Introduction

The development in the late nineteenth century of long- range, rapid-fire artillery capable of delivering a high volume of extremely lethal explosive shells on targets out of sight of the gun positions greatly increased the probability that friendly troops might be subject to the fire of their own supporting artillery. The concurrent development of tactical doctrines designed to capitalize on the technological advances in artillery served only to add to the problem. Tremendous artillery preparations, the rolling barrage and close defensive concentrations utilizing guns and shells of frequently unpredictable performance in indirect fire techniques of still primitive efficiency, and the absence of dependable, instantaneous battlefield communications posed significant hazards to friendly troops in both the attack and the defense.

In time both weapons and ammunition have become much more dependable, and techniques for controlling indirect artillery fire have been improved in both sophistication and reliability. Communications on the battlefield have also improved dramatically. Nevertheless, friendly artillery fire continues to fall on friendly troops in combat.

While artillery amicicide may be attributed to a wide range of discrete causes, the incidence of such events seems to respond, for good or ill, to technological improvements in guns, ammunition, communications, and position determination devices; to changes in tactical doctrine; and, above all, to changing levels of competence on the part of the people responsible for manipulating the devices. Changing levels of competence are, of course, a reflection of native intelligence, training, and discipline. The key factor in artillery amicicide, as in other types, is that ever-present element in war, human error.

It must again be emphasized that the available information is far too sparse and uncertain to permit a definitive appreciation of the problem of artillery amicicide.

An understanding of the causes and effects of artillery amicicide, however, even in broad outline, is an important first step toward preventing such occurrences. The narrative depiction of selected examples may thus provide better insight into the overall problem of artillery amicicide than does the manipulation of the uncertain statistical data.

World War I

By 1914 artillery weapons had reached their technological adolescence but were still far from consistent in accuracy and reliability. Communication, an essential element of indirect fire control, was also of limited perfection. Tactical doctrine for the employment of indirect fire artillery weapons, however, had evolved more rapidly and threatened to outstrip the available technology.

Incidents of artillery amicicide due to inadequate communications, poor survey and fire control, and the sheer volume of artillery fire called for by the prevailing tactical doctrine became so common in World War I as to be an almost unremarkable aspect of the war on the western front. Postwar memoirs of participants on both sides attest to the frequency with which troops were fired upon by their own artillery. Indeed, when estimating the probable human cost of an offensive operation, the thorough staff planner usually included an allowance for casualties due to a friendly barrage. [1]

The result, according to one French general, was nothing less than the outright massacre of friendly infantry by its own artillery. [2]

Although the true number of such incidents, the actual number of casualties incurred thereby, and the practical effect of artillery amicicide in World War I are perhaps unknowable, General Percin's calculations of 75,000 French casualties, are perhaps not totally unreasonable.

"...as a result of a misunderstanding of the principle of the offensive, as a result of a lack of coordination of the artillery and the infantry, as a result of an irrational use of the heavy artillery..." [3]

The 75,000 casualties attributed by Percin to artillery amicicide constitute only about 1.5 percent of the total 4,945,470 casualties suffered by the French army in World War 1. [4]

It may be supposed that the other armies engaged on the western front fared little better. The Germans certainly experienced similar problems, and one particularly guilty German field artillery regiment, the 49th, was wryly known as the "48 1/2-th" because of its persistently short shooting. [5]

The direct effect on combat power of so many casualties due to friendly artillery fire was probably exceeded by the deleterious effect of such incidents on morale and on the willingness of soldiers to leave the comparative safety of the trenches. Artillery amicicide was also probably one contributor to the well-known distaste of the frontline soldier for the denizens of the staff and rear area, among whom the artillerists were (in view of their exposure to counterbattery fire) perhaps unjustly included.

In any event, shelling by friendly artillery, although routine, was seldom accepted, and the World War I infantryman was always "prepared to damn the gunners without reflecting on the difficulty of their task." [6]

World War II: Europe

By 1939 artillery weapons and ammunition as well as communications and fire control procedures were somewhat improved, and tactical doctrine had changed significantly for the better with respect to amicicide. But artillery amicicide continued to be a problem. Technological and tactical advances appear to have been offset by continued heavy use of artillery and the lack of significant improvements in the means for accurate location of friendly troops on the ground.

