Partly because of lack of shipping, and also because of the nature of the military situation in Southern England, the troops from Munster were brought over in a piecemeal fashion, and used to strengthen the existing Royalist forces, rather than being employed as a separate formation. The first units to arrive, in late October 1643, were the Foot Regiments of Sir Charles Vavasour and Sir John Paulet. They landed at Minehead and Bristol, and were incorporated into the new army which Lord Hopton was raising to advance into Hampshire and the South East. The two units were each between 4 and 500 strong, and were described by Hopton as "bold, hardy men, and excellently well officer'd, but the common-men were mutinous and shrewdly infected with the rebellious humour of England, being brought over meerly by the virtue, and loyalty of their officers, and large promises [of pay] which there was then but small means to performe." [6]

Disciplinary problems were common enough among the troops from Ireland, but in the case of Vavasour's Regiment proved particularly serious. The Irish troops were sent to join in the siege of Wardour Castle, where matters quickly deteriorated. Preparing to march to the relief of Basing House "And not haveing heard of the proceedings of the Irish Regiment at Warder, and doubting that nothing but money would make them tractable, he [Hopton] went himself thither from Winchester, and carried £ 30 with him; where comeing to Funtill he was presently entertained by Sir Cha: Vavaser and Lo: Arundell of Warder (who was then there) with a complaint, that the regiment lying at Henden was in a high mutiny against theire officers, in so much ad they durst not adventure to come amongst them. Whereupon the Lo: Hopton that night appointed a Rendezvous of Sir George Vaughand's Regiment of horse, and of the two troopes of dragoones neere Henden, and with them, the next morning early fell into the Towne upon the mutineers, tooke some of the Principals, and commanded the rest of the regiment to drawe out. And upon that terror, and the execution of two or three of the principale offendours, he drew the regiment quietly to Winchester." [7]

Possibly because of this incident, or through ill-health, Vavasour gave up his command, and was replaced by his Lieutenant- Colonel, Matthew Appleyard, a capable professional soldier, under whose leadership there was no further evidence of mutiny. Sir John Paulet's Regiment was also brought up from Bristol, and Paulet, "a bold hardy man", with European experience, was appointed as Hopton's Major-General of Foot.

The presence of these veterans from Ireland enabled Hopton to take the offensive in December 1643, and both were present at Cheriton on March 29th 1644. Here Appleyard led a force of 1,000 commanded musketeers, who most probably included some of the Irish troops, with considerable success.

Both Regiments (described as Yellowcoats) were present at the Aldbourne rendezvous of April 10th, and served with the Oxford Army during the 1644 campaign, being at Cropredy Bridge, Lostwithiel (where Appleyard again played an important role in the Royalist attack) and II Newbury. Whilst the evidence does not permit a detailed assessment of their roles, it seems likely that the Irish troops must have helped give some extra backbone to the King's foot.

Paulet's Regiment was in Winchester garrison during the winter of 1644/45, but took part in the Naseby campaign. The Regiment may still have totalled 5 companies at Naseby, where it was effectively destroyed.

Appleyard's Regiment was involved in the storm of Leicester, evidently playing a key role, for Appleyarrd was knighted for gallantry and made Deputy Governor. Four companies seem to have been at Naseby, and were lost there.

The next units arrived at Bristol in November. They consisted of the Foot Regiments of Lord Kerry, which had been raised in the West Country in 1642, now commanded by Colonel Sir William St Leger, and that formerly commanded by Sir William Ogle, now led by Colonel Nicholas Mynne. These units had lost some 500 deserters prior to embarkation, ostensibly because of supply shortages, and on reaching England mustered between 800-1,000 men. They were accompanied by about 300 of Lord Inchiquin's Regiment of Horse under Captain Bridges. [8]

These units were despatched to reinforce Sir William Vavasour, commanding Royalist forces in Herefordshire and Gloucestershire, and enabled him to tighten pressure on Parliamentary-held Gloucester. But in April, part of Vavasour's force, including St Leger's Regiment, was added to the Oxford field army. In April, St Leger's men, described by Symonds as a 'full regiment", [9] were lying at Marlborough, and were being re-equipped with pikes and matchlocks from Oxford. In February, the Regiment had been placed under the titular colonelcy of James, Duke of York. [10]

The Duke of York's Regiment, possibly Redcoats, continued to serve with the Oxford Army for the remainder of its career. It was present at Cropredy Bridge, Lostwithiel and 11 Newbury (where St Leger was killed). In 1645, at Naseby, it still seems to have been a fairly strong unit with at least six companies. Henry Ireton was captured when he led an attack on its pikes. Interestingly, two of the officers captured at Naseby have possibly Irish names. [11]

