Issue No 46 of ECW Notes & Queries featured a very enjoyable and stimulating article on "Sir Thomas Fairfax as a Leader". The article, by Jane Mills, was particularly interesting in its analysis of Fairfax's qualities using the critera of management evaluation laid down by Fayol and Drucker.

There are, however, comments to be made on certain assertions made in the article where it touches on Fairfax's role in the Great Seige of Colchester in 1648, and most particularly his part in the executions of Sir Charles Lucas and Sir George Lisle.

In 1748, the Reverend Philip Morant published a seminal history of the town, which, despite a prounounced Royalist bias typical of his time, included a detailed and valuable collation of the events of the seige. Morant's sources were: " taken from Rushworth, Vol VII, Whitelock's Memorials, Heath's Chronicle, Lord Clarendon, Matt Carter, &c" [1]

Morant also makes it clear later in the text that he had studied Fairfax's own memoirs as well. [2]

The first point of accuracy is the question of Sir Charles Lucas' precise involvement in the Kentish rebellion. On Morant's evidence, Sir Charles Lucas was not one of the instigators of the uprising in Kent, "In the mean time, the Royal party were not idle in this county (Essex), but held private and public meetings, on purpose to promote the King's interest; at some whereof the Earl of Norwich assisted: and at Chelmsford they seized on the Committee of Parliament. Sir Charles Lucas, one of the most active Royalists, who had attended these meetings, having drawn together a considerable body, advanced to Brentwood; where the Kentish forces joined him June 8" [3]

However, once this small point of accuracy has been established (and the present writer is always willing to be corrected by any firm evidence), the question of Lucas' treason as advanced by Jane Mills remains unchanged. Before he had committed himself to fight in the second Civil War, Lucas himself was evidently as uneasy on his position in law as subsequent historians have been on his behalf. In 1668, David Lloyd, while conceeding that Lucas broke "his Parol with the General", argues that the cavalry commander had satisfied his own honour and conscience by relying "upon good advice" (although the name and qualifications of his adviser/s are not given). [4]

According to Brigadier Peter Young, C H Firth believed that Lucas could have been excused because he compounded for his estate. [5] If he has been correctly reported, Firth's conclusion is quite perverse, as surely Jane Mills is correct in assuming that by the act of compounding Lucas had recognized the Government. He must have known that any subsequent participation in armed hostilities would bring at least indictment for treason, even if he had a technical defence to the charge.

In the event, Lucas was given little chance to test his arguments, for as we all know, he and Sir George Lisle were summarilly executed with the minimum of legal niceties and the maxium of haste. All indications are that this rough justice was military in nature and not, as Jane Mills suggests, in any way an expression of indignation at the suffering of the people and families of Colchester. The statement of the Council of War as reported by Clarendon has an authentic feel of military bluntness:

"That after so long and obstinate a defence until they found it necessary to deliver themselves up to Mercy, it was necessary, for the example of others, and that the peace of the Kingdom might be no more disturbed in that manner, that some Military justice should be executed; and therefore the Council had determined they three should presently be shot to death" [6]

The reference to three persons here alludes to a further Royalist prisoner, Sir Bernard Gascoigne, whose case will be discussed below.

Parliamentarian Concern

It is easy to see why Jane would assume Parliamentarian concern for the well being of the citizens of Colchester, a town whose contribution and support for the Parliamentarian war effort is a matter of record. The evidence above, however, suggests a cold military indifference for the fate of civilians; indeed, there is some indication that the feeling was even more ambivalent than that.

