Jim Bloom recently attended the annual meeting of the Society fro Military History & sends back this report. Anyone care to do the same for Origins? This is a diagnosis of military history's (that recent 61st annual meeting of the Society for Military History (SMH) -- more of a seminar -- held in Washington, D.C. (actually the northern burb of Bethesda, Md.) from April 7 through the 10th, is an excellent gauge of the discipline's trends and prospects. If you are reading this, it is a safe assumption that you have an abiding interest in the history of warfare. The field of military history has several tiers, representing diverse approaches. Well-illustrated journalistic war histories can be useful for playing or designing a wargame, or painting a miniature army but are snubbed by some elitist academicians as being too childish, pedestrian or hackneyed. Even if your interest is restricted to orders of battle, uniform and equipment guides, development of game rules, or the state of the wargaming industry, you can mine military history profitably. But your hobbyist or enthusiast outlook may be disdained by some purists. If you appreciate operational history and analysis for its own sake, you will find more common ground with the mainstream of military historians, but even here you will encounter some scorn. As suggested by my foregoing comments, there is one segment of the newer, more scholarly school, that may dull the attention of anyone concerned with the "nuts and bolts" of preparation for and conduct of warfare. This group views the military institution and society as just another bureaucracy or "social structure" to accommodate their dense jargon and abstract concepts. At the risk of seeming anti-intellectual, I believe that operational history should be at the heart of our subject. Much to my happy surprise, the pacifist-elitists don't seem to rule the SMH colloquia these days. In fact, I could hardly find them. Whatever your perspective, the paramount organization for debating and advancing the discipline is the SMH. Its quarterly publication, The Journal of Military History, (JMH) is the repository of the most sophisticated and authoritative expositions of war-in-context of the politically uncorrected variety. It stands head and shoulders above the slick picture books and pop adventure magazines that pose as military history on the drugstore book rack. The SMH is the beneficiary of a mid-1980s marriage between the academic military history community and the uniformed service school scholars. Although organized in the mid-1930s to gain respect for the field, it is now the cutting edge of what has become known as The New Military History (for the final useless acronym -- NMH). Before some of you angrily tear off this page and wrap your tuna sandwich in it, you should know that the type of NMH favored by the Society has evolved since its appearance about 20 years ago. At that time it embraced such dry themes as: "the sociological analysis of class and caste origins of the East Nottingham Argyles Regiment" or local histories featuring such spellbinders as "the impact of WWII on postal clerks in Slow Creek, Nebraska" or "a survey of attitudes reflected in breakfast table conversations about the shortage of horseshoes at Fort Dungheap remount station in 1873". These are obviously outgrowths of learned dissertation themes and reek of the lamp. Some of this hardly-military history found its way into the JMH's predecessor, Military Affairs, especially in the aftermath of Vietnam. That was the era when the indelicacy of war studies required that they be purged of violence, weaponry, or any hint of combat before entering academia's halcyon halls. In 1975, right-thinking ( more like left-thinking) sensitive worthies from the American Historical Association disrupted an SMH-sponsored session on military affairs that had the temerity to accept the former's invitation to participate in their national convention. That episode marked the nadir of the relationship between tenured scholars and military historians. Happily, since that episode the SMH mainstream has been fending off the political correctness police and combining the best from both worlds. The sterile fixation on social context has relaxed enough to bring "the stench of cordite" back into the field. In a 1975 JMH article, Dennis Showalter, author of a recent monograph on Tannenberg (1914) as well as astute studies of Austro-Prussian armies, had made a modest plea for the reintroduction of what had become known as "drum and trumpet" narrative. At its worst, this species comprised hero tales of battlefield derring-do. At its best, the type embraced by Showalter, they were polished campaign studies integrating the political and social framework. Showalter wasn't advocating a return to the pure military textbook approach. He was concerned, however, that much of what passed for military history in the War and Society configuration, was nothing more than meandering social science gobbledygook with an incidental military "subject". The writers may have just as well been discussing a striking coal miner's union as a military unit. There was no comprehension of what armies, navies and air forces are supposed to ultimately do. Nor did the writer consider thismessy detail relevant. The essays were simply "matrices" for some pet sociological axioms. Armchair generals were not welcome. During the heyday of the anemic "milieu and motivation" trend, I dropped my membership. After ten years, in the late 1980s, I thought I'd give them another try. I was pleasantly surprised to find that battle historians such as myself will find much to please them in the pages of JMH. The touchstone was "military effectiveness". Consider all aspects relevant to bringing a nation's warmaking or peacekeeping power to bear --- but don't lose sight of the "sharp edge". This was certainly reflected in the recent annual session, the first I had ever attended. At first sight, the theme of