The annals of military history contain ample evidence of the old adage "truth is stranger than fiction." Units have fought desperate battles over bridges across fordable streams; opponents have turned over potential assassins to their intended victims rather than have their reputations besmirched; and at least one fleet has been destroyed because a flock of sacred chickens were tossed overboard. But perhaps the most bizarre incident ever chronicled was one that occurred in the desert between Kuwait and Basra at the start of this century. The Kuwaiti Fulcrum Kuwait, as even the most casual student of the Gulf War knows, occupies a key geographic position at the head of the Arabian Gulf. The Emirate is at the fulcrum between Najd (the central plateau of the Arabian peninsula) and Al Hasa (the fertile oasis of the peninsula's eastern coast) on one hand and the eastern leg of the Fertile Crescent on the other. Hence, Kuwait has historically been a key nexus on the trade routes between Mesopotamia, the Najd and India. Under normal circumstances, Kuwait should have enjoyed unparalleled prosperity relative to its neighbors even before the discovery of oil. But it did not. This was partly because of the need to constantly defend itself against a continuous succession of petty and not so petty raiders, seeking to carve off part of the wealth of the region for themselves. Mubarak bin Sabah At the turn of the Twentieth Century the commander of the Kuwaiti army -- never larger than 15,000 men --was Mubarak bin Sabah Al Sabah. Mubarak was far from being a general in the usual sense. What military authority he had was drawn form his connections with the ruling family (he was the son of the previous, and brother of the current Emir) and the force of his own personality. He was a warlord not a modern major general. But Mubarak was no fool and readily grasped the reality of the Kuwaiti military situation. The absence of fixed borders in the shifting sands of the Arabian deserts meant that ownership extended as far as a tribe or nation could project power. At the same time roving tribes of various sizes and relative strengths conducted regular ghazzus (raids) against the settled communities. The ancient law of the desert -- he who shows weakness is doomed -- kept Mubarak occupied for most of his adult life. Realizing that Kuwait needed buffer space, Mubarak engaged in what he saw as a necessary series of raids and other campaigns intended to define as large a territory for Kuwait as possible. Increased territory would enhance respect for the Al Sabahs. At the same time it would provide buffer space around the central portion of the realm, protecting it from the worst of the ghazzus conducted by neighboring tribes and nations. Mubarak's strategy was sound, but his attempts to implement it brought increasing enmity between himself and his brother the Emir Mohammed, his other brother Jarrah and the Emir's business partner Yousef Al Ibrahim. Safely ensconced in his palace in Kuwait City, Mohammed looked upon the demands of his aggressive militaristic brother as a source of irritation and his ventures as a waste of money. In a deeply insulting incident Mohammed refused to make good on a promissory note that Mubarak had written for needed war materiel. The merchant who held the now useless IOU, followed Mubarak and humiliated him by declaring Mubarak's credit to be no good in front of the Kuwaiti troops. The merchant was prevented from repossessing the unpaid for rifles and camels, only because one of Mubarak's cohorts promised to honor the debt. Emir Mohammed's action was a personal insult to Mubarak and an act of derision that Mubarak never forgot. In 1895, Mubarak took his revenge and murdered Mohammed and Jarrah and seized the Emirate. Finally in control, he planned a series of military actions. By now an aging warlord, he had an excessively high opinion of his military prowess and led Kuwait into a string of embarrassing military fiascoes. The Rashidi War In 1901 Mubarak led a Kuwaiti army of between 8-10,000 men against an army led by Ibn Rashid whose vast holdings were centered on the distant city of Ha'il. The Rashidis had been raiding along the periphery of Kuwaiti territory (at least as Mubarak defined it) and he decided to deal with them. Gathering an army in excess of ten thousand men, he outnumbered his opponents two to one. So certain was Mubarak of victory that he allowed a Saudi force under Abdul Aziz bin Abdul Rahman Al Sa'ud -- the future founder of Saudi Arabia (whom he was currently sheltering) -- to split off from the main body and lead an attack towards Riyadh, while the rest of the Kuwaiti army went to deal with the Rashidis. Pursuing the Rashidis across the Dahna desert into the Qassim region of upper Najd, Mubarak finally engaged them at the Battle of Tarifyah (sometimes called Al Sarif). The Kuwaitis were soundly defeated. Their forces shattered by the smaller but better led Hail troops. For days afterwards, the victorious Rashidis amused themselves by hunting through neighboring villages for Kuwaiti escapees from the battle and slaughtering them. One consequence was the aborting of Abdul Aziz' initial assault on Riyadh. The next year, burgeoned by their earlier success, the Rashidis gathered a large force intending to seize the Kuwaiti capital and strip the Al Sabah of their power in the same way they had crushed the Al Sa'uds a decade earlier. The plan was foiled when a lightning raid by Abdul Aziz against Riyadh recaptured the ancient Saudi capital and threatened the Rashid flank. Mubarak, his military reduced to tatters, still needed to maintain Kuwait's preeminence in the immediate region. This he accomplished by conducting raids and minor punitive expeditions against the small nomadic Bedouin tribes who ventured too close to his territory or showed too great an interest in Kuwaiti camels and sheep. Sa'doon Pasha, Sheik of the Muntafik One such tribal leader was Sa'doon Pasha Al Sa'doon whose area of operation was in what is now southern