1. The German publication that set forth the new doctrine did not give a specific title to the new defensive technique. "Grundsatze fur die Abwehrschlacht im Stellungskriege [Principles for Defensive Combat in Positional Warfare]," 20 September 1918 ed., in Urkunden der Obersten Heeresleitung, 3d ed., edited by Erich von Ludendorff (Berlin: E. S. Mittler and Sohn, 1922), hereafter cited as "Grundsatze." Captain Graeme C. Wynne, a British authority on German defensive doctrine during World War I, suggests that the term "elastic defense" was used informally within the Imperial German Army. Graeme C. Wynne, If Germany Attacks: The Battle in Depth in the West (1940; reprint, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1976), 156, 158-59. The German official history of World War I used the expression "elastic battle procedure" (das elastische Kampfverfahren) in its discussion of the new doctrine. Oberkommando des Heeres, Der Weltkrieg 1914-1918 (Berlin: E. S. Mittler, 1939), 12:45. When the Oberkommando des Heeres (Army High Command) is the author of a source, it is cited as OKH. This research survey will use the term "Elastic Defense" as a title for the German technique of defense in depth.

2. Wilhelm Balck, Development of Tactics-World War, translated by Harry Bell (Fort Leavenworth, KS: The General Service Schools Press, 1922), 79-80.

3. The discussion of the Elastic Defense that follows in the text is from Wynne, If Germany Attacks, 148-64; Timothy T. Lupfer, The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Changes in German Tactical Doctrine During the First World War, Leavenworth Papers no. 4 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1981), 11-21; "Grundsatze"; and "Allgemeines fiber Stellungsbau [Principles of Position Construction]," 10 August 1918 ed., in Urkunden, and edited by Ludendorff. 

4. "Grundsatze," 607.

5. Ibid., 617. The German military vocabulary included separate doctrinal terms for each type of counterattack. A hasty local counterattack by engaged units was a Gegenstoss in der Stellung; one reinforced with fresh reserves was a Gegenstoss aus der Tief; and a deliberate, coordinated counterattack was a Gegenangriff. This distinctive vocabulary illustrates the careful attention the Germans paid to counterattack. No comparable terms exist in the American military lexicon.

6. Ibid., 606-15; Wynne, If Germany Attacks, 209-10.

7. Wilhelm, Crown Prince of Germany, My War Experiences (London: Hurst and Blackett, 1923), 267.

8. See, for example, "General von Maur's Memorandum on the English Tank Attack of April 11, 1917," translated by David G. Rempel and Gertrude Rendtorff, in Fall of the German Empire, 1914-1918, edited by Ralph Haswell Lutz (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1932), 1:625-27.

9. Erich von Ludendorff, Ludendorff's Own Story (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1919), 2:202-3.

10. See "Grundsatze."

11. A good critique of the German 1918 strategy is given in Gordon Craig, "Delbruck: The Military Historian," in Makers of Modern Strategy, edited by Edward Mead Earle (1941; reprint, New York: Atheneum, 1969), 275-82. Following World War I, an official German investigating commission examined the 1918 collapse and later presented its findings to the Reichstag. Extracts from the commission's reports appear as "Report of the Commission of the German Constituent Assembly and of the German Reichstag, 1919-1928," in The Causes of the German Collapse in 1918, edited by Ralph Haswell Lutz, translated by W. L. Campbell (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1934), hereafter cited as "Commission Report." A critical assessment of the 1918 German offensive strategy is on pages 72-90.

12. Balck, Development of Tactics, 87.

13. "Commission Report," 81. See also Lupfer, Dynamics of Doctrine, 48-49.

14. Crown Prince Wilhelm, who commanded a German Army Group in the 1918 battles, wrote after the war that, "In view of the ever-increasing weight of the attack ... it [the Elastic Defense] was without doubt right in principle, but it was dependent upon strictly-disciplined, well-trained and skillfully-led troops. As the war progressed, these conditions became increasingly difficult to fulfill." Wilhelm, My War Experiences, 282-83.

15. Ludendorff, Ludendorff's Own Story, 2:341-42.

16. "Commission Report," 71-72; Hermann Joseph von Kuhl, Entstehung, Durchfuhrung and Zusammenbruch der Offensive von 1918 (Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft fur Politik and Geschichte m.b.H., 1927), 79-86.

17. Balck, Development of Tactics, 289-90.

18. "Headquarters, Fifth [German] Reserve Corps: Experiences from the Fighting on the West Bank of the Meuse, 29 September 1918," in Lutz, Fall, 662.

19. Hans Ritter, Kritik des Weltkrieges: das Erbe Moltkes and Schlieffen im grossen Kriege (Leipzig: K. F. Koehler, 1920), 64. Published anonymously by "A General Staff Officer."

