1 "Directive Number 21, `Operation BARBAROSSA,' 18 December 1941," in U.S. Department of the Army, Pamphlet no. 20-261a, The German Campaign in Russia: Planning and Operations, 1940-1942, by George E. Blau (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955), 22, hereafter cited as DA Pam 20-261a.

2. The particular merits of Keil and Kessel tactics in Operation Barbarossa are discussed in Hans von Greiffenberg, et al., "Battle of Moscow, 1941-1942," Foreign Military Studies no. MS T-28 (Historical Division, U.S. Army, Europe, n.d.), 91-92, hereafter cited as MS T-28. For comments on the coordination of early encirclement battles, see Franz Halder, The Private War Journal of Generaloberst Franz Halder, edited by Arnold Lissance (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1950), 7:167, 170 (entries for 24 and 25 June 1941), and 8:1 (entry for 1 August 1941); Hermann Hoth, Panzer-Operationen: Die Panzergruppe 3 and der operative Gedanke der deutschen Fuhrung, Sommer 1941 (Heidelberg: Kurt Vowinckel, 1956), 62-66; and Guderian, Panzer Leader, 161.

3. The principle of the "strategic offensive, tactical defensive" was first established in German military art by Helmuth von Moltke, chief of the Prussian (and later German) General Staff from 1857 to 1888. See Addington, Blitzkrieg Era, 3-4.

4. At the beginning of Barbarossa, German panzer divisions consisted of one panzer regiment and two rifle regiments plus supporting elements. Each infantry regiment had only two infantry battalions, however, giving a panzer division a total organic infantry strength of only four battalions. (This total excludes divisional reconnaissance, antitank, and other combat support units that might perform missions as infantry on occasion. Some panzer divisions also contained an additional motorcycle infantry battalion under the division headquarters.) In comparison, regular German infantry divisions consisted of three infantry regiments, each of three battalions. Panzer divisions therefore had roughly half the infantry strength of infantry divisions and were proportionately less able to hold terrain. Mueller-Hillebrand, Das Heer, 2:161-83.

5. Erich von Manstein, Lost Victories, edited and translated by Anthony G. Powell (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1958), 185.

6. Wolfgang Werthen, Geschichte der 16. Panzer-Division 1939-1945 (Bad Nauheim: HansHenning Podzun, 1958), 46; U.S. Department of the Army, Pamphlet no. 20-201, Military Improvisations During the Russian Campaign (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1951), 22, hereafter cited as DA Pam 20-201.

7. Halder, War Journal, 7:1 (entry for 1 August 1941).

8. On 22 June 1941, all ten of the German Army's motorized infantry divisions and four Waffen SS motorized divisions (Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler, Das Reich, Totenkopf, and Wiking) were deployed on the Russian Front. Of these, all were assigned to one of the four German panzer groups except for 60th Motorized Division, which was initially held in OKH reserve. MuellerHillebrand, Das Heer, 2:190-91. Four of the army's motorized divisions (14th, 18th, 25th, and 36th) were equipped wholly or in part with captured French materiel. Halder, War Journal, 6:48 (entry for 3 April 1941). In mid-May 1941, General Halder noted that the training of the 18th Motorized Division was "sketchy" with "no unit training" due to its late conversion from a regular infantry division. Ibid., 6:122 (entry for 17 May 1941). Motorized infantry divisions contained only two infantry regiments and were therefore not equal to regular infantry divisions in their ability to occupy and defend terrain. Mueller-Hillebrand, Das Heer, 2:179. For a description of the difficulties encountered by the German 29th Motorized Division in containing surrounded Soviet forces on 29-30 June 1941 at the cost of "very heavy losses," see Bryan I. Fugate, Operation Barbarossa: Strategy and Tactics on the Eastern Front, 1941 (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1984), 112-13.

9. For a discussion of the problems inherent to subduing a "wandering pocket," see "Das Phanomen der wandernden Kessel" in Rudolf Steiger, Panzertaktik im Spiegel deutscher Kriegstagebucher 1939-1941 (Freiburg: Romach, 1973), 52-56; and MS T-28, 91-92.

