 1st the combined Allied army was drawn up on or about Hessay moor facing west towards Knaresborough, probably running from Long Marston to Hessay and beyond. Manchester's army would have held the most northern end of the line, Lord Fairfax's the most Southern end, with Leven's army in the centre. Not one source as yet mentions Tockwith as a place where men quartered or units formed-up.

However, Rupert was not going to plough straight at the Allied force. Watson's account suggests that Rupert entered York that night, leaving his army in Galtres Forest five miles north west of York. Stockdale's letter tells us that Rupert marched to Boroughbridge, over Thornton bridge and down the north side of the Ouse to Poppleton where he caught Manchester's guard upon the bridge of boats there and paused his army in Poppleton. The Allied General's dispatch reports that Rupert passed to Boroughbridge and so put the Ouse between them and himself.

Caught with their army facing the wrong way the three Generals resolved in conference to move the army south to Selby via Tadeaster and Cawood. Again very early in the morning of the 2nd the Allied broke camp and made ready to march. The sources that give any details say dawn, probably about 4.30 a.m.. It is clear that the Scots led the march as two accounts, James Lumsden's and Stockdale's make it clear the Scots had nearly reached Tadcaster "..not one mile from it..", " Within a mile of it..", "...As far as Tadcaster.. ".

Yet WHA account states that he had moved less than a mile when contact was first made with Rupert's forces. As WH. makes it clear in conjunction with Watson that they had quartered at Long Marston it is probable that the two men are referring to Manchester's forces as a whole. Where Lord Fairfax's forces were in the line of march is not known as Sir Thomas did not accompany the main army and no other source adds any clues.

The rearguard of 3,000 Horse and Dragoons under Leslie, Sir Thomas and Cromwell's command had started the morning still on Hessaymoor, according to Stockdale, whilst Leven, Manchester and Lord Fairfax remained in Long Marston. Capt. Henry Westby's account book in Sheffield Archives lists the four Troopers he lost on "Hessa Moor". By about 9 p.m. The army was stretched out over a distance of about eight miles when 5,000 Royalist Horse and Dragoons entered Marston Moor from the direction of Tockwith - Wilstrop. Shortly after the first contingents of Rupert's Foot marched onto the moor.

In doing so Rupert pressed very closely upon the rear of the Allied line of March and the bulk of their wagons and ordinance (Watson). If Rupert were to attack in force virtually all of the Allied ordinance and stores would be lost. Thus Sir Thomas, Cromwell and Leslie sent word to Leven who ordered a recall. It is the rate and style of the this turn about on the line of march that would shape the Allied battle line.

By now some five to six hours had passed, at 2 p.m. Watson would report that "..we had indifferently well formed our army..". Thus it may be argued that the reform could have taken at least five and possibly only four hours. Reform would therefore take nearly as long as the Allied armies had already marched and possibly an hour less.

A change of direction would be forced on the Allied commanders as the Royalist forces marched onto Marston moor from the north and east. Clearly therefore the Allied army would wish to push itself westwards to avoid any risk of being caught at a kack angle. Watson's account could be taken at this point to refer primarily to Manchester's forces when he says "..and as our foot and horse came up, we formed our battlion and the left wing.." it also could refer to the whole army.

Manchester's Horse

If Watson means that the returning units formed the left wing then all other sources would confirm that Manchester's horse formed the right wing of Horse to the Allied army. Yet as Watson himself says later on that Manchester's horse, commanded by Cromwell formed the left wing and that Sir Thomas, with his father's horse commanded the right wing, which six sources in all confirm. Therefore what Watson is saying is that Manchester's army, at the rear of the line of march, formed into Battlia and pushed westwards as the rest of the allied army returned.

If Manchester's army did form the rear of the line of march it would make more sense as units returned to push the line westwards rather than forming the new units to the left of Manchester's forces. This could be argued to be the case as Watson says slightly earlier that "..our Pioneers.." had to "..get ground.." to extend the wings of the army.

It could therefore be argued that Manchester's men slowly pushed their way westwards as the Allied army retraced its route and in doing so clashed with the royalists in the tussle for control of what high ground there was. Lumsden's account makes clear the desire of the Allied commanders to retain any advantage they could whilst the Foot marched up and the skirmishing that went on for control of the ridge line.

