Part I, Introduction and Republique rules Overview
The War Times Journal is an electronic magazine located on the Web
at: There's no subscription or membership fees required, so once you
have accessed WTJ's home page, you have at your immediate disposal a
plethora of information and links, such as the ARCHIVES and PORTAL. The
available links are also topical-related to such topics as news stories on
hostile activities and modern-day warfare subjects.
You may enter WTJ's electronic store and do some quick shopping
using their shopping-cart method. Order what you need, miniatures,
accessories, books, et al.
And this magazine has more. One of its main features are the rules
available to visitors by simply clicking "print." Yes, readers and
computerphiles, no downloading required. You choose the what type of rules
that you would like to learn and use, such as Battlefleet, WWI miniature
rules for warfare at sea; 1916, WWI miniature rules for land combat; 1943,
WWII miniature rules for land warfare; and Republique, Revolutionary and
Napoleonic miniature rules for grand tactical land warfare on the Continent.
Even of greatest manifest is that the rules are supported by WTJ's
intranetwork, created by its message-board system, which allows inquirers,
supporters of the rules, and other Wargamer-related information and
questions to appear in a series of message formats with links to e-mail
addresses of the recipients for immediate contact. This discussion utility
amply reinforces WTJ's prowess for inter-relating components of the rule
types with the subjects of discussion, and thereby providing hyper-rule
sources and objectifying their quality control, both interdependently (WTJ
as innovator of the original rule version and the supporters or consumers).
There's a constant "Revision Index," also called a "Change Index,"
which tracks corrections, changes, additions, and deletions to the body of
the particular rule set. The purpose of these extra pages is to give
adherents and newcomers a ready-made reference to revisions made to the set
of rules, although I have some reservations about this which will be
discussed in Part II.
Another valuable addition to augment rule compatibility with
consumers is the "Question and Answer" section which lists and elucidates
on "The Most Common Question . . ." and their answers concerning the rule's
system.
Some rules have additional features which you may access and print,
including the pages just mentioned above. For instance, the Republique
rules have a small "Uniform Glossary," "Battlefield Tactics,"
"Situations and Examples," "Leader Ratings," "Troop Lists" of 6 major
nations and relative time periods, "Combat Chart" and "Assault" matrix on
one page, and the "Movement," "Leaders," "Rallying," etc. on another
page--both are accessible in either US measure or International measure
(mm). In addition, you may add a template of Republique's Artillery fire
zone, which includes its "frontage zone" and its arc of fire, and
Republique's "Optional Rules," which includes a sighting table, congreve
rockets, and other national and idiosyncratic options.
The organization and the methods of elucidation of WTJ's rules and
their rule support network makes their rules a special variety or genre,
which I have identified through METAWARGAME, as "Web-accessible Rules." By
far, WTJ's resourceful, innovative, and imaginative work has brought forth
a truly elemental addition to the Wargame Community, not only formatting an
useful magazine, but also designing and supporting rule versions with the
consumer in mind.
For Historical Miniature Wargamers who would like to access rules
from WTJ's web pages, go to www.wtj.com/games and pick your poison! I
accessed Republique recently which cost me $9.00 at the local library to
copy 60 pages. Please remember that WTJ's rules are copyrighted; that
means you're subject to copyright and "fair use" restrictions.
In Part I of this article, I discussed War Times Journal as an
electronic magazine, located on the web at 1. Synopsis
The proceeding are extracts of questions to and answers from WTJ's
Webmaster, part of WTJ's support network. Please keep in mind that,
because of the length of some of the questions and their answers, some of
the extracted material is shortened with ellipses accompanying longer
extractions. The focus of the Q&A is about WTJ's Historical Miniature
Wargame rules, REPUBLIQUE, Grand Tactical Napoleonic Warfare in Miniature
rules and the resultant discussions. Each question will be followed by the
answer which was given by the Webmaster, and this answering will be
preceded by a ">." A comment by me may follow the answer, and this will
concern what's still on my mind about the material previously discussed
which you are reading, in fragment.