10. An account of the tactical difficulties experienced by one panzer division in defensive combat is Werthen, Geschichte, 53-67. See also Guderian, Panzer Leader, 158-67; and Rolf Hinze, Hitze, Frost and Pulverdampf: Der Schicksalsweg der 20. Panzer-Division (Bochum: Heinrich Poppinghaus Verlag, 1981), 49-56.

11. Rohricht, Probleme, 30; Halder, War Journal, 6:209 (entry for 7 July). On 29 June, Halder had already expressed surprise at the small number of prisoners taken in relation to the vast quantities of equipment seized, a sign that many enemy soldiers were escaping through the German lines. Ibid., 6:181 (entry for 28 June). This problem became more pronounced as the campaign progressed. On 25 August, for example, Halder wrote that "it appears that considerable enemy elements did manage to escape encirclement.... The trouble is that our panzer divisions now have such a low combat strength that they just do not have the men to seal off any sizeable areas." Ibid., 7:64 (entry for 25 August).

12. The inferiority of German tanks compared to the Soviet T-34 is discussed in Steiger, Panzertaktik, 103-13; and Erich Schneider, "Antitank Defense in the East," Foreign Military Studies no. MS D-253 (Historical Division, U.S. Army, Europe, 1947), 22-25, hereafter cited as MS D-253. An overview of German and Soviet tank development, including performance characteristics of specific models, is Richard M. Ogorkiewicz, Armor: A History of Mechanized Forces (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960), 206-36.

13. Hermann Plocher, The German Air Force Versus Russia, 1941, edited by Harry R. Fletcher, USAF Historical Studies no. 153 (New York: Arno Press, 1968), 74-75. In one of the functional redundancies typical of Nazi Germany, the Luftwaffe and the army had overlapping air defense responsibilities in the field. Thus, those Luftwaffe flak units assigned to German combat divisions were in addition to the army flak detachments organic to every German division.

14. Halder, War Journal, 6:173 (entry for 26 June).

15. Friedrich Hossbach, Infanterie im Ostfeldzug, 1941-1942 (Osterode-Harz: Giebel and Oehlschlagel, 1951), 50.

16. See TF 1:182-83.

17. An impression of the nearly constant fighting-both offensive and defensive-performed at the small-unit level during the German advance can be gained from Wilhelm Koehler, "Engagements Fought by the 488th Infantry Regiment at the Stryanitsa and Desna Rivers (6-29 Sep 1941)," Foreign Military Studies no. MS D-134 (Historical Division, U.S. Army, Europe, 1947); and Maximilian Fretter-Pico, Missbrauchte Infanterie: Deutsche Infanteriedivision im osteuropaischen Grossraum 1941 bis 1944 (Frankfurt am Main: Verlag fur Wehrwesen, 1957), 26.

18. "Directive 3," issued by Marshal Semen K. Timoshenko on the evening of 22 June 1941, ordered an all-out counteroffensive by Red Army forces. Although "virtually impossible to carry out from a purely military point of view, [Directive 3] in a way formulated the character of the war. The idea was to make unceasing and powerful counterblows." Amnon Sella, " 'Barbarossa': Surprise Attack and Communication," Journal of Contemporary History, 13 (July 1978):574. See also John Erickson, "The Soviet Response to Surprise Attack: Three Directives, 22 June 1941," Soviet Studies 23 (April 1972):549-53. Senior Soviet military officers recognized the futility of such an order but, for the most part, endorsed its aggressive spirit. See G. K. Zhukov, Vospominaniya i razmyshleniya (Moscow: Novosti Press, 1971), 240.

19. MS D-251, 6. The attachment of artillery batteries to German infantry units during marches and hasty attacks was a lesson learned from the 1939 campaign in Poland. See U.S. Department of the Army, Pamphlet no. 20-255, The German Campaign in Poland (1939), by Robert M. Kennedy (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1956), 134.

20. Werner Prellberg, "Employment of Flak in an Army Defense Zone," Foreign Military Studies no. MS D-050 (Historical Division, U.S. Army, Europe, 1947), 14.

21. German accounts are unanimous in confirming the ineffectiveness of the 37-mm antitank gun. The German 50-mm Pak was somewhat more effective at short ranges against the heavier Soviet tanks, but it was still inadequate. See MS D-253, 5, 17; I. G. Andronikow and W. D. Mostowenko, Die Roten Panzer: Geschichte der sowjetischen Panzertruppen (Munich: J. F. Lehmanns Verlag, 1963), 252-54; and Fugate, Barbarossa, 106-7.