So the Oxford Army was reinforced by three regiments of foot from Ireland during the 1644 campaign. They may have totalled in the region of 1,500 men, just over a quarter of its total infantry. Whilst it is certainly too much to claim, as Malcolm does, that the King would have been unable to have taken the field without them, it may be that the markedly improved showing of the Oxford Army foot during the 1644 campaigns, compared with its performance in the previous year may have owed something to the veterans from Ireland. [12]

Nicholas Mynne's Regiment remained on the Welsh Border, its Colonel, favoured by Prince Rupert, succeeding Vavasour as Colonel-General of the area. Mynne met with little success, however, and was killed by Edward Massey at Redmarley on August 4th, his Regiment being destroyed in the process. [13]

Inchiquin's Horse, who probably included a number of English settlers from Ireland, eventually made their way to the West Country, and suffered a mauling at Dorchester, a number of officers being captured and hanged. On the defection of Inchiquin to Parliament, the Regiment changed sides, and was shipped back to Ireland. [14]

The final major reinforcement from Munster arrived at Weymouth in January 1644. It consisted of the Foot Regiments of Inch in and Lord Broghill, each possibly about 800 strong. [15] They reinforced Prince Maurice s Army, and were engaged in the Siege of Lyme. Inchiquin's men captured Wareham in April 1644, and later garrisoned the town. However, on Inchiquin's defection to Parliament in the autumn of 1644, his Regiment surrendered, and was shipped back to Ireland. Broghill's Regiment followed its example, after serving, without particular notice, with Maurice at the siege of Plymouth and Lostwithiel.

There was a final attempt to despatch troops from Munster to the West of England in the spring of 1644. Anthony Willoughby's Foot Regiment was shipped across, but met with disaster at the hands of the increasingly active Parliamentarian fleet. At least 150 of Willoughby's 400 men were captured, and 70 of these were tied back to back and thrown overboard by Captain Richard Swanley "under the name of Irish rebels" (they certainly included a number of men locally raised in Connaught). This incident marked the effective end of "Irish" reinforcements for the SouthWest. Not only the increasing threat of the Parliamentarian navy, but also the demands of the situation in Ireland, and shortage of shipping ended an effort which had always lacked any clear strategic objective.

The story of the troops from Leinster, however, was very different.

"A Cure for the Scots"

There were a number of factors which made the potential of the troops stationed in Leinster, mostly in Dublin and its environs, considerably different from that of the troops from Munster. They were under Ormonde's direct control, and the shorter sea crossing from Dublin to Royalist- held territory in North Wales and North-West England made their transport less difficult. Furthermore, naval strengths in the northern part of the Irish Sea were more evenly balanced.

The Parliamentarian "Irish Guard" generally operated further south, and the Navy's effective strength in the area consisted of half a dozen armed merchentmen based on Liverpool, which were effectively countered by the Royalist John and Thomas Bartlett, with the naval fifth rate, "Swan" and the armed merchantship "Providence". these, operating from Dublin, proved able to keep the sea lanes open for the Royalists for a fairly brief but critical period. These factors, combined with wintry weather which further hindered the Parliamentarian fleet, made it possible to bring over between 5- 6,000 troops from November 1643 to February 1644. [16]

Unlike in the SouthWest, the prospect of being able to bring over comparatively large numbers of troops fairly quickly opened up the possibility of using them as a unified force to carry out a more coherent strategic programme than was either possible or necessary eleswhere. The long-term aim, it was generally assumed in Royalist quarters, was to use the Army from Ireland as a counter to the imminently expected Scottish invasion. Arthur Trevor, in Oxford, expressed this view in a letter to Ormonde on November 21st.

"The expectation of English Irish aydes is the dayly prayers, and allmost the dayly bread of them that love the Kinge and his business, and is putt into the dispensory and medicine booke of state as a cure for the Scots" [17].

There seem to have been several proposals as to the best way of initially employing the troops when they landed. One was to use them to re-establish Royalist control of Lancashire and Cheshire, a course urged by such local leaders as the Earl of Derby. [18] After fulfilling this objective, they could be used to bar any Scottish incursion down the west coast of England. Alternatively, the troops might winter in the North-West before being used in the spring to reinforce either the King or the Marquis of Newcastle. [19] The final option, and the one, partly through circumstances, eventually adopted, was to leave the decision to the commander on the spot, originally intended to have been Ormonde himself.