2. Question #1.
On page 3 in the FORMATION EXAMPLES: It says "Squares move
normally except ...." With this rule source, I must believe that all
squares formed during a scenario will move at normal infantry movement,
except where, otherwise, noted? The allied squares at Waterloo hadn't
dared to move during the French pernicious cavalry assaults. And I know
only a few examples of squares moving: the French created divisional
squares in Egypt to protect themselves from the Mamluk horsemen and the
Austrians used a battalion mass. Both were movable to a certain degree of
tactical deployment. So why such a general rule incorporated into
REPUBLIQUE's structure to accommodate a closed and insignificantly used
tactic? Why not just limit the use of a movable square to National strategy
characteristics?
Actually, I believe that squares were both more mobile, and more
common than is generally believed. As for mobility, General Friant related
watching a battalion/regimental square marching in double-time past his
position and disappearing over the hill near which he was deployed (this
was at the front line, not behind it). The large squares deployed in Egypt
were unusual, but it is important to note that they were very mobile, which
could not have been achieved without also having first been attainable on a
smaller scale. There are also eyewitness cases of smaller/company squares
fighting rear guard actions against cavalry while also maintaining their
withdrawal (i.e. fighting while marching in square). The British squares
at Waterloo probably did remain immobile during the cavalry assaults . . .
People mention their immobility, and there is little doubt that they
probably stood firm in their positions, but that does not mean that they
were incapable of moving. Only that they chose not to due to local
conditions. As for rarity, squares were quite common, and very much the
formation of choice in any unsure situation. According to one eyewitness
account, the beginning of the Aspern-Essling
battles in 1809 saw much of the Austrian and French armies deployed into
squares due to the unsure nature of enemy dispositions. The Austrian
"column mass" was actually a closed column of divisions, a formation which
dated back to the Seven Years War, and was widely known throughout Europe.
It has become famously associated with the Austrians simply because they
were specifically noted as using it, but in reality other nations also
used the same closed-column formation in various incarnations. A factor
which would definitely effect square performance would be troop grade.
The effect of troop grade on unit movement is something not addressed in
Republique because we have decided to keep the rules simple. We have
however, considered adding an optional set of rules which would have troop
grade effecting unit movement and formation changing. That would involve
several issues you raised here, and some others, the most important being
the relative incapacities of green or militia troops
Comment: True, to develop this and obtain a reasonable simulative
effect, Republique's rule structure would support a general adaptation for
square forming based on the lesser experienced formations; but keep in mind
how the rate of conscription increased for France, even after the debacle
in Russia, and how this effects training by sending these novice formations
into the field. What major officer would suspect that commanders of units
wouldn't train their troops while out on active duty with the concept of
square? In Spain, thousands of French soldiers had to be used to offset
guerrilla activities. Could it be that these recruits from France where
already trained and indoctrinated in the defensive motions of square
forming or learning it through practice sessions given by their able and
qualified commanders? Or was it a skill more required of the front line
formations who might accidentally ambulate into an unannounced enemy
cavalry formation? To learn how to form square would be a skill developed
by the unit; its continued practice thereafter would invoke definite
experienced usage. Therefrom, I believe that square performance is
affected by commander ability (control), especially when the likelihood of
engagement becomes inevitable, which could be a reflection of Republique's
LEADER RATINGS and the experience of the formations, which would be the
GRADE of the various troops.
