by LTC Charles Shrader
Introduction While amicicide incidents arising from the engagement of one friendly ground unit by another have not involved the same destructive force as either artillery or air incidents, they have nevertheless constituted a serious threat to the continuity of ground operations and have resulted in death, wounds, and loss of friendly equipment. Active combat operations involving large numbers of infantry troops and armor units are particularly difficult to coordinate. The lack of proper coordination, the inability to distinguish friend from foe, and the usual stresses of combat on nervous or ill-disciplined troops have on occasion led to friendly soldiers or tanks firing on one another with predictable consequences. None of the fifty-eight incidents identified in this study were related to any mechanical problem. The incidents were all due to some human failure. It should be pointed out that the weapons involved in the noted incidents of ground amicicide were direct-fire weapons of limited range and required visual acquisition and identification of the target. In World War II and in Vietnam there were no technical, electronic aids to assist in the identification process, and the pressures of combat usually demanded, or seemed to demand, a "shoot first and sort 'em out later" policy. Most of the fifty-eight incidents examined involved small arms and automatic weapons fire of one infantry force against another. Sixteen of the fiftyeight incidents involved tanks, but most were cases in which tanks fired with both machine guns and main armament on infantry forces. Only two major incidents involved friendly tanks engaging other friendly tanks, and one additional incident involved a protracted engagement of tanks with friendly tank destroyer forces. All three incidents occurred in the European theater during World War II. Two of the incidents are described in detail in this study. World War I The well-fixed defensive lines and planned, coordinated attacks characteristic of warfare on the western front in World War I were not proof against frequent incidents of ground as well as artillery amicicide. The great confusion of offensive operations and the serious disruption of communications that accompanied such attacks sometimes resulted in one group of friendly troops battling another. The limited visibility and confusion of a disputed trench was often the scene of such incidents. Typical of these was the experience of the Australian 50th
Infantry Battalion on 24 April 1918 during the second battle
of Villers-Bretonneux. [1] Despite heavy enemy fires, the
Australians advanced steadily toward the German trenches under
cover of the darkness. As they neared the German position,
several shots were fired at them from close in front, someone
yelled "Bomb the bastards," grenades were thrown, and a rush
of the trench was made. [2]
The trench proved to be occupied, not by the Germans, but
by remnants of the 2d Devon and 1st Worcester Battalions, who
had not been informed of the Australian counterattack and
thought the Germans were attacking them from the rear.
World War II: Europe
The more fluid conditions of combat in World War II,
both in Europe and the Pacific, only intensified the problems
of locating and coordinating friendly units in order to
preclude incidents of amicicide. Although communications were
greatly improved, the greater area of dispersion, higher
mobility, and, particularly in the Pacific, more difficult
terrain offset any gain in ease of communication.
Surprisingly, there appear to have been no incidents of ground
amicicide during the North African campaign of 1942-43 worthy
of being recorded in the more obvious sources. The
inexperience of US forces was amply revealed in several
incidents of artillery, air, and antiaircraft amicicide, but
cases of misplaced ground fires that may have occurred do not
appear in the published histories of the campaign.
The ill-fated airborne reinforcement of the Gela
beachhead by the 504th Regimental Combat Team on the night of
11 July 1943 has been described above. Friendly antiaircraft
fires were not the only hazard for the paratroopers of
Operation HUSKY 2. Several of the American paratroopers were
hit by friendly small arms and automatic fire while still in
their parachutes, and a few were shot after they landed.
For example, Chaplain Delbert A. Kuehl (HHC, 504th
Parachute Infantry) and several other men landed in the 45th
Infantry Division area, well to the southeast of Gela, and
immediately began to receive fire from American troops. [3]
Shouting the password only caused the fire to increase,
so while the other
men fired their weapons into the air, Chaplain Kuehl crawled
around to the rear of the American position and succeeded in
stopping the fire.
Both the 171st and 158th Field Artillery Battalions of
the 45th Infantry Division reported engagements with American
paratroopers on the night of 11 July, the 171st's report
stating that: "Since no news of the American paratroopers had
reached this headquarters, they were assumed to be hostile and
the Battalion was deployed for all around defense." [4]
The nervous artillerymen even managed to kill one of their
own men who was mistaken for a German parachutist. [5]
The entire Gela-Farello fiasco prompted an investigation
which, however, came to no firm conclusions. [6]
Both the antiaircraft and ground amicicide incidents
connected with Operation HUSKY 2 did bring improvements in
coordination that went far toward avoiding such incidents
during later airborne operations.
Both the pace and scale of combat operations on the
Continent after 6 June 1944 made the avoidance of ground
amicicide difficult if not impossible. The fire and maneuver
of many large units, often in a confined area, against a
determined and skillful enemy frequently resulted in the
engagement of one friendly unit by another. Such incidents
were particularly common during the periods of active
offensive operations (the Normandy breakout; the breaking of
the West Wall) and during the confused retrograde and holding
actions in the Ardennes in December 1944.
Amicicide began to occur almost as soon as the first
Allied troops crossed the Normandy beaches in June 1944.
Within the first four or five days after the invasion, the
green troops of the 25th Cavalry Regiment (4th Armored
Division) shot up another American unit while attempting to
straighten their lines in a defensive position near the
Normandy beachhead. [7]
The data on amicicide incidents of all types is
particularly good for at least one unit that fought in the
European theater. The US 30th Infantry Division took part in
some of the hardest fighting on the Continent and appears to
have carefully recorded its share of both the receipt and
delivery of misplaced fires. The experiences of the 30th
Division were by no means unique and thus may serve as
examples of the problems faced by all Allied units during the
advance into Germany.
Between 1 and 6 July 1944 the 30th Infantry Division,
commanded by Maj. Gen. Leland S. Hobbs, as part of Lt. Gen.
Charles H. Corlett's XIX Corps, held defensive positions north
of the Vire-et-Taute Canal and east of the Vire River and
prepared to continue the attack to the south with an assault
crossing of the canal-river line in the vicinity of Aire 1.
Active patrolling was conducted as the division prepared for
the coming river crossing operation. Although the relatively
quiet course of static defensive operations brought no major
amicicide incidents, some liaison officers and messengers
reported that they were "more afraid of nervous sentries in
the rear areas than of Germans." [8]
At 0430 on 7 July 1944 XIX Corps attacked with the 29th
and 30th Infantry Divisions and the 113th Cavalry Group
(mechanized) to secure the high ground north of St. Lo. The
30th Division successfully assaulted westward across the Vire
River in the vicinity of Airel and southward across the
Vire-et-Taute Canal to seize the high ground in the
vicinity of Pont Hebert with the main effort in the direction
of St. Jean de Daye, St. Giles, and St. Lo. By nightfall on 7
July the division had secured its bridgeheads and was
preparing to resist German counterattacks and continue the
attack to the south on 8 July. [9]
Late on 7 July the corps commander, Lieutenant General
Corlett, sought to exploit a possible' breakthrough situation
by committing elements of the 3d Armored Division through the
small and still developing 30th Infantry Division bridgehead
over the Vire River. Combat Command B of the 3d Armored
Division was ordered to cross the Vire River at Airel and
attack southward on the morning of 8 July with the 30th
Infantry Division. The commitment of CCB through the
confined 30th Division bridgehead served to increase
enormously the confusion and turmoil already present in the
still tenuous position and was to result in several serious
incidents of ground amicicide before the units broke free to
the south toward St. Lo.