It is true that from the riots of 1642, when the Lucas house was destroyed and Sir Charles Lucas' mother almost killed by angry citizens, until the ordeal of 1648, there is no doubt that public opinion in the locality was overwhelmingly in support of Parliament. [7] Many years of heavy and growing taxation may well have cooled such ardour, and there were manifest reasons to suppose that the area shared in a national revival of sympathy for the King following his incarceration. Parliamentarian leaders must have been unnerved at the rash of riots which broke out in East Anglia and the Home Counties in the Spring of 1648, with major riots in the Parliamentarian heartlands of Norwich (24th April) and Bury-St Edmunds (12-13th May). [8]

On the very same day as the rioting in Norwich, a petition from the county of Essex, said to contain 30,000 signatures, was presented to Parliament by a deputation of over 2,000 petitioners. This document called for the disbandment of the army and negotiation with the King. Serious disorder was avoided only by a show of force on the part of the army in Westminster and Whitehall. The city did not escape so lightly when a similar petition was presented by the county of Surrey, which ended in rioting and death. By the time Kent had begun to produce a similar petition, the county had slipped into full scale war. That figure of 30,000 signatures must have weighed heavily on Fairfax's mind as he marched for Colchester, as well as the fact that the Essex Committee for Parliament had been taken prisoner, not by the Royalist army but by Colonel Farr, a local officer of the Essex Trained Bands. It is obvious from the all-embracing indemnity published by Parliament on 5th June that the authorities simply did not know whom they could trust. Although Sir Thomas Honywood, after avoiding capture by Colonel Farr, raised the Trained Bands in North Essex for Parliament, it is clear from this and isolated incidents of violence that the New Model Army felt that it was no longer marching through friendly territory.

It is quite possible that Colchester might have tried harder to resist the Royalist army had they known just how close behind Fairfax was. In the event, a troop of sixty horse was sent out "a very formal troop, well armed and accoutred" to bar the way of the Royalists. However, it seems that this troop was decidedly nervous and were soon brushed aside by the Royalist vanguard. Seeing the size of the oncoming army, Colchester surrendered without any bloodshed (save the death of one scout just outside the walls), opening the gates and delivering up their arms. [9]

There is a local tradition that the mayor threw the keys over the wall in order to plead later that he had not actually adimitred the King's party. This is not quite as violent as the forcible entry alluded to by Jane. If Fairfax was aware of the course of these events (and we know that he did not want for spies during this campaign), then fie would have good cause for suspecting the loyalty of at least some citizens.

Where Fairfax had cause for concern, Lucas had cause for hope. We should ignore Clarendon's poisoned profile of him, for Sir Charles Lucas was nobody's fool; his confidence in raising the area for the King was not Digbyesque fantasy, nor desperate romance, but was justified by the events of the previous weeks. Sir Charles was not given to flights of fancy; as well as being a shrewd, professional soldier, it must be emphasised that he was a native of the town which he now defended, and knew its people well. The hopes of the Royalists for support from the Suffolk

Trained Bands poised on the Nayland River must raise further questions on the solidity of local allegiance. [10]

In any event, there is no indication either in the Articles of Surrender or in the subsequent Queries Propounded by the Commissioners from Colchester that there was ever any particular attention to the sufferings of the townsfolk. The mention that "such as are wounded and sick in the Townc shall be there kept and provided for" is as likely to be a reference to the Royalist soldiery as to the civilian population. [11]

It is surely a most significant indication of the prevailing military attitude that the victorious Fairfax celebrated the surrender by promptly levying a fine £ 14,000 on the populace. This fine, soon reduced to L12,000 was to excuse the town from being plundered by the forces of Parliament. It was one glaring inaccuracy of the Channel 4 Civil War series to state that the town was sacked - it was not. Half of this fine fell on the large Dutch community of Colchester, a convenient and vulnerable ethnic minority which the Royalists had not ommitted to fleece during their own occupation. According to Morant, L10,000 of this fine was distributed amongst the Army and £ 2,000 given to relieve the condition of Colchester's poor. The poor Dutch (which was now basically all 1,500 of them) received the princely sum of £ 100. [12]

Fairfax then proceeded to slight the huge and historic Roman walls of the town. This was a move which, as an antiquarian, the Lord General would not have done lightly, but at the same time it was the standard proceedure where the inhabitants were not to be trusted.

Gray Area of Leadership

From the moment that the garrison of Colchester surrendered, we enter a grey area where the motives and leadership of Fairfax are concerned. The municipal fine and slighting could still be considered within what might be termed the mechanics of war for payment of the army and strategic demolition were areas where Fairfax was experienced and confident. The aftermath is another matter. The most obvious fact, as Jane Mills tightly pointed out, is that the executions were out of character for Fairfax. Thus, there will probably always be a debate on the instigator of the move and on the motive behind the choice of Lucas, Lisle and Gascoigne.