22. The problems of using field artillery for antitank defense are described in MS D-253, 9-12, 27. For a somewhat heroic account of the exploits of German artillery against Russian tanks, see Eugen Beinhauer, ed., Artillerie im Osten (Berlin: Wilhelm Limpert Verlag, 1944), 44-49, 55-58, 230-39.

23. See Friedrich August von Metzsch, Die Geschichte der 22. Infanterie-Division, 1939-1945 (Kiel: Hans-Henning Podzun, 1952), 19-20; Paul Carrell, Hitler Moves East, 1941-1943, translated by Ewald Osers (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1964), 76-78; Charles W. Sydnor, Soldiers of Destruction: The SS Death's Head Division, 1933-1945 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977), 192, including note 68; and Fretter-Pico, Infanterie, 49.

24. Halder, War Journal, 6:221 (entry for 10 July).

25. Fretter-Pico, Infanterie, 25; Hans Breithaupt, Die Geschichte der 30. Infanterie-Division, 1940-1945 (Bad Nauheim: Hans-Henning Podzun, 1955), 119.

26. Fretter-Pico, Infanterie, 21-26. This same engagement is described from the standpoint of the German artillery in MS D-251, 6-7. German light infantry divisions contained only two infantry regiments rather than three as in regular infantry divisions. Mueller-Hillebrand, Das Heer, 2:174-75. For an assessment of German lessons learned in this battle, see Ernst Ott, Jager am Feind: Geschichte and Opfergang der 97. Jdger-Division 1940-1945 (Munich: Kameradschaft der Spielhahnjager, 1966), 37.

27. Hossbach, Infanterie, 54-59.

28. See Malcolm Mackintosh, Juggernaut: A History of the Soviet Armed Forces (New York: Macmillan Co., 1967), 132-36; and Erickson, Road to Stalingrad, 60-73. For the tactical readiness of Soviet forces, see Amnon Sella, "Red Army Doctrine and Training on the Eve of the Second World War," Soviet Studies 27 (April 1975).

29. Halder, War Journal, 6:195 (entry for 3 July).

30. Ibid., 6:205 (entry for 6 July). General Eugen Ott delivered this report. Although commanding a corps at the time this observation was given, General Ott had recently served as inspector general of infantry within the German Army. Ott's observations on Soviet and Russian tactics seem to have been particularly valued by Halder. General Ott's service record is in Wolf Keilig, Das Deutsche Heer, 1939-1945: Gliederung, Einsatz, Stellenbesetzung, 3 vols. (Bad Nauheim: Hans-Henning Podzun, 1956), 3:243.

31. Halder, War Journal, 7:35 (entry for 11 August).

32. The operational problems caused by the separation of German units are discussed at length in Heinz Guderian, "Flank Defense in Far-Reaching Operations," Foreign Military Studies no. MS T-11 (Historical Division, U.S. Army, Europe, 1948).

33. Halder, War Journal, 6:203 (entry for 5 July). 34. Ibid., 6:255 (entry for 19 July).

35. Ibid., 6:197, 272-73 (entries for 3 and 25 July); Walter Warlimont, Inside Hitler's Headquarters, 1939-1945, translated by R. H. Barry (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), 183.

36. Warlimont, Inside, 184.

37. DA Pam 20-261a, 56.

38. The German strategic indecision is traced in Ibid., 61-70; and Warlimont, Inside, 180-92.

39. P. N. Pospelov, et al., eds., Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, 1941-1945: A General Outline, translated by David Skvirsky and Vic Schneierson (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1974), 66, hereafter cited as GPWSU; Werner Haupt, Heeresgruppe Nord 1941-1942 (Bad Nauheim: Hans-Henning Podzun, 1967), 78-81; Percy Ernst Schramm, ed., Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht 1940-1945, vol. 1, 1 August 1940-31 December 1941 (Frankfurt am Main: Bernard and Graefe Verlag fur Wehrwesen, 1965), 465-70 (entries for 13-18 August 1941), hereafter cited as KTB/OKW.