Problems began as soon as CCB attempted to cross the
crowded Vire River bridge at Airel and move into assembly
areas in the bridgehead on the night of 7-8 July. Chaos
prevailed as both tankers and infantrymen competed to cross
the bridge and find space for assembly areas. In the confusion
men from both units fired indiscriminately with small arms and
machine guns, partially from fear and confusion and partially
out of frustration and anger over the actions of their
supposed comrades-in-arms. [10]
The following day Major General Hobbs complained to
corps headquarters that his division had suffered sixteen
casualties as a result of uncontrolled shooting by the CCB
tankers. [11]
Casualties among the tankers were apparently not reported.
The attempt to advance on 8 July saw no substantial
improvement. Most of the day was spent trying to sort out the
jumble of tanks and infantrymen now faced by counterattacks
and strong resistance from the recently arrived 2nd SS Panzer
Division (Das Reich). [12]
General Hobbs subsequently complained bitterly of the
inactivity and lack of movement by CCB which prevented his own
regiments from moving forward and which hampered efforts to
support the 30th Division units with close artillery fires for
fear of hitting the friendly armor elements. [13]
On the afternoon of the eighth the artillery commanders
of the 3d Armored Division and the 30th infantry Division met
in an effort to coordinate their fires and to prevent the
artillery of one unit from firing on the troops of the
other. [14]
At 2045 Major General Hobbs and Maj. Gen. Leroy H.
Watson (commanding general of the 3d Armored Division)
discussed both the problem of CCBs not moving out and the
problem of possible additional amicicide incidents:
Watson: Do you mean I am holding you up?
Hobbs: Yes.
Watson: I don't see how I am.
Hobbs: If you don't move those people will shoot
into each other. We have had 16 casualties from the
situation as it is now. [15]
A few minutes later General Hobbs told his artillery chief
that ". . . as far as fires are concerned tonight [I want] it
clearly understood that first of all it should be prepared to
protect our troops as they are now, wherever they are,
irrespective of armor or anything else, and if they call for
it, they get it." [16]
Fortunately, there were no major incidents of misplaced
artillery fire, but the resumption of the attack on 9 July was
to see a significant incident of ground amicicide involving
the two commands.
In an effort to relieve the congestion and confusion in
the Airel bridgehead caused by the presence there of two major
units under separate command, on the evening of 8 July CCB was
attached by Lieutenant General Corlett to the 30th Infantry
Division, despite the protests of Major General Hobbs, who was
convinced his division could proceed in the advance without
further "assistance" from the pesky armor unit. [17]
Nevertheless, Hobbs received attachment of CCB and plans
were made for the tankers to continue the attack to the
southwest on 9 July to seize the dominant terrain of Hill 91
at Hauts-Vents, slightly more than three miles ahead.
On the morning of 9 July Brigadier General Bohn, the
CCB commander, attempted to pass his trailing task force in
column through his leading elements. The always difficult
maneuver was further complicated by the heavy hedgerow terrain
and extremely muddy conditions caused by several days of heavy
rain. The advance of the armored forces was soon bogged
down and also stymied the attempts of 30th Division units to
move forward. Dissatisfied with CCB's slow progress, General
Hobbs pressed General Bohn, telling him to take his objective
by 1700 or surrender command of his unit. [18]
In an effort to give his impatient superior some sign
of progress, Bohn ordered one of his tank companies to strike
ahead without pause, cross the St. Jean de Daye-Pont Hebert
highway, and move southwestward to Hill 91. The company of
eight Sherman tanks soon moved off toward Hauts-Vents spraying
the ditches and hedgerows with machine gun fire.
Meanwhile Bohn attempted to get the remainder of his
mired combat command underway and the various elements of the
30th Infantry Division braced themselves against expected
counterattacks by the 2nd SS Panzer Division from the west and
the Panzer Lehr Division from the east. As the day wore on the
30th Division's infantry and attached armor (743d Tank
Battalion) came under increasing German pressure. Although the
division generally stood firm in the face of the German
counterattack, isolated units withdrew precipitately after
learning of the virtual destruction of the 743d Tank Battalion
in a German ambush on the division right flank.
The 823d Tank Destroyer Battalion (Towed) was attached
to the 30th Infantry Division in April 1944 and landed at
OMAHA Beach on 24 June 1944. Equipped with thirty-six 3-inch
or 76-mm towed antitank guns, the 823d was considered a
well-trained unit with high morale even though on 9 July
it was still in its shakedown period. Later the battalion
would hold the US Army record for tanks destroyed by a tank
destroyer battalion for the period 6 June 1944--8 May 1945 on
the Continent, having knocked out III enemy tanks and other
armored vehicles. [19]
Company C, 823d Tank Destroyer Battalion, had crossed
the Vire River on 7 July and had supported the 30th Infantry
Division's abortive attempts to continue the attack out of the
bridgehead on 8 July. Its main role, however, had been
to counter the German counterattacks that mounted in intensity
on 9 July. By late afternoon on the ninth the company was in
defensive direct-fire positions south of the St. Jean de Daye
crossroads astride and east of the main highway to St. Lo. [20]
Shortly after 1635 1st Lt. Ellis W. McInnis's 1st Platoon
shifted positions slightly in anticipation of an expected
German armored counterattack north up the St. Lo highway. [21]
By about 1715 1st Platoon's guns were in position covered
by the bazookas and small arms of the Ist Reconnaissance
Platoon, 823d TD Battalion, led by 1st Lt. Thompson L. Raney.
While Lieutenant McInnis's platoon moved into position,
stragglers from the 117th Infantry Regiment streamed northward
along the St. Lo highway reporting that the German armor was
not far behind. Air bursts from unidentified artillery over
the tank destroyer positions lent credence to the imminence of
a German assault. About 1800 Lieutenant McInnis spotted a tank
about 1,000 yards to his front which moved back and forth
several times to look over the hilltop in hull defilade. He
immediately radioed the Company C commander to ascertain
whether there were any friendly tanks in the area and received
the reply that "what you are looking for is in front of
you." [22]
Almost immediately the tank moved north along the
highway spraying the hedgerows, ditches, and 1st Platoon
positions with .30-caliber machine gun fire. It was soon
joined by several other tanks which also fired their machine
guns and 75-mm tank guns. Unable to visually identify the
advancing tanks because of the drizzle and fog which had
restricted visibility all day, Lieutenant McInnis could only
conclude that the tanks firing on his position constituted the
long-awaited German counterattack and gave the order to his
platoon to open fire. [23]
Sergeant Malery Nunn, who had already received a graze
on the face from one of the tank machine gun bullets, issued
the fire commands for his gun to engage the lead tank at an
estimated range of 500-600 yards. The gunner, Corporal
Clement, scored a dead center hit with the first round, and
the lead tank stopped as smoke poured from it. Two
additional rounds were fired, but their effect could not be
observed because of smoke. The other tanks continued to
advance firing, and Sergeant Nunn's gun was hit, and Corporal
Clement was wounded in the leg. Sergeant Nunn assumed the
gunner's position and Lieutenant McInnis loaded. Three more
rounds were fired, but no hits were observed, and the
remaining tanks continued to roll forward. [24]
As the tanks closed, the tank destroyer personnel were
forced to take cover in the ditches where they were pinned
down by the machine gun fire from the tanks. When the tanks
were about 400 yards away, Sergeant Nunn recognized them as
friendly mediums, called for a cease-fire, and stood up waving
at the tanks in an attempt to halt their firing. His brave
attempt had no effect, and the 1st Platoon hugged the ground
as several tanks, only three of which were not firing, passed
through the position and continued out of sight to the north,
all attempts by the tank destroyer personnel to identify
themselves having failed. [25]
Sgt. Carl Hanna, Private First Class Hardin, and Pfc.
