The Korean War was the first large-scale confrontation between the Communist Bloc and the Free World that saw both sides armed with nuclear weapons. It is perhaps more remarkable that both sides refrained from using them during this conflict than at any other time of international crisis since then, considering their novelty, the apparent economy of force they represented, and the casual attitude towards them that many military figures adopted. Of course, while no weapons were actually used, the threat to use them was often made, especially by the United States. Discussion on the use of nuclear weapons began almost simultaneously with the start of the war and the commitment of American ground troops. In July 1950 General of the Army Douglas MacArthur briefly discussed their use with the Army and Air Force Chiefs of Staff, and Representative Lloyd M. Bentsen Jr. called publicly for a nuclear ultimatum to be delivered to North Korea to withdraw from the South within one week or face nuclear bombardment. President Harry S Truman even authorized the transfer of ten nuclear-configured B-29 bombers and the non-fissile components of a number of nuclear bombs to Guam, but by late July (even as South Korean and American forces were being forced back into a small enclave at the southeastern end of the peninsula) he announced that this option was 'not being considered' and the bombers were transferred back to the USA. MacArthur's daring amphibious invasion at Inchon on September 15th completely reversed the course of the war. However, his headlong pursuit of the remnants of the North Korean army alarmed the leadership of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Their warning on October 2nd that the PRC would intervene in Korea if American troops crossed the 38th parallel (the pre-invasion dividing line between North and South Korea) was ignored. By mid-November over 130,000 'Chinese People's Volunteers' had infiltrated into northern Korea, the result was a near disaster for the United Nations forces. The front line moved back below the 38th parallel, but counteroffensives directed by the new commander of US forces in Korea, General Matthew B. Ridgway, restored the military balance in February and March 1951. Radioactive Wasteland At this point, MacArthur suggested dropping between 30 and 50 nuclear weapons against the Chinese airfields and supply depots in Manchuria, and laying a belt of radioactive waste along the North Korean border with China so as to seal off ground traffic for the next 60 years, but this plan was given scant consideration. In early April, as intelligence indicated that the Chinese would attempt a large-scale spring offensive with possible intervention by their air force or even the Soviets, Truman authorized the transfer of nine complete nuclear bombs from the (civilian-controlled) Atomic Energy Commission to the Air Force in anticipation of another military defeat and possibly having to abandon Korea altogether. This period was the closest the United States came to actually using nuclear weapons during the 'mobile' phase of the war. The failure of the spring offensive, MacArthur's dismissal by President Truman for his continued insubordination, and the methodical UN advance to what is essentially the dividing line between the Koreas today were the main events during the period April-June 1951 that backed the United States away from the nuclear threshold. In July, the Communists entered into peace talks with the UN that continued for two full years until the final armistice in July 1953. Nuclear weapons remained under consideration as a way to break the political and military stalemate, especially during times of great frustration with Communist stalling tactics during the peace talks. They had an abiding popular image of infinite destructive power (the Chinese word for 'atomic bomb' during this period was fabao, or 'magic weapon') and the ability to end decisively the apparently purposeless Korean conflict on American terms. However, Truman and his administration realized that using them represented a political event of tremendous importance that would cause protest around the world, damage relations with America's allies, and in all likelihood invite nuclear retaliation by the Soviet Union (in Korea itself or the base areas in Japan). There were also many military limitations on their use. Chief among them, in a strategic sense, was the fact that there was not much on which to drop bombs. There were few worthwhile industrial targets in Manchuria and the source of China's best military equipment (high-performance jet fighters, heavy artillery, battle tanks, and trucks) was in the Soviet Union. Tactically, the Communists' extensive use of underground fighting positions and tunnels, the mountainous terrain of Korea, and the difficulty of locating troop concentrations in time to attack them severely limited the physical effects and usefulness of tactical nuclear weapons. The Communist side of the fighting front in Korea consisted of a belt of extensive field fortifications, mines, and barbed wire that was over twenty miles thick in places - far in excess of anything encountered during World War One. It would have been impossible to blast gaps in this line without both depleting the existing stocks of nuclear weapons (which had got to be saved in the chance of war with the Soviet Union), irradiating the exploiting troops, and devastating Korea to an unacceptable level. Technical and doctrinal delays were also encountered. At the beginning of the war, the only way to deliver nuclear weapons was by air, and they could not be dropped by anything smaller than a B-29 heavy bomber. It was not until late 1952 that the first truly tactical nuclear weapon, the MK7 bomb, went into production. This bomb could be configured at will to produce an explosion of 10-70 kilotons and could be carried by an F-84 jet fighter. Meanwhile, the Army developed the 280mm "atomic cannon," a monster gun on a carriage two city blocks long that could fire the MK9 shell (15-20 kiloton yield) up to fifteen miles. This warhead was able to penetrate up to 100 feet into the ground and then explode, which made it possible to take out deeply buried fortifications. However, this weapon and its warhead were not given a full-scale test until late May, 1953. Finally, the Army had to learn how to use these new weapons in conjunction with ground troops. From 1951 to 1953, the Army conducted Exercise Desert Rock, a series of training exercises in Nevada that tested the minimum safe distances from Ground Zero for friendly personnel, the effects of nuclear weapons against field fortifications, and how soon ground troops could safely follow up nuclear strikes. In 1952, a Presidential election year, the war continued in Korea with no movement in the battle lines or armistice negotiations. Truman, coming to the end of his term in office, was attacked many times during the election campaign over his policy in Korea but did not feel secure in attempting to force an armistice through nuclear threats before the election. In December 1952, President-elect Dwight D. Eisenhower made a personal visit to Korea and began to discuss with his advisors ways to bring an end to the war. He eventually reached the position where nuclear weapons had to be considered as "simply another weapon in the arsenal," and that the debate on using them should not be based on moral considerations. He was supported in this by studies undertaken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff that advocated large-scale use of nuclear weapons both strategically and tactically (although at the risk of a wider and more costly war) and assurances by John Foster Dulles, the Secretary of State, that relations with America's allies could be repaired over time. On 20 May, 1953, the National Security Council decided to endorse the use of nuclear weapons in Korea if the armistice negotiations broke down or if hostilities resumed after the conclusion of a peace agreement. The following day Dulles met with the Jawahral Nehru, the Prime Minister of India (who had been acting as a go-between for the United States and the People's Republic of China) and told him of this decision. Nine weeks later on 27 July, an armistice was signed. In 1950, the United States found itself called upon to defend the regional balance of power in the Pacific Rim in the name of "containment." Through a variety of circumstances, the war ended in a stalemate. Whether it was the threat of nuclear bombardment alone that brought an end to hostilities, or if Mao Zedong simply decided at that point (especially after Stalin's death in March and the resultant confusion in the Communist Bloc) that having fought the most powerful nation in the world to a standstill was enough, is still a subject for speculation. To this day, Korea remains a divided peninsula, the legacy of the first of the "limited" wars. Back to Cry Havoc #26 Table of Contents Back to Cry Havoc List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1999 by David W. Tschanz. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. 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