Communications between the two forces during the seige betray a considerable amount of personal animosity between Fairfax and Lucas. From the start Fairfax bluntly refused to treat with Sir Charles, describing him in a letter of June 17th as a man who had "forfeited his parole, his honour and his faith, being his prisoner upon parole, and therefore not capable of command, or trust in martial affairs" [13] As young men, they had both fought in the setvice of the Dutch United Provinces, and it is just possible that the bad feeling had begun then. The Mills article details a strong case against Lucas, in particular in compounding for his estates in Essex. [14] He had previously been captured at Marston Moor in 1644 and Stow-on-the-Wold in 1646, and had been at Parliament's mercy after the surrender of Berkeley Castle. Sir Charles Lucas must have known that there was a limit to the patience of his enemies.

Sir George Lisle seems a more unfortunate soldier. His only crime seems to have been identified as one of the King's most competent and resourceful commanders, and thus simply too dangerous to live. It is notable that two other Royalist commanders of similar calibre taken at Colchester found themselves in particular peril. Lord Capel was indeed executed for his part in the Seige, whereas the escape of Sir William Compton will always leave unanswered the question as to whether he would have also paid with his life.

Sir Bernard Gascoigne

The third candidate chosen for immediate execution at Colchester is even more problematical than Lisle. Sir Bernard Gascoigne was reprieved at the last moment when his true nationality was discovered. As Buarnardo Guasconi, a Florentine and personal friend of the Duke of Tuscany, [15] it was suddenly realised that his death might have international repercussions. This action of mercy suggests that at least some influential members of the Council of War were well aware of the larger implications of any Parliamentarian action. It also suggests that a mood of deliberation rather than hot-headed bloodlust prevailed in the secret debates.

The initial inclusion of Sir Bernard Gascoigne in the death list also makes it possible to discern the method behind the selection for the firing squad. A footnote by Morant quotes the list of officers taken prisoner at Colchester, which he in turn took from the account published by John Wright on 2nd September, 1648. The names on the list follow the standard order of social and military precedence of the time, with the first names being: George Goring, Earl of Norwich; Col. Arthur, Lord Capell; Henry Hastings, Lord Loughborough; Sir Charles Lucas; Col. Sir William Compton; Col. Sir George Lisle; Sir Bernard Gascoigne. Once the decision to make an example had been taken (and here we have for evidence the statement above, which talks of "an example to others"), it is conceivable that the Council of War simply ran their finger down the list in their possession and picked the first three names, who, whilst being prominent commanders, were yet men who could be safely done to death without delay and without referral to higher authority. Here Fairfax himself reported "I thought fit to manumitt ye Ld Capell, ye Ld Norwich &c., over to ye parlarn't being the Civil Judicature of ye Kingdom... as ye most prop' Judges of their Cases, being considerable for estates and Familyes. " [16]

So, by excluding the peers and Sir William Compton (who, as son of the 2nd Earl and brother of the 3rd Earl of Northampton was certainly "considerable for estates and Familyes"), we are left with three names - Lucas, Lisle and Gascoigne.

The peers and Compton were transported to London. Compton was imprisoned, pending trial. He escaped on January 29 1648/9, whereas he may otherwise have been expected to appear on trial with Norwich, Capell and the Earl of Holland the following month, possibly to climb the scaffold on March 9th with Capell and Holland. Norwich, a man of little military energy or accomplishment, was saved from death by one vote. Capell, like Lisle, a soldier of some ability, was condemned by the same margin. Perhaps the authorites had decided enough examples had been made before Loughborough came to answer-, he survived by compounding for his estates and paying a huge fine.