Ernie Jacobs of Lieutenant Raney's recon platoon were in the
process of establishing a bazooka position in a ditch when the
tanks appeared. They were pinned down by fire from the tanks,
and when it became unbearably heavy, Sergeant Hanna ordered
his men to take cover in the ditch on the other side of the
hedgerow. As they attempted to do so, Private First Class
Jacobs was hit in the head by a 75-mm tank round, which killed
him instantly and knocked out Sergeant Hanna, who was hit in
the back of the head by fragments of Jacob's skull. [26]
Company C's 2d Platoon, led by 1st Lt. Francis J.
Connors, also fell victim to the tankers' fire. A tank rolled
up to within fifteen yards of Connors's uncamouflaged
halftrack, which could scarcely have been mistaken for
anything other than a US vehicle, and fired point-blank,
severely wounding the halftrack's assistant driver in the
chest. [27]
Lieutenant Connors identified the tank as a 3d Armored
Division tank (No. 25) and Sgt. Joseph A. Chustz, the 2d
Platoon Security Sergeant, identified another by the name on
its hull, BE-BACK. [28]
During the course of the fray Lieutenants McInnis and
Raney and several of their men took cover on the north side of
a stone building. One of the tanks fired an HE round into the
building from twenty feet away and five feet from where the
party was standing. The next tank in column turned its turret
toward the group but did not fire when Lieutenant McInnis
waved his arms and shouted. Shortly after the offending tanks
had rolled northward out of the Company C area, 1st. Lt. Neil
P. Curry of the 30th Reconnaissance Troop arrived from the
north and reported that the tanks had also fired on his M-8
halftrack and showed the hole in the turret ring mount. [29]
The results of the twenty-five-minute engagement were
serious but not catastrophic. Two US medium tanks were destroyed, and one 3-inch antitank gun was damaged by machine
gun fire striking the recoil mechanism but was returned to
service within twenty-four hours. [30]
The 823d TD Battalion suffered casualties of one man killed
and three wounded (two seriously); the tankers lost six men.
[31]
In his daily report for 9 July the 823d TD Battalion S-3,
Maj. Ashby I. Lohse, reported the unit's combat efficiency as
"satisfactory but mad as hell" and added that the unit "took
two prisoners which were its first, suffered its first fatal
casualties, was shot up by its own Infantry and Armored Force
and in turn shot up our own Infantry and Armored Force but
under all circumstances came through their first critical
engagement in fairly good shape and without too serious
losses." [32]
On 10 July Major Lohse was appointed a board of one
officer to investigate the incident. He identified the
offending tanks as belonging to the 3d Armored Division and
concluded that the US tanks were fired upon because
[33] :
(2) poor visibility prevented recognition of type and
nationality of tank,
(3) no friendly tanks were known to be in that area,
(4) because tanks were firing upon gun positions and
friendly positions generally and,
(5) because tanks were moving north while the
direction of attack was south. Despite the poor visibility and obvious stress of being
under heavy fire, the tank destroyer personnel did recognize
the tanks as friendly and ceased firing when the tanks were
about 400 yards away. They then attempted, often at very
personal risk, to identify themselves. Under the circumstances
the continued firing by the tankers is difficult to excuse.
Every effort was made by the tank destroyer personnel to
identify themselves, but whether out of confusion, fear, or
simply lack of discipline, the tanks moved through the
friendly position and well to the rear, firing continuously.
As the reader has probably already surmised, the
offending tanks were the company from. CCB, 3d Armored
Division (probably a company of the 33d Armored Regiment)
earlier dispatched by Brigadier General Bohn to proceed
expeditiously to Hauts-Vents. Apparently the tank company
commander either misunderstood his instructions or became
confused.
In any event, upon reaching the north-south St. Lo highway
he turned right (north) rather than left (south) and blundered
into the 823d TD Battalion position. The commander personally
suffered the consequences of his error. His tank was the one
knocked out at the beginning of the engagement by Sergeant
Nunn's gun. Just at the moment the lead tank was hit, General
Bohn was attempting to contact his wayward unit by radio and
over the open radio channel heard the tank company commander's
cry of pain and anguished statement, "I am in dreadful
agony." [34]
After their pass through the 823d's position, the
remaining six tanks reversed direction and proceeded to the
objective, Hill 91 at Hauts-Vents, which they somehow managed
to reach shortly before dark. Ironically, the six tanks
reached the objective just in time to be hit by an American
strafing attack requested earlier but delayed by bad weather.
Fortunately, there were no casualties and the remnants of the
tank company spent the night on Hill 91 only to be withdrawn
the following morning (10 July) when it proved impossible to
reinforce them. The Hauts-Vents objective was finally secured
by CCB on the afternoon of 11 July. [35]
Despite the tragic amicicide incident, Lieutenant
General Corlett, the XIX Corps commander, congratulated Major
General Hobbs on the 30th Infantry Division's performance on 9
July, and Hobbs replied that he, too, thought that the
division had done a good job and that "...there were a few
upsets but things like that will happen. In one case our own
tanks turned the wrong way and went up the wrong road, but all
in all it was a good show." [36]
The unfortunate engagement of CCB, 3d Armored Division,
and the 30th Infantry Division's 823d Tank Destroyer Battalion
south of the St. Jean de Daye crossroads on 9 July 1944 was
representative of the problems of identification and control
faced by ground forces commanders in the difficult hedgerow
terrain of Normandy as Allied forces plagued by often foul
weather attempted to break out of the Normandy enclave against
strong German opposition. Given the difficult terrain, poor
visibility, and confusion generated by crowded Allied units
and skillful German resistance, the occurrence of incidents of
amicicide of all types is not
surprising. On 10 July, the very morning following the St.
Jean de Daye crossroads incident, 30th Infantry Division units
were again reporting friendly tank fire falling on their
troops. [37]
But the 30th Infantry Division was not the only American
unit to experience ground amicicide incidents in the Normandy
fighting. The attack of the 29th Infantry Division to seize
St. Lo 15 July 1944 got off to a dismal start when lack of
proper coordination with the adjacent 35th Infantry Division
resulted in a misunderstanding and exchange of fire among US
troops. A panicky withdrawal by an infantry company of the
115th Infantry Regiment (29th Infantry Division) was averted
only by the prompt action of an artillery liaison officer who
took charge and restored order and discipline. [38]
Such incidents would continue to occur as the Allies
pressed forward on the Continent.
In late July as Allied forces broke out of the Normandy
lodgement and raced toward Avranches, mission-type orders were
common and operations often took place in great confusion. On
one occasion two tank battalions of the 4th Armored Division
engaged in a shooting match while trying to occupy the same
night assembly area. A short time later the two US battalions
were joined by a German tank battalion also attempting to use
what must have been a really choice assembly area. The German
tanks parked unchallenged and it was some time before all
parties realized what was happening. The upshot was a frantic
melee in which the German and American tanks engaged each
other at ranges of eight to twenty-five feet. [39]
Some American tanks posed a hazard to friendly troops
merely by virtue of their construction. In September 1944 the
lst Infantry Division cautioned its units that extreme care
should be exercised in firing the bow machine gun with which
some US tanks were equipped because the gun was mounted in a
low position and was impossible to aim accurately, thereby
creating a serious hazard for infantry in front of the tank. [40]
By late November 1944 American units were pressing
against the prepared German West Wall positions in the Saar-Moselle triangle. In foul weather on 23 November 1944 the 90th
Infantry Division's 2d and 3d Battalions, 358th Infantry
Regiment, were ordered to attack Muenzingen and Sinz, 3,000
and 4,000 yards respectively behind the Orscholz Switch Line,
in hopes of opening the way for CCA of the 10th Armored
Division (to which the 358th Infantry was then attached) to
drive through and secure a crossing over the Saar River at Saarburg.