20. Wilhelm, My War Experiences, 267. 21. Balck, Development of Tactics, 288.

22. A particularly impassioned version of the "stab in the back" is given by Balck, who asserted that the "criminal responsible for our fall ... should be sought in the ranks of the leaders of our political parties [who] ... placed pursuit of their own ends above the weal and woe of Germany." These cowards, according to Balck, struck down the German Army "like Hagen of old did to the unconquerable hero, Siegfried." Ibid., 294.

23. Graeme C. Wynne, "The Legacy," Army Quarterly 39 (October 1939 and January 1940), 26.

24. The early rebuilding of the German Army is described in Harold J. Gordon, The Reichswehr and the German Republic, 1919-1926 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957), 169-216; and Herbert Rosinski, The German Army, rev. ed. (Washington, DC: Infantry Journal, 1944), 123-29.

25. The most prominent spokesman of the "trench school" was General Walter Reinhardt, who served briefly as Chef der Heeresleitung prior to Seeckt. Reinhardt was dismissed from this position as a result of the Kapp Putsch in 1920. Rosinski, German Army, 103.

26. Reichswehrministerium, Fuhrung and Gefecht der verbundenen Waffen, 2 vols. (Berlin: Offene Worte, 1921), 223, hereafter cited as FuG.

27. Ibid., 223.

28. Ibid., 221-22.

29. Ibid., 206.

30. Ibid., 215-16.

31. Ibid., 192.

32. Ibid., 196.

33. Ibid., 197-201.

34. On Seeckt's personal dogmatism, see Francis L. Carsten, The Reichswehr and Politics, 1918 to 1933 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966), 106-7. On his suppression of contradictory theories, see Friedrich von Rabenau, Seeckt: Aus seinem Leben 1918-1936 (Leipzig: Von Hasse and Koehler, 1940), 505.

35. See "Grundlegende Gedanken fair den Wiederaufbau unserer Wehrmacht," in Rabenau, Seeckt, 474-75. This same 1921 memorandum also first set forth Seeckt's idea of the Reichswehr as a Fuhrerheer (Leader Army), a high-quality cadre for a future expansion of the German Army.

36. Ibid., 511. 37. Ibid., 512.

38. Ibid., 509. For the strategic dimensions of Seeckt's theories, see Hans von Seeckt, Die Reichswehr (Leipzig: R. Kittler, 1933), 34-64; Hans von Seeckt, Thoughts of a Soldier, translated by Gilbert Waterhouse (London: E. Benn, 1930), 59-64; and Larry H. Addington, The Blitzkrieg Era and the German General Staff, 1865-1941 (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1971), 28-30.

39. Ritter, Kritik, 47; Rosinski, German Army, 81-91. Rosinski flatly states that the German decision in November 1914 "against a return to the mobile strategy of the first weeks of the war ... must be considered to be the real turning point of the war [italics in original]." Hans Delbruck, the prominent German military historian and critic, argued even during the war that Germany's only hope for escape from Stellungskrieg lay in the direction of a political settlement since a German military victory was no longer within reach. Craig, "Delbruck," 278-80.

40. The military constraints on Germany are detailed in Part V (Military, Naval and Air Clauses) of the Versailles Treaty. Article 160 limited the size and composition of the German Army; Article 171 prohibited poison gas and tanks; Article 180 prohibited fortifications along Germany's western frontiers. Table II (Armament Establishment) listed allowed types and quantities of weapons. In addition to "offensive weapons" such as tanks, aircraft, and poison gas, the Germans were also forbidden to possess such patently defensive weapons as antitank and antiaircraft guns. The Treaty of Peace with Germany, June 28, 1919 (Washington, DC, 1920).

41. Paramilitary units such as the Freikorps and the Stahlhelm remained essential to the defense of the eastern frontiers until Germany's rearmament in the mid-1930s. Carsten, Reichswehr, 149-50, 231-32, 265-68, 355-56.

42. Gordon, Reichswehr, 254-61.

43. Albert Seaton, The German Army, 1933-1945 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982), 51-71. One of the earliest rearmament measures ordered by Hitler was the construction of fortifications along Germany's border with France-a repudiation not only of the Versailles Treaty, but also of Seeckt's doctrines of offensive maneuver. Burkhart Mueller-Hillebrand, Das Heer 1933-1945 (Darmstadt: E. S. Mittler and Sohn, 1954), 1:38-43.

44. Philip C. F. Bankwitz, Maxime Weygand and Civil-Military Relations in Modern France (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967), 40-45. Ironically, the building of the Maginot Line was inspired in part by French fears of Seeckt's theories of preemptive offensive warfare.

