After the attacks of September 11, 2001, then with the war that followed in Afghanistan, and then the frutiless weapons inspections in Iraq followed by the war itself, we have wondered about the ability of terrorists or rogue nations to strike out with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). These could include biological, chemical and nuclear threats. Indeed, during the war in Afghanistan, the press and military alike frantically waved remnants of terrorist cookbooks for WMD as evidence of an imminent threat. However, they often failed to understand that the documents themselves were rudimentary and often uninformed, incorrect, and reliant on technology and skills that were difficult to procure. Still, the media in the West caught a whiff of terror from limited anthrax attacks in the United States and fragments of documents in Afghanistan, and set about exhaustive, and unfortunately often incorrect, reporting on weapons of mass destruction. Regarding biological weapons and agents, one news agency went so far as to have an expert claim that a biological weapon of mass destruction could be produced in a "five-gallon bucket in your back yard." While this I personally doubr that any Al Qaeda members rushed out to buy buckets, I still blame the media for irresponsible and ultimately inaccurate reporting that resulted and continues to cause nothing more than spreading fear without basis and a temporary boost in ratings. What always seemed to be at the root of the reporting was the possibility of a large-scale biological attack, with "anthrax" being the leading bio-buzzword. Even though limited infections of anthrax occurred and resulted in only five deaths, the looming danger was most certain to be cataclysmic from the media's viewpoint. Crop dusters, fogging machines and agricultural misting equipment were all put on display as possible methods of delivering the deadly biological toxin. In truth though, none of these devices or delivery methods would be effective for spreading anthrax. First we must understand that weapons-grade anthrax is not easily developed. In fact the only nations that have successfully developed weapons-grade anthrax are the United States and the former Soviet Union. It is a process that requires knowledge, facilities and equipment - beyond the scope of your garden-variety bucket wielder. Converting anthrax to dry spores is essential to its usability as a weapons-grade biological agent and is technically difficult to achieve. Anthrax is a naturally occurring livestock pathogen common in rural farming areas. Since it is not concentrated and occurs primarily at the ground level, it is seldom harmful to humans. Even wool sorters who are believed to come in contact with trace amounts of anthrax through their daily work rarely see it affect their health. To make it a viable weapon for mass destruction, it must be concentrated, dried to powder form and delivered optimally through an aerosol application. This process that initially calls for highly trained biologists to identify, segregate and develop appropriate anthrax spores then still requires equipment and knowledge beyond that of even the savviest terrorist organizations. Anthrax is a cellular pathogen that is naturally moist because of its composition. In its wet form anthrax is not at all effective as a weapon, certainly not of mass destruction. Sprayers clog and mechanical stress on the microbes can kill up to 95 percent of the pathogen. To be delivered effectively, the "anthrax slurry" used to cultivate the spores must be dried in a centrifuge, a large and expensive piece of equipment. Moreover, simply opening your centrifuge to retrieve your bio-weapon is not recommended, but requires a host of pressure chambers and steam sanitizing equipment before properly trained and protected technicians can safely retrieve the biological agent. If this cultivation and purification process were successful you would now have a heap of very deadly powder that would still be hard to deliver to the mass populace. Aerosol is a preferred method of delivery for the US government, but is still considered a limited deployment option. Consider that even when aerosols are sprayed, a powder, like all objects, will obey gravity and drop to the ground, much of it not being inhaled. Delivering anthrax as a weapon of mass destruction, then, to a large population is considered ineffective, costly and having only limited impact. There are similar hurdles against developing other bacterial pathogens into weapons-grade quality and delivering them to the masses. Years ago the technically savvy, well trained and funded Japanese Aum Shinrikyo cult attempted to develop biological weapons, reportedly including anthrax and botulism, but finally turned to the chemical weapon sarin or nerve gas that it used in its 1995 attack on a Tokyo subway. The complexity of developing and delivering the delicate bacterial agents thus often precludes their application and use as a WMD, especially for terrorist groups. Another classification of biological agents that can be used as weapons is that of viral agents. Examples include smallpox, yellow fever and influenza, which can be modified to increase their effectiveness. As we have seen with bacterial agents, technical skill and training in biology are essential to handling and developing these agents and preparing them for use as a weapon. Unlike bacterial agents, viral agents are often contagious and this in itself can act as a delivery method. A single person purposely infected with smallpox could infect dozens of people quickly. This bio-suicide bomber of sorts in a mobile population such as the United States' could cause outbreaks across the country in a matter of days. A 1999 report in the Journal of the American Medical Association states that more than 30 percent of such a population could be infected in matter of weeks. Considering that smallpox vaccinations ceased more than 25 years ago and the United States holds only 15.4 million doses of vaccine for a population of more than 260 million, the effects of an outbreak could be massive. Control of such outbreaks would center on quick recognition, immediate treatment and strict isolation of infected individuals. This could prove difficult in a mobile modern society, especially since most medical doctors of the day have never had to diagnose smallpox. Some cases could be sent home misdiagnosed only to spread the contagion further. This type of attack would be truly suicidal, as in today's increasingly internationally mobile society it would likely spread to Third World nations where the poor and even terrorists themselves would be least prepared to deal with such an outbreak. It may be that because of these apocalyptic ramifications for their own world, smallpox would not be a viable tool for terrorists. Toxins or naturally occurring poisons derived from plants and animals need less time to take deadly effect than bacterial and viral agents that require incubation periods ranging from days to weeks. However, much like their counterparts, these biological agents are hard to store, develop and deliver to a large population. Like bacterial agents, toxins are susceptible to environmental factors in delivery and storage that could ultimately render them ineffective. One of the primary considerations in biological weapons is effectiveness in delivery. For this reason, when coupled with the hardships of weapons-grade development and subsequent storage and transport, we may see more clearly why biological weapons, while they may seem tempting to terrorists, are not in most cases conducive to the contemporary urban battlefield where terrorists tend to wage their battles. Instead, in the more conventional warfare we have seen in Iraq in years past, and could see again, the battlefield is defined, and missile-based delivery of biological agents becomes more viable. In such situations the usually less effective and less widely used liquid-form agents would at least wreak havoc on enemy troops on the battlefield, complicating military movement and operations. So while the terrorist may stand ready -- bucket in hand -- he will likely soon find that biological agents are not the answer to his weapons needs. Terrorists remain far more likely to choose weapons that can be easily developed, safely stored and transported, and that effectively destroy their enemy while instilling terror in the masses. TW Gideon is a historian and epidemiologist who specializes in biological warfare. He has published articles on this topic in a variety of venues including Command, Strategy & Tactics and Military History. Back to Cry Havoc! # 46 Table of Contents Back to Cry Havoc! List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 2004 by David W. Tschanz. This article appears in MagWeb.com (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com