1. "Anlage 1 zu OKH, GenStdH, Op.Abt.(Ia) Nr. 1693141," in KTB/OKW, 1:1075-76. See also DA Pam 20-261a, 91; Reinhardt, Die Wende, 202-4; and MS T-28, 134-36.

2. Guderian, Panzer Leader, 260.

3. Army Group Center War Diary, quoted in Reinhardt, Die Wende, 214; Halder, War Journal, 7:209 (entry for 8 December).

4. Halder, War Journal, 7:206 (entry for 7 December).

5. Istoriya, 2:280-81; Halder, War Journal, 7:206, 211 (entries for 7 and 10 December); and Guderian, Panzer Leader, 261-62. The fighting withdrawal of the 10th Motorized Division from its positions east of Tula is described in August Schmidt, Geschichte der 10. Division, 1933-1945 (Bad Nauheim: Podzun Verlag, 1963), 117-19. Retreats by the 10th Motorized Division and by the 269th Infantry Division both opened critical gaps in the German front that could not immediately be closed. See Hossbach, Infanterie, 170-71; and Halder, War Journal, 7:215 (entry for 12 December).

6. Istoriya, 2:281; Halder, War Journal, 7:212-15 (entries for 10 and 12 December); Guderian, Panzer Leader, 262; and MS T-28, 33.

7. Halder, War Journal, 7:225 (entry for 15 December).

8. Guderian argues that some of the intermediate positions occupied by the Germans in October during the advance on Moscow had been partially fortified and constituted rearward positions of a sort. This is probably an exaggeration. At best, these positions would have consisted of hastily prepared bunkers and trenches without minefields or other obstacles. All would probably have been buried by the intervening snowfall. Field Marshal von Bock, Guderian's superior, discounted the value of any such positions. Compare Guderian, Panzer Leader, 259, 262; and Seaton, Battle for Moscow, 181.

9. See comments by General Gunther Blumentritt and General Kurt von Tippelskirch described in Liddell Hart, The Other Side, 284, 289; and MS T-28, 58-59. One particularly eerie reminder of the 1812 campaign was the Kutusov Monument at Borodino, commemorating the Russian field marshal's victorious efforts to repel Napoleon's invasion. Several German divisions passed by that site during their own winter retreats, an omen that did not go unremarked. See MeyerDetring, 137. Infanteriedivision, 100; and Martin Gareis, Kampf and Ende der FrankischSudetendeutschen 98. Infanterie-Division (Bad Nauheim: Hans-Henning Podzun, 1956), picture facing page 176, 177.

10. Guderian, Panzer Leader, 259; Halder, War Journal, 7:221-22 (entry for 14 December).

11. Halder, War Journal, 7:224 (entry for 15 December); Reinhardt, Die Wende, 214; and MS T28, 119.

12. Seaton, Battle for Moscow, 181; Seaton, Russo-German War, 227 (entry for 16 December); and "Abschrift, OpAbt (IM) Nr. 1725/41," dated 16 December 1941, in KTB/OKW, 1:1083.

13. Halder, War Journal, 7:227 (entry for 16 December). Schmundt was completely dedicated to Hitler and had made a recent visit to Army Group Center's headquarters. While Schmundt was there, Bock had incautiously confessed his own misgivings about a winter retreat. Schmundt reported these to Hitler, who used them as ammunition to refute the recommendations of Brauchitsch, Halder, and even Bock. See Seaton, Battle for Moscow, 180-81.

14. Seaton, Battle for Moscow, 178-79; Halder, War Journal, 7:227 (entry for 16 December).

15. "Fernschreiben, GenStdH, OpAbt (III) Nr. 1736/41," dated 18 December 1941, in KTB/OKW, 1:1084.

16. See Bullock, Hitler, 665-69; Walter Gorlitz, History of the German General Staff, 16571945, translated by Brian Battershaw (New York: Praeger, 1953), 404-6; and Gordon Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640-1945 (London: Oxford University Press, 1955), 468-503. Hitler's stand-fast order was almost univerally opposed by high-level commanders, and most made no secret of their dislike of Hitler's instructions. See Reinhardt, Die Wende, 222.

17. Halder, War Journal, 7:193, 206 (entries for 30 November and 7 December).

18. Joseph Goebbels, The Goebbels Diaries, 1942-1943, edited, translated, and with an introduction by Louis P. Lochner (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1948), 135-36, hereafter cited as Goebbels Diaries.

19. Halder, Hitler as War Lord, 49.

20. Guderian, Panzer Leader, 263-70.

21. Halder, War Journal, 7:250 (entry for 8 January 1942). Not all of the sanctions against Hoepner were enforced. See Seaton, Russo-German War, 236. Hoepner wore his uniform on at least one later occasion-as an accomplice in the 20 July 1944 attempt to assassinate Hitler and seize control of the German government. See Gerald Reitlinger, The SS: Alibi of a Nation, 19221945 (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1981), 321-22.