Though eventually the need for Ormonde's continued presence in Ireland prevented him from taking up this command, there were good reasons for the Royalists to feel his presence with his troops to be desirable. For there were considerable doubts concerning the reliability and loyalty of many of the soldiers from Ireland. Even before they set out, The King's Secretary of State, Lord George Digby, expressed to Ormonde the Royalists' nightmare scenario: if "the armye that is transporting hither, considered as fatal to the rebels here, in case it come over and continue with hearty and entire affections, but folly as fatall to bid majesty's affaires in case it should revolt." [20]

This fear was to continue to haunt the Royalists, and give hope to their opponents, for some months to come. Ormonde himself was gravely concerned, fearing the effects of Parliamentarian agents who had been reported promising the soldiers their arrears of pay if they should switch sides on arrival. He warned the authorities at Chester, in whose vicinity the troops were expected to land, that the troops "would be apt to fall into disorders, and will think themselves delivered from prisons when they come to English ground, and that they may make use of their liberties to go whither they will. And if the case bee such, that plentifull provision cannot be instantly readie, it is absolutely needfull that a compitent strength of horse and foote, of whoes affections you are confident, sbould bee in readiness by force to keepe the common soldier in awe- And whatever provision is made for them, this will not be amiss." [21]

A further concern was presented by the loyalty of the officers, who were required to swear an oath of allegiance to the King.

The next problem lay in finding sufficient shipping to transport the troops. This was never fully solved, with the result that the Leinster forces had to be carried across in three waves, but Digby (responsible for arranging the reception of the Irish forces in England) was able to despatch to Dublin seven or eight Bristol ships under Captain Baldwin Wake, which were reinforced by a number of vessels obtained by Ormonde. [22]

The need for haste in bringing the troops over was increased by the accelerating collapse of Royalist fortunes in North-West England and North Wales. The local Parliamentarians, under Sir William Brereton and Sir Thomas Myddleton, in an attempt to pre-empt the landings, in late October 1643 launched an offensive into North-East Wales which led to a speedy collapse of Royalist resistance there, and left Chester isolated. On November 16th, the first contingent of Ormonde's troops sailed from Dublin.

This force consisted of about 1,850 men, under the overall command of Sir Michael Earnley, an experienced professional soldier. The troops with him included 400 men (possibly all musketeers) of the Regiment of Sir Fulke Hunckes, Sir Simoin Harcourt's Regiment (now commanded by Richard Gibson), (700 men), Earnley's own regiment, (400), part of Robert Byron's composite Regiment (200), again possibly all musketeers, and the firelock companies of Captains Thomas Sandford and Francis Langley, each 50 strong. [23]

Earnley's men disembarked without opposition on November 21st at Mostyn in Flintshire. The Parliamentarian invasion of North-East Wales promptly collapsed. After making an apparently vain attempt to persuade the newcomers to defect, [24] Brereton retreated into Cheshire, leaving a garrison to hold Hawarden Castle, which, partly under the influence of blood-curdling threats from Captain Sandford, surrendered on 4th December. The troops from Ireland had made their first major contribution to the Royalist cause by saving Chester.

Probably in response to Ormonde's plea that other reliable troops be on hand, on November 21st John Lord Byron was despatched from Oxford with 1,000 horse and 300 foot. On arrival in Chester, Byron, who had been made "Field Marshal-General of North Wales and those Parts" took over command of the forces from Ireland. [25]

On or about December 6th, the second contingent of troops from Dublin disembarked safely at Neston in Wirral. It consisted of the remainder of Robert Byron's Foot Regiment (about 750 men), and Henry Warren's Regiment (about 500 men), together with three companies of dragoons totalling about 140 men. [26] They rendezvoused with the rest of Byron's command in Chester.

The troops from Ireland had been wretchedly provided for on arrival; it was noted that they reached Chester "in very evill equipage..., and looked ad if they bad been used hardship not having either money, hose or sboes, and 'faint, weary and out of clothing." [27]

However, in a remarkably successful piece of organisation, the Royalist M.P. for Wigan, Orlando Bridgeman, had organised the collection of both money and clothing throughout North Wales and the Royalistheld area of Cheshire. In Chester, the Mayor sent "through all the wardd to get apparell of citizend who gave freely, dome whole sutes, some two, some doubletts, others breeches, otherd shirts, shoes, stockings and batts to the apparelling of about 300." [28]