Planning and coordination of the attack proved faulty,
however. As the 2/358th Infantry crossed the line of departure and moved into the attack it was taken under heavy short-range 75-mm fire by the tanks of CCA's TF CHAMBERLAIN, bogged down in the mud on the flank. Almost
simultaneously the supporting 344th Field Artillery Battalion,
mistaking the location of the friendly infantry, showered the
unfortunate infantrymen with a hail of shells. Caught
unaware by friendly fire from flank and rear, many of the
infantrymen were killed or wounded, control was lost, and the
attack stalled. The 3/358th Infantry suffered less damage than
its sister 2d Battalion and quickly reorganized and continued
the attack, clearing Campholz Woods of the enemy. The 2/358th
Infantry, however, was seriously disorganized and was unable
to reform and resume the attack until late in the afternoon
and then with only meager success. [41]
The infantrymen of the 358th were justly enraged by the
careless firing of the CCA tankers. Ill will between the two
units persisted for some time. Fights broke out in the
hospitals where casualties of the two units were confined, and
there were numerous altercations between the infantrymen and
tankers later in the rest area behind the lines. [42]
Friendly troops paid a heavy toll for the failure of
commanders and staff officers to adequately coordinate the
operations in progress.
The unexpected and violent German attack in the
Ardennes in December 1944 scattered American units and
seriously disrupted the coordination and cooperation of the
hard-pressed American soldiers. Struggling to reorganize and
hold the powerful German offensive thrust, several units found
that in the confusion and uncertainty of the moment their
fires found friendly rather than enemy troops. [43]
On 16 December 1944 the 4th Infantry Division attempted
to jam the southern shoulder of the German penetration. That
morning Company B, lst Battalion, 12th Infantry, and ten tanks
from the 70th Tank Battalion mounted a limited attack to
relieve the 2d Battalion's Company F, then encircled at the
north end of the village of Berdorf. The tanks, with
infantrymen on their decks, reached the northeastern edge of
the town just before noon and began shelling the Parc Hotel,
which proved to be occupied by men of Company F, who quickly
found in the hotel an American flag, which they displayed on
the roof. Having relieved the battered infantrymen of Company
F, the attacking force attempted to clear the town but German
resistance proved strong, and the attempt was abandoned at night fall.
The same day (16 December) found the 28th Infantry
Division resisting the attack of the 2nd Panzer Division in
the vicinity of Weiler and Wahlhausen. Small elements of US
armor and infantry were committed piecemeal in the area, and
coordination was difficult. In the early afternoon a
platoon of medium tanks from Company A (or B), 707th Tank
Battalion, attempted to drive the Germans off the road linking
the villages of Holzthum and Consthum. The tankers were
informed that there were no friendly troops on the road, but
just outside Holzthum the tanks engaged and knocked out an
antitank gun placed there by Company I, 3d Battalion, 110th
Infantry. After a short delay while the infantry and tankers
identified themselves, the tanks rolled on to the south to
complete their mission.
At several times American units were forced to withdraw
and in the resulting confusion were fired upon by their own
troops. On the night of 17-18 December elements of the 2d
Battalion, 38th Infantry (2d Infantry Division), and the 395th
Infantry Regiment (99th Infantry Division) were forced to
withdraw from the village of Rocherath. The 395th Infantry
elements took up new defense positions on the 2d Infantry
Division left flank northeast of Rocherath and waited for the
expected enemy advance. In the withdrawal from Rocherath
the 324th Engineer Combat Battalion (99th Infantry Division)
had been left behind on Rath Hill. On the morning of the
eighteenth, the engineers moved west to rejoin their fellows,
but before reaching safety they came under fire from both the
enemy and the 395th Infantry and suffered some casualties.
Also on the morning of 18 December Major General
Barton, the 4th Infantry Division commander, dispatched the 2d
Battalion, 22d Infantry, to strengthen the right flank of the
12th Infantry near the village of Osweiler. As the battalion
approached the village, the American tanks there, mistaking
them for Germans, opened fire. After two hours and several
casualties, a patrol under a white flag managed to make
contact with the tankers in Osweiler and establish
identification, and the tank company in Osweiler was augmented
by the somewhat worn 2/22d Infantry.
The following day (19 December) the 423d Infantry
Regiment (106th Infantry Division) attempted to mount a
counterattack against the German forces in the vicinity of
Schoenberg in the Schnee Eifel. The 3/423d jumped of f at
1000, but one company was soon cut off and captured. The other
two rifle companies nearly reached Schoenberg, but were forced
to withdraw. The 1/423d managed to get one company in the
advance, but it was eliminated by mid-afternoon. The
fate of the 2/423d was even less inspiring. Attempting to advance to the northwest on the regiment's right flank, the 2/423d became separated and was taken under fire by the left flank elements of the neighboring 422d Infantry, 400 yards to the north. The 422d men mistook the 2/423d's advance for a German flanking attack and fired into the draw up which the 423d, men were moving. A brief fire fight ensued, and both units became considerably disorganized. At 1630, with contirol gone, ammunition spent, and many wounded men untended, the commander of the 423d Infantry surrendered his regiment to the Germans. Eventually, all but 150 men of the 422d
Infantry were forced to surrender as well.
The attacking Germans in the Ardennes were not immune from ground
amicicide incidents either. On the morning of 23 December 293. Regiment (18th Volks-Grenadier Division) worked its way through the Fuhrer Begleit Brigade around Rodt (near St. Vith) and proceeded along the road to Poteau, intending to outflank CCA, 7th Armored Division, to the east. The German situation was as confused as the American, however, and the 293. Regiment ran into the infantry and assault gun screen of the 9th SS Panzer Division, which mistook them for a withdrawing
American column and delivered a heavy flanking fire. Several hours later, after the Americans had escaped from the trap, the 293rd entered Poteau.
The American forces in the Bulge weathered the Ardennes storm and soon
resumed their steady advance toward Germany. That advance continued to be
accompanied by occasional amicicide incidents that caused casualties and disrupted the continuity and pace of offensive operations.
In the 6th Armored Division attack toward Wardin on 2 January 1945, the
9th Armored Infantry Battalion attempted to replace the 44th Armored Infantry Battalion, but was caught in an artillery barrage during the passage of lines and was seriously disorganized. The 9th was unable to resume the advance until noon and soon thereafter was subjected to the misplaced fire of the 134th Infantry (35th Infantry Division) which further retarded its progress.
One final incident will conclude our survey of ground amicicide in the
European theater. It merits detailed description because it is one of the very few incidents in which friendly tanks were fired upon by other friendly tanks. [44]
At the end of February 1945, the 30th Infantry Division was advancing, steadily opposed by elements of the 9th and 11th Panzer Divisions, along the Roer River. The flat, open terrain dotted with villages afforded little cover and concealment for a conventional daylight attack, and so most of the bounds forward from town to town were made by coordinated night attacks lit by moonlight. [45]
The incident with which we are concerned involved elements
of the 30th Infantry Division in a night attack north of
Oberembt, Germany, on 26-27 February 1945.
On the night of 25-26 February the 117th Infantry
attacked successfully and seized the towns of Lich and
Oberembt. On the twenty-sixth, the 117th consolidated its
position and planned the next phase of the operation: a
coordinated night attack to seize the villages of
Kleintroisdorf and Kirchtroisdorf and the town of Putz farther
on. The day was spent in reconnaissance and detailed planning
and coordination, and at 1800 the regimental plan was issued.
