by Patrick Ray
The first part of Patrick Ray's look into this interesting subject. It is sometimes suggested that the medieval castle fell into obsolescence as a result of the development of artillery in the course of the fifteenth century, to be replaced by the low-lying polygonal fortifications, purposely designed to withstand gunfire, which were to reach their highest level of development under Vauban some two centuries later. This theory is difficult to reconcile with the lengthy resistance which the defenders of medieval fortifications were sometimes able to sustain in the face of besieging forces during the Civil War, even when artillery was deployed against them. The decline of the castle was, in fact, due at least as much to social factors as to purely military considerations; private individuals placed more and more emphasis on comfort and ostentation rather than security, and either adapted the existing buildings at the expense of their defensive value, or abandoned them altogether in favour of fashionable new houses. In the more settled conditions of the Tudor period, the majority of royal castles were not seen as having an important role to play in the defence of the realm, and were put onto a "care and maintenance" basis. Financial parsimony generally ensured that they received very little of either but were left to crumble gracefully away. Pontefract, which was to defy every attempt at assault in the 1640s, was described in 1609 as "much decayed", [1] nor were the nearby royal castles of Tickhill and Sandal in better condition, although the latter would also endure heavy bombardment before surrendering.
It is noteworthy that the castles were not considered to be militarily obsolete: a commission of enquiry which visited the site in 1564 reported that "the whole castle of Sandal ought to be repaired because there is not other stronghold nearby and £500 would repair it well and sufficiently". [2] A similar report on Harlech Castle, written forty years later, recommended that it should "...be maintained and kept in reparaccion, so that his majesty may easily (if need be) fortify the same - as well as keep the Country in awe from any insurrection, or rebellion, as also to resist and withstand foreign powers". [3] Harlech was to be the last of all castles to fall during the Civil War, largely because of its isolated position and the difficulty of transporting artillery to the site. The former royal castle at Conway, owned by the Archbishop of York and hastily patched up on the outbreak of war, held out for over three months after the neighbouring town had been occupied, however, and there can be little doubt that Harlech was equally defensible.
At Newark, an impressive weight of shot has been dredged from the River Trent beneath the surviving wall of the Castle (built in the twelfth century and refaced in about 1300) - yet it is still substantially intact, and the rest of the building was only destroyed after the war, by systematic demolition. The Tudors concentrated their efforts on maintaining the defences of those parts of the kingdom which were vulnerable to an external threat: the south and east coasts, and the Scottish border. Berwick's Elizabethan defences were built in the new style, with a complex system of bastions designed to allow enfilading fire to sweep the approaches to the ramparts. At Carlisle, however. Henry VIII adapted the medieval castle to mount artillery by lowering and broadening the walls. He was also responsible for the construction of a series of fortifications along the south coast (for example, at Deal, Portland and Walmer) which, though not castles in the strictest sense, are generally referred to as such: though designed to mount powerful batteries of guns and more compact than earlier defences, they still presented almost as sizable a target for artillery as some of their medieval predecessors. At Dartmouth and Kingswear, Henry again adapted fifteenth century castles to fit into his defensive scheme. When civil war broke out in place of the foreign invasion which had long been seen as the principal threat to England's security, neglected and dilapidated medieval fortifications regained much of their former importance. They had been built to dominate strategic points and to act as bases for garrisons who would exercise control over the surrounding country, posing a constant potential threat to any opposing field army which might enter the area and hampering its operations by compelling it to devote a significant part of its strength to the neutralisation of fortresses. These functions were no less valid in 1642 than they had been four hundred years earlier and, as the French army would discover at Verdun in 1916, even a neglected fortification is infinitely preferable to no fortification at all.
Few castles had ever seriously been considered to be impregnable; even if they were more vulnerable to seventeenth century artillery than to the siege equipment of the Middle Ages their effectiveness had simply been reduced - it had by no means disappeared. Indeed, it might even, in a sense, have been increased: a trebuchet or siege tower might be assembled on the spot by carpenters, but not a cannon, which would have to be transported to the scene of operations at the cost of infinite labour over roads no better than those which had existed when the castle was first built, together with its powder and shot. A contemporary author [4] advised that "if the way be foule, morish and durty, then for a whole cannon weighing 7000 lb weight, you must spanne in 15 couple of horse and a Thiller." A "quarter cannon" or culverin, probably the smallest weapon which was of any real use in battering walls, [5] required 6 pairs of horses [6] plus the single "thiller"; it weighed about 3000 lb. Even in good weather, it would have been no sinecure navigating the gun and its cumbersome team along the unmade roads of the period, together with carts containing all the paraphernalia needed to keep horses, gunners and gun mobile and functional: progress would hardly have been rapid at the best of times. Ram; narrow bridges; hills and movement across rough terrain would have reduced it to a crawl [7] if possible, therefore, heavy artillery would be moved by sea or simply borrowed from the fleet, the Parliamentarians obviously having the advantage here due to their superiority at sea. For example, in June 1648, Hugh Peters obtained two drakes two culvenns and two demi-culvenns from the "Lion" at Milford Haven for use in the siege of Pembroke, [8] while Monck deployed ten naval guns to supplement his small battering train at Dundee in 1651. [9] The number of heavy guns available was, of course, finite and acted as another constraint on siege operations. It appears that Sir William Brereton only disposed of a single large calibre piece at Stafford, as he wrote to a colleague who was engaged in siege operations: This is confirmed by an entry in the Order Book of the Staffordshire County Committee, intrigumgly