22. Seaton, Russo-German War, 245; Haupt, Heeresgruppe Nord, 111.

23. A brief summary of major command changes, including relief dates, is in Andreas Hillgruber, "Einftihrung," KTB/OKW, 2:39-40. Gorlitz counts General Karl von Stiilpnagel, who was relieved from command of the Seventeenth Army in early October, as a victim of Hitler's vengeance as well. However, StUlpnagel's relief seems to have been primarily the result of criticism by Rundstedt and Brauchitsch of Stiilpnagel's timid leadership. Compare Gorlitz, History, 403; and Halder, War Journal, 7:138 (entry for 4 October). See also Guderian, Panzer Leader, 273-74.

24. See testimony of General August Winter in Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 14 November 1945-October 1946 (Nuremberg: International Military Tribunal, 1948), 15:604-5. Most changes of senior commanders were publicly represented as being due to the incumbent's ill health. Poor health was a contributing factor in the replacement of some officers, several of whom were more than sixty years old. (Rundstedt, born in 1875, had actually been called out of retirement to take command of an army group in 1939.) Brauchitsch, Bock, and Strauss, to name three, were all suffering from physical ailments at the time they were relieved. However, Hitler's primary intent was to remove uncooperative senior officers, not just unhealthy ones.

25. Seaton, Battle for Moscow, 222-26.

26. T. N. Dupuy, A Genius for War: The German Army and General Staff. 1807-1945 (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1977), 116. See also Rudolf Hofmann, "Das XXIX A.K. in der Abwehr auf breiter Front am Nordfluegel der 6. Armee im Winter 1941/42," chapter 5 in "Selected Corps Operations on the Eastern Front," by Hellmuth Reinhardt, et al., Foreign Military Studies no. MS P-143b (Historical Division, U.S. Army, Europe, 1954), 178, hereafter cited as MS P-143b-5.

27. Halder, War Journal, 7:197 (entry for 3 July). Hitler had an intellectual grasp of Auftragstaktik, even if he found it difficult to tolerate in practice. In one of the rambling monologues that he periodically inflicted on his dinner guests, Hitler had remarked on 1 August 1941: "The Wehrmacht gives its highest distinction to the man who, acting against orders, saves the situation by his discernment and decisiveness." Adolph Hitler, Hitler's Table Talk, 1941-1944: His Private Conversations, 2d ed., translated by Norman Cameron and R. H. Stevens (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1973), 19.

28. Frido von Senger and Etterlin, Neither Fear Nor Hope, translated by George Malcolm (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1964), 219-22.

29. "197. Inf. Division Abt.Ia Nr. 264/42. Betr.: Fragebogen," dated 10 May 1942, NAM T-78/ 202/6145735.

30. Hossbach, Infanterie, 170.

31. Ibid., 171. See also the experiences of the 52d Infantry Division described in Lothar Rendulic, "Combat in Deep Snow," Foreign Military Studies no. MS D-106 (Historical Division, U.S. Army, Europe, 1947), 12-14.

32. Rudolf von Roman, "The 35th Infantry Division Between Moscow and Gzhatsk, 1941," Foreign Military Studies no. MS D-285 (Historical Division, U.S. Army, Europe, 1947), 8, hereafter cited as MS D-285.

33. Gareis, Kampf, 178-79.

34. MS D-285, 3-6, 22-30.

35. MS T-28, 123.

36. A discussion of the problems affecting German weapons in deep snow and severe cold is in "Anlage zu Gen.Kdo. XX.A.K. Ia Nr. 2644/42 (Erfahrungen im Winterfeldzug)," dated 16 May 1942, NAM T-78/202/6145569, 6145578-6145581, hereafter cited as "XX.A.K.-Erfahrungen"; and in "5 Panzer-Division Abt la Nr. 427/42. Erfahrungsbericht der 5. Panzer-Division fiber den Winterkrieg 1941/42 in Russland," dated 20 May 1942, NAM T-78/202/6145541-6145542. Though the German Army had previously developed a shaped-charge antitank shell, bureaucratic resistance had limited distribution of this ammunition. According to Greiffenberg, an appeal by Field Marshal von Kluge directly to Hitler helped to speed up deliveries of this ammunition, which stiffened German antitank defense somewhat. See MS T-28, 140.

37. MS T-28, 123; MS P-143b-5, 163.

38. Hossbach, Infanterie, 173-74.

39. MS P-143b-5, 162; MS T-28, 139. Through 5 January 1942, total German officer losses on the Eastern Front amounted to 26,775 killed, wounded, and missing. In view of the shortage of combat officers, General Halder agreed on 3 January that the "promotion of First Lieutenants and Captains must be accelerated, as nearly all are commanding battalions now." Halder, War Journal, 7:248 (entries for 3 and 5 January). Through the first six months of the Russian campaign, the German Army included large numbers of elderly reserve officers as regimental and even battalion commanders. Although these officers were adequate for the relatively easy campaigns in Poland and France, the arduous conditions in Russia led to the wholesale replacement of these reservists with younger, tougher officers. According to one officer with extensive Eastern Front experience, "in 1942 we had no more commanders older than 40 years except generals." Statement by Lieutenant General (Ret.) Heinz-Georg Lemm at the 1985 Art of War Symposium, reproduced in U.S. Army War College, Center for Land Warfare, 1985 Art of War Symposium: From the Dnepr to the Vistula-Soviet Offensive Operations, November 1943-August 1944, a Transcript of Proceedings (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, August 1985), 582.