The executions of Lucas and Lisle have hitherto been seen in isolation whereas it is surely more comprehensible to view them in the line of executions (Capell, Holland, Hamilton and King Charles himself) which followed the second Civil War. Put together, these executions fit a pattern of Parliamentarian attitude, if not written policy. The war had begun by being fought with the apologetic civility displayed by Sir William Waller and his friend, Sir Ralph Hopton. By 1648, it had degenerated into a dogfight for survival and supremacy, increasingly notable for callousness and mutual contempt. Parliament, irritated by the stubborn flame of insurrection, began to sever heads as the prospect of reconcilliation faded. This was no more than the treatment Royalists were later to meet out to Parliamentarian commanders such as Harrison and Okey.

In common with many other soldiers in history, Fairfax emerges as a warrior manifestly more at home on the battlefield than in the council chamber. Once the fighting was over at Colchester, he appears to have been eager to retreat as far into the shadows as his great office would allow.

His own distaste at the course of events was conclusively shown by his absence from the King's trial (where his proRoyalist wife offered noisy evidence of her influence). In the Army debates of 1647, Fairfax had sat on the fence and preferred to distance himself from the politicking. Cromwell, and particularly Ireton, then largely took matters out of his hands. [17]

Without in any way decrying his very obvious and excellent talents as a military commander, 1647 and 1648 provided two of the most glaring examples of Fairfax's lack of political acumen. Every time the military strategy took second place to politics, the Lord General lost his grip on the situation and he would be swept along on the tide of events. The unease of a physically brave man struggling to cover his idealogical timidness is evident in his Memoirs, where the glories of the northern battles are dearlt with in detail, and the stains of the Colchester campaign scantilly covered,

"I thought fit to manumitt ye Ld Capell, ye Ld Norwich &c., over to ye palam't being the Civil Judicature of ye Kingdom... as ye most prop' Judges of their Cases, being considerable for estates and Farmlyes. But Sir Charles Lucas & Sr Geo. Lysle being meer soldiers of Fortune and falling into or hands by ye chance of war, execution was done upon ym. And in this Distribution of Justice, I did nothing but according to my Commission, & ye Trust reposed in me." [18]

Peter Young was right to assert that Fairfax was at his best during the first Civil War, when his northern campaigns showed such resourcefulness, resilience and inspiration as to bear comparison with the Marquess of Montrose. It is this leader that can be recognized in the article by Jane Mills. Command of the New Model Army, on the other hand, became as much a political position as a military appointment, and, as Peter Young observed, "he never had much grip on the New Model".

Fairfax to Cromwell

On the resignation of Fairfax from the position of Lord Generall, his place was immediately taken by Oliver Cromwell. Unlike his predessessor, Cromwell was a man uniquely suited for the task, having sufficient talent to be a competent military commander and more than enough political skill to be a strong statesman. The Earl of Manchester had already found to his cost that Cromwell was quite capable of fighting the enemy and waging political War against his colleagues at the same time. At that time, John Lilburne was his chesspiece. Cromwell may have offered him a general's baton more for his political potential than any inherrent military, ability Lilburne's resignation from the army and his increasingly savage attacks on the Lord Protector may reveal an anger at having been used as well as a passion for democracy.

Cromwell recognized a very real danger in Lilburne and by his trial in 1649 attempted to have the Leveller erased. By the time of the Army Debates, we can already see that Ireton had taken the place planned for Lilburne as Cromwell's enforcer. Cromwell did not Wage all out political war against Fairfax as he had done against Manchester, but we can observe that with each little nudge, it was only a matter of time before the Lord Generall was baited into resignation and his protection withdrawn from the Presbyterians in Army and Parliament. Whether they were consciously co-ordinated or not, the wave of executions in 1648 signalled a new milestone in the struggle for the soul of the Roundhead alliance, just as the actions against the Earl of Manchester, and the Self Denying Ordinance had done four years before.

It has often been suggested that Ireton accompanied Fairfax on the Colchester campaign more in the capacity of a warder than a lieutenant, and that it was he who advocated the executions after the surrender of the Royalist garrison. The executions were out of character for the compassionate and honourable Fairfax: they were not out of character for the cold and ruthless Ireton. Whether he was the instigator of the policy begun at Colchester or received guidance from elsewhere, it is Ireton who stands out as the most enthusiastic and energetic volunteer for the task of executioner.

Notes