3. Question #2.
In the SITUATION AND EXAMPLES FOR REPUBLIQUE: "Y" is assaulted by
two dragoon brigades while in "ordered square." As a result of the
cavalry's second assault round, Y must retreat (MANDATORY MOVEMENT, p.12)
one full move [8"] as "shaken[?]" in the face and embroilment of a recent
[and also continuing] charge and assault. The retreat withdraws Y 800
yards away from a highly mobile enemy where it is destroyed by the final
assault of Cavalry unit "A." Although I understand the generality of
Repulique's rule mechanics, I'm not sure why they allow infantry in a
square formation to escape the clutches of even a disordered cavalry
assault which would have reserve waves of squadrons available to pin Y
infantry unit where it had been, originally, contacted. Is there some
explanation for this type of discrepancy? Shouldn't Y be, automatically,
demoralized if any cavalry assault wins the assault outcome while Y is in
square?
The answer is "maybe, maybe not." That's why we let the dice
have such a strong influence. The infantry might have rolled poorly (real
life: panic, disorder, poor morale, etc.) or they might have rolled well
and bloodily repulsed the cavalry (real life: good NCOs, effective
volleys, good morale, etc.). The cavalry might have had reserve
squadrons, but because the die roll failed to destroy the square, the
inference is that they either did not, or that they were not deployed
correctly by the "local" commander (which is out of the control of the
player [decentralized control]). It is important to note that the initial
goal of the mission was eventually achieved, I.E. - the destruction of the
square. It just didn't occur as "cleanly" as the attacker would have
preferred, which is how events often transpired.
Comment: Participants have no control over local commanders in
Republique. It seems to me that local conditions are evinced or evidenced
through the knowledge of the players, yet how may Historical Miniature
Wargamers have knowledge or experience of defending and attacking on the
Napoleonic battlefield? The fact the Y has either good NCOs or bad NCOs is
not a necessary condition of the rule and its outcome. How many variations
of this in one scenario can Y have compared to supposed circumstances in a
real-life situation? Giving an opposing player a decided edge in an event
based on an arbitrary subjective application not only makes your strategy
unmanageable but also creates an uncontrollable situation in the event by
making one-sided decisions.
4. Question #3
On page 13, TERRAIN EFFECTS: "Units may form their front line to
the local terrain ...." is unclear. I think it should read: Units from
the front line may alter their formations to conform and navigate with
local terrain heterogeneity.
That's a good point. I'll take a look at that section and review
its language.
Comment: The entire sentence and what follows reads: "Units may
form their front line to local terrain such as hillside, woods, blocks of
buildings, streams, etc.. Units in the open must maintain their linear
formations." The semantics and language of the first sentence makes it
read as if participants MUST conform to the local terrain distinctions.
5. Question #4
At page 12, as a generality under the FRENCH MANEUVER SYSTEM:
"Moving backwards[?] counts as a rough movement (double normal costs).
About facing counts as a formation change." The old caracole maneuver was
in part disgraceful, yet in Napoleonic warfare it was useless in the face
of increased firepower and maneuver flexibility. The motion of "moving
backwards" in Napoleonic warfare on the critical and dire landscape of the
battlefield is more associated with cowardness and the realization of
imminent death. The order to "about face" takes no more time to initiate
completely, and less so, than do units who must reorganize after exiting
from a difficult wood.
That is true, but the ability to move a regiment backwards was
available, and we leave it up to the players to enforce the issue of honor
and cowardice (the decision to move or not to conduct a retrograde move
ultimately lies with the commanders).
Comment: I'll never forget Desaix's remarks after this! For
Wellington at Waterloo it was a different matter, & c (those who were
wounded or injured [hors de combat], regaining their statuses and
dispositions, guarding prisoners, and prisoners going to the rear areas, et
al., et al.).
At page 19, ASSAULT MODIFIERS, EACH SKIRMISHER DEPLOYED: "If half
or more of their[?] bases belong to units with deployed/killed skirmishers,
attacker and/or defender subtracts one point for each skirmisher base those
units[?] have deployed or lost." This sentence as written is unclear.
What do you mean here? I can suggest: Attacker and/or defender will
subtract one point for each for each skirmish base deployed during an
assault contact or lost from a previous phase or turn, if at least half or
more of the combatant's bases belong to units with deployed/killed
skirmishers. Is this correct?