40. Hossbach, Infanterie, 173. See also "263. Infanterie Division. Der 1. Generalstabsoffizier (Anlage 5 zu A.O.K. 4 Ia Nr. 677/42)," dated 21 August 1942, NAM T-312/184/7730365; and "XXXXIII A.K. Der Chef der Generalstabes Ia Nr. 1391/42. Betr.: `Stiitzpunkt,' 'Widerstandlinie,' " dated 22 August 1942, NAM T-312/184/7730355.

41. Meyer-Detring, 137. Infanteriedivision, 114. The gradual adoption of strongpoint tactics in the 34th Infantry Division is traced by the commander of the 107th Infantry Regiment in "Infanterie-Regiment 107 Kommandeur. Betr., `Stiitzpunkt' oder Widerstandlinie. Bericht eines Truppenkommandeurs," dated 17 August 1942, NAM T-312/184/7730359-7730360.

42. MS T-28, 283d.

43. Baumann, 35. Infanterie-Division, 137.

44. Panzer Group 3 War Diary, 19 December 1941, quoted in Reinhardt, Die Wende, 207.

45. MS D-285, 9; Gerhard Dieckhoff, Die 3. Infanterie-Division (Gottingen: Erich Borries, 1960), 149; and Horst Grossman, Geschichte der rheinisch-westfaiischen 6. Infanterie-Division 19391945 (Bad Nauheim: Hans-Henning Podzun, 1958), 103. Some divisions disbanded entire infantry battalions, using those personnel as fillers for other units. The 78th Division, for example, disbanded one battalion in each of its regiments, and these disbanded battalions were never reconstituted. See 78. Sturm Division, 151.

46. Panzer Group 3 War Diary, 19 December 1941; Panzer Group 4 War Diary, 18 December 1941; both quoted in Reinhardt, Die Wende, 207.

47. Allen F. Chew, Fighting the Russians in Winter: Three Case Studies, Leavenworth Papers no. 5 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1981), 33; MS T-28, 272; and U.S. Department of the Army, Pamphlet no. 20-291, Effects of Climate on Combat in European Russia (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1952), 3-4, hereafter cited as DA Pam 20-291.

48. On taking command of the German Army on 19 December, Hitler cited the inadequate coldweather provisions as proof of the "mechanical," uninspired spirit of the army's officer leadership. Halder, War Journal, 7:233 (entry for 19 December). Concerning the winter clothing drive, see Goebbels Diaries, 130-31, 136. The Sicherheitsdienst (Security Service or SD), whose unsavory activities included monitoring German civilian morale, noted in a secret report on 22 January 1942: "As regards the reasons for and the implications of the wool collection [Nazi Party clothing drive], the event ... has affected the population in the civilian sector more than any other since the beginning of the war.... People had seen in the dismissal of Brauchitsch an indirect reply to the many questions as to who was responsible for the failures to provide winter clothing." See Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Pridham, eds., Documents on Nazism, 1919-1945 (New York: Viking Press, 1975), 661-62. See also Willi A. Boelcke, ed., The Secret Conferences of Dr. Goebbels: The Nazi Propaganda War, 1939-1943, translated by Ewald Osers (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1970), 196-97, 199-200, 223-24.

49. Guderian, for example, consistently blames the OKH (the army's leadership) for his supply problems and claims that the problem of winter clothing "would have been the easiest to avoid of all our difficulties" had senior General Staff planners only exercised sufficient forethought. Guderian absolves Hitler from responsibility by asserting that the army's quartermaster general lied to Hitler about winter clothing deliveries so that Hitler was unaware of any deficiency until informed of it by Guderian on 20 December. (Guderian also credits himself with having inspired the Nazi Party's clothing collection with his complaints. Based on entries in Goebbels' diary predating Guderian's 20 December meeting with Hitler, Guderian's claim is greatly exaggerated.) Guderian, Panzer Leader, 233-35, 237, 266-67. See also MS T-28, 141, where one of the German officer authors blames the winter clothing shortage on the "lack of foresight on the part of competent headquarters."

50. Halder, War Journal, 6:216 (entry for 9 July), 7:7, 159 (entries for 2 August and 10 November). See also Boelcke, ed., Secret Conferences, 191-92.

51. Mueller-Hillebrand, Das Heer, 3:30; and Van Creveld, Supplying War, 173-74. 52. MS T-28, 275-76; DA Pam 20-291, 19; and Guderian, Panzer Leader, 265-66.