The plan called for the 3/117th to move up from Steinstrass,
pass between the 2d and Ist Battalions, and attack on the left
at 2230 to seize Kleintroisdorf. The 2st Battalion would
attack simultaneously on the right to seize Kirchtroisdorf.
Then the 2d Battalion would be committed through the 3d
Battalion to seize Putz. [46]
The attack would be supported by tanks from Companies B
and C, 743d Tank Battalion, and a company of British flail
tanks (Troop A, 1st Lothian and Border Yeomanry) to be used
for breaching minefields. [47]
Despite the obvious problems of a night passage of
lines (by the 3d Battalion), the attack jumped off smoothly at
2230. By midnight the Ist and 3d Battalions had taken
Kirchtroisdorf and Kleintroisdorf respectively, and three
hours later the 2d Battalion passed through and took Putz
before daylight in a short but stubborn fight. [48]
Only one incident marred the generally well coordinated
and successful moonlit attack. The platoon of British flail
tanks (four tanks) detailed to follow the 1/117th in the
attack on the right toward Kirchtroisdorf strayed left into
the 3/117th zone. After proceeding several hundred yards the
platoon leader realized his mistake and turned his platoon
around. As his tanks again approached the 3d Battalion axis of
advance, they were spotted by elements of the 3d Battalion,
which had jumped off ten minutes late.
The 3/117th and its accompanying armor (B-743d Tank Bn
and Troop A, Ist Lothian and Border Yeomanry (-)) and tank
destroyer elements (one platoon of C-823d TD Bn) assumed that
the tanks were German and took the hapless flail tanks under
fire, destroying the entire platoon. [49]
In an otherwise well planned, well coordinated and well
executed attack, chance, an error, and reduced visibility
making identification difficult resulted in a serious case of
ground amicicide, as it had so many times before in the
European battle area.
World War II: The Pacific
Numerous incidents of ground amicicide occurred in the
Pacific theater and for the same reasons prevalent in Europe:
green troops, confusion, lack of coordination, and
misidentification due to poor visibility, dense jungle, and
the excitement of battle. If anything, small-scale incidents
of indiscriminate firing at night were an even greater problem
in view of the reputation of the Japanese enemy as a wily
night fighter.
An attack by Company K, 127th Infantry (32d Infantry
Division), on the Buna Mission on 28 December 1942 was stifled
by spontaneous and uncontrolled firing by American troops, and
the attack had to be halted while a reorganization took
place. [50]
Lt. Gen. Robert L. Eichelberger, the commanding general
of the Buna Force, also reported: "Excitedly firing at noises
during the night was a common fault and seriously restricted
the use of patrols and other important movements after dark."
[51]
The problem of indiscriminate firing at night was a
serious one everywhere in the Pacific. It was addressed in
some detail in a report worth quoting in its entirety:
PART 2: Killing or wounding our own troops
During recent operations a number of officers
and enlisted men have been killed or wounded at night
by our own troops who fired with the belief, or from
the fear, that the Japs were infiltrating into their
areas. The majority of cases reported occurred among
troops bivouaced well to the rear of the front line
infantry battalions. Some of the men and officers were
sleeping in their jungle hammocks when shot. The
majority of this 'trigger happy' firing, although not
restricted to troops which had not been previously in
action, was among newly arrived units.
Officers with battle experience in this theater
are of the opinion that this condition is contributed
to by the overemphasis placed on the ability of the Jap
to infiltrate into our rear areas and by the often
heard statement "stay in your slit trenches after dark,
assume that everything that moves is a Jap".
That attitude is, of course, essential for
patrols and observations posts remaining outside the
'perimeter' at night and for the small units forming
that 'perimeter.'
In the rear of this line, even in the areas of
the battalions in contact, commanders, staff officers,
messengers and wire communications personnel must move
around at night. Further to the rear, back of the
artillery areas for instance, such personnel should be
able to move with more freedom.
Those officers also believe that, while there
will continue to be incidents of this nature in the
forward area, training prior to arrival in the theater
in the withholding of fire until it is established that
the target is an enemy will obviate these losses in the
rear areas. They feel that such training, together with
a judicious use of passwords or recognition signals,
will reduce these casualties in the forward areas. [52]
The danger of uncontrolled firing by ill-disciplined
green troops was clearly demonstrated in the events on the
Aleutian island of Kiska on 15-16 August 1943. Expecting
fanatical Japanese resistance, 35,000 US and Canadian troops,
most of whom had not seen combat before, invaded Kiska on 15
August 1943. By nightfall on 16 August, twenty-eight men were
dead and fifty were wounded despite the fact that there was
not a single live Japanese soldier on the island. [53]
Although a few (four killed and several wounded) fell
victim to booby traps and mines left by the Japanese, most
were shot by mistake by their own comrades in the heavy Kiska fog.
Immediately upon landing on 15 August, the
inexperienced troops fanned out through the fog. The columns
frequently engaged each other in the reduced visibility, and
the night of 15-16 August brought even more firing by the
nervous soldiers. One participant, US Army Lt. Brian Murphy,
later recalled that, "the troops were shooting at anything
that moved." [54]
One infantryman attacked what he believed to be an
enemy patrol. The patrol members shouted for him to stop, but
he began to throw hand grenades and was promptly shot down.
The Kiska landing was an embarrassing and costly
mistake in several respects, not the least of which was the
uncontrolled gunfire of the inexperienced troops. The invasion
commander, Vice Adm. Thomas C. Kincaid (commander, North
Pacific Force), proved somewhat disingenuous when he later
stated that "of course we had no way of anticipating our men
would shoot each other in the fog." [55]
Inadequate coordination between units was another cause of ground
amicicide incidents in the Pacific. In May 1943, three months before the ill-fated Kiska landings, US troops on Attu, another of the Aleutian Islands, experienced delays and casualties from their own fires.
As one platoon leader on Attu later commented, "Staff work must equal
small unit work in quality if there is to be success. Lack of coordination will cause units to fire into the area held by friendly units, and, as I actually saw, attack friendly units. I cannot stress this too much, as I saw the lack of it too much." [56]
A major obstacle to the quick capture of Butaritari Island (Makin) on 20
November 1943 was the West Tank Barrier, a trench six feet deep and more than fourteen feet wide, which extended north and south across the island about 3,400 yards east of the RED landing beaches. [57]
The planners of the 27th Infantry Division decided that the best method of eliminating the obstacle would be to envelop it, and because this would involve two units moving toward each other, great care was taken to avoid the danger of a fire fight between friendly units. The measures proposed to coordinate the two assaulting units involved colored smoke signals and constant radio contact between the two units.
In the event, the coordination measures proved inadequate. On D-Day (20
November) the 1st Battalion, 165th Infantry, landed and advanced eastward toward the West Tank Barrier, while the 2/165th Infantry moved westward toward it. No direct radio communication between the two units was established, and the frantic attempts of the 1/165th conanander, Lt. Col. Gerard W. Kelley, to determine the whereabouts of the 2/165th were futile. About 1400 the 1/165th was pinned down by friendly fire from the front, but Kelley was ordered by 27th Infantry Division Headquarters to press on to a junction with Lt. Col. John F. McDonough's 2d Battalion. The men of the 1/165th pressed on, but not without some anxious moments due to the continuing fire of the 2/165th Infantry.