The enormous scale and scope of the Second World War also had its effect by requiring the frequent employment of inadequately trained personnel in combat operations conducted in a variety of climates and terrain. In every case the results were similar: dead and wounded comrades, delayed or stifled offensive actions, confusion, and a general degradation of combat effectiveness.

Surprisingly few artillery incidents have survived into the published official histories of combat in North Africa. Considering the greenness of American troops in the North African campaign and the relatively high mobility of combat forces, one would expect the record to be replete with instances of artillery amicicide.

The apparent lack of such incidents is no doubt due to the disarray of the sources rather than to any real lack of casualties due to friendly artillery or mortar fire, although the comparatively better visibility afforded by the flat, open desert terrain may have been a factor. [7]

The conquest of the Italian peninsula, however, was not without its share of friendly casualties due to friendly artillery fire. The rugged terrain and stubborn German defense from prepared positions made the employment of supporting indirect artillery and mortar fire both heavy and at times inaccurate. The mountainous terrain of central Italy also made the positive location of friendly troops somewhat uncertain.

The assault of elements of the US 85th Infantry Division on the Gothic Line at Monte Altuzzo in the Northern Apennines between 10 and 18 September 1944 illustrates in detail the problems encountered by the small unit leader in maintaining cohesion following the shelling of friendly troops by their supporting artillery. It also illustrates the difficulties faced by battalion commanders and their attached artillery liaison personnel in identifying the culpable unit and controlling their fires satisfactorily. [8]

In the short period of three days (14-17 September 1944) the 1st Battalion, 338th Infantry (85th Infantry Division), suffered six killed and three wounded in four separate incidents of artillery amicicide on the steep slopes and peaks of Monte Altuzzo. Misplaced fire from supporting mortars and artillery served on several occasions to delay or halt the assault, disrupt the defense against German counterattacks, and adversely affect the battalion's morale and fighting spirit. In addition, the fear of striking friendly troops hampered the full employment of available firepower.

Forced by violent and repeated German counterattacks to withdraw from advanced positions on Monte Altuzzo on the evening of 14 September, Company B, 1/338th Infantry, commanded by Capt. Maurice E. Peabody, Jr., was ordered to withdraw to the battalion CP at Paretaio.

Under cover of darkness Captain Peabody began to move his men off the mountain, but before they had reached the safety of Paretaio they were subjected to fire from American artillery being used to stop a counterattack against the 2d Battalion's Company E. Fortunately, Company B suffered no casualties as a result of this shelling, nor was the withdrawal significantly affected thereby.

The following day, 15 September, fire from friendly artillery or direct fire weapons (tanks or tank destroyers) landed on the southwest slopes of Knob 2, then occupied by the 1st Platoon, Company C, 1/338th Infantry.

The first shell struck a few yards below the platoon's position, but a few minutes later a second shell landed squarely in the middle of the 2d Squad.

The second shell killed six men, including the squad leader, and wounded two others. The survivors were badly shaken by concussion and withdrew precipitately to the platoon CP. The platoon leader, 1st Lt. William S. Corey, was sure the fire was American and attempted to have it lifted, but the shells had cut his telephone lines to the Company C CP. After some difficulty the supporting artillery units were notified. Although Lieutenant Corey's riflemen were certain the rounds were from a friendly 105-mm or 240-mm howitzer or 8-inch gun, the liaison officer of the supporting 329th Field Artillery Battalion conjectured that they came from either a tank or tank destroyer. The actual source was apparently never determined.

Although only one round actually struck the platoon, the resulting confusion and the belief that it was from friendly artillery had a demoralizing effect on the survivors. The dazed and angry men had quickly scattered down the hillside and Lieutenant Corey had an extremely difficult time reorganizing his position to face the expected German counterattacks. The shaky men were scarcely capable of maintaining a stubborn defense. Fortunately, the platoon was not immediately tested; it later withdrew spontaneously and apparently without authorization.

The memory of 1st Platoon's misfortune served to restrict the use of available firepower in subsequent attempts to take the mountain. Further assaults later in the day by both Companies A and C went unsupported by the companies' 60-mm mortars for fear their fire would hit the attacking elements.