53. Van Creveld, Supplying War, 174. See also Seaton, Russo-German War, 218-19; and MS T-28, 210.

54. German summer clothing included a long wool overcoat which, with some padding from straw or newspapers, made a passable winter outer garment. Lieutenant General (Ret.) HeinzGeorg Lemm, Interview with the author, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 2 May 1985. Lemm was a platoon leader and company commander on the Eastern Front during the winter of 1941-42. Also, many German troops removed suitable winter clothing items from Soviet corpses and, in some cases at least, probably from Russian prisoners as well. Such expedients were risky, however. A 17 December 1941 regimental order to soldiers of the 488th Infantry Regiment directed that German soldiers in the forward lines wear only German uniform items, since German prisoners taken wearing Russian garments were being regarded by the enemy as looters and "handled accordingly" (i.e., shot). German combat troops were ordered to "exchange" any such Russian items with troops assigned to rearward units, a directive that was in all likelihood widely ignored. See "Regimentsbefehl," Anlage 16 in Meyer-Detring, 137. Infanteriedivision, 277.

55. Hossbach, Infanterie, 168. See also Gareis, Kampf, 201; and Guderian, Panzer Leader, 266-67. German frostbite casualties alone during the winter of 1941-1942 exceeded 250,000, while total German losses (killed, wounded, missing, sick) from December 1941-March 1942 amounted to 723,200. See Berthold Mikat, "Die Erfrierungen bei den Soldaten der deutschen Wehrmacht in letzten Weltkrieg," appendix 8 in "Frostbite Problems in the German Army During World War II," by Alfred Toppe, Foreign Military Studies no. MS P-062 (Historical Division, U.S. Army, Europe, 1951), 2, 3; and Mueller-Hillebrand, 137. Infanteriedivision, 3:171, 206. Seaton estimates total German casualties (including frostbite) at 900,000 for the winter period. However, as not all frostbite casualties were unfit for duty, this figure probably overestimates the actual loss of German effectives. Seaton, Russo-German War, 228. So severe was the danger of frostbite that most German units adopted a policy similar to that used in the 12th Infantry Division, according to which no sentry would remain outdoors longer than thirty minutes and all sentries would always be posted either in pairs or within the sight of another sentry. Lemm interview.

56. Quoted in Steiger, Panzertaktik, 136.

57. A medical briefing to General Halder on 9 March 1942 reported 10,204 cases of typhus, of which 1,349 had proved fatal. Halder, War Journal, 7:281 (entry for 9 March).

58. Baumann, 35. Infanterie-Division, 135; Chew, Russians in Winter, 38. Detailed reports on problems with German equipment (radios, vehicles, etc.) during winter conditions are in "78. Inf. Division Ia/Org. Nr. 243/42. Erfahrungsbericht," dated 9 May 1942, NAM T-78/202/61456886145692; "XX.A.K.-Erfahrungen," NAM T-78/202/6145581-6145585; and "197. Inf. Division. Fragebogen," NAM T-78/202/6145742-6145744. One former German officer recounted how, during the night of 24 January 1942 with the outside temperature at -56°C, four out of five machine guns and nearly half of the rifles in his company would not fire. Colonel (Ret.) Arnulf von Garn, Interview with the author, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 21 May 1986.

59. A brief contemporary discussion of the reasons for adopting the strongpoint defense may be found in "Hptm. Haderecker, Kdr, I./Inf. Rgt. 20 (mot). Betr.: Erfahrungsbericht. Stiitzpunktsystem oder H.K.L.," dated 17 August 1942, NAM T-312/184/7730344-7730345; "10 Inf. Div. (mot) la (Anlage zu A.O.K. 4 Ia Nr. 4885/42). Stiitzpunktartige Verteidigung oder durchlaufende Verteidigungssystem," dated 20 August 1942, NAM T-312/184/7730340-7730341; and "Generalkommando LVI. Pz.Korps. Der Chef des Generalstabes. Stellungnahme zur Frage Stiitzpunkte oder Widerstandslinie. (Anlage zu A.O.K. 4 Ia Nr. 4885/42)," dated 1 September 1942, NAM T-312/184/ 7730332-7730333. The first of these documents gives the views of a battalion commander; the second, a division staff officer; and the third, a panzer corps chief of staff. Though each sees the problem from a slightly different perspective, their conclusions are similar to those given in the text.

60. "Oberkommando der Wehrmacht Nr. 442277/41 WFSt/op(H)," dated 26 December 1941, in KTB/OKW, 1:1086-87.

61. MS T-28, 189.

62. "A.O.K. 4 Ia Nr. 166/42. Abschrift," dated 23 January 1942, NAM T-78/202/6146773-6146775. That this document received wide circulation is evident in that the copy in the National Archives microfilm collection shows a supplementary document reference number assigned by Army Group Center ("H.Gr. Mitte, Ia Nr. 826/42") and also in that this document was found at the end of the war in a file folder of the Training Branch of the German General Staff. The combat actions on which this document was based-defense of the Roslavl-Yukhnov-Moscow Rollbahn supply artery-are briefly described in Schmidt, Geschichte, 123-27. In an enlightening aside, Schmidt notes that this Rollbahn was the first asphalt-paved road that the 10th Motorized Division had yet encountered in the entire Russian campaign.