Japanese sniper fire and ruses on the night of 20-21 November provoked
uncontrolled firing by the jumpy American troops, who blasted away all night, wasting ammunition and drawing Japanese counterfire. Daylight on the twenty-first brought a resumption of incidents attributable to poor coordination and lack of strong fire discipline. Two hulks on the reef near On Chang's Wharf (YELLOW Beach), which had been heavily attacked by air and naval gun fire, were again
thought to harbor the enemy. Landing craft coming in to YELLOW
Beach machine-gunned the hulks, many of their rounds landing
amidst the American troops on shore. Between 0818 and 1630
several air strikes were directed against the hulks, and at
0920 several medium tanks were brought up to the beach and
shelled the hulks with their 75-mm guns. Many of their "overs"
fell into the boat lanes in the lagoon, making the approach to
YELLOW Beach a very uncomfortable one indeed.
The 27th Infantry Division's problems with
illcoordinated and downright indiscriminate ground fire on
Butaritari were neither unique nor particularly costly. They
did, however, interrupt operations and adversely affect the
discipline and morale of the men ashore. Given other
conditions, they may have proved costly indeed.
Amphibious assaults, the dominant tactical form. in the
Pacific war, were very difficult to coordinate and control,
and amicicide incidents were frequent for both the Army and
the Marines. During Operation FLINTLOCK, the assault on
Kwajalein Atoll on 1 February 1944, the 2d and 3d Battalions,
24th Marines, landed on Namur Island beginning at 1145.
Enemy fire was light, but the Marines were greatly
annoyed and suffered several casualties as a result of fires
by friendly armored amphibians offshore that raked the Marines
moving inland from the beach. The Army forces on Kwajalein had
problems of their own. The greatest danger to the 32d Infantry
Regiment (7th Infantry Division) advancing on the east side of
the island on 3 February 1944 was friendly small arms fire
from the 184th Infantry to the west.
Green troops and confusion were not exclusive
characteristics of American forces. In the attack on
Myitkyina, Burma, on the night of 20 May 1944, unseasoned
infantrymen of the Chinese 150th Regiment (Chinese 50th
Infantry Division) assisting Merrill's Marauders became
confused, fired on their own men, and ran away in panic. [58]
Some incidents of ground amicicide in the Pacific were
almost bizarre. During the campaign on Saipan the 27th
Infantry Division had great difficulty controlling its
artillery fires. [59]
The tanks of the 27th Division were also occasionally
guilty of firing on the adjacent Marines, but proved equally
dangerous for the 27th's infantrymen. [60]
During an attack on Hill Able on the morning of 27 June
1944 two platoons from the 762d Tank Battalion supported the
assault. Soon after the attack began it started to rain, and
the tanks became covered with mud, which obscured the vision
of the drivers and caused them to lose their sense of
direction. As a consequence, the tanks fired in the direction of the 3d Battalion, 106th Infantry, disrupting the coordination of the attack and halting it. The 3/106th was forced to regroup and effect further coordination. They finally jumped off at 1250 and accomplished their mission by 1342. [61]
The stiff Japanese resistance and difficult terrain on
the island of Guam made the coordination of all arms difficult
during the campaign in July and August 1944. [62] Typical of the
problems caused by the dense Guamanian jungle was that faced
by the 22d Marines attempting to take Orate on 28 July. The
Marines swept through the barracks grounds and moved on to the
outskirts of the village of Sumay, where they were held up by
Japanese fortified in coconut-log pillboxes. Marine tanks
were called up to eliminate the pillboxes but made little
progress because the dense brush restricted observation and
frequently made it impossible to fire without danger to
friendly troops. Fortunately, no friendly troops were injured,
but the Japanese had to be winkled out by the infantry in a
slow and dangerous operation.
The Army and Marines on Guam, as on so many other
islands of the Pacific, found it extremely difficult to
maintain contact with adjacent units and to keep their
operations adequately coordinated. The attack of the 77th
Infantry Division to secure Mount Barrigada resumed on the
morning of 4 August 1944.
In order to reduce Japanese roadblocks and reestablish
contact with the 3d Marine Division on the division's flank, a
platoon from the lst Battalion, 307th Infantry, and one tank
from Company A, 706th Tank Battalion, set out along the
Finegayan Road about 0645. Three hours later the small task
force had broken two strongly held Japanese roadblocks, and
shortly before 1100 it came to a third. The American tankers
opened fire at once on what they assumed to be another
Japanese position. This roadblock, however, turned out to
be manned by Company G, 9th Marines, who had been warned by
the 3d Marine Division to expect the Army patrol. The Marines
did not fire and were apparently unaware that the Army troops
expected friendly positions to be signaled by red smoke
grenades. Capt. Francis L. Fagan, the Marine company
commander, was able to stop the Army firing only by running
down the road toward the Army troops waving his helmet. Before
he was able to stop the firing, seven of his Marines were
wounded. Contact between the Army and Marines was
reestablished, but at some cost to the Marines.
Several days later it was the Army's turn to come under
fire from the Marines. Troops of the 2d Battalion, 306th
Infantry, moving along the Salisbury Road in the attack on
Mount Santa Rosa, began receiving rifle and machine gun fire
about 1215. They suspected the fire was coming from the 3d
Marine Division elements in the area. About 1245 the
trailing company, Company F, 2/306th Infantry, was engaged in
a short fire fight at the junction of the Chaguian Trail and
Salisbury Road by what they were convinced was a force of US
Marines. Complaints were lodged with the 3d Marine Division,
which denied that its troops were in the area. Shortly
thereafter the 306th Infantry Regimental CP came under
artillery fire that was conclusively shown to be from Marine
pack howitzers, and a short time after the mistaken shelling
an Army motor column on the Salisbury Road was machine-gunned
by what again was believed to be the Marines.
The confused situation along the Salisbury Road and the
attendant incidents of amicicide resulted from a lack of
adequate coordination between Army and Marine units in the
area. Once ad hoc action had been taken to stop the mistaken
firing, the 306th was able to complete its mission with
relative ease, and by 1715 the regiment had dug in across the
northern face of Mount Santa Rosa. [63] The eighth of August
ended for the troops of the 77th Infantry Division in a grand
finale of amicicidal firing. At sunset the 1/306th
Infantry, west of Lulog, and the 3/307th Infantry, to the
south on Mount Santa Rosa, engaged in a prolonged and costly
fire fight. About 1830 each battalion began receiving mortar
fire coming from the general direction of the other. Although
it might have been Japanese fire, it was more likely from
American weapons being registered for night defensive fires.
Both battalions reported a Japanese counterattack and opened
up with small arms fire in the direction of the presumed
attack. This fire only increased the illusion in each unit
that they were under attack, and the tanks with the 306th
Infantry began firing toward the 307th's position. Both
battalions called for artillery fire, and the 902d Field
Artillery Battalion fired a brief barrage. Fortunately, it
soon became apparent that friendly troops were firing on one
another and the firing was stopped. The costs of the mistake
were high: the 3/307th Infantry had at least ten casualties,
and the 1/306th and the 306th Regimental CP suffered a smaller number.
The Korean War
Two of the first one hundred men wounded in the Korean
War received their wounds as a result of friendly fire. Both
incidents, however, more resembled a true accident than they
did a correctly designated case of ground amicicide. They
are included, however, because they both meet our definition
of amicicide and presaged an all too common event of the next
conflict (Vietnam) one green and nervous soldier shooting another.