Two days later, on 17 September, the 3d Platoon of Company C moved out in the assault again. The platoon had proceeded about fifty yards along the main trail just below and west of the main Altuzzo ridge, when friendly supporting fire fell fifty yards to its front. The platoon halted and quickly called for the fire to be lifted. The platoon leader, 2d Lt. Albert J. Krasman, held his platoon for more than an hour to insure that the shell-fire had stopped. During that time, one man was slightly wounded by fragments from the friendly shells.

As soon as he was notified of the incident, 1st Lt. Dawson L. Farber, Jr., the 329th Field Artillery Battalion liaison officer, queried the supporting division and corps artillery units to determine the source of the shells falling on 3d Platoon. Unable to determine the offending unit (or even whether the fire was from artillery, tanks, or tank destroyers) all II Corps artillery units were ordered to cease firing for half an hour in the Altuzzo area and 1,000 yards either side of the main ridge.

The fire continued, however, and ceased only after the artillery no-fire line was pushed 1,000 yards north of the crest of Monte Altuzzo. Company C resumed its advance at 0200, 17 September, after a delay of about three hours.

Subsequently, on 18 September 1944, the 1/338th Infantry took Monte Altuzzo and continued its advance up the rugged Italian peninsula. The memory of the destruction, confusion, and delay occasioned by friendly fire on Monte Altuzzo receded as replacements joined and new leaders took command.

The long-range effect of this incident of artillery amicicide is problematical, but its negative effects on combat power probably outweighed the positive ones if on each future occasion the use of available firepower was a little more hesitant and the confidence of the infantrymen in their supporting artillery a little weaker.

Operation OVERLORD and the subsequent advance of the Allied armies across France and Belgium into Germany brought no noticeable improvement in the problem of artillery amicicide. The progress of offensive action continued to be disrupted from time to time by friendly artillery fires, and occasionally friendly artillery caused the temporary withdrawal of friendly forces, as it had on Monte Altuzzo. In some respects the conditions of combat in the European theater complicated the accurate delivery of indirect fires. The greater number of troops and units in the line, extensive and irregular frontages, the dense hedgerows of Normandy, and heavy forestation of parts of Belgium and Germany, coupled with frequent fog conditions and heavy rain and snow, served to intensify the difficulties in correctly locating friendly troops and coordinating supporting fires.

The great confusion accompanying the German Ardennes offensive in December 1944 also contributed to several incidents of amicicide, by both indirect and direct fire weapons. The German forces, too, were subject to the same conditions and also experienced instances of artillery amicicide.

On 5 July 1944 Maj. Gen. Robert C. Macon's 83d Infantry Division was ordered to attack in the Carentan Peninsula to seize the town of Santeny. The attack by the division, which had been badly handled by the enemy the previous day, began inauspiciously when several rounds from the ten-minute artillery preparation landed on friendly troops, causing a regimental executive officer to report frantically that the artillery was "slaughtering our 3d Battalion." [9]

The incident did not precipitate disaster, but less than two weeks later, shortly before the St. Lo breakout, the CP of one of the 83d Infantry Division's infantry battalions was nearly obliterated by 155-mm howitzer rounds fired by the 957th Field Artillery Battalion. The incident occurred when one of the computers* (*a soldier, not a machine) in the 957th's Fire Direction Center (FDC) relayed the wrong charge (he said, "Charge 4," when the mission was computed "Charge 5") to the firing battery. Corrective action was subsequently taken to avoid such human errors: computers were to repeat aloud to the battalion S-3 the instructions given to the batteries by telephone. [10]

The lines of the opposing forces in Normandy were frequently so close that the use of artillery was limited so as not to strike friendly forces. [11]

Nevertheless, several units experienced cases of artillery amicicide during the early weeks of the fighting on the Continent. A nighttime raid by a platoon of the 117th Infantry (30th Infantry Division) in late June 1944 into the town of Pont-du-St. Fromond near Airel on the Vire River was disrupted by friendly artillery fire, demonstrating the difficulty of coordinating fires at night in the hedgerow country. [12]