Yes, that is correct. I will also review the language of that
section in light of your own recommendation.
Comment: Again, problems at formulating sentence semantics, syntax
to get to the essence and correct usage of this rule source. The reason
why there are two questions at this enumeration is that in the original
e-mail transmission, I make a mistake in transcription. In a proceeding
e-mail, dated Wed, 3 Feb 1999, I clarified the questions in which I,
inadvertently, made an error.
6. Question #5
At page 14, UNOPPOSED SKIRMISHERS: It says "Skirmisher bases
cannot "'fire'" at other skirmish bases but may, if unopposed and in range,
fire at the parent light[?] units from which the enemy skirmishers
originate." Does this mean to suggest that skirmishers "unopposed and in
range" can fire only at "light units" from where the skirmishers had
originated? In the French unit organization, skirmishers evolve or
originate from not only light units, but also their line formations. Do
you mean the singularity of the light units for REPUBLIQUE's mechanics, or
is this a mistake as written into the text?
That's an excellent observation, and one which I will address
immediately. You are very right, this ruling should not apply only to
light infantry units.
Comment: Writing rules requires the same patience and honing
(rewriting) as does writing a novel, for instance. I was taught early by
the "fine red line on my dear manuscripts" to avoid what some other writers
(and authors) have labeled as "the theater of the absurd." It's far too
easy to create an adverse impression of yourself and consumer
dissatisfaction through miscommunications. Literary authors will suggest
something more retrospective, so that your product (and your instrument)
will say what you mean, not what someone wants you to think or say.
7. Question #6
...concerning multiple hits. If a single unit suffers multiple
"morale hits" and multiple "kills" (casualty affects) during the same
round/turn, in what order are these modifying effects processed? In other
words, how do participants portion their combat results: morale hits, then
kills; or kills, then morale hits? Also consider additional results, like
desertion, which would complicate the order procedure further (or
un-complicate it).
Kills and morale hits should be applied simultaneously. Desertion
[is] already included in the more extreme results ... Morale hits are
applied to entire formations, not individual bases. Base quantities are
mentioned in the assault rules because several different formations may
participate, and the numerically strongest must be allowed to have the
greater influence on the results.
Comment: The results-specified ASSAULT Matrix for the ROLL
DIFFERENCE of "9 or more" indicates "D suffers 4M, 1K and routs. 2 bases
desert, A captures all art. and off -->." A player with two stands who
suffers this result from the INFANTRY ATTACKER simply subtracts two bases
as deserters. And although there's a 4M result, there are no bases to
assign this to; and as per ASSAULT RESULTS, page 20, at BASE HITS, where
deserting bases are subject to prescribed rules, only incidental units
involved in the assault(s) may be assigned the unassigned base hits, and in
the MORALE HITS, the participating results.
8. Question #7
...concerning Reserve/Restage status (Cf. page 8, ORDERS). When
Reserve units receive new orders (see page 8, RESERVE/RESTAGE, part a), do
these Reserve units lose their Reserve/Restage status?
Yes.
9. Question #8
...concerning detachments. In a brief way, detachments are
included in REPUBLIQUE ... but this is awfully minuscule. Why does
REPUBLIQUE's design leave out the possibility of defensive divisional
detachments, such as units to defend a town or village, guard a bridge or
ford crossing, reinforce fortifications and field defensive works?
Detachments may be permanent and non-permanent. Skirmishing is
representative of a non-permanent detachment capability at regimental level
in REPUBLIQUE. It's a shame to see so useful a device, so ignored.
This has been considered, and when we do some more play testing,
there may be some attempt to create detachment rules. When the rules were
created, we frankly didn't anticipate this much of a response (and demand)
so there are a number of issues yet to be included.