63. After-action report of the 35th Infantry Division, attached as an annex to "Generalkommando IX. Armeekorps Ia Nr. 916/42. Betr.: Erfahrungsbericht aus dem Winterkrieg 1941/42," dated 3 July 1942, NAM T-78/202/6145647. This annex is untitled and undated, having only the handwritten notation "35. Inf. Division" written across the top of the first page. It is identified as "Erfahrungsbericht der 35. I.D." on the coversheet of the IX Corps report cited above, NAM T-78/ 202/6145611, and hereafter is cited as "Erfahrungsbericht-35. I.D." See also "78. Inf. Division Ia/Org. Nr. 243/42. Erfahrungsbericht," dated 9 May 1942, NAM T-78/202/6145680.

64. "A.O.K. 4 la Nr. 166/42. Abschrift," NAM T-78/202/6146773-6146774.

65. MS T-28, 192-93.

66. "A.O.K. 4 la Nr. 166/42. Abschrift," NAM T-78/202/6146775.

67. "87. Inf.-Div., la Nr. 273/42," dated 9 May 1942, NAM T-78/202/6145707. See also "331. Infanterie Division. Der 1. Generaistabs-Offz. Betr.: Erfahrungsbericht-Widerstandlinie-Stiitzpunkte," dated 25 August 1942, NAM T-312/184/7730353.

68. "Erfahrungsbericht-35. I.D.," NAM T-78/202/6145647.

69. "7. Division Ia/Nr. 0479//42: Betrifft: Beanwortung des Fragebogens des Panzer-A.O.K. 4 fiber Wintererfahrungen," dated 11 May 1942, NAM T-78/202/6145631, hereafter cited as "7. Division-Wintererfahrungen."

70. MS T-28, 187.

71. Compare, for example, differing priorities of work developed by the 7th Infantry Division, "7. Division-Wintererfahrungen," NAM T-78/202/6145632; the 35th Infantry Division, "Erfahrungsbericht-35 I.D.," NAM T-78/202/6145647; and the 87th Infantry Division, "87. Inf.-Div.," NAM T-78/202/6145706.

72. "Erfahrungsbericht-35. I.D.," NAM T-78/202/6145649. See also Paul Schulz, "Position Warfare in Winter 1941-1942 and Experiences," Foreign Military Studies no. MS D-298 (Historical Division, U.S. Army, Europe, 1947), 4-12, hereafter cited as MS D-298.

73. "Erfahrungsbericht-35. I.D.," NAM T-78/202/6145650.

74. Willibald Utz, "Experiences of a Mountain Infantry Regiment During the Battle of the Volkhov River (Mar-May 1942)," Foreign Military Studies no. MS D-291 (Historical Division, U.S. Army, Europe, 1947), 20-23, hereafter cited as MS D-291; "A.O.K. 4 la Nr. 166/42. Abschrift," NAM T-78/202/6146775; and "Oberst Heine, Kommandeur des Inf. Regt. 449. Betr.: Kampferfahrungen: Stiitzpunkt oder Widerstandlinie," dated 17 August 1942, NAM T-312/184/7730364.

75. "Erfahrungsbericht-35. l .D.," NAM T-78/202/6145649-6145650; Garn interview; and Lemm interview.

76. "87. Inf.-Div.," NAM T-78/202/6145708. See also "Erfahrungsbericht-35. I.D.," NAM T-78/ 202/6145650; and Fritz Wentzell, "Combat in the East," Foreign Military Studies no. MS B-266 (Historical Division, U.S. Army, Europe, 1952), 44.

77. "Erfahrungsbericht-35. I.D.," NAM T-78/202/6145650-6145651; "87. Inf.-Div.," NAM T-78/ 202/6145708. The 7th Division rigged even its antitank mines with tripwires. See "7. DivisionWintererfahrungen," NAM T-78/202/6145633.

78. Gustav Hoehne, "In Snow and Mud: 31 Days of Attack Under Seydlitz During Early Spring of 1942," Foreign Military Studies no. MS C-034 (Historical Division, U.S. Army, Europe, 1953), 5; Lemm interview. Lemm's 12th Infantry Division participated in the Demyansk fighting, and he recalled that the Soviet units in this sector lacked snowshoes or skis. Forced to wade through waist-deep snow, Russian attackers were shot by defending German troops with an ease that was "truly horrible to watch."

79. "7. Division-Wintererfahrungen," NAM T-78/202/6145632; "Erfahrungsbericht-35. I.D.," NAM T-78/202/6145650; MS D-298, 9; and MS D-285, 32-33.

