The plans which Prince Rupert's Engineer and Quartermaster-General, Bernard De Gomme, drew up showing the dispositions of the Royalist armies at Edgehill, Marston Moor and Naseby are well-known to historians of the Civil War. Less known, but of considerable interest is the plan which De Gomme prepared of the deployment of the Royalist forces on the morning of November 9th, 1644, outside Newbury, when the King offered battle to the combined forces of the Earl of Manchester, Sir William Waller and the Earl of Essex.

Before discussing De Gomme's Plan (British Library Add. MSS 16370, fol.61), in more detail, a brief description of the events surrounding its production may be useful.

On the night of October 27th, after the day's fierce fighting known as the Second Battle of Newbury, the Royalist army withdrew under cover of darkness, leaving their baggage and guns in the relative safety of Donnington Castle. Whilst the main army fell back on Wallingford, King Charles and his Lifeguard headed for Bath to hasten Prince Rupert and his promised reinforcements from Bristol.

Picking up this urgently needed assistance, which may have totalled 5,000 horse and foot under Rupert, Sir Marmaduke Langdale and Sir Charles Gerrard, the King reached Oxford on November 1st, and on the 6th ordered a general rendezvous of his forces on Bullingdon Green. The combined Royalist armies may have been 15,000 strong. The King took the opportunity to honourably retire his General, the old, much-wounded, and increasingly deaf and bibulous Earl of Forth, and appointed Prince Rupert in his place.

On November 7th, with 5,000 horse and 6,000 foot, the King and Prince Rupert set out to relieve Donnington Castle and recover their artillery and baggage.

The Parliamentarian commanders, meanwhile, had done nothing to capitalise on any advantage which they might have gained from the battle at Newbury. It had proved impracticable to mount any effective pursuit of the retreating Royalists, whilst the senior Parliamentarian general present, the Earl of Manchester (Essex was absent, pleading illness) refused, despite the please of Sir William Waller, to follow the King towards Bath. As his reason, he cited shortage of supplies and sickness and desertions among the troops. The Parliamentarian army was indeed probably unfit to undertake a serious campaign, but Manchester was in any case unwilling, for a variety of reasons, to risk a major battle.

Instead, he made a half-hearted attempt to reduce Donnington Castle, and after its failure, on November 2nd agreed reluctantly with Waller and Cromwell's demands for an advance into the Thames Valley to cover forces left to maintain the siege of Donnington. But even these limited objectives were more than Manchester was willing to go along with for long. He threatened to return to the Eastern Association unless a Council of War agreed to fall back again to Newbury, a move which was carried out on November 6th.

Next day, on learning of the Royalist march to relieve Donnington, Manchester ordered Cromwell to lead the Parliamentarian horse to intercept them. Cromwell realistically pointed out the impossibility of attempting this. "My Lord, your horse are so spent, so harassed out by hard duty, that they will fall down under their riders if you thus command them; you may have their skins, but you can have no service."

The Royalist army reached Donnington Castle at about 1 p.m. on November 9th. Whilst the garrison was reprovisioned, and the artillery brought out, the main force "drew into battle", but seeing no sign of the enemy, crossed the River Lambourn "by a mill and two fords besides it". The Royalists drew up in the large open field between Speen and Newbury "which was thought a good place to expect the enemy who in the meantime had drawne a greate body of their horse and foote into the other field towards Shaw, and made breastworks and batteries on the backside of Newbury".

Richard Symonds describes the course of events.

"The enemy betimes in the morning drew off all theire men betweene us and the Castle. About two of the clock all the King's Army was drawne clowne by the Castle over the river and picht in Battalia in the playne on the last ground we had before, a body of horse and a body of foot ranged together. About 4 the enemy drew off Newbury two bodyes of horse and lyned a hedge with musquetiers, played upon our horse with their cannon as they marched up to them. And because the Queen's regiment of horse was drawne within danger of some musquetiers which they drew down below Mr [Shaw's] house which Colonel Lisle last kept for us, and a body of the enemyes horse drew boldly out, the Prince Rupert commanded the Queen's regiment of horse and Prince Maurice and his regiment or horse to charge them, who no sooner drew up to them but the rebells wheeled off behind theire owne cannon and musquetiers, which galled that body of ours. Captain Fitzmaurice killed of the Prince's regiment, and divers more killed and hurt. Their cannon played on both sides, and their musquetts. Little hurt on our side. A muskett bullet in volley shott the King's horse in the foot as he stood before his owne regiment in his armes.