10. Continuation for #5, Question #4
Yes, doing a about face is easy, but that is not the only movement
executed when a unit turns about. When a unit changes facing to the rear
(i.e. - about face) the guidons at each end and standard bearers in the
middle must march around the unit and take up their new positions. Hence,
the entire unit must hold still while the "controllers" change to their new
positions. In Prussian System units, the order of the companies also have
to be inverted so that they will still be in the correct sequence in their
new facing.
11. Special Discussive
There were a few transmissions sent to the webmaster concerning the
idiosyncratic value of Republique's system and the historic deployment of
squares as brought to us by the scholars and historiographers, of which I
quote several secondary sources. The following are extracts from those
transmissions discussing squares.
SQUARES: I must honor your evaluative acknowledgements of the
curious deployment of squares during the Napoleonic wars, and no doubt,
according to Rathbone, squares were mobile. In Craufurd's covering of the
7th across the Turones, his light division, "... then retired slowly along
the plain in squares ... Four of them, square by square, each covering the
other." Believing in such a formation, then, is possible. But Craufurd's
light infantry were highly trained and led by a capable officer with
vision. Of course, there were many examples given to us (the readers and
the researchers) about the use and deployment of squares, but how
regular(ly) and why such a variation? (A history reader might recall the
shiltrons and similar Swiss Confederation formations.) If you were to
examine a range of available Napoleonic literature, what might be found is
a limited use of non-mobile squares and a more limited use of mobile
squares. Why has Historiography presented such a view? ... Historiography
has provided the amateur Military History reader with its renderings [and
under certain constraints was obligated "to write, to compose a coherent
work of literature with data provided by history." Maybe verisimilitude,
maybe pseudo-realism? The exception to the general depiction would be like
battles, such as Waterloo, where the historiographer has drawn a patchwork
of details, right down to the defensive area of the squares' and their
idiosyncrasies during assault. This type of work is very distinctive for
Sutherland. Although his viewpoint is limited, Sutherland provides the
readers' interests with details about the French cavalry assaults during
Waterloo.
For instance, after the French cavalry's initial inadequacies,
Sutherland portrays a related incident: "In front of Sergeant Morris's
[Sgt.Thomas Morris, 2/73rd Regiment, part of General Halkett's brigade (of
the 3rd Division) next to La Haye Sainte.] square the cavalry brought their
own artillery support with them ... But this time the horsemen paused some
yards in front of them. Artillerymen leveled a cannon and fired at the
square with grape shot, "'making complete lanes'" through the battalion.
The cavalry then spurred their horses, trying to enter the openings [in the
square]. But before they could gallop [sic] through, the regiment closed
its files, "'throwing the dead outside, and taking the wounded inside the
square [sic] ... '" The cavalry was then beaten off. But they retired to
the advanced artillery and again tried the same tactics." Some could
reason that the cavalry were beaten not only by the discipline of the
regiment, but also the ease and alacrity used to properly close its
defensive perimeter.
Sutherland continues his historic presentation: "Squares were
formed in a checkered pattern so they could deliver a heavy crossfire at
the charging cavalry. [A heavy crossfire from a static, defensive
formation.] But now units had lost so many men that they could not
properly form a square [?] and had combined with other battered regiments
to present a defense." [To present a defense by forming ad hoc units.]
Churchill provides substantial imagery in his
biography of Marlborough, where, at the Battle of Blenheim (Blindheim), the
French had formed squares [most of their formations still being 6 ranks
deep]. After Marlborough had established and secured his position across
the Nebel river, he began his progressive assaults on the remnants of
Tallard's formations [he had already committed his Gendarmerie]. Churchill
ruminates on a special reserve of Tallard's: The formation of nine bns.
were "... young troops, who fought with so much gallantry [did Churchill
mean distinction?] for France ..."; that they "... caused a good deal of
disorder in Marlborough's first line [of cavalry] ..."; that Marlborough
brought cannon and infantry to the front line to "... rake the devoted
French battalions, some of which [had?] formed square."