40. Breithaupt, Geschichte, 98-110.

41. Halder, War Journal, 7:52 (entry for 18 August).

42. Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, WFSt/L (I Op.) Nr. 441386/41, "Anlage 36," dated 15 August 1941, in KTB/OKW, 1:1045; Halder, War Journal, 7:44 (entry for 15 August).

43. Sydnor, Soldiers, 175-78; Manstein, Lost Victories, 199-201. Manstein's account misidentifies the Soviet units participating in the engagement.

44. "Operative Gedanken des Fuhrers and Weisungen am 21. August 1941," KTB/OKW, 1:1061-62; and letter from Hitler to Brauchitsch, dated 21 August 1941, KTB/OKW 1:1062-63.

45. Hitler's interest in strategic objectives other than Moscow predated the beginning of the Barbarossa campaign. Brauchitsch, Halder, and other officers ignored this interest insofar as possible, hoping that events would favor their preference for a drive on Moscow. The Soviet attack near Staraya Russa in mid-August roused Hitler to action. This Russian thrust seemed to confirm Hitler's prescience about the vulnerability of the German flanks and to discredit the judgment of Halder, who as late as 15 August did not regard the situation as serious. Halder, War Journal, 7:44 (entry for 15 August). His judgment fortified by this incident, Hitler proceeded peremptorily to order the diverging offensives to the north and south, thereby totally rejecting the strategic reasoning of his senior military advisers. Hitler added insult to injury by bluntly criticizing the army leadership in a study dated 22 August. This criticism, together with Hitler's apparent lack of confidence in the professional skills of the Army High Command, nearly led Halder and Brauchitsch to resign. Hitler's criticism is in his signed "Studie," dated 22 August 1941, in KTB/OKW, 1:1063-68. Halder regarded Hitler's decision to postpone the attack on Moscow to be "the final turning point of the Eastern campaign" and admitted that the Staraya Russa attack had helped influence Hitler's decisions at this critical time. See Franz Halder, Hitler as War Lord, translated by Paul Findlay (London: Putnam, 1950), 44-47. See also Barry Leach, German Strategy Against Russia, 1939-1941 (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), 209-17; Seaton, Russo-German War, 142-52; and Warlimont, Inside, 190-92.

46. Halder, War Journal, 7:63 (entry for 24 August). Halder's assessment is confirmed by the strength reports of forward units. On 21 August, for example, the German Sixteenth Army (Army Group North) reported that each of its divisions had suffered at least 40 percent total casualties since the beginning of the campaign. A.O.K. 16 [Armeeoberkommando 16], la, "Gefechtskraft der Div., An Heeresgruppe Nord," dated 21 August 1941, NAM T-312/548/8156867-8156869.

47. For an analysis of German supply problems throughout Operation Barbarossa, see "Russian Roulette," in Martin van Creveld, Supplying War (London: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 142-80. See also U.S. Department of the Army, Pamphlet no. 20-202, German Tank Maintenance in World War II (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1954), 2-3, 21-23, 26.

48. On 16 August, Halder projected that German personnel replacements would be virtually exhausted by 1 October. Halder, War Journal, 7:49. By 1 September, Halder was weighing the possibility of disbanding twelve divisions to cover anticipated winter losses. Ibid., 7:79. See also DA Pam 20-261a, 71-72; and Seaton, Russo-German War, 171-75. 49. Alan S. Milward, The German Economy at War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), 39-45; Leach, German Strategy, 133-35, 140-45.

50. The battles around Smolensk are described in Hans Baumann, "Die Kesselschlacht von Smolensk and die Abwehrkampfe westlich des Wop," in Die 35. Infanterie-Division im 2. Weltkrieg, 1939-1945, edited by Hans Baumann (Karlsruhe: Verlag G. Braun, 1964), 93-100; Hoth, PanzerOperationen, 98-102; Guderian, Panzer Leader, 176-82; and KTB/OKW 1:439-58 (entries for 22 July-8 August). According to the Soviet official history, the Russians first used their new Katyusha multiple rocket launchers in this fighting. P.N. Pospelov, et al., eds., Istoriya Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voiny Sovetskogo Soyuza 1941-1945, 6 vols. (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1961), 2:66, hereafter cited as Istoriya.