Similarly, the attack of a battalion of the 8th Infantry (4th Infantry Division) on the town of La Chapelle-en-Juger following the Operation COBRA bombing of 25 July 1944 was brought to a halt by friendly artillery fire. [13]

Misplaced American artillery fire also played a role in the ill-fated battle of Schmidt in early November 1944. Beginning in the early morning hours of 6 November 1944 elements of the 28th Infantry Division's 2d Battalion, 112th Infantry, began to withdraw individually and without orders from their defensive positions in the village of Vossenack. [14]

With great difficulty the battalion officers had managed by 1030 to reestablish in the vicinity of the battalion command post a defensive line of about seventy men. All American infantrymen capable of leaving the eastern portion of Vossenack had done so, although some American tanks remained behind. Despite their presence a call for artillery support was made, but the first four volleys fell short among the defenders at the newly established battalion CP line. One round hit a barn in which men from the lst Platoon of Company E had taken shelter. One man was killed and three others seriously wounded. The platoon sergeant, T. Sgt. Donald Nelson, and another surviving member of the platoon immediately withdrew to the battalion's rear aid station in Germeter.

The Company E commander, Ist Lt. Melvin Barrilleaux, and several of his men were also fully exposed to the friendly artillery fire. Barrilleaux rushed into the battalion CP to try to stop the firing, and just as he left the CP another round exploded nearby, killing his first sergeant and wounding the lieutenant himself in the face and leg. He, too, moved back to the aid station in Germeter, as did one of his lieutenants, 1st Lt. Clifton W. Beggs, who had been only slightly wounded in the shelling. Beggs later discounted the seriousness of his wounds and returned to his platoon in Vossenack.

Calls to the supporting artillery lifted the friendly fire after only four volleys, but the surviving officers found that, by virtue of casualties, their position was weaker than ever. The retreat was stopped, and at noon American infantry still held half the town of Vossenack. But the tenuous defense had been little helped by the friendly artillery fire on the American positions.

The difficulties posed by terrain, weather, and many units operating in close proximity to each other contributed to many of the cases of artillery amicicide in the European theater. On 14 December 1944 troops of the 9th Infantry in the vicinity of Wahlerschied were fired on by friendly artillery during the attack of the 2d Infantry Division toward the Roer River dams. The problems in registration due to dense forest, clinging fog, and a lack of specific information on enemy positions were cited as contributing factors. [15]

The Wahlerschied incident reinforced an earlier comment of Maj. Gen. Raymond 0. Barton, commanding general of the 4th Infantry Division, that, "Positive measures must be taken to insure the supporting artillery knows where you are." [16]

The problem of coordinating the fires of different units operating in the same area is well illustrated by an incident involving the assault of the 2d Battalion, Ilth Infantry, on Fort St. Blaise from the 5th Infantry Division's bridgehead across the Moselle River at Dornot on 8 September 1944. In order to permit the supporting artillery to shell Fort St. Blaise before the final assault, Companies F and G were pulled back 400 yards. They were struck by three rounds of friendly artillery that fell short, killing three men and wounding several others. [17]

The regimental commander, Colonel Lemmon, later related that checks made by his liaison officers from both the 5th Infantry Division and 7th Armored Division artilleries revealed that the short rounds had been fired by a 7th Armored Division artillery unit on call from his 7th Armored Division artillery liaison officer, who had the fires lifted immediately. [18]

The confusion engendered in defending American forces during the great German offensive in the Ardennes in December 1944 also led to several instances of artillery amicicide. Representative of those incidents is the case of the confused withdrawal of the 2d Battalion, 394th Infantry, and lst Battalion, 393d Infantry, of the 99th Infantry Division from the vicinity of Murringen on the night of 18 December 1944. Lost, badly mauled, and greatly confused, the two battalions were withdrawing toward Wirtzfeld when they were fired on by the artillery of the 2d Infantry Division and suffered several casualties. [19]

The tired and hungry men nearly panicked, but the officers and NCOs managed to restore order while a squad leader ran ahead to an American observation post and managed to stop the artillery. Most of the 2/394th and 1/393d reached Elsenborn in the early hours of 19 December, somewhat the worse for their handling by the Germans and the 2d Division artillery.