45. A summary of Beck's role in the development of all facets of German doctrine during this period is in Addington, Blitzkrieg Era, 35-38; see also S. J. Lewis, Forgotten Legions: German Army Infantry Policy, 1918-41 (New York: Praeger, 1985), 45-55. Beck's role in restoring the Elastic Defense is spitefully discredited by Heinz Guderian in Panzer Leader, translated by Constantine Fitzgibbon (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1952), 31-33. Guderian, who saw Beck as an obstacle to his own pet schemes of armored warfare, characterized Beck in his memoirs as "a paralyzing element wherever he appeared." As evidence of this, Guderian cited "his [Beck's] much-boosted method of fighting which he called `delaying defense.' ... In the 100,000-man army this delaying defense became the cardinal principle." Guderian credits the "fine, chivalrous, clever, careful" General Freiherr von Fritsch-who coincidentally tended to support Guderian's ideaswith jettisoning the "confusing" and "unsatisfactory" delaying defense in the early 1930s. In all of this, Guderian is mistaken. The Hinhaltendes Gefecht was not Beck's brainchild at all, but rather part of Seeckt's schemes for defense by offensive maneuver. It was conversely through Beck's efforts in Truppenfuhrung that the "delaying defense" was supplanted by the more workable Elastic Defense system. Guderian's story is repeated uncritically by Robert J. O'Neill, "Doctrine and Training in the German Army, 1919-1939," in The Theory and Practice of War, edited by Michael Howard (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), 153.

46. Reichswehrministerium, Truppenfuhrung, Teil 1, H.Dv. 300/1, dated October 1933 (1933; reprint, Berlin, 1936), 179, hereafter cited as TF 1.

47. Ibid., 179-208. Truppenfuhrung also made minor changes in nomenclature. The battle zone (Grosskampfzone), for example, was retitled the main battle position (Hauptkampffeld).

48. OKH, Der Stellungskrieg, H.Dv. 91 (1938; reprint, Berlin, 1940), 59-90; OKH, Generalstab des Heeres/Ausbildungsabteilung (II) [Training Branch of the Army General Staff], Die Stdndige Front, Teil 1: Die Abwehr in Stdndiger Front, H.Dv. 89/1 (Berlin, 1940), 5-24; the OKH Training Branch is hereafter cited as OKH, GSII. Techniques to be used in positional warfare were also written into various branch and training manuals as well. For example, see OKH, GSII, Ausbildungsvorschrift fur die Infanterie, Heft 11: Feldbefestigung der Infanterie, H.Dv. 130/11 (Berlin, 1940), and OKH, GSII, Pionierdienst aller Waffen, H.Dv. 316 (Berlin, 1935).

49. See, for example, "Truppenfuhrung. Stellungskrieg, Stosstrupp-Unternehmen and Angriff mit begrenzten Ziele," Militdr-Wochenblatt, no. 23 (2 December 1938):1508-12; and "Truppen-Kriegsgeschichte: Gegenangriff des R.I.R. 93 am 15.8.1917," Militdr-Wochenblatt, no. 38 (18 March 1938): 2435-37, and no. 39 (25 March 1938), 2499-2500.

50. Leeb's articles were compiled into book form as Die Abwehr (Berlin, 1938). The cited portion is from Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb, Defense, translated and edited by Stefan T. Possony and Daniel Vilfroy (Harrisburg, PA: Military Service Publishing Co., 1943), 121.

51. Leeb, Defense, 115-19.

52. Generalmajor Klingbeil, "Das Problem `Stellungskrieg,"' Militdr-Wochenblatt, no. 36 (19 March 1937):2149.

53. One major exception to the general trend in German strategic thought was Colonel Hermann Foertsch's The Art of Modern Warfare, translated by Theodore W. Knauth (Camden, NJ: Veritas Press, 1940). Foertsch theorized that modern weapons and mobility merely increased the lethality and extended the size of the battlefield. He concluded that, therefore, "the defensive has greatly gained strength as compared with the attack .... The war of the future will see more defense than has been the case for the last hundred years." Ibid., 217. Foertsch was convinced that future wars would necessarily be decided by the exhaustion of one of the belligerents and urged a defense in depth to conserve military resources. Foertsch later served as an army group chief of staff and commander of an infantry division during World War II.

54. Guderian, Panzer Leader, 32-33; Addington, Blitzkrieg Era, 35-38.

55. OKH, GSII, Truppenfuhrung, Teil 2, H.Dv. 300/2 (1934; reprint, Berlin, 1941), 8-10 ("Abwehr gepanzerter Kampffahrzeuge"); OKH, GSII, Die Standige Front, Teil 2: Der Kampf der Infanterie (Berlin, 1940), 25-27.