51. Istoriya, 2:69.

52. Guderian, Panzer Leader, 181, 186. The figure of 450 miles given by Guderian on page 186 is presumably the distance to the nearest serviceable rebuilt railroad-probably not far from the 22 June border. On the formation of the Yelnya salient, see Fugate, Barbarossa, 128-33.

53. Guderian, Panzer Leader, 181, 182, 186; Halder, War Journal, 7:2 (entry for 1 August).

54. Guderian, Panzer Leader, 179.

55. Plocher, German Air Force, 107-8, 110-11.

56. Guderian, Panzer Leader, 185.

57. Ibid., 189.

58. Halder, War Journal, 7:11-12 (entry for 3 August).

59. Plocher, German Air Force, 116.

60. DA Pam 20-261a, 65; "Tagesmeldungen der Operations-Abteilung des GenStdH," KTB/OKW, 1:558, 561 (reports for 7 and 8 August). See also Fugate, Barbarossa, 163-67.

61. Halder, War Journal, 7:17 (entry for 4 August).

62. Ibid., 7:22 (entry for 6 August).

63. DA Pam 20-261a, 65; "Tagesmeldungen," KTB/OKW, 1:567 (report for 12 August).

64. Istoriya, 2:73-74.

65. Halder, War Journal, 7:47 (entry for 15 August).

66. Soviet air superiority is mentioned in "Tagesmeldungen," KTB/OKW, 1:565 (report for 11 August). The pressure on Ninth Army is discussed briefly in Fugate, Barbarossa, 201-2.

67. Werner Haupt, Heeresgruppe Mitte 1941-1945 (Dorheim: Hans-Henning Podzun, 1968), 73.

68. "Tagesmeldungen," KTB/OKW, 1:575-89 (reports for 17-24 August); Halder, War Journal, 7:55, 70-71 (entries for 19 and 28 August). The unit on the 161st Division's right flank was the 7th Regiment, 28th Infantry Division. The Soviet attacks during this period are described in the 7th Regiment's unit history, Romuald Bergner, Schlesische Infanterie: Grenadier-Regiment 7 (Bochum: Heinrich Poppinghaus Verlag, 1980), 88-103. The 161st Division was replaced by the 14th Motorized Infantry Division. This unit became available for employment only through Bock's pleas to delay that unit's departure for the attack on Leningrad. "Tagesmeldungen," KTB/OKW, 1:589 (report for 24 August).

69. "Tagesmeldungen," KTB/OKW, 1:591 (report for 25 August).

70. Halder, War Journal, 7:70 (entry for 28 August). The fighting in the V Corps sector is described in Baumann, 35. Infanterie-Division, 100-102.

71. "Tagesmeldungen," KTB/OKW, 1:595 (report for 27 August).

72. Halder, War Journal, 7:69 (entry for 27 August).

73. Ibid., 7:49 (entry for 16 August).

74. Giinther Blumentritt, "Moscow," in The Fatal Decisions, edited by Seymour Freidin and William Richardson (New York: William Sloane Associates, 1956), 61.

75. Das Buch der 78. Sturm Division (Tubingen: Buchdruckerei H. Lauppir, n.d.), 59-60. The general shortage of barbed wire and mines is mentioned in Halder, War Journal, 7:50 (entry for 16 August).

76. 78. Sturm Division, 60-61. Other comments on the state of Yelnya defenses are in Benignus Dippold, "Commitment of the 183rd Infantry Division," Foreign Military Studies no. MS D-223 (Historical Division, U.S. Army, Europe, 1947), 25. General Dippold's 183d Division relieved the 78th Division at Yelnya between 18 and 20 September.

77. Halder, War Journal, 7:43, 49 (entries for 14 and 16 August); Wilhelm Meyer-Detring, Die 137. Infanteriedivision im Mittelabschnitt der Ostfront (Petzenkirchen, Austria: Kameradschaft der Bergmann-Division, 1962), 62-77, 274-75.