It growing night, the whole army marched off in full bodies, drums beating and colors flying, trumpets prattling their marches, all in the face of the enemy, who followed not but with some piquering rogues. Our army drew up to the castlehill, and lay in the field all night, the King lay in the castle."

Charles had called a Council of War in the field, which, possibly with the exception of Prince Rupert, agreed that by relieving Donnington Castle and recovering their ordnance and baggage the King "had done his business" and by crossing the river in the face of the enemy and offering battle had regained any honour lost in the encounter of the previous month. It was probably the right decision; the day's skirmishing had shown the Parliamentarians to be in a strong defensive position.

The Parliamentarians were in fact no more eager to risk battle. The bulk of their foot had been drawn up behind the hedge to the west of Shaw House, facing west, whilst Cromwell and some of the horse were on Newbury Wash on the south side of Kennet and to the south of the town. Many of the horse had scattered to forage, and it was late in the day before Cromwell was able to muster all of them. Newbury itself was held by some foot. A Council of War was held, which decided against offering battle; the Royalists could be strongly supported by the guns of Donnington Castle, and the fear was expressed that if the whole army was drawn north of the Kennet, the Royalists might succeed in slipping past them into Newbury. It was felt that a better opportunity to fight might occur next day when the Royalists withdrew.

On the morning of the 10th, picking up his ordnance from the Castle, the King began his retreat. After falling back about 2 miles, the Royalists halted at about 11 a.m. on Winterbourne Heath, evidently prepared to offer battle. The Parliamentarians held another Council of War. In addition to the previous objections to fighting, the army was growing steadily weaker; there were said to be only 4,500 horse left out of the 8,000 at the start of the campaign, whilst Essex had only 800 horse and 1,200 foot (he had had perhaps 3,000 foot at the start of the 2nd Newbury campaign). Sir Arthur Hazelrigg shared the opinion of Manchester that a defeat would be disastrous, but Cromwell, who feared an invasion in the spring by the French in support of the King, wanted to fight despite the disadvantages. However the majority of the Council supported Manchester in his unwillingness to fight, and apart from a half-hearted attack by some horse, who were repulsed, on the rear of the Royalist army when it resumed its retreat, no fighting took place.

The King successfully completed his autumn objectives by relieving Basing, and had some grounds for satisfaction when his army went into winter quarters on November 23rd. His opponents' armies, on the other hand, were on the point of disintegration. Parliament's response was to be the New Model.

The Plan

De Gomme's Plan measures approx 55 x 45 cms., and like the other plans of Royalist orders of battle which he produced, seems to have been drawn after the Restoration, and based presumably on a rough draft produced in the field, probably for the use of the Council of War prior to the battle. Further evidence for this is given by the fact that De Gomme had evidently forgotten the date on which the Relief of Donnington took place, and credits Sir Charles Gerrard with the peerage which he did not actually receive until the late summer of 1645.

As in all of De Gomme's Plans, only a sketchy indication is given of terrain, and the River Lambourne is incorrectly called the Kennet, which is actually the un-named river on the Royalist right flank. The vague Parliamentarian dispositions shown should also be treated with caution.

Not all of the Royalist regiments known to have been present are shown, in this respect the Plan is less detailed than some of De Gomme's other productions, but it is an invaluable source of information for the Royalist order of battle, and of the formations adopted by Rupert on his first appearance as C-inC. The close resemblance to the Royalist deployment at Naseby is striking, in fact the Plan is an excellent guide (especially for wargamers interested in "what-if" scenarios) to the dispositions which the Prince would have employed on that occasion if Goring and Gerrard had been present.

De Gomme credits the Royalist army with a total strength of 4,200 horse and 5,000 foot, which seems rather on the low side, unless he is not including officers.

The Order of Battle

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