this session, Civil-Military Relations, did not electrify me since this type of subject attracts the aseptic approach that had turned me away. However, a glance at the preliminary agenda convinced me that it would be worth my while. To be sure, there were several presentations that reverted to the preoccupation with sociological models, aura and habitat. But these were isolated and interspersed with more substantive topics. And, as it happened, even the dubious presentations were much more military-oriented than the titles portended. In fact it was difficult to choose among the five or six competing "panels" in each of the five half-day sessions. A quick computation showed that there were 33 panels altogether over the 2 1/2 day period. Each panel consisted of a chair, three presenters and a commentator or two. Thus, there were over a hundred papers being presented, of which I could select only about 18, plus the critiques of the commentators. I will briefly review those that I did select; lack of space does not permit me to describe the content of several others that I had wanted to attend but had to forego. As can be seen, I have strong opinions on the war and society studies where the war element is but a faint echo. I noted only about three or four speakers/papers on the program that strayed too far from the Red God. The opening Keynote Address on Friday morning, April 7 by Richard H. Kohn, noted military historian and president of SMH, stressed the "Primacy of Civil-Military Relations in the Study of Military History". He alluded to a couple of controversial contemporary examples which jolted the sleep from our eyes: The uniformed rank-and-file's continuing disdain of their new commander-in-chief in light of his collegiate anti-war antics; Clinton's careless decision on gays in the military, and the obvious lack of military know-how or concern among his key policy personnel; The stir over some of Colin Powell's recent journalistic revelations; The flip-flops on military options in Bosnia; and Resignation and operational ineptitude in Somalia and Haiti. The first panel I attended on Friday was titled New Perspectives on War and Society, 1300-1800. The first paper was presented by Thomas Arnold, of Yale and discussed the effect of the application of geometric reckoning to all physical matters in the epoch of the "military revolution", 1500-1800. The second paper, by Clifford Rogers of Ohio State University, went to the essence of the Military Revolution. His exposition was helped by a very useful handout on the political and economic bases for why certain armies were manned, armed and provisioned the way they were and how this affected their most important campaigns. The commentator, John Lynn, University of Illinois, did not merely critique the papers, but added a meaty argument of his own on the continuing controversy over the span and nature of the "Military Revolution" of the early modern period. Lynn is an important contributor to this debate. All three will be represented in a forthcoming compendium of essays. One of the most pivotal members, one might even say originators, of the debate, Geoffrey Parker, was supposed to have chaired the panel. Unfortunately (or luckily, for his part), he was attending his citizenship formalities and could not attend. The papers and commentary were excellent and did not, as I feared, indulge in defining "paradigms" to the exclusion of strategy or tactics. The awards luncheon was next, with special presentations to D'Ann Campbell for her essay on women in combat in WWII, Everett Wheeler for his piece challenging recent scholarship that questioned whether the Romans had a conscious "strategy" in expanding and defending their empire, and John Keegan for his new book, The History of Warfare ( he could not attend). A special achievement award was given to Dr. Harold Deutsch. He wrote several important books on the various contending factions in the German military establishment on the eve of WWII. He noted in his acceptance speech how he was one of the few ( perhaps only) living historians that had interviewed (in 1936-37) the people surrounding the legendary Schlieffen during the period when he formulated his fated Great Plan as well as the staff officers implementing the Hindenburg-Ludendorff Offensives of March to August, 1918. He regretted that others had not utilized the opportunity, for he was now quite elderly, and had not really done definitive work on that period. That afternoon, I selected the panel on Military and Civilian Relations During the Napoleonic Period. Donald Horward of Florida State University, dean of the American students of Napoleonic Warfare, led off with a reflection on the little noted centrality of sieges and urban warfare in the Peninsular Campaign -- a seeming aberration considering Nappy's emphasis on maneuver. Kyle Eidahl, of Florida A&M, a former student of Horward's, considered Oudinot's "containment" measures as civil administrator in Holland and Neufchatel and his efforts to protect his new subjects against Napoleon's more repressive edicts. James Herson, yet another Horward protégé, now teaching at the U.S. Military Academy, spoke of the strains on British-Spanish coalition warfare during the Battle of Barrosa, and the debate in the Spanish Cortes. All three papers were ably critiqued by Kenneth Hamburger of the U.S. Military Academy. One interesting, colorful but irritatingly persistent commentator from the floor, Owen Connally, author of the controversial Blundering to Glory, attempted to interject a note of skepticism over what he perceived as the presenter's crediting Napoleon with undue rationality in planning his campaigns. Connally's thesis is that Nappy lunged rather impulsively and then scrambled brilliantly --- that is improvised -- to extricate himself. Inasmuch as this matter was peripheral at best to the theme, efforts were made to break for lunch before meeting at Waterloo. Saturday, April 9th, opened with a