Not all cases of artillery amicicide in the ETO can be blamed on American forces alone. Some cases reported as amicicide may have been due to German fire. In April 1945 an Army ground forces observer reported two cases in which deceptions by the enemy gave the appearance of friendly fire incidents. [20]

In the first case an attack by the 3d Infantry Division in the vicinity of Osheim on 23 January 1945 was preceded by a twelve-minute artillery preparation. The fires were suspended when the commander of the leading infantry battalion reported that friendly fire was falling on his troops. After a quick check the preparation was resumed with increased range but again was reported to be falling short. An order to cease firing was issued, and about a third of the preparation's value was lost. An investigation disclosed that the fire was coming from German tanks on the east flank. The 3d Infantry Division subsequently developed the SOP to continue scheduled preparations until completed, regardless of reports from the front lines, a procedure which probably contributed to future cases of genuine artillery amicicide.

In another case, a patrol from the 11th Armored Division came under intense German small arms fire and radioed for artillery support. The enemy monitored the radio transmission, and when the American artillery reported "on the way" the German artillery promptly opened fire on the patrol. Mistaking the enemy fire for friendly artillery falling short, the patrol called for "cease fire," thus saving the Germans from a heavy artillery barrage. [21]

The Germans did not, however, escape occasional incidents of artillery amicicide among their own troops. During the attack of the US 30th Infantry and 2d Armored Divisions against the West Wall at Uebach on 4 October 1944, the attacking German forces of the 49th Infantry Division were fired upon by their own artillery and forced to break off their assault. [22]

And again in the so-called Sad Sack Affair on 28 December 1944 near Sadzot, Belgium, the attacking 25th Panzer Grenadier Regiment (2nd SS Panzer Division) became confused and put mortar fire on its own positions during the course of a night engagement with elements of the US 3d Armored and 82d Airborne Divisions. [23]

Neither side in the war in Europe had an exclusive claim on human fallibility.

World War II: The Pacific

With respect to artillery amicicide, the war in the Pacific did not differ substantially from that in Europe. Difficult terrain, heavy vegetation, weather, and hard fighting against a competent and determined enemy conspired to mask the location of friendly troops and to complicate coordination. Nor were the effects of artillery amicicide any different: the reduction of friendly combat power through the loss of friendly troops dead and wounded, confusion, and the inevitable degradation of morale, all of which contributed to slowed or broken offensive operations and to the weakening of defensive positions.

Almost every major operation in the Pacific Islands was punctuated by instances of misplaced friendly artillery fire, the usual problems of weather, terrain, and troop location being further complicated by the presence of both Army and Marine Corps units and the frequent use of naval gunfire, which demanded increased coordination.

The Buna Campaign has been called "A Leavenworth Nightmarell; it certainly was with respect to the coordination of artillery fires. [24]

On 25 November 1942, an 81-mm mortar shell fell short on the command post of Company L, 3d Battalion, 126th Infantry (32d Infantry Division), during the advance along the Sanananda Road toward Buna in Papua. The nephew of an Australian general, Cpt. Jack M. Blamey, a company commander of the 2d/2d Australian Infantry Battalion, and one of his men were killed, and six other Australians and Americans, including the Company L commander, Capt. Bevin D. Lee, were wounded. [25]

On Carlson Island (Kwajalein) in the Marshalls, the late advance of the 2d Battalion, 32d Infantry (7th Infantry Division), on I February 1944 delayed until twilight the registration of the 49th Field Artillery Battalion, and the first shells of the reparatory fires fell on the 2/32d Infantry's positions. [26]

On 15 June of the same year the 1st Battalion, 162d Infantry (41st-Infantry Division), found itself pinned down most of the afternoon by friendly artillery and mortar fire, thereby slowing the progress of its attack to capture Mokmer Drome on the island of Biak. [27]

The same problem faced the 43d Infantry Division's 172d Infantry, attacking toward Hill 351 on Luzon on 11 January 1945. [28]

Such incidents were frequently very costly in terms of human suffering. On 7 August 1944 the elements of the 124th Infantry composing TED Force (Col. Ted Starr) of PERSECUTION Task Force lost one KIA and three WIA to Japanese forces in the battle of the Driniumor River in New Guinea. [29]