At this point the only further evidence that is clearly given by Watson states that Cromwell commanded the left wing of Horse whilst Sir Thomas commanded the right wing of Horse. After that Watson clearly writes "..our foot on the right side of us (being only the Earle of Manchesters Foot).." followed by "..Our three brigades of Foot of the Earle of Manchesters being on our right hand..". Without any doubt whatsoever therefore the left wing of Horse and Foot consisted of the Earl of Manchester's army.

What else was happening then ? As the Scots were first in the line of march then they would have had the furthest to march back. However, as the Scots were the weakest in Horse of all the armies present it would have been foolish of them to take the right wing command. As the strongest in foot with at least twice the number of foot of one of the other two armies and as many as both English armies together it would be more sensible for Leven to take the main battle.

This argument is supported in part by "Mercurius Britanicus" printed by July 8th and in full by "A Full relation of the late victory Obtained.." printed in London on July 11th. "Mercurius Britanicus" confirms the command of the two wings of horse and informs us that a right wing of Foot was commanded by Lord Fairfax, consisting of the Yorkshire Foot and 2 brigades of Scots Foot. Beyond that it names the units that formed the main battle and reserve but does not say where in the line each unit stood. " A Full relation again confirms the command of the two wings of Horse, the existence of a right wing of Foot under Lord Fairfax and the form of the main battle and reserve. Sir Thomas Fairfax's own account again confirms command of the two wings of Horse and places the three Generals, Manchester, Leven and his father with the Foot. In both the main two accounts given above the bulk of the main battle and reserve was formed by eleven regiments of Scots Foot.

Stockdale

However Stockdale's letter somewhat shambles this. Stockdale writes that the Yorkshire forces strengthened with a great party of Scots held the main battle, Manchester held the left wing and the Scots commanded the right wing. Four sources badly contradict this claim in part whilst Stockdale only partly matches his report with Watson's report in one part, that of the command of the left wing of the army and partly matches his claim with the three other sources in terms of the command of the left wing of Horse.

So what did Stockdale see?It is possible that Stockdale assumed that the battle line was formed by just turning the Allied army about and marching back and then west. Stockdale claims that each battle was winged by reserves of Horse, a good practice if marching along a limited number of roads close to hostile forces but a serious force weakener in a pitched battle.

If Stockdale is referring to the marching order of the Allied army then Stockdale is right. Viewed as a marching order then the Scots are in the van with Manchester's army bringing the rear up. Therefore then Lord Fairfax's army is mixed in with the bulk of the Scots army. If Leven had already decided that he would take the centre then the easiest way of achieving that aim is to pass the Scots Foot through Lord Fairfax's army first. In which case this manoeuvre was partly successful

In which case the army could be partly formed-up within four to five hours. Watson and Griffen point out that the ordinance did not open -up until 2 p.m. and ceased fire about 4 - 5 p.m. This could have covered the last of Lord Fairfax's units moving into position after they had waited for the Scots to pass through.

By 5 p.m. on the afternoon of July 2nd 1644 the combined Allied army should have finished all movement. Out of the seven accounts referred to four confirm without any doubt the commanders of the two wings of Horse. Three sources expand upon this and confirm command of the left wing of the Allied army to Manchester. Two sources confirm command of the right wing of the Allied army to Lord Fairfax. Six sources confirm command of the right wing of Horse to Sir Thomas Fairfax.

Sources

"Mercurius Britanicus " and "A Full relation.." are highly exact in their naming of units in the main battle and reserve and both display a good knowledge of the battle, thus both can surely be taken to represent a more truthful account of the action. Watson's account is very good where it covers the actions of Manchester's army but falls over when mentioning anyone else. Lumsden's account is likewise, good when covering the Scots but weak on everyone else. Stockdale's account is odd, it seems to know what is going in the area that Stockdale probably saw but totally misses what is happening during the time taken to form the battle line badly.

References

E2(l) A Continuation
E2(7) Mercurius Britanicus
E2(14) A more Exact Relation of the late Battell
E54 (7) A True Relation of the late fight ...
E54(1 1) A Relation of the Good success
E54 (19) A Full Relation of the late victory obtained
Harleian Mss.166 Fo.87 Thomas Stockdale's letter to John Rush-orth Dated July 5th 1644
Sir Thomas Fairfax's "A Short Memorial ......
Major General James Lumsdens letter to Lord Loundon (Copy in P.Young's book "Marston Moor 1644")