Unfortunately much of this apparent store of initial goodwill was speedily dissipated. It has been claimed, notably by Joyce Malcolm, [29] that the use of the troops from Ireland proved severely damaging to the King's cause among a population fed for years on stories of Irish and Catholic atrocities. However, it should be remembered that the bulk of the new arrivals were in fact natives of Cheshire and North Wales, with friends and relatives in the area! Problems arose rather because of the behaviour of the soldiers. Looting, of cattle and other goods, seems to have begun immediately, many of the men sold their donated clothing back again to the civilian population, and brawling and robberies became a source of increasing alarm to the citizens of Chester. [30]

So alarmed were the civic authorities, that on Ist December they offered at least £ 100 of the city plate to the Royalist commanders on condition that "the soldierd be removed sorth of the Cittie to quarters else wheere by Monday next." [31]

Once active campaigning began, problems continued. Byron was to complain of the hostility of the bulk of the Cheshire population. This was, of course, partly due to the fact that many of them were Parliamentarian in sympathy in any case, but once again the behaviour of the troops, harshened by the brutal war in Ireland, played a large part. Looting continued to be widespread, and was worsened by incidents such as the "mamacre" of civilians at Bartholmley on December 26th. [31]

Though there was in fact some strictly military justification for this, it provided ready propaganda for the enemy, particularly after Byron's letter to the Marquis of Newcastle, defending the action on the grounds that "I find to be the best way to proceed with these kind of people, for mercy to them is cruelty", fell into enemy hands.

Notes

[1] Frank Kitson, "Prince Rupert" (1994), p. 115.
[2] The exact total strength of the government forces in Ireland at this date is virtually impossible to calculate. In August 1642 they had, on paper, an establishment of 42,800, but in reality were considerably weaker. Numbers had dwindled still further in the interim. See Ian Ryder, "An Army for Ireland", 1987.
[3] Thomas Carte, "life J'Ormonde" vol V 5.
[4] Malcolm's findings can be found in her "All the King's Men: the Impact of the Crown lrish Soldiers on the English Civil War", in "Irish Historical Studies", vol. XXI, No 83, 1979, pp.239-264, largely repeated in her book, Caesar's Due: Loyalty and King Charles 1642-46", 1983. Malcolm's theisis is that the King's cause lacked widespread popular support in England, and as a result he was forced to rely heavily on help from elsewhere notably Ireland. Unfortunately, in order to attempt to support her theory, the author relies heavily on indescriminate and unsystematic use of Parliamentarian news sheets, and other unreliable sources. Her statistics are devastating and convincingly, indicted by R. N. Dore in his article "The Sea Approached: the Importance of the Dee and the Mersey in the Civil War in the North Weot"in "Trandactions of the Historic Society of Lancashire and Cheshire, vol. 136, 1986, pp. 1-26
[5] Figures based in part on Ryder, op.cit., pp.31-34, where full references are given.
[6] Ralph Hopton, "Bellum Civile" (1902 ed) p. 62.
[7] ibid p. 64-5
[8] Ryder, og. cit. pp. 31, 33.
[9] Richard Symonds, Harleian MS. 986.
[10] See Ian Roy (ed) "Royalist Ordnance Papers", Oxfordshire Record Society, 1963/4 and 1975, pp. 137, 332, 425.
[11] Peter Young,' Naseby"', P 78-79
[12] Malcolm, "All the King's Men" pp.262-3.
[13] Ronald Hutton, " The Royalist War Effort", 1982, pp. 148-9.
[14] Stuart Reid, "Officers and Regiments of the Royalist Army",vol. III, p104.
[15] Ryder, op. cit. p.33.
[16] See Dore, op. cit. P 1-4
[17] Thomas Carte, "Life of Ormonde", vol. V, p. 52 1.
[18] ibid., pp 504-52.
[19] Clarenton, History of the Great Rebellion", Vol.III., p.35.
[20] Carte, op. cit., vol V., p.51.
[21] Ibid, pp. 505-6.
[22] see Dore, op. cit., 8-9
[23] details drawn from Ryder op. cit., p. 31.
[24] A number of the troops did temporarily leave their colours, but they were apparently mainly local men taking self-granted home leave.
[21] This was not a piece of self-seeking intrigue by Byron as is sometimes alleged, but a clearly defined command intended to remain in force until either Ormonde or some other senior commander was appointed. See Ronald Hutton "The Royalist War Effort", 1982, pp. 123-4.
[26] See Ryder, op cit., pp.31, 32.
[27] HMC Vol. XX App XI, p' 41 '; Harleian MSS (British Library) , 2125, f.135
[28] ibid.
[29] Malcolm, op. cit. P.248.
[30] Chester RO AF/26/4
[31] Chester Assembly Book, f. 64v.

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