78. "Tagesmeldungen," KTB/OKW, 1:584 (report for 22 August); Istoriya, 2:75; and Zhukov, Vospominaniya, 289. The Soviet Reserve Front facing Yelnya was Zhukov's first field command of World War II. Zhukov had previously served as chief of the Soviet General Staff, being reassigned from that post on 29 July. Zhukov observed German tanks and assault guns dug in near Yelnya at the time of his arrival there. These presumably were elements of the German XLVI Panzer Corps. If Zhukov is correct, it means that the Germans were so pressed to occupy their thin lines at Yelnya that they violated the cardinal principle of panzer operations by posting stationary armored vehicles along their perimeter instead of holding them exclusively in reserve for counterattack.

79. Zhukov, Vospominaniya, 290.

80. Halder, War Journal, 7:69 (entry for 27 August); Guderian, Panzer Leader, 203, 208. Guderian was a difficult subordinate and managed, at one time or another, to alienate all three field marshals under whom he served during Barbarossa (Brauchitsch, Bock, and Gunther von Kluge), as well as General Halder, the chief of the General Staff. On Guderian's relations with his superiors during this period, see Guderian, Panzer Leader, 208-10; Halder, War Journal, 7:62, 6869, 77 (entries for 24, 27, and 31 August); and Kenneth Macksey, Guderian: Creator of the Blitzkrieg (New York: Stein and Day, 1975), 131-33, 137-40, 148-51.

81. "Tagesmeldungen," KTB/OKW, 1:601, 603 (reports for 30 and 31 August).

82. Small-unit actions in the Yelnya area are described in Carrell, Hitler, 90-96; and 78. Sturm Division, 62-69.

83. "Tagesmeldungen," KTB/OKW, 1:568-604 (reports for 13-31 August); Halder, War Journal, 7:77 (entry for 31 August).

84. Halder, War Journal, 7:80 (entry for 2 September); "Tagesmeldungen," KTB/OKW, 1:614 (report for 5 September). The Soviet official history claims that Red Army forces finally stormed Yelnya and overran German defenses. However, Zhukov supports the German version by noting that the Germans voluntarily withdrew. Compare Istoriya, 2:75; and Zhukov, Vospominaniya, 292. The best account of the Yelnya fighting in English is Fugate, Barbarossa, 167-83.

85. Istoriya, 2:75-76.

86. 78. Sturm Division, 67; Haupt, Heeresgruppe Mitte, 78.

87. Halder, War Journal, 7:124 (entry for 26 September). Halder also recorded that the German armies on the Eastern Front had a net deficit of 200,000 men.

88. Klaus Reinhardt, Die Wende vor Moskau: Das Scheitern der Strategie Hitlers im Winter 1941-1942 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1972), 315; Blumentritt, "Moscow," 61.

89. Quoted in Albert Seaton, The Battle for Moscow, 1941-1942 (London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1971), 300.

90. Halder noted on 11 September that Army Group Center had managed to accumulate only one ammunition issue in its stockpiles. Halder, War Journal, 7:91. Even this paltry ammunition buildup was apparently accomplished at the expense of fuel and ration deliveries. See Van Creveld, Supplying War, 168-71.

91. Sydnor, Soldiers, 170-86; Haupt, Heeresgruppe Nord, 67-86.

92. Leon Goure, The Siege of Leningrad (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962), 83'-85; DA Pam 20-261a, 73-75.

93. "Tagesmeldungen," KTB/OKW, 1:661 (report for 26 September).

94. Halder, War Journal, 7:106. See also Guderian, Panzer Leader, 202-25; and Werthen, Geschichte, 63-67.

95. "Weisung Nr. 35," in Walter Hubatsch, ed., Hitlers Weisungen fur die Kriegfiihrungen 19391945: Dokumente des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht (Frankfurt am Main: Bernard and Graefe Verlag fur Wehrwesen, 1962), 150-53; DA Pam 20-261a, 75-76.

