by Rhoads Murphey, UCL Press ISBN 1-85728-389-9

This long-awaited study looks at the successive phases of warfare: before, during and after, with a unifying theme being the constraints and limitations of Ottoman warfare. Dr. Murphey challenges common misconceptions regarding the impact of gunpowder technologies; the religious motivations of the Ottoman soldier and the effect warfare had on the empire and its inhabitants.

Chapter One gives a broad overview of the period emphasizing warfare on the European front as the Ottomans defended their Balkan conquests. Whilst major wars were fought warfare was characterized by small scale fighting (6,000-8,000 men) usually initiated by 1ocal commanders.

Chapters Two to Five highlight the constraints on Ottoman warfare. Transport problems and improvements in fortress design limited the impact of gunpowder technologies. Warfare was an expensive business and tables show the growing cost of the regular army, particularly the Janissaries, and the prohibitive cost of naval operations. Physical constraints included the time taken just to reach the borders within the campaign season. Further limitations included the need for quality pasture in the spring for a largely cavalry army and the risk that late season campaigns would literally be bogged down. The popular myth of the marauding Ottoman army living off the land is buried in detailed statistics showing the preparation for each campaign including transport and grain supplies. By the standards of the period, Ottoman armies were better equipped, supplied and even more regularly paid than their opponents.

Chapter Six looks at Ottoman methods of warfare with an emphasis on how the prevailing technology was deployed in actual battlefield conditions. In doing so the book challenges the subjective and one-sided European accounts of Ottoman military techniques, which imply a general backwardness, particularly in the 17th century. The siege of Baghdad and the 1664 Danube campaign are used to illustrate the process.

Perhaps the most fascinating aspect of this book is to be found in Chapter Seven with a study of the motivational and psychological aspects of Ottoman warfare. Dr. Murphey argues that ideological and religious inspiration was less important by the 16th century. The motivation of he leadership and the individual soldiers was a much more complex matter than simply focussing on the so-called "Gazi" state. Individuals were motivated by a range of factors including pre-battle incentives, postbattle rewards as well as army ritual and an organizational effort to maintain the welfare of the troops.

The final chapters look at the destructive capacity of war on the Ottoman State and the impact fiscal pressures and recruitment had on the economy. It concludes that the costs of warfare both in terms of expense and social costs were kept within sustainable bounds. Thus the Ottomans' never transformed into the military society that is sometimes claimed.

This work makes a justifiable claim to become the definitive study of Ottoman warfare in the early modern period. Detailed notes help to make the book eminently readable and point the reader in the right direction for further study. Highly recommended.

For those of you who like statistics the book contains 192 pages of text, seven appendices with 48 pages of notes, an index and a select bibliography of primary and secondary sources (eight pages). Included are 14 tables (army strengths, expenditures, transport loads and costs) five illustrations (Ottoman paintings of army life but nothing original) and five maps (extent of the empire during the period, travel distances, etc.).