stimulating panel on The Politics of Military Reform, 1919-1940. Eugenia Kiesling, University of Alabama,-- editor of the Naval Institute's recent edition of Castex's Strategic Theories -- presented a provocative paper on French interwar doctrine, complementing the works of Robert Doughty and Porch. She convincingly demonstrated how the French perceptions of the effectiveness of anti-tank fire during the tank attack led them to badly underestimate the ability of German armor to break through. She ably explained the mindset that created this blind spot. This was followed by Harold Winton, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, who discussed the political influences ( civilian "reformers" such as Liddell Hart and Fuller swaying the cabinet ministers to their point of view) on armored warfare and mechanization in Great Britain. Finally, James Corum, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, contrasted the interwar General Staff's concepts of military reform with the countervailing pull of Nazi ideology. He challenged the common notion that the aristocratic General Staff had no notion that Germany blundered in WWI, using the stab-in-the-back to cover their flanks. After an open lunch break, I opted for the first afternoon session with a Civil War theme. Herman Hattaway, University of Missouri, noted for, among other things, his collaborative effort with Archer Jones on a comprehensive modern military study of the ACW (How the North Won, 1983), chaired an illuminating panel on political influences on and by two influence-seeking Confederate commanders. The first two lectures -- by Steven Newton of Delaware State University and Craig Symonds, US Naval Academy ( author of several well received CW biographies and atlases), concerned Joe Johnston's love-hate relationship with Jefferson Davis and the effect on his campaigns in the West, while the third analyzes motive and mood of the tragic John Bell Hood in 1864. This was an interesting series but there were surprisingly no questions from the floor afterwards. The final panel on Saturday was ably chaired by Frank Wetta, of the Daytona Beach Community College and dealt with Classical Military Theorists and Civil-Military Themes. The introductory paper on "The Warrior Ethos and Abuses of Clausewitz in German Military Literature, 1890-1914" was a fascinating (at least to me) subject. Unfortunately the presenter, Atulio Echevarria, of the U.S. Military Academy, had a surprisingly lifeless, tedious speaking style and simply read his paper as if into a tape recorder. I wish that he had distributed copies, as much of interest was lost in the delivery. He stressed how German theorists like Freytag-Loringhoven (Schlieffen's hagiographer) focused on Clausewitz's views on the power of an energetic personality to overcome poor operational planning in war. The second lecture was in sharp contrast. Paul Rahe, of the Woodrow Wilson Center, presented a scintillating talk on Interest, Morality, and the Conduct of War in Thucydides. Having had little previous interest in the Greek historian, I was happily surprised by the entertaining and informative exposition of his many stylistic tricks. The last lecture was the most striking. Christopher Bassford, of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College provoked a torrent of commentary with his "John Keegan and the Grand Tradition of Trashing Clausewitz: A Polemic". It might as well have been subtitled, the trashing of John Keegan, as he demolished JK's latest effort, The History of Warfare, which, oddly enough, had just been awarded the SMH's prize for the year's best work of military history. Bassford made it clear that he had admired Keegan's groundbreaking Face of Battle and some of his subsequent work, but that Keegan, like Liddell Hart before him, had become a superficial print mill. The reaction was so animated that the session ran over into the cocktail hour. After indulging myself at the bar for an hour or so, I attended the main banquet, at which the guest speaker, former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger regaled the crowd with some sharply delineated insights on the Oval Office -- Pentagon interface. His insider's tale of the hapless Mayaguez episode was particularly revealing. My choice for the final session on Sunday morning, when many of the out-of-towners were busy checking out and trying to make plane and train connections, concerned The Brass and the Politicians: Civil-Military Relations at the Top. The chair, Lewis Sorley, is the able biographer of General Clayton Abrams. The opening paper was enhanced by a lively, informal exposition, by Fort Leavenworth's Michael Pearlman, on the Wilson-Pershing disagreement in 1917-18 over the French high command's desire to amalgamate the American forces with French units in the teeth of Pershing's commitment to an independent American army. Eugene Rasor, author of several excellent research guides on modern military history, breezily surveyed the historical literature on the controversial Dugout Doug MacArthur. Finally, Robert Buzzanco, finishing a behind the scenes book on ignored professional military early warnings on the Vietnamese quagmire, discussed the dissent among some of the more perceptive brass and Washington's attempt to stifle or discredit the professional nay-sayers. Carol Petillo, of Boston College, an able author of some unflattering MacArthur critiques, capably wrapped up the lively discussion. As illustrated by this cornucopious assembly, Military History is very much alive and well, despite the efforts of the timid toadies of the ivory tower to lobotomize and domesticate it. The Society for Military History can be reached at Journal of Military History; George C. Marshall Library; Lexington, VA 24450-1600. Back to Cry Havoc #7 Table of Contents Back to Cry Havoc List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1994 by David W. Tschanz. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com