entitled "The Fornicator Gunner", which reads: Brereton's letter dates from 6 May 1645 and the Gunner's discharge from 18 March 1643, suggesting that no additional "great guns" had reached this theatre of operations for over two years, despite the fact that Brereton was responsible for the leaguer of Chester. The calibre of this gun is unknown but it must have been, at the least, a culverin: Brereton wrote to Liverpool on 5 May 1645 requesting that: Ordnance sometimes had to be transported further than this: Cromwell wrote to the Derby House Committee in London when besieging Pontefract Castle in November 1648, asking for 500 barrels of powder, "six good battering guns" (none of which were to be smaller than demi-cannon) and "two or three of the biggest mortar pieces", with ammunition, to be shipped to Hull. He explained that, while there were "....two or three great guns in Hull and hereabouts... they are unserviceable..." [13] Perhaps these weapons were some of the four cannon royal which had been sent from Hull to Wakefield in 1645 for use at the sieges of Sandal Castle. In the previous year, the Earl of Manchester had to send to York for a demi-cannon and "The Queen's Pocket Pistol" in order to batter Sheffield Castle. [14] The latter threw a 36 lb shot and weighed 5,790 lbs. Illustrating the shortage of such weapons, it had been captured from the Royalists at the siege of Hull before being used at Newark and York (with two further changes of owner). Guns of this size could not be moved in a hurry, and even the threat of a relieving force's arrival might induce the prudent commander to withdraw them rather than risking their falling into enemy hands. Brereton's siege of Harwarden Castle had to be abandoned when it was reported that the king was marching north, Sir William explaining that the Parliamentarians had: These factors combined to ensure that many Civil War siege trains were quite inadequate for the tasks which faced them. The British siege train of the Peninsular War was not considered to be particularly well equipped, and it is instructive to use it as a yardstick against which to compare the resources which were available some 160 years earlier. At Badajoz, Wellington was able to deploy sixteen 24 pdrs, twenty 18 pdrs and at least a dozen howitzers. [16] In contrast, the siege train which Cromwell took to Ireland in 1649 consisted of two cannon royal, two cannon, 4 demi-cannon and 3 culverins (excluding lighter guns): [17] this gives a total weight of fire of 367 lbs, as against 744 lbs for the battering train at Badajoz (not counting the howitzers), although it should be noted that, individually, most of Cromwell's guns fired a heavier shot than did Wellington's. The guns requested for use against Pontefract Castle had a combined weight of fire of only 162 lbs. On arrival in Ireland, Cromwell's guns were soon in action against the defences of Drogheda, consisting chiefly of a town wall six feet thick, twenty feet high and with a perimeter of approximately 2600 yards, interspersed with towers. [18] It took only a single day, once the artillery had been brought into action, to bring one of these towers down. The next day, the guns (which had been sited in two batteries) were engaged in bombarding selected stretches of the wall in the same general area and. with the expenditure of two or three hundred pounds, opened up a pair of breaches. The defenders had time to construct half a dozen retrenchments behind the wall and, from these hastily constructed defences, they managed to throw back the first attempt to carry the breaches before being overwhelmed by a second attack. [19] At Badajoz in 1812, Wellington was likewise faced with a medieval town wall, reinforced (where not protected by a river) with eighteenth century bastions of dubious workmanship and by a castle. There were a number of outlying fortifications, but the perimeter of the main defences was in the region of 4800 yards. [20] Between 17 March and 6 April, three breaches were made by the guns. The first two were in the relatively modern bastions and were not very satisfactory, partly because of the range at which the bombardment had been carried out and partly because, despite heavy damage to the masonry of the bastions, the roundshot made very little impression on the clay by which it was backed. It was therefore decided to open a third breach in the curtain wall, and this was achieved by eight 24 pdrs, together with six 18 pdrs, within a single day - perhaps in as little as three hours. [21] A reasonable guess, given that a rapid rate of fire would have been maintained (in order to deny the enemy time to construct retrenchments, by bringing down the wall as quickly as possible) would be that 4 - 500 rounds did the job. In all, no fewer than 18,832 24 pdr and 13,029 18 pdr shot were expended at the third siege of Badajoz, together with 2,523 barrels of powder. [22] Even these totals pale into insignificance compared with those for the siege of San Sabastian. In the course of operations against the town and castle, no less than 43,367 24 pdr and 9,303 18 pdr shot were expended, without taking into account grape, case or howitzer shells. On one day alone, ten 24 pdrs discharged 3500 rounds (though admittedly this was considered to be an exceptional performance). All in all, 5579 barrels of powder (over 220 tons) were consumed. [23] Operations fell into two distinct phases (20 - 25 July, and 26 August - 9 September, 1813) as an assault on the breach made during the first stage of the bombardment was repulsed and the siege then had to be temporarily raised on the approach of Soult's army. Another important factor in this decision was lack of ammunition for the siege train, fresh supplies having to be obtained from Britain. The castle, described by Wellington's artillery commander Alexander Dickson as seeming "almost impregnable except by blockade", continued to hold out after the town had fallen. A total of twenty eight 24 pdrs, three 18 pdrs, eight 8" howitzers, sixteen mortars and four 68 pdr cannonades were turned against it. [24] Two hours of rapid and concentrated fire (preceded by several days of mortar fire), sufficed to bring about the garrison's surrender. No actual breach had been made, but all the guns exposed to bombardment had been dismounted and the wall considerably damaged. The figures quoted above make an interesting companion with the six guns, 1800 rounds and 500 barrels of powder requested by Cromwell for his operations against Pontefract Castle, particularly as only half the powder was forthcoming. He had no illusions about the magnitude of the task he was undertaking, and summed it up by stating: More from Patrick in the first issue of The English Civil War Times. Notes
Back to English Civil War Notes & Queries No. 50 Table of Contents Back to English Civil War Times List of Issues Back to Master Magazine List © Copyright 1994 by Partizan Press This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. |