by Brian Train
Victoria, British Columbia
The world has seen great changes in the Republic of South Africa (RSA) in the last five years. The system of apartheid or 'separateness' gave white people, about 20% of the population, control of the great majority of the country's resources. This system had to be guarded, and for many years the internal and external security of the RSA was guaranteed by the South African Defence Force (SADF). Such groups as the African National Congress (ANC), the South-West African People's Organization (SWAPO), and the Azanian People's Liberation Army conducted a low-key but constant guerrilla and terrorism campaign in the RSA and its "protectorate" Namibia, operating from sanctuaries in Angola, Botswana, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique. Fighting the guerrillas, together with having to garrison Namibia and support the South African Police Service (SAPS) in dealing with chronic rioting in South Africa's cities, challenged the abilities of the SADF. The death of Communism in the Soviet Union removed the ideological and geopolitical justifications for white rule in South Africa, and increasing economic and political pressure by other nations slowly pushed the government into accepting the error of its ways. F.W. de Klerk was elected President in 1989 and he set about a delicate process of fundamental political reforms, bringing South Africa closer towards true democracy. The final blow to apartheid came in April 1994 when the first multi-racial elections were held. Nelson Mandela, leader of the ANC, succeeded De Klerk and now presides over a multi-racial 'National Unity government.' State power had passed from the hands of the white race without the climactic bloodbath some observers had expected. However, soon a series of wrenching changes began that would transform the SADF (renamed the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) in 1994) completely. On May 17, 1994, the Minister of Defence under the old government handed over formal control of the armed forces to the new Minister — Joe Modise, the former commander of Umkhonto we Sizwe ('Spear of the Nation', the armed wing of the ANC). Shortly afterwards conscription ended (under the old order, all white males in the RSA were liable for conscription for one year, followed by 12 years of compulsory service in the reserves) and was replaced by three categories of voluntary service. The process of bringing the armed forces back under explicit civilian control began with the appointment of a civilian Defence Secretary, supported by a civilian Defence Secretariat in 1995. The new government also established a "Truth and Reconciliation Commission" tasked with investigating allegations of abuses and illegal activities by people associated with the apartheid regime, which soon had many senior members of the SADF under scrutiny. Another great challenge was integrating members of "non-statutory forces" (a term including anti-apartheid guerrilla forces, informal tribal militias such as the Inkatha Freedom Party raised in the Homelands, and other paramilitary organizations) into the SANDF. This process ran from 1995 to late 1997. Up to 28,000 people from seven different groups of formerly opposed forces were planned to be absorbed into the SANDF. In the end, only 19,000 actually did so and of them over 3,000 have since resigned from the military. As a result, the racial balance of the SANDF has changed considerably: of the 54,300 troops in the Army in 1997, there are 12,000 whites, 38,300 Blacks, and 4,000 Coloured (mixed-race) or Asians. Only 29% of commissioned officers are Black, although this is certainly an improvement over the pre-1994 figure of 1%. Finally, on 1 June 1998, Lieutenant General Georg Meiring retired as Chief of the SANDF and was replaced by Siphiwe Nyanda, its first Black commander. It would seem that the process of transformation is well on its way to completion. Readjusting Economy However, the National Unity government faces a situation of overall economic decline and the additional strain of readjusting the economy in order to ease some of the economic inequities among its people. Military spending has been reduced from US$3.2 billion in 1995 to US$2.6 billion in 1996, to approximately US$2.0 billion in 1998. The police budget, at about 7% of total government expenditures, now exceeds the defence budget level of 6%. Much of the funding cut from the military has been transferred to the Reconstruction and Development Program, a massive social welfare scheme designed to improve the living standards of the 30 million Blacks in the RSA. It is certain that the ever-smaller SANDF will also be ever-busier, dealing with an array of demands. One important mission for the SANDF is border control. Drug and arms smuggling is a thriving business. There are also over 1.5 million illegal immigrants in the RSA, people who have fled the anarchy and social chaos that envelops much of central Africa. There are not nearly enough troops in the standing army to keep the border controlled and the SANDF has turned to using "commando" local defence units of the Part-Time Force to help keep sections of the border with Mozambique under surveillance. International peacekeeping is another possible demand on the SANDF's resources, but there has been little actual participation to date. A formal UN request for a South African unit to be used in Haiti in 1994/5 was turned down by the government, and some African nations have objected strenuously to serving with South African troops in a peacekeeping force. In theory, one infantry battalion is tasked with UN peacekeeping should the opportunity arise. A more likely scenario would see SANDF troops serving as part of a regional peacekeeping force set up by the OAU or Southern Africa Development Community (an organization that is emerging as the main body for resolving regional security and economic issues). The endemic violence and crime within the RSA, although much reduced since 1994, is still a severe problem owing to the desperate economic situation of many people and the large numbers of firearms still in private hands. Although the units are rotated, about 7,000 army troops are deployed more or less permanently in support of the South African Police Service. The soldiers are usually deployed on movement control duties (e.g. roadblocks and checkpoints), but they have also been used on large-scale sweeps through lawless neighbourhoods. This tasking is distasteful to unit commanders, but it is likely to continue for some time to come. Still more distasteful is the likelihood of the SANDF having to intervene in some form of domestic political conflict. The African National Congress (ANC) was the main organization opposing the old regime and is now the major player in the new coalition government. There are splinter groups that have seceded and factions within the ANC itself that may contribute to political instability. The SANDF may find itself required or ordered to intervene on behalf of one political party or another, if only to keep the government in power. The ex-Chief of the SANDF, General Meiring, incurred the displeasure of President Mandela in March 1998 when he informed him of a plot by elements within the ANC to overthrow his government by a coup d'etat, which turned out to be a hoax or possibly disinformation designed to split the ANC.