The final Allied cavalry assault had broke what remained of the French cavalry's confidence
and expectations, "leaving the remnants of nine battalions to their fate."
As a postscript, Churchill includes "But these poor soldiers of France
behaved so bravely [?] that the positions [sic] they had held could be
plainly seen the next day upon the battlefield by their corpses lying in ranks."
The square was deployed in other theaters of operation as well.
David Hamilton-Williams in his Waterloo Perspectives, alluding to the
eventual size of the French cavalry charges at Waterloo (nearly 12,000),
says "... at Eylau Napoleon had sent in Murat with all his cavalry. Murat
had smashed through the Russian center, through two lines (echelons) of
infantry, had broken six squares and captured sixteen standards." According
to Gates, after the Battle of Salamanca, General Bock [of the KGL]
destroyed the 76th Line [?] because a "mount rolled into the infantry,"
which had formed square and delivered musketry. The 6th Leger then met its
fate, because it could not completely form. This had been Foy's division
under pursuit, and the encounter took place near La Serna outside Garcia
Hernandez, according to Rathbone. This was an odd incident of breaking a
square, except for the 6th Leger. During the Battles of Albuera where
Colborne's brigade from Stewart's Second Div. had counter assaulted
Girard's left flank, but in turn was assaulted by the "lst Vistula Lancers
and the 2nd Hussars" on his flank. "Five colors were taken, as was their
supporting artillery battery and, of the 1,648 men in the three leading
battalions, 1,248 [74.7%] were killed, wounded or taken [prisoners?]. Only
the 31st Foot manage to form square and avoid destruction."
12. Retrospection
Readers should be reminded that REPUBLIQUE rules are constantly
under revision. This is one aspect which makes them an unique source for
Wargame rules. But suggestions about Republique's rule inadequacies made
during Feb.'99 on my 2/1/99 copy of Republique have not been entered in the
revision list as noted on my 2/10/00 copy. Supporters of REPUBLIQUE are,
no doubt, experiencing some technical difficulties with this slow
progression of development. However, the staff at WTJ seems very busy, one
could only speculate at the natural results. WTJ's webmaster, although,
provided a wealth of information but easily sidestepped other questions.
13. REPUBLIQUE, Grand Tactical Napoleonic Warfare ... rules, Vitals.
1) Web-site accessible with support.
14. Republique Characteristics
a) Game spaces confined to lower square feet because of higher
representational ratio (RR) and surface ratio.
The research and invention of METAWARGAME required a nurtured experience
about Wargames and post-secondary education. It is also a product, or more
firmly, an end-product of my retrospection, not only of the recurring
disabilities within The Hobby, but also from the obtuse and egregious
manners portrayed by elements of our society.
Part II: E-mail Extracts with WTJ's Webmaster
2) Grand tactical (smaller figures, brigades and larger).
3) Surface ratio: 1" = 100 yards.
4) 1 turn = 20 minutes of real-life battle time.
5) 1 base of infantry or cavalry = 550 combatants.
6) 1 base of artillery = 12 cannon.
7) 10-sided (decahedron) dice required.
8) Insulation caps to mark morale dispositions.
9) Combat and Movement charts in U.S. and metric measure.
10) Artillery Fire arc.
11) Many extras: Optional Rules, Leader Ratings, et al.
b) Combat blends firepower into assault procedure.
c) Some decentralized control.
d) "Prime Mission" to recreate the "large Napoleonic battle."
e) Representative terrain feature and effects chart.
f) National and Leader command radius.
g) Type of Orders specified.
h) Result-specified Assault matrix.
i) Skirmishers and skirmisher markers.
j) Number of functions for artillery maneuvering.
k) Illustrated examples.
l) Smallest maneuver element is one base which could be a regiment
(battalion), cavalry brigade, and company of artillery.
m) Sequential turn system with player/side sub-cycles.
n) National characteristics and doctrinal methods included.
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