On the same day, however, eight men were killed and fourteen wounded as a result of faulty mortar ammunition, and the following day, 8 August, misplaced artillery fire from the 120th Field Artillery Battalion killed four men and wounded twenty-two others in the lst Battalion, 124th Infantry. [30]

Naval gunfire could and did prove especially damaging to friendly forces when poorly placed. Smoke and dust from the preliminary air and naval bombardment of Parry Island (Eniewetok), which began at dawn on 22 February 1944, soon masked the target for some of the supporting ships. The landing craft started ashore at 0845 and three of the LCI(G)s that went in with the first wave to fire rockets were hit by 5-inch shells from the destroyer Hailey, killing thirteen and wounding forty-seven. [31]

Later the same day the lst Battalion, 22d Marines, called for naval gunfire to suppress Japanese artillery. Five salvos from 5-inch naval guns eliminated the Japanese artillery and broke enemy resistance, but proved damaging to friendly troops and tanks as well. [32]

The campaign of the 77th Infantry Division on Guam in August 1944 also saw several cases of artillery amicicide. Ordered to withdraw from their exposed position 200 yards north of Barrigada at 1430, 2 August 1944, the men of 2d Platoon, Company B, 1st Battalion, 307th Infantry, had to make their dash for safety through an unintentional barrage of American artillery fire. [33]

The following day, 3 August, the advance of the 2d Battalion, 307th Infantry, was slowed by short artillery rounds that disrupted communications and killed some men in the CP area and wounded others, including the battalion commander, who had to be replaced.

On 7-8 August the 2d Battalion, 306th Infantry, was fired on by Marine pack artillery of the 3d Marine Division near Mount Santa Rosa.

Dense jungle, inadequate maps, and frequent overcast conditions made the location of friendly units on Guam extremely difficult, and unit commanders rarely knew their exact position, with one result being American artillery fire on friendly positions. Even when the fire was Japanese, the men of the 77th Division were inclined to believe it was friendly, and the division commander, Maj. Gen. Andrew D. Bruce, had to remind his troops that the Japanese, too, had artillery and that they frequently masked its sound by firing at the same time as the friendly guns. He finally had to warn the infantrymen to "stop accusing our own artillery of firing on [our] own troops until the 'facts are known. [34]

The discovery of additional cases of artillery amicicide during the World War II campaigns in the Pacific is probably limited only by the researcher's time and perseverance in reviewing the available records. One additional instance, however, is both interesting and instructive in that it clearly outlines the problems of coordinating artillery fires between units of different services engaged in hard fighting on difficult terrain and also sheds some further light on one of the most famous general officer reliefs of the Second World War.

Operation FORAGER, the invasion of Saipan, began with the amphibious assault of the 2d and 4th Marine Divisions on 15 June 1944. By 25 June Lt. Gen. (USMC) Holland M. Smith's V Amphibious Corps, including the US Army's 27th Infantry Division under the command of Maj. Gen. Ralph Smith, were pressing against the Japanese forces in the mountainous terrain in the central portion of the island. The 27th Division occupied the center of the corps zone in the area that came to be known as Death Valley.

The 2d Marine Division was on its left, on and around Mount Topatchau, and the 4th Marine Division was on its right. The terrain was extremely steep and heavily wooded with numerous cliffs, which made the maintenance of contact with flanking units especially difficult. The Japanese defenders were particularly tenacious and frequently mounted violent counterattacks, which pushed back friendly forces and further added to the problem of accurately finding friendly lines.

