With all due respect to Colonel Rosenberger, his article is a bunch of crap. While I don't have time to go through ii point by point, let me say that the basic facts are correct; however, he presents these facts in a misleading, one-sided, and disingenuous way. For instance, the fact that GPS is jammable has been well known in the military for 12 years and publicized in the open press for five years, however, what he didn't tell you is that the next generation of GPS with anti-jamming capability will roll out soon. He asserts that the Chechens were so smart for using Cell phones; however, he fails to tell you that cell phone technology is much more jammable and interceptable than the tactical communications devices that he derides in his article. He also fails to mention that there are at least four different radio systems in development which will address the weaknesses he describes. There isn't anyone in the operational community, the doctrine development community, or the acquisition community who isn't cognizant of the issues that the Colonel raises; however, rather than just criticizing everyone and implying that those who develop and deploy these technologies are stupid, the people in those communities work every day to find solutions to those problems. Colonel Rosenberger is a "finder;" it is much more difficult and useful to be a "fixer." It is important to remember that the OPFOR at the NTC is more copetent, better trained, and better led than any enemy we are likely to face on any battlefield. NTC is INTENDED to me more challenging and intense than real war. One of the advantages that the OPFOR has is that they fight on the same ground over and over again. That analysis COL Rosenberger describes of the terrain in which they template where the command and control nodes are likely to be sited has been tested, modified, and validated through hundreds of "battles" on the same piece of ground. The OPFOR commanders don't even have to do much planning anymore; they knoyv what the enemy will do. There are only so many ways to attack the Whale Gap. My complaint with his article, however, is not his omissions and clear bias but with his conclusions. He assets that the "direction, design, and investments we've made" in technology have been wasted. He asserts that without his insights, the joint team has made imprudent investiments in technology, equipment, doctrine, etc. He also seems to imply that smart folks pay no attention to the outcomes of "battles" at the NTC for lessons learned. These assertions are misleading and false. What would COL Rosenberger have us do? Fight with spears, since they don't break, they cannot be jammed, and their location on the battlefield is not easily predicted. Even signals passed by flags can be "jammed" through the use of smoke, artillery, etc. The services have been following lessons learned around the world, in Kosovo, Chechneya -- and even at the Colonel's NTC. Services create Mission Needs Statements which are eventually turned into Operational Requirements Documents (ORDs). These ORDS are used as the basis of developing and acquiring new equipment (and technologies!) for our soldiers. The services, however, do not have unlimited funds, and projects must be prioritized. This process has created the stronges military the world has ever known. It has lots of blemishes and warts, but it works better than analogous systems in every other country in the world. COL Rosenberger, however, seems to think that those who develop and acquire systems for our soldiers are stupid and oblivious to the weaknesses of the systems that are given to our soldiers. This is in fact NOT true. While sometimes it takes operational use to find out ALL the flaws in a new system, the Operational Test community identifies most of the weaknesses before the system is certified for issue to soldiers. War has always been about measures, counter measures, and counter counter measures. We can choose to advance technology -- and therfore our warfighting capabilities -knowing full well that the enemy will develop countermeasures that we will in turn learn to compensate for or defeat, or we can wait for the enemy to develop technologies first to use against us. Buck. Thanks for your comments. Quite interesting , like I didn't know anything about the work to alleviate the GPS guidance problems. Again I'11 say the atricle was included to elicit comments from those like yourself who are in the know. Bill. Back to Dispatch April 2003 Table of Contents Back to Dispatch List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 2003 by HMGS Mid-South This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com