Pvt. Robert J. McCoy, 21st Infantry (24th Infantry
Division), suffered a severe shrapnel wound of the left arm at
0900 on 10 July 1950, when he was mistaken for an enemy
soldier by his buddy, who threw a hand grenade at him. [64] At
2220 on 2 August 1950, Pfc. Norman A. Yoder, Battery B, 15th
Field Artillery Battalion (2d Infantry Division), was shot in
the right arm by a .30-caliber carbine fired by a sergeant
guarding the battery CP north of Pusan. [65]
The sergeant mistook Private First Class Yoder for a
North Korean infiltrator. Yoder spent the next thirty hours in
pain at the battalion aid station "waiting for another
casualty to be put in the ambulance." [66]
Such "accidents" involving individual soldiers were
probably not uncommon in Korea. More serious results followed
ground amicicide incidents of greater scale. The tactical
situation of US forces in the Korean War frequently involved
the loss and subsequent recapture of defensive positions at
night. Sometimes the same position changed hands several times
in the course of a single night. Ad hoc attacks and
counterattacks mounted in darkness and great confusion bred
ground amicicide incidents arising from a lack of
coordination. Two examples can suffice.
One of the most gallant episodes of the Korean War was
the stubborn defense of the British 29th Brigade along the
Imjin River north of Seoul in April 1951. [67]
Faced by a massive Chinese Communist attack beginning
on 22 April 1951, the 29th Brigade held its positions until
the early morning of 25 April when it was ordered to withdraw.
The battered remnants of the Ist Battalion, Royal
Northumberland Fusiliers, an attached battalion of Belgians,
and the 1st Battalion, Royal Ulster Rifles, were able to
retire in good order.
The 1st Battalion, The Gloucester Regiment, was not so
fortunate. Surrounded, exhausted, and with ammunition and
rations nearly expended, the Glosters left their dead and
wounded in the care of their battalion commander,
sergeant-major, surgeon, and chaplain and attempted to
break out after sixty hours of continuous fighting.
The only element of the Glosters to escape death or
capture was Company D, under the command of Capt. Michael
Harvey, and Company D paid a heavy price to both enemy and
friendly fire for its ultimate survival. Pursued closely by
the Chinese, Harvey and his men had almost reached the safety
of American lines by running and crawling the length of a
narrow valley when they encountered a line of American tanks
drawn up across the valley 500 yards ahead and firing at the
Chinese pursuers.
As the surviving Glosters rushed forward, the American
tanks mistook them for the enemy and produced a devastating
fire from main guns and machine guns. Six of the hapless
Glosters were killed. After several agonizing minutes, during
which the Chinese continued to bayonet the stragglers, Captain
Harvey succeeded in identifying his force to the American
tankers. The surviving Glosters were brought under the meager
protection of the US tanks, and the combined force conducted a
three-mile fighting retreat out of the valley to safety.
Captain Harvey and thirty-eight men of the Glosters made it to
safety; they were the only men of the regiment to do so.
Two years later American troops found themselves the
victim of their own fires. Pork Chop Hill was occupied by a
succession of Red Chinese and American troops on the night of
16-17 April 1953. [68]
Shortly before dawn on 17 April, Companies K and L,
31st Infantry (7th Infantry Division), attacked from opposite
sides of the hill to retake it. Neither company knew that the
other was to attack from the other side. Company K, commanded
by Ist Lt. J. G. Clemons, had just reached the top of the hill
near the CP bunker when they came under intense machine gun
fire. They immediately returned fire. The fire on Company K
was coming from the right-hand finger of the hill where Sgt.
Horace Ford of 1st Platoon, Company L, had found a machine gun
and two boxes of ammunition and had ordered Pvt. Columbus
Jackson to fire on the crest of Pork Chop Hill, believing it
to be held by the Chinese. As S. L. A. Marshall expressed it,
"King's men tried to signal Love to shut it off, but the fire
was too intense to stand against. It died only after Love had
been bled into silence." [69]
The Dominican Republic
Even the brief intervention by US forces in the
Dominican Republic in 1965 produced at least one incident of
ground amicicide. Two companies of the 82d Airborne Division
were assigned to secure a bridge, one company at either end.
Neither company could be said to have been seasoned, and when
someone fired a shot, a fire fight between the two units broke
out. The firing halted only after both company commanders
called to the same field artillery battalion for support. Two
men were wounded. [70]
Vietnam
Ground amicicide incidents of various types occurred
among US troops with disconcerting frequency during the ten
years of US involvement in Vietnam. Most were precipitated by
nervousness and lack of fire discipline or by inadequate
coordination. [71]
As in other conflicts, green troops in Vietnam took
their toll of their fellow soldiers by firing nervously before
properly identifying their target. One man was killed in
October 1966 near Bong Son during a five-man patrol sent out
by Troop D, 2d Squadron, 12th Cavalry (1st Cavalry Division,
Airmobile). The patrol stopped for a break and one man left
the trail to relieve himself. When he attempted to rejoin the
patrol he was "mistaken for the enemy" and shot to death by
his best friend. A similar incident occurred in the 1st
Battalion, 46th Infantry. A soldier from Company B, 1/46th,
was killed by a comrade in the summer of 1971. The victim left
the company's night defensive perimeter and became
disoriented. Returning to the perimeter at the wrong location,
he scared another man from Company B, who shot and killed him.
Aside from possible enemy action, night defensive
positions often proved to be dangerous places. In 506 Valley,
south of Bong Son, on 16 December 1966, Company A, 1/12th
Cavalry (1st Cavalry Division, Airmobile) had established a
defensive position at night, when the battalion commander
ordered another company (probably Company B, 1/8th Cavalry,
OPCON at the time to the 1/12th Cavalry) to pass through A-
1/12th and take up a position on the other side. During the
passage of lines a soldier from B-1/8th shot one of the
platoon leaders from A-1/12th, wounding him severely. In
November 1971 an infantry rifle platoon of Company C, 1/506th
Infantry (101st Airborne Division), found itself in a night
defensive position in I CTZ. A new member of the platoon was
pulling night perimeter guard for the first time. He was
Spanish-speaking and could barely understand English. As the
relief guard approached to relieve him, the Spanish-speaking
soldier turned in fright and killed the relief with a shot
from his M-16 rifle.
The limited quantities of armor employed in Vietnam
served to make amicicide incidents involving tanks rare. No
incidents involving tank against tank or infantry against
tanks were recorded. On one occasion, however, an armored
vehicle fired on friendly troops with devastating effect. In
September 1969 soldiers of the 758th Supply and Service
Company and the 546th Ordnance Company (both of the 610th
Maintenance Battalion, lst Cavalry Division, Airmobile),
manning the perimeter at Quan Loi base camp, were fired upon
by a 1st Cavalry Division M-551 Sheridan using a beehive
round. Seven of the soldiers were killed in and on their
bunker.
Although tanks were relatively rare in Vietnam, armored
personnel carriers equipped with .50-caliber machine guns were
not, and the mechanized infantry forces were fond of reconning
by fire. On 25 February 1967 just before the battle of Prek
Klok the lst Battalion, 16th Infantry (1st Infantry Division),
commanded by Lt. Col. Rufus C. Lazzell, was fired upon in the
early hours of darkness by a friendly mechanized unit
conducting reconnaissance by fire with their .50-caliber
machine guns. Fortunately, the only damage was to an 81-mm
mortar. [72]
In 1 CTZ in 1971 Company C, 1/506th Infantry (101st
Airborne Division), also narrowly escaped injuries when fired
upon at night by .50-caliber machine guns mounted on friendly
armored personnel carriers. The APCs were 11returning fire",
after having received "sniper fire."
The confusion and disorientation that affect even
seasoned troops in active combat often produced amicicide
incidents, especially when previous coordination was less than
adequate. In September 1968 Company A, 3/7th Infantry, 199th
Light Infantry Brigade, established a night ambush position
along the edge of a village in Long An Province. The perimeter
of the ambush was irregular, with village huts separating the
various platoon positions. As the expected Vietcong squad
approached the ambush site, one platoon opened fire as
planned. During the ensuing fire fight another platoon to the
right of the first began firing on the first platoon's
position, hitting several of the friendly soldiers with rifle
and machine gun fire.