80. MS D-285, 33. A sketch of this type obstacle is in "197. Inf. Division. Fragebogen," NAM 778/202/6145754.

81. "7. Division-Wintererfahrungen," NAM T-78/202/6145633.

82. "78. Inf. Division. Erfahrungsbericht," NAM T-78/202/6145683. Other divisions disputed the value of this tactic. The 6th Infantry Division, for example, reckoned that Soviet winter clothing allowed the Russians to spend nights wherever they pleased, and the telltale smoke of burning villages seemed only to invite Russian artillery fire. Grossmann, Geschichte, 93.

83. Grossmann, Geschichte, 99.

84. "Lagebericht AOK 6 an OKH/Fremde Heere Ost, v. 27.12.41." quoted in MS P-143b-5, 65-66.

85. Otto Zeltmann, "Closing of the Large Gap in the Front Between Demidov and Velikiye Luki in 1942," Foreign Military Studies no. MS D-231 (Historical Division, U.S. Army, Europe, 1947), 9-12, hereafter cited as MS D-231.

86. "Erfahrungsbericht der 5. Panzer-Division," NAM T-78/202/6145531.

87. "87. Inf. Div.," NAM T-78/202/6145707. See also "7. Division-Wintererfahrungen," NAM T-78/ 202/6145631; and Oskar Munzel, "Tactical and Technical Specialties of Winter Warfare," Foreign Military Studies no. MS P-089 (Historical Division, U.S. Army, Europe, 1951), 12.

88. Patrolling techniques varied greatly between units. The 7th Division preferred to dispatch its patrols only when absolutely necessary to clarify the enemy situation and considered the half-light of dawn or early evening best suited for reconnaissance work. In contrast, the 78th Division considered daytime patrols useless and sent its scouting parties out mostly at night. Compare "7. Division-Wintererfahrungen," NAM T-78/202/6145634; and "78. Division. Erfahrungsbericht," NAM T-78/202/6145682. See also "IX. Armeekorps. Erfahrungsbericht," NAM 778/202/6145615.

89. "331. Infanterie Division. Erfahrungsbericht," NAM T-312/184/7730353.

90. "98. Inf. Division Ia. An den Herrn Chef des Generalstabes des Gen.Kdo XII. A.K.," dated 21 August 1942, NAM T-312/184/7730379. The 98th Division preferred a continuous linear-style defensive front and considered strongpoints useful mainly in the depth of the defensive zone.

91. See MS D-231, 2; MS T-28, 75; "XXXXIII A.K.," NAM T-312/184/7730356; "263. Infanterie Division," NAM T-312/184/7730365; and "197. Inf. Division. Fragebogen," NAM T-78/202/6145735.

92. See "197. Inf. Division. Fragebogen," NAM T-78/202/6145736; "Erfahrungsbericht-35. I.D.," NAM T-78/202/6145651-6145652; "7. Division-Wintererfahrungen," NAM T-78/202/6145633; "Infanterie-Regiment 487 Kommandeur. Betr.: Kampferfahrung Stutzpunkt-Widerstandlinie," dated 21 August 1942, NAM T-312/184/7730347; "Der Chef des Generalstabes der 2. Armee. 2403/42 Betr.: Stutzpunkt oder Widerstandlinie," dated 8 September 1942, NAM T-312/1660/000852; and Breithaupt, Geschichte, 157.

93. "87. Inf Div.," NAM T-78/202/6145708.

94. "197. Inf. Division. Fragebogen," NAM T-78/202/6145736.

95. "Erfahrungsbericht-35. I.D.," NAM T-78/202/6145651. See also MS D-285, 10-11; "87. Inf. Div.," NAM T-78/202/6145708; "5 Panzer-Division-Erfahrungsbericht," NAM T-78/202/6145532; and "Hptmn. Haderecker-Erfahrungsbericht," NAM T-312/184/7730346.

96. "78. Inf. Division. Erfahrungsbericht," NAM T-78/202/6145681.

97. "Erfahrungsbericht-35. I.D.," NAM T-78/202/6145652. See also MS D-285, 31-32.

98. MS D-285, 31.

99. The composition of local reserves, together with general techniques for immediate counterattack, is discussed in "197. Inf. Division. Fragebogen," NAM T-78/202/6145736; "XX. A.K.Erfahrungen," NAM T-78/202/6145568-6145569; and "7. Division-Wintererfahrungen," NAM T-78/ 202/6145633-6145634.

100. Fretter-Pico, Infanterie, 66.

101. Ibid., 67. The 97th Light Infantry Division's battles are described briefly on pages 63-67. This unit's remarkable success earned it the following entry in Halder's diary on 15 December: "97th Division has put up a very good fight. Good work, Fretter-Pico!" Halder, War Journal, 7:224.

102. Erickson, Road to Stalingrad, 269-70.

103. A. Yekomovskiy, "Taktika sovietskoi armii v velikoi otechestvennoi voinye," Voyenny Vestnik, April 1967:14.

104. Quoted in A. Ryazanskiy, "Taktika tankovikh voisk v godi velikoi otechestvennoi voinie," Voyenny Vestnik, May 1967:18.