Dissatisfied with the late and uncoordinated attack of the 27th Division on 23 June, which he felt had jeopardized the entire operation, Holland Smith relieved Ralph Smith of his command on the afternoon of 24 June. [35]

After briefing his regimental commanders on attack plans for the following day, Major General Smith outlined the situation for his successor, Maj. Gen. Sanderford Jarman, and subsequently departed Saipan for Hawaii by seaplane at 0530 on 25 June. General Smith's relief subsequently became a cause celebre and "Smith vs. Smith" remains one of the more debated reliefs of a general officer in World War II. [36]

The attack planned by Major General Smith got underway at 1630 on 25 June, as Companies E and G, 2d Battalion, 106th Infantry, supported by Company B, 762d Tank Battalion, moved out up the right side of Death Valley. [37]

The supporting artillery preparation by Battery A, 106th Field Artillery (155-mm), and Battery B, 249th Field Artillery (105-mm), which had been in position and firing on the cliffs since about 1530, was halted about 1715, because friendly shrapnel was landing on the 2d Battalion, 8th Marines (2d Marine Division), on Mount Topatchau. [38]

Both the attack and the inadvertent shelling of the Marines continued on the following two days with the 2/8th Marines continually requesting, and often demanding, better control of the artillery and mortar fires supporting the 106th Infantry. [39]

On 29 June the regiments of the 27th Division experienced their own problems with their uncoordinated artillery fires. [40]

Maj. Gen. George W. Griner, the new division commander, ordered the 3d Battalion, 105th Infantry, to take up position on the right, completing the cordon around the enemy forces in Death Valley. Meanwhile the 2d Battalion, 165th Infantry, was to finish the conquest of Purple Heart Ridge by taking Hill Able. In order to accomplish its mission the 2/165th would first have to recapture Hill King, which had been retaken by the Japanese.

The day's events began inauspiciously when friendly artillery fire struck the 3/105th before it could jump off. Capt. Alexander C. Bouchard's Company K finally left the battalion assembly area at 0700 and proceeded to skirt the west slope of Purple Heart Ridge en route to the line of departure. Informed by a guide from the 106th Infantry that Hill King was clear (it was not) and offered an easy route, Captain Bouchard's men had climbed halfway to the crest when they came under intense Japanese rifle fire. In The 27th Division, Love relates what happened next:

"The company commander then assumed that the fire was coming from a small party of stragglers and dispatched a squad under Staff Sgt. Carl A. Neidt to circle the hill and clean them out . . . . As Neidt started out on his patrol the [friendly] artillery preparation [for Company E, 2/165th Infantry, attacking from the other side] began landing on Hill King. The first fifteen shells landed squarely in the midst of K Company, wounding nineteen men. Captain Bouchard looked around, saw the crest of the hill, and figured that if he could get his men on the reverse slope of it he would be safe from the artillery. Without any further ado he ordered his men to get over the top of the hill, rifle fire or no rifle fire. They were just in the act of following out the order when the full force of the concentration struck and the dispersal which the scramble up the hill had effected acted to cut down the casualties." [41]

As it was, Company K found itself in the middle of a sizable Japanese force, but hard fighting by Company K, assisted by the assaulting Company E, finally cleared the hill of Japanese. Company K had to stop to reorganize, and it was not until 1300 that it was finally able to take its position closing the line around the enemy forces in Death Valley. Despite the delay, by 1530 the 27th Division had restored contact with the 2d Marine Division on its left flank, successfully completing at least an important part of the day's mission. [42]

During the remaining days until Saipan was declared secure on 9 July 1944, reports continued to flow into the 106th Infantry CP (and presumably into the other regiments) requesting cease-fires of friendly artillery falling on American troops. [43]

Even the planes dropping surrender leaflets to the Japanese proved inaccurate. On 30 June the leaflet aircraft managed to drop two batches of leaflets behind and two batches of leaflets in front of friendly lines. [44]

The Marines continued to experience serious cases of artillery amicicide as well. Advancing on Garapan on 2 July, the 8th Marines were temporarily disorganized when friendly artillery fire fell into their lines, causing forty-five casualties. [45]

The relief of Army Maj. Gen. Ralph Smith by USMC Lt. Gen. Holland Smith on 24 June and the constantly erratic artillery fire of the 27th Infantry Division into the Marine units on its flanks during the campaign aroused animosities between the Army and Marines that soured their relations in the subsequent months. [46]

Although Ralph Smith's relief was ostensibly based on the slow and uncoordinated advance of his division on 23 June, there can be little doubt that Holland Smith's decision was influenced by the unwarranted shelling of his marines by the 27th Division's artillery.