96. Halder, War Journal, 7:84 (entry for 5 September).

97. Alan F. Wilt, "Hitler's Late Summer Pause in 1941," Military Affairs 45 (December 1981):189.

98. Seaton, Russo-German War, 177-78; Hoth, Panzer-Operationen, 130-31.

99. The Totenkopf Division was holding an extremely wide sector-approximately fifteen milesat the time of these Russian attacks. Even so, the Waffen SS officers and soldiers seem to have been somewhat lax in preparing their defensive positions. See Sydnor, Soldiers, 185-86, 188-97. Although Waffen SS tactical doctrine was nearly identical to that of the German Army in most respects, Waffen SS units apparently despised the elastic defense in depth as being unworthy of their courage and steadfastness. The SS increasingly accepted the principles of Elastic Defense as the war progressed. See Klaus Moelhoff, "Experiences with Russian Methods of Warfare and Their Utilization in Training at the Waffen SS Panzer Grenadier School," Foreign Military Studies no. MS D-154 (Historical Division, U.S. Army, Europe, 1947), 11-13. Early in the war, SS units occasionally suffered heavy casualties by putting National Socialist ardor ahead of tactical good sense. See George H. Stein, The Waffen SS: Hitler's Elite Guard at War, 1939-1945 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1966), 91-92.

100. Breithaupt, Geschichte, 123-33.

101. Halder, War Journal, 7:138 (entry for 4 October).

102. Hoth, Panzer-Operationen, 136; "Tagesmeldungen," KTB/OKW, 1:702 (report for 15 October). Soviet accounts of the Vyazma-Bryansk battles are vague about Russian losses. The Vyazma pocket contained the Nineteenth, Twentieth, Twenty-Fourth, and Thirty-Second Armies, while the Bryansk Kessel snared major elements of the Third and Thirteenth Armies. GPWSU, 86-90 (including map facing page 88).

103. See, for example, Walter Kranz, "Meine Feuertaufe bei Wjasma," in Baumann, 35. Infanterie-Division; and the account of 6th Panzer Division in "hedgehog defense" at Vyazma in DA Pam 20-201, 22-23. An analysis of the German tactics at Vyazma is in MS T-28, 89-92.

104. Istoriya, 2:240-44; Zhukov, Vospominaniya, 326-29; and Erickson, Road to Stalingrad, 216-19.

105. Halder, War Journal, 7:147 (entry for 8 October); Otto Dietrich quoted in Alan Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, rev. ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), 654.

106. Seaton, Russo-German War, 197.

107. See Eberhard von Mackensen, Vom Bug zum Kaukasus: Das III. Panzerkorps im Feldzug gegen Sowjetrussland 1941142 (Neckargemuend: Scharnhorst Buchkameradschaft, 1967), 41-42; and also the comments of Ewald von Kleist in Basil H. Liddell Hart, The Other Side of the Hill, 2d ed. (London: Cassell, 1973), 281-82.

108. Halder, War Journal, 7:187-89 (entries for 28 and 29 November). See also Rundstedt's remarks in Liddell Hart, The Other Side, 282.

109. Halder, War Journal, 7:193, 195 (entries for 30 November and 1 December); Seaton, RussoGerman War, 197; Warlimont, Inside, 194.

110. Halder, War Journal, 7:196 (entry for 1 December); "Tagesmeldungen," KTB/OKW, 1:78687 (report for 1 December).

111. Plocher, German Air Force, 222.

112. Seaton, Russo-German War, 194.

113. Mackensen, Bug, 44.

114. Halder, War Journal, 7:173 (entry for 21 November).

115. Werthen, Geschichte, 76.

116. Halder, War Journal, 7:195 (entry for 1 December).

117. A secret General Staff memorandum dated 6 November 1941 calculated the effective strength of the 136 German divisions deployed in Russia to be that of only 83 full-strength divisions. Infantry divisions averaged 65 percent of full combat strength, while motorized infantry divisions and panzer divisions were rated at 60 percent and 35 percent respectively. "Beurteilung der Kampfkraft des Ostheeres," KTB/OKW, 1:1074-75.

118. For accounts of Operation Taifun's final phase, see Reinhardt, Die Wende, 162-71; Seaton, Battle for Moscow, 152-69; Alfred Turney, Disaster at Moscow: Von Bock's Campaigns, 19411942 (London: Cassell and Co., 1971), 136-51; Bergner, Schlesische Infanterie, 119-33; and MS T-28, 61-73.

119. Halder, War Journal, 7:170, 178, 190 (entries for 19, 23, and 29 November).

120. "Weisung Nr. 39," in Hubatsch, Hitlers, 171-74. The army's implementing directive, "Weisung fur die Aufgaben des Ostheeres im Winter 1941/42," is in KTB/OKW, 1:1076-82.