56. OKH, Der Stellungskrieg, 77-78. See also the sketch in "Truppenfuhrung. Stellungskrieg," 1509-10.

57. OKH, Die Infanterie, Waffenhefte des Heeres (Munich: Deutscher Volksverlag, 1938?), 7; Mueller-Hillebrand, Das Heer, 1:158-59. The German antitank rifles were the 7.92-mm Panzer­biichse 38 and Panzerbuchse 39. Neither proved particularly effective in combat. The German crew-served antitank gun was the 37-mm Pak, whose armor-piercing ammunition could penetrate 1.93 inches of homogeneous armor (30-degree slope) at 400 yards. U.S. War Department, TM-E 30-451, Handbook on German Military Forces (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1945), VII-9-VII-10, VII-31-VII-32.

58. One outspoken critic of the German antitank concept was General Ludwig Ritter von Eimanns­berger, who proposed a complete overhaul of German defensive doctrine in order to place primary importance on antitank defense. Eimannsberger's ideas on this and other topics related to mech­anized warfare are in his Der Kampfwagen Krieg (Munich: J. F. Lehmanns Verlag, 1934), type­script English translation at the U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Antitank defense is discussed on pages 117-49 of this typescript.

59. Ludwig Ritter von Eimannsberger, "Panzertaktik," Militar-Wochenblatt, no. 26 (8 January 1937):1448-53.

60. Major Sieberg, untitled commentary on fighting in Spain, Militdr-Wochenblatt, no. 33 (11 February 1938):2097. Foertsch asserted that the combination of new antitank weaponry and skillful use of elastic defense in depth meant that "such advantages as tanks enjoyed in 1917 and 1918 will hardly survive." Foertsch, Modern Warfare, 136-37. For examples of technical disputes on antitank tactics, see "Panzerabwehr in der Praxis," Militar-Wochenblatt, no. 18 (29 October 1937): 1101-3; Guderian, Panzer Leader, 37; and Eimannsberger, "Panzertaktik," 1452.

61. Eimannsberger, Kampfwagen Krieg (MHI typescript), 143.

62. At the outbreak of World War II, German tank armaments were: Panzer I, two machine guns only; Panzer II, a 20-mm cannon; Panzer III, a 37-mm cannon (same ammunition and performance characteristics as the 37-mm Pak); and Panzer IV, a short-barreled, low-velocity 75­mm cannon. The last three models also had machine guns of various types.

63. Compare FuG, 2:46; TF 1:195; and Foertsch, Modern Warfare, 155.

64. TF 1:195; OKH, Der Stellungskrieg, 77.

65. Edgar Rohricht, Probleme der Kesselschlacht (Karlsruhe: Condor-Verlag, 1958), xv; Hermann Metz, "Die Deutsche Infanterie," in Die Deutsche Wehrmacht, edited by G. Wetzel (Berlin, 1939).

66. The impact of the Polish campaign on the German Army is described in Williamson Murray, "The German Response to Victory in Poland: A Case Study in Professionalism," Armed Forces and Society 7 (Winter 1981).

67. Ibid., 289.

68. Der Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres, GS la Nr. 400/39g, dated 13 October 1939, "Ausbildung des Feldheeres," microfilm series T-312, roll 234, frame 7787781, National Archives, Washington, DC. Further references to National Archives microfilm will be cited as NAM.

69. OKH, GSII, Richtlinien fur Fiihrung and Einsatz der Panzer-Division, D-66, dated 3 December 1940 (Berlin, 1940). The two paragraphs on defense are on page 54.

70. Guderian, Panzer Leader, 143-44. Although the Panzer III's main gun was enlarged to 50-mm, the German Army Ordnance Office selected a shorter, lower-velocity gun tube than the 50-mm L60 ordered by Hitler.

71. Some units also received Czechoslovakian 37-mm antitank guns. The expansion of the German Army prior to Barbarossa caused many new German divisions to have fewer antitank guns of any type than authorized. Mueller-Hillebrand, Das Heer, 2:108. Despite the proliferation of new weapons, German antitank training remained based on dated manuals and training guides. See OKH, GSII, Die Infanterie-Panzerabwehrkompanie, H.Dv. 130/5 (Berlin, 1938); and Edler Ritter von Peter and Kurt von Tippelskirch, Das Panzerabwehrbuch (Berlin: Offene Worte, 1937).

72. Joseph Prinner, "Organization, Advance and Combat of the 81st Artillery Regiment in 1941," Foreign Military Studies no. MS D-251 (Historical Division, U.S. Army, Europe, 1947), 2, hereafter cited as MS D-251.

73. Wynne, "Legacy," 29. See also Armand Mermet, Siegfried Taktik 37 (Paris: Charles-Lavauzelle, 1939).