The Korean War

The Korean War was fought with the weapons of World War II using similar fire direction techniques and troop location aids. Tactically it was somewhat different in its greater emphasis on small unit defensive positions, numerous small patrol actions, and a greater reliance on artillery firepower to break large enemy assault formations. The rough terrain of the Korean peninsula also made the accurate delivery of artillery fires more difficult.

In the frequent night battles for platoon-size positions perched on steep ridges and isolated from the main lines, a position could and did change hands several times in the course of a single night, and cases of artillery amicicide were almost inevitable. The confusion created by tenuous communications and by defending isolated positions at night meant that friendly troops would frequently retake a defensive position from the enemy using small arms, automatic weapons, and hand grenades before requested artillery support could be called off. The result was that concentrations fired by friendly artillery units frequently struck the very troops they were intended to support.

The records of the Korean War have not been reviewed systematically in this study for incidents of artillery amicicide, and a single case must serve as an example. On the night of 16-17 April 1953 various elements of the 31st Infantry Regiment Oth Infantry Division) participated in the defense of Pork Chop Hill. [47]

The battle in the darkness was extremely confused, with first one side, then the other, and sometimes both at the same time occupying the trenches, bunkers, and slopes of the hill. At 2307 the position (or parts of it) was in the possession of elements of the 1st and 3d Platoons of Company E, 31st Infantry, when "Flash" fires were called for. One battery fired the protective barrage using VT fuzes. Pfc. Richard Long of the Company E CP group failed to see or heed the flare signaling the imminent "Flash" fire and was hit by the friendly protective shelling.

Shortly before dawn (about 0530) on 17 April the 1st Platoon of Company L, attempting to regain possession of the hill, had just fired accidentally on elements of Company K when they themselves were struck by friendly artillery fire. One salvo wounded the platoon sergeant (Sgt. Horace Ford) in the arm and sent a sliver of shrapnel through the helmet of one private, who was miraculously unharmed. Another salvo landed in a communications trench occupied by fourteen members of Company L, getting them all. For many of these men it was their second or third wound of the night. One man of this group, Private Williams, was sent to the rear of the hill to attempt to stop the artillery. There he found three medium tanks parked, and as Williams was trying to communicate with the tankers, two more friendly rounds landed among the tanks. Williams ducked under the hull of a tank and escaped further injury. The sergeant of the tanks apparently then radioed and got the fire lifted.

About 0600, 17 April, shortly after 1st Lt. Joseph G. Clemons, Jr., commander of Company K, reached the CP bunker on Pork Chop Hill, three rounds of what were apparently shorts from friendly artillery exploded in the CP area. One, landing directly in the doorway of the bunker, rewounded Lieutenant Attridge of Company E, and the other two, exploding about twenty-five yards away, wounded three KATUSAs of Company K.

A thorough examination of Korean War records would probably reveal many similar instances. The rather unique terrain and tactical situations encountered by the contending forces in Korea made artillery amicicide almost unavoidable.

Vietnam

By the 1960s artillery and ammunition technology, FDC and troop location procedures and aids, and battlefield communications had all been significantly improved over what was available in World War I, World War II, and the Korean War. Improvements in technology were complemented in the Vietnam War by an increased awareness at all levels of the need to protect friendly soldiers and noncombatants from unintentional exposure to friendly fire. US Forces in Vietnam were directed by the commander of the United States Military Assistance Command Vietnam to observe scrupulously an elaborate set of rules and procedures for the employment of firepower. [48]

The MACV Rules of Engagement were intended specifically to prevent amicicide and were so specific and complex that some officers and men claimed the rules unduly limited the successful application of superior American firepower. American artillery units in the field also adopted numerous procedures designed to insure accuracy and to preclude friendly casualties. [49]

Among the safety measures employed generally were [50] :

1. Firing a smoke shell set for a 200-meter height of burst as the first round for most observed missions.

2. Double- or even triple-checking all firing data at each echelon from the forward observer to the gun.

3. Conducting periodic gunner (firing) inspections and drills.

4. Separating and segregating, by lot, projectiles and powder for separate-loading ammunition.

5. Boresighting guns at least twice daily.

6. Registering guns at least twice weekly.

7. Conducting frequent staff inspections to insure compliance with safety policies.