105. Yekimovskiy, "Taktika," 14.

106. Ibid., 14.

107. G. K. Zhukov, "Kontrnastupleniye pod Moskvoi," Voyenno-Istorichesky Zhurnal, October 1966:77.

108. A case in point is that of the 78th Infantry Division of the IX Corps. After days of heavy fighting against Soviet attacks, the 78th Division learned on 13 December that a heavy Soviet blow had broken the thin strongpoint line of the neighboring 267th Infantry Division. On 14 December, the 78th Division lost all contact with other German forces and discovered that strong Russian elements had taken up blocking positions across the division's rear. Under cover of darkness on the night of 14-15 December, the 78th Division initiated a breakout through the surrounding Soviet ring. Although harassed by Russian tanks and cavalry, the 78th Division successfully picked its way past enemy units and rejoined German forces on the Ruza River on 18 December. The other divisions of the IX Corps had similar experiences. See 78. Sturm Division, 123-41; and Bergner, Schlesische Infanterie, 133-47.

109. Zhukov, "Kontrnastupleniye," 71-72.

110. Mueller-Hillebrand, Das Heer, 3:31.

111. DA Pam 20-261a, 100-101.

112. See Martin Jenner, Die 216./272. Niedersachsische Infanterie-Division, 1939-1945 (Bad Nauheim: Podzun Verlag, 1964), 47-53.

113. MS D-231, 4.

114. Erickson, Road to Stalingrad, 298.

115. Ibid., 302.

116. Ibid., 319-22, 331-32, 352-53.

117. Zhukov, Vospominaniya, 355-57; Istoriya, 2:325-32. These deep strikes were also supported by sizable airborne forces. General Halder was relieved that these Soviet thrusts lacked sufficient strength to achieve major success. On 2 February 1942, Halder wrote: The scenes in this battle behind the front are absolutely grotesque and testify to the degree to which this war has degenerated into a sort of slugging bout which has no resemblance whatever to any form of warfare we have known. An instance in point is the inept commitment of a group of several divisions ... against the deep flank of Army Group Center. It is ineffectual as an operational measure and will merely serve to pin down some of our forces for a while, without producing any decisive results. Halder, War Journal, 7:263. The Soviet airborne operations are discussed in David M. Glantz, The Soviet Airborne Experience, Research Survey no. 4 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, November 1984), 37-56.

118. Halder, War Journal, 7:254. The deteriorating situation on the front of Army Group Center is discussed in detail in Reinhardt, Die Wende, 245-55.

119. "Fuhrerbefehl an die H.Gr. Mitte vom 15. Januar 1942 zum Ruckzug auf die 'Winterstellung,' Gen.St.d.H./Op.Abt.(I) Nr. 420021/42," in KTB/OKW, 2:1268-69. The new defensive line authorized by Hitler was essentially the same as that urged by Bock a month earlier.

120. Seaton, Russo-German War, 233. See also Hossbach, Infanterie, 173; Grossmann, Geschichte, 94; and MS T-28, 187.

121. Erickson, Road to Stalingrad, 299-300. 

122. Zhukov, Vospominaniya, 357. On 1 February 1942, Zhukov was named commander of the Western Theater in addition to the Western Front. In this new capacity, he also exercised operational control over the Kalinin and Bryansk Fronts.

123. Yekimovskiy, "Taktika," 14.

124. Zhukov, Vospominaniya, 357-58.

125. F. Samsonov, "Artilleriya v hodie voinie," Voyenny Vestnik, May 1965:74. 126. Ryazanskiy, "Taktika," 18.

127. Yekimovskiy, "Taktika," 14.

128. Istoriya, 2:318; Samsonov, "Artilleriya," 74; Ryazanskiy, "Taktika," 18; and Erickson, Road to Stalingrad, 302-3.

129. Goebbels Diaries, 132, 135.

130. Seaton, Battle for Moscow, 276-80.

131. See, for example, Halder, War Journal, 7:260, 266 (entries for 17 January and 7 February).

132. The author was unable to locate the original tasking document. However, several unit after-action reports cite "Oberkommando der 4. Pz. Armee Ia Nr. 1712/42," dated 17 April 1942, as the source of their efforts. See, for example, "78. Division. Erfahrungsbericht," NAM T-78/ 202/6145679. The 78th Division's report also repeats the specific questions posed by Fourth Panzer Army that guided the unit responses. When completed, these reports were actually forwarded to Third Panzer Army since Fourth Panzer Army's headquarters had, in the meantime, been transferred to the southern portion of the front in preparation for Operation Blau.

133. "XX. A.K.-Erfahrungen," NAM T-78/202/6145569.

134. "IX. Armeekorps-Erfahrungsbericht," NAM T-78/202/6145614.

135. "Erfahrungsbericht-35. I.D.," NAM T-78/202/6145653.