Tribal conflict is another possibility. In the years leading up to 1994, the vast majority of clashes occurred between ANC "self-defence units" and the militia of the Zulu tribe's Inkatha Freedom Party in the KwaZulu-Natal province. The ANC now has the greatest share of political power, and the Zulu leaders feel that they should have received a better deal in the coalition government. In a sense, the South African Army has been on an extended domestic peacekeeping mission in KwaZulu-Natal for 15 years, and greater violence and organized Zulu defiance of the ANC-dominated government is likely. Racial Disorder Finally, there is the spectre of renewed racial disorder that may itself split the SANDF. Morale and discipline in some units has suffered as a result of the budget cuts, the government's continued vacillation and uncertainty over its defence and foreign policies, and the perception that politics now matters more than operational effectiveness. Many of the casualties of the massive reductions in numbers were career White members of the former SADF. These men are ripe targets for the many small right-wing, pro-apartheid groups that still exist and continue to campaign for a Whites-only homeland, or for "security agencies" that are actually mercenary groups. (The private company Executive Outcomes, for example, is composed mostly of ex-members of the elite SADF airborne battalions and reconnaissance regiments - some of the best soldiers in the world.) There have also been some complaints that "commando" local defence units have been used as private police forces and harassment. Finally, in May 1998, there was a series of thefts of weapons, equipment and ammunition from the base of the 44th Parachute Brigade, the elite unit of the South African Army. This particular unit had also twice openly defied the Minister of Defence's standing order not to celebrate Cassinga Day (the anniversary of a major SADF raid on a SWAPO base on 4 May 1978), in 1996 and 1998. The political reliability of this and other units of the SANDF may yet be called into question. ORGANIZATION OF THE SANDFDespite recent politically-driven changes in leadership and composition, the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) is still the best-trained and equipped military force in Africa. With a certain amount of economic sacrifice, the country became self-sufficient in the production of ammunition, most weapons, and vehicles (many of which were designed in South Africa as well). South Africa is also a significant international arms exporter, mainly to Latin America and Asia. NUMBERS & ORGANIZATIONArmy Full-Time Force: 9 regional commands, consisting of headquarters staff but no actual troops. Troops are provided by the FTF or mobilized PTF units as required for the assigned tasks, which are usually internal security or border defence duties. Each regional command has a varying number of PTF Group Headquarters units under its control.
2 airborne infantry battalions at the Airborne Training School 1 mechanized infantry brigade group (43 Mechanized Brigade, at Wallmanstal north of Pretoria) 1 tank battalion (Olifant MBT) 1 armoured reconnaissance squadron (Eland armoured cars) 1 mechanized infantry battalion (Ratel AIFV) 5 motorized infantry battalions (Buffel, Casspir, or Mamba wheeled APC) 1 artillery battalion (140mm G-2 or 155mm G-5 howitzers) 1 air defence battalion (SA-7/14 missiles, or a combination of 20mm, 23mm and 35mm guns) 1 engineer squadron - plus HQ, signals, maintenance, and training units 1 Special Forces brigade (at Durban?) 2 battalions of special forces troops Part-Time Force (PTF)
3 brigades, organized identically, each with the following subunits:
1 tank battalion 2 mechanized infantry battalions 1 self-propelled artillery battalion (155mm G-6 SP guns) 1 air defence battalion 1 engineer squadron Divisional troops, including:
1 mechanized infantry battalion 1 motorized infantry battalion 1 towed artillery battalion 1 multiple rocket launcher battalion (27mm 40-tube Bataleur launchers) 1 air defence battalion 30 Group HQ units that are under the control of Regional Commands, and filled out with troops from FTF and PTF units when required. "Commandos" - at least 50 company-sized infantry home defence units. The actual size, quality, and readiness of each unit varies considerably. Air Force
1 transport/ tanker/ electronic warfare squadron (5 Boeing 707-320) 1 maritime reconnaissance squadron (8 C-47TP) 3 air transport squadrons (1 with C-130 and C-160, 1 with small civilian VIP transports, 1 with 19 C-47) 4 helicopter squadrons (total of 53 SA-316/319 and 9 BK-117, some are armed) 2 SAM wings of 2 squadrons each (20 Crotale, large numbers of ex-Soviet SA-8/-9/-13) 1 ground defence unit for airfield defence (The South African Air Force Regiment; equipped with Rhino APC) PRE-INTEGRATION MILITARY FORCE COMPLEMENTSFor comparison's sake, the approximate strengths of the various armed groups in South Africa in early 1994 are shown in Table 2.
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