Iraq. As chief of the Muntafik tribes, he led a nomadic people who had a tradition of supplementing their meager of income with regular ghazzus against unwary targets. In 1910, an ally of Sa'doon Pasha, Mutni bin Hallaf, a chief of the Al Thufair tribe, rustled sheep from the herds of a Kuwaiti merchant named Othman ben Rashed. At the same time, Sa'doon himself led ghazzus against the Mutair and the Arib Dar tribes who were allied with Mubarak, seizing booty primarily in the form of livestock and cash. When word reached Mubarak of the raids he was outraged. His first conclusion was that Sa'doon was responsible (in point of fact Sa'doon did not know of the Al Thufair action). Mubarak saw this as a personal insult against his authority. The matter was further compounded by the nature of the Al Thufair's victim. Raiding allied tribes would have required some sort of response but robbing a Kuwaiti national demanded a much more serious and comprehensive reply. Sa'doon was terrified at the prospect of a Kuwaiti reprisal. When Mubarak's son Jabber arrived demanding payment, Sa'doon was only too happy to comply, and compelled Mutni to return the rustled sheep. When Jabber returned with the booty he was prepared for anything but what followed. Mubarak castigated Jabber for asking for the money and then accepting it. "A true leader does not ask for what is his," Mubarak scolded, "He takes it." To Mubarak the issue was not one of the money -- it was a matter of principle. In Mubarak's opinion Jabber had only made matters worse and displayed an unacceptable streak of wimpiness for an Al Sabah. Call to Battle Unable to personally take command, Mubarak placed Jabber at the head of a Kuwaiti force of 2000 with orders to uphold the family honor and make an example of Sa'doon. The upcoming battle was clearly a mismatch. Sa'doon could, at best, bring together a force of 200. The advancing Kuwaiti army was joined by a number of visiting local dignitaries, including the Emir of Bahrain, who Mubarak invited along to witness the upcoming demonstration of Kuwaiti military prowess and the way the Al Sabah dealt with those who dared transgress their honor. The soldiers themselves looked at the upcoming campaign as if it were a picnic. Many brought along bags of silver and gold coins to purchase any booty that was auctioned off. Others brought cans of paint to mark the new livestock they expected to strip from Sa'doon. When word reached Sa'doon Pasha of the advance he sent several conciliatory messages, all of which were rejected Jabber. The younger Al Sabah was in no mood for another tongue lashing from his father. Sa'doon attempted to flee but realized that he could not escape -- the Kuwaiti army could quickly catch up with his nomad band impeded with its understandable need to safeguard families, herds and the rest of their meager possessions. Just north of Jahrah, (where 80 years later fleeing Iraqis forces would be trapped on the Mutla ridge) with the Kuwaiti banners whipping in the wind, their horses and advancing camels marching forward to military glory, Sa'doon Pasha made his stand. Against his meager force of 200 ill- equipped and ill-trained Bedouins were gathered some 2000 Kuwaitis. Chroniclers differ on the precise details of what happened next. Some record an initial Kuwaiti attack that was repulsed, others that the Kuwaitis were preparing to an attack. All agree on the outcome. Maneuvering deftly, Sa'doon managed to encircle the Kuwaiti battle force "like the halo around the moon" while it was negotiating a depression in the terrain. The Kuwaitis heard the Muntafik war cry. Seconds later they realized they were surrounded, the way blocked, with the enemy occupying the high ground around them and able to pour a withering defilade fire into their trapped ranks. A few stray shots were fired from both sides. A handful of Kuwaitis fell dead and wounded. With nowhere to turn the Kuwaitis capitulated. Sa'doon stripped the Kuwaitis of most of their mounts, weapons, clothing and of course the bags of coins they had brought. Then, having looted his would-be punishers, he sent them back to Kuwait. Haddiyah! Haddiyah! When the disheveled, beaten, stripped army appeared in the streets of the Al Sabah capital they were greeted by the "Ulululus" of the women. From his palace Mubarak watched them slink in. Then a new sound joined the cries of the women -- a song of praise and thanksgiving from the street corners and alleyways. It was not a song glorifying Mubarak or the Al Sabahs. Instead the streets of Kuwait City reverberated with a spontaneously created paean of praise for Sa'doon Pasha -- for not killing the enemy when he had the chance. The Kuwaiti survivors declared it the Battle of Al Haddiyah -- the Battle of the Gift. For decades afterwards the elders of Kuwait would say, when this battle was mentioned, "Lamlamha Mubarak wa hdaha" ("Mubarak gathered it [Kuwait's wealth] and gave it as a gift") to an upstart, petty chieftain. For his part, Sa'doon reciprocated and gave the Kuwaiti army his own gift -- their lives. "We can only thank Sa'doon for being merciful" wrote the Kuwaiti historian Abdul Aziz Ar Rasheed, "and we acknowledge him with gratefulness and gratitude." And so it was, that Mubarak witnessed jubilation filling the streets of Kuwait City and an enemy was spoken of with honor, dignity and respect --for not doing onto his enemies as they would have done onto him. SOURCE: Ar Rasheed, Abdul Aziz. Tareekh Al Kuwait [History of Kuwait] Beirut, Lebanon: Dar Maltabat Al Hayat, 1978 (revised from 1929 edition by Yacoub bin Abdul Aziz Ar Rasheed). Translations & transliterations by the principal author of this article. Editor's note: The authors' advised me after this was accepted for printing that they had received a contract for this piece from Command magazine. FANTASTIC! Back to Cry Havoc #4 Table of Contents Back to Cry Havoc List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1993 by David W. Tschanz. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com