136. "OKH/GenStdH. Ausb. Abtlg. (II) Nr. 1550/42. Zusammenstellung von Osterfahrungen uber Bekampfung von Panzerkampfwagen and Angaben fiber Panzerabwehrwaffen and Munition," dated 19 May 1942, NAM T-312/1283/000203. See also "252. Inf. Division. Erfahrungsbericht fiber Winterfeldzug 1941/42" (undated), NAM T-78/202/6145759.

137. "Erfahrungsbericht-35. I.D.," NAM T-78/202/6145653. This report mentions a Soviet reluctance to advance single tanks very far into German defensive areas, presumably for fear of antitank gunfire or infantry close assault. On the use of heavy flak guns in an antitank role, see "12. Flakdivision (mot.) Fiihr. Gruppe (Ia) B.B. Nr. 2160/42 Betr.: Flakkampftrupps, Einsatz and Gliederung," dated 11 September 1942, NAM T-312/189/7736198-7736200.

138. "Erfahrungsbericht-35. I.D.," NAM T-78/202/6145653. See also "Zusammenstellung von Osterfahrungen," NAM T-312/1283/000204.

139. "Erfahrungsbericht-35. I.D.," NAM T-78/202/6145653.

140. "7. Division-Wintererfahrungen," NAM T-78/202/6145634.

141. See "Ia der 34. Division. Betr.: `Sttitzpunkt' oder 'Widerstandlinie,' " dated 17 August 1942, NAM T-312/184/7730358; and "10. Inf. Div. (mot)-Stutzpunktartige Verteidigung," NAM T-312/ 184/7730342.

142. See Ogorkiewicz, Armor, 215-17; and Guderian, Panzer Leader, 276-83.

143. "Armee-Pionier-Fiihrer, Armee-Oberkommando 2. Merkblatt fur Panzervernichtungstrupps," dated 10 February 1942, NAM T-312/1660/00941. This brief pamphlet included sketches of newer Soviet tanks, with their vulnerable points highlighted, along with instructions on tactics, equipment, and training for antitank teams.

144. Halder, War Journal, 7:261, 263 (entries for 29 January and 2 February). The apparent product of these discussions was a Training Branch circular to German units, "Oberkommando des Heeres. GenStdH./Ausb. Abt. (II) Nr. 1550/42. Betr.: Kampferfahrungen, Panzerabwehr," dated 19 May 1942, NAM T-312/1283/000199. This circular included "Zusammenstellung von Osterfahrungen" (cited in note 136) as an annex.

145. The full title of the decoration was Sonderabzeichen fur das Niederkampfen uon Panzer kampfwagen durch Einzelka:'npfer (Special Badge for the Single-Handed Destruction of a Tank). This badge was actually a cloth patch worn prominently on the upper right sleeve of the uniform coat. As most other German decorations were worn on the front of the coat, it may be that the particular prominence given this award was a conscious attempt to counteract the "suicidal" aura that surrounded the idea of infantry-versus-tank combat. On 26 May 1942, Hitler also authorized a special campaign medal for all German soldiers who had served in Russia during the winter campaign. This Medaille Winterschlacht im Osten (Medal for the Winter Battle in the East) was commonly referred to in the ranks as the "frozen flesh medal." John R. Angolia, For Fuhrer and Fatherland: Military Awards of the Third Reich (San Jose, CA: R. James Bender Publishing, 1976), 69, 109.

146. "252. Inf. Division. Erfahrungsbericht," NAM T-78/202/6145757-6145758.

147. "XX. A.K.-Erfahrungen," NAM T-78/202/6145567.

148. The tasking document is cited as "Chef des Generalstabes der Heeres vom 6.8.42" in "2. Armee. Stutzpunkt oder widerstandlinie," NAM T-312/1660/00852.

149. "Infanterie-Regiment 488, la," dated 18 August 1942, NAM T-312/184/7730391.

150. "Infanterie-Regiment 289, Kommandeur. Betr.: Kampferfahrung," dated 17 August 1942, NAM T-312/184/7730380.

151. "2. Armee. Stutzpunkt oder Widerstandlinie," NAM T-312/1660/00853.

152. "331. Infanterie Division. Erfahrungsbericht," NAM T-312/184/7730352.

153. "Infanterie-Regiment 434, Kommandeur," dated 17 August 1942, NAM T-312/184/7730339.

154. "Erfahrungsbericht-35. I.D.," NAM T-78/202/6145648. See also "Erfahrungsbericht der 5. Panzer-Division," NAM T-78/202/6145531.

155. "Hptmn. Haderecker, Erfahrungsbericht," NAM T-312/184/7730345.

156. "XXXXIII. A.K. `Stutzpunkt,' " NAM T-312/184/7730355. See also "Der Chef des Generalstabes des XII. A.K. An den Herrn Chef des Generalstabes der 4. Armee," dated 21 August 1942, NAM T-312/184/7730378.

157. See "Der Chef des Generalstabes des XII. A.K.," NAM T-312/184/7730377.