A similar incident involving a single platoon, 3d
Platoon, Company D, 4/12th Infantry (199th Light Infantry
Brigade), occurred near Dinh Quan (Long Kanh Province) in
October 1969. The platoon established a perimeter defense for
the night in dense jungle. During the night the platoon
received a few rounds of enemy fire at close range and
returned fire. One of the platoon machine guns was observed
firing across a portion of the friendly perimeter, and
following the enemy attack one man was discovered in the area
fired across by the friendly machine gun with a mortal wound
in the back of his head. Presumably he had been killed by the
friendly machine gun.
Incidents involving confusion and inadequate coordination also happened to units on the move. In August 1969, Company A, 1/22d Infantry (4th Infantry Division) was on the move across a sparsely wooded plain with high brush south of Pleiku.
First Platoon led, followed by the 2d and 3d Platoons. Three enemy mortar rounds fell to the left of the company, and enemy sniper fire was received from the left front. The 2d Platoon returned fire on the suspected sniper location, forgetting in the heat of battle that the 1st Platoon was ahead. A Kit Carson Scout with the point squad of the 1st Platoon received a wound in the groin from a friendly M-79 grenade launcher HE round.
The difficult terrain of Vietnam often made even well planned operations
the scene of amicicide incidents when units were unable to maintain contact and coordination. In Pleiku Province in June 1966 the commander of Company C, 1/35th Infantry, prescribed specific routes for each of his three platoons on a search and destroy mission. The unit had had recent contact in the area, and the men were quick to fire. During the course of the operation one platoon became disoriented and strayed into the path of another platoon. The two platoons engaged in a fire fight that resulted in two men wounded in each platoon before the firing was stopped.
On 2 September 1969 Company A, 1/50th Infantry (Mech), made a combat
assault ten kilometers north of LZ Sandy. On landing, the troops dispersed on the rice paddy dikes and almost at once received fire from the brush nearby and observed what they believed to be the enemy on the horizon to the east. Company A returned fire and then received fire from the wood line to the southeast in the general direction in which the "enemy" had been observed. The troops on the horizon to the east turned out to be friendly; fortunately, no casualties were caused in either unit.
In August 1970 the 1st and 2d Platoons of Company A, 1/7th Cavalry (1st
Cavalry Division, Airmobile), conducted clearing operations. The two platoons inadvertently crossed paths and engaged in a five-minute fire fight, which resulted, surprisingly, in no casualties. One platoon's M-60 machine guns laid down a heavy and effective suppressive fire, which, although it fortunately did not hit anyone, did
force the other platoon to the ground and limit their fire.
Such "coordinated" operations were even more hazardous when conducted
at night and when the plan involved close cooperation between US and ARVN forces. Company A, 3/7th Infantry (199th Light Infantry Brigade), was on a night operation near a Vietnamese village in Long An Province in
August 1968 when fired upon by an ARVN security force. one US
soldier was killed and several were wounded. The ARVN element
was located on the edge of the village with the mission of
security and ambush. The US company was moving to a pickup
zone. The leading platoon leader of the US company was told by
his company commander that the ARVN security force had been
informed of the company's movement and that a strobe light
displayed at a certain trail intersection would bring an ARVN
soldier to the passage point and that he would guide the unit
through the village.
Fifteen meters from the passage point, the US platoon
leader could hear the ARVN security force and see the guide.
Suddenly the ARVN soldiers fired a flare and took Company A
under f ire. After some time, the leading platoon leader was
able to establish direct voice communication with the ARVN
security force and to have the firing stopped. The incident
was the product of incomplete coordination on the part of the
ARVN security force. Their US advisor had indeed informed the
ARVN platoon leader of the US company's movement, but the
latter had not passed the information on to the security squad
that did the firing.
Neither the US nor the ARVN forces were immune from
mistaken engagements during night operations. In early 1969
two US patrols, one of which was from Company B, 5th
Transportation Battalion (101st Airborne Division), met and
engaged in a fire fight at night outside the perimeter of Camp
Eagle (Phu Bai). One American soldier was wounded. In the
spring of the same year (1969) two Regional Force/Popular
Force platoons were conducting a night operation in a
contested area in Binh Tranh District, Dinh Tuong Province.
The plan called for the two units to operate on opposite sides
of a canal during the patrol, but mistakes were made, and the
two platoons engaged each other in the dark. As was so often
the case, one man was killed and one was wounded.
Conclusion
There is nothing at all mysterious about either the
causes of ground amicicide or the measures necessary to
prevent it. Incidents of friendly ground troops firing on one
another are natural products of the fog of battle. In every
war, inexperienced and nervous soldiers, poorly planned or
inadequately coordinated operations, and occasionally poor
fire discipline or true mistaken identification result in
friendly forces inadvertently engaging each other with weapons
ranging from rifles and hand grenades to tanks and antitank guns.
As was the case with air amicicide incidents,
visibility seems to have been a significant factor in most
incidents of ground amicicide (see table 5). Nearly half
(twenty-seven) of the fifty-eight incidents examined in this
study took place under conditions of reduced visibility,
mostly during the hours of darkness. The natural increase of
fear, misorientation, and nervousness during reduced
visibility perhaps played as great a role as the inability to
see and distinguish clearly other ground forces in the
vicinity.
The type of tactical operation in progress at the time
of an incident seems to have followed the dominant tactical
employment in each conflict. In World War II most incidents
(twenty-six out of thirty-four) took place during offensive
operations in which the necessary fire and maneuver of forces
against often strong enemy opposition made coordination and
identification much more difficult. In Vietnam, on the other
hand, most of the incidents identifiable as to type of
operation (sixteen) occurred in defensive situations at night
(seven) or during patrols (eight).
By far the most significant causative factor in all
ground amicicide incidents appears to have been some lack of
adequate coordination between units. In twenty-six of the
fifty-eight incidents studied, lack of coordination was the
primary cause. This was especially true of incidents that
occurred in the Pacific during World War II (twelve out of
sixteen) and in Vietnam (ten out of twenty), where the natural
difficulties of coordination and accurate location of friendly
forces were further complicated by difficult terrain.
The misidentification of friendly for enemy troops was
also a frequent cause. In fifteen of the fifty-eight incidents
misidentification was the major factor, and it was an element
in many of the incidents attributable mainly to faulty
coordination as well. Proportionately, misidentification seems
to have been a greater problem in Europe during World War II
(twelve out of eighteen incidents) than in either the Pacific
theater in World War II (none out of fifteen incidents) or in
Vietnam (only two out of twenty incidents). The employment of
green troops and lack of fire discipline and proper control of
firing by leaders were also an important factor (eleven
incidents).
The results of such incidents have always been killed
and wounded soldiers, disrupted operations, and a general
degradation of cohesion, morale, and combat power. The
measures required to prevent them are also simple in concept
if not so easy in achievement. Adequate training and battle
indoctrination accompanied by tight fire discipline imposed by
calm and capable leaders are essential. Operations must
be planned and thoroughly coordinated with detailed attention
given to the possible occurrence of amicicidal engagement.
Even the best planned operations conducted with well-seasoned
troops will probably continue to result in occasional
amicicide incidents, given the frightening and confusing
atmosphere of the battlefield. While human error cannot be
eliminated from war, its incidence and effects can be
attenuated somewhat if due attention is given it by those
charged with the lives of men and the fate of their nation.
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