Like many people interested in WWII, I always found the above subject a little unclear. The recent article in CPQ was interesting and illuminating. While it cleared up much of my misunderstanding, I still had a nagging feeling that there may be a little more to the story. While it is now clear that the Chemical Branch was certainly responsible for flamethrower equipment and training, I remembered instances in my readings of infantry units employing them. However, a very easy pitfall for anyone studying a vast topic like WWII is to make a generalization about a specific instance encountered in the total experience of WWII. It is possible to find many strange and uncommon experiences in the war that do not generalize to the total. While everyone can readily recognize that an antitank gun is primarily effective against enemy tanks, it would be an utter absurdity to believe that submarines were effective and primarily deployed against aircraft because one can cite an instance where a submarine downed an enemy aircraft. In this regard, I commend GDW and CPQ on doing an excellent job, in their organizations, etc., of creating general representations of combat formations in WWII. I, therefore, decided that I would do a bit of research on flamethrower usage in the US Army in the ETO to determine if there was anything else that could be generalized about the subject.
The source material I chose was the US Army Official Histories because of its comprehensive nature.
In the volume Cross Channel Attack, I found several references on the subject. In preparing for the assault, the D-Day assault companies were organized into three assault and one HQ platoon. The first two assault platoons were organized into two sections of 29 men and one officer (the capacity of the LC VPs that would transport them). As they were expecting to encounter fortifications and obstacles, the first two assault platoons included a wire-cutting team, a bazooka team, a flamethrower team, a BAR team, a 60mm mortar team and a demolition team. The third assault platoon was identical except it substituted a heavy machinegun for the BARs and an 81 mm mortar for the 60mm mortar. Therefore, in the assault companies, a number of infantrymen were trained and equipped with flamethrowers. Considering what they might have encountered on landing, it was a wise precaution. Each platoon would have the necessary equipment to deal with whatever it might encounter on the beach (theoretically).
On page 191, describes the "...requirement that the assaulting troops be able to knock out enemy fortifications and push rapidly inland ...Planners wished to minimize the structural changes and so facilitate the reconstruction of assault units for normal infantry tasks once they were through the enemies fortifications."
Page 192 continues: "...rifle companies were organized in assault teams with special equipment to deal with fortified positions.... After the assault, each platoon was to be reorganized into a normal rifle platoon with two rifle squads and a weapons squad.... Tank fire so directed would enable the infantry to cut their way through the wire entanglement of the fortifications, approach the pillbox with flamethrowers and demolitions, and destroy it."
From this it may be concluded that each platoon possessed a team of infantrymen who were trained and equipped with flamethrowers in order to deal with pillboxes and other fortifications. Further, it was anticipated that immediately after breaching the beach defenses, the specialist teams would relinquish their special equipment and revert to their normal role. In the case of the flamethrower men, they would jettison their flamethrowers and become riflemen again.
Given the American propensity for scrounging and improvisation, there were probably some who retained their special equipment, but from the fact that so much flamethrower equipment was recovered in and around the beach area (as noted in CP) it would appear that once through the fortified beach area, the flamethrowers were discarded. Therefore, it may be inferred that the US Army viewed flamethrowers and a weapon useful vs. fortifications such as pillboxes, bunkers, etc., but not for regular field operations.
The last reference to flamethrower use in Cross Channel Attack is on page 390, where on June 9, the 22nd infantry employed flamethrowers to attack fortifications at Cherbourg, another example of infantrymen using flamethrowers in this special circumstance.
The following volume in the series, Breakout and Pursuit, contains numerous examples of flamethrowers in use by infantrymen against fortifications. "Infantry, reinforced by several engineers using bangalore torpedoes... while a flamethrower team sprayed a nearby bunker..." (page 408, 83rd division at St. Malo). "The task force used flamethrowers, demolitions, tank destroyers and artillery fire to destroy pillboxes and emplacements..." (page 641, 2nd division at Brest). "The division began to probe to locate and systematically destroy pillboxes, emplacements, fortification,... overwhelming pillboxes with flamethrowers and demolirions after patient maneuver and fire..." (page 643, 29th division at Brest). "Eight men (with two flamethrowers, a bazooka and 2 BARs) made a wide detour, neutralized several small nests of resistance, came up behind the pillbox and flamed the position until 13 Germans surrendered..." (page 647, 2nd division in street fighting at Brest). "The actual conquest of the garrison had come as the result of action by the combined arms-heavy artillery, infantry assaults, engineer blasting operations, and the use of flamethrowers" (page 652, discussing the battle of Brest as a whole). A further reference on page 650 cites British crocodile flamethrower tanks supporting the 29th infantry division and 121st combat engineers.
The Lorraine Campaign cites on page 180 and 271 two examples of infantry using flamethrowers against fortifications and pillboxes, but on page 180 states, "Flamethrowers had been stocked in the Third Army depots in preparation for the anticipated assault against the west wall. However, the flamethrower seldom was employed in the operations of the Third Army." Why was the Third Army prejudiced against flamethrowers? Could it have been Patton's natural desire to avoid position warfare? As the army as a whole seems to have viewed the flamethrower as unsuitable for normal field operations, this might explain the dearth of examples of their usage by the Third Army, where the desire was to emphasize maneuver.
Siegfried Line contains the following references on flamethrowers: "The 28th division was not ready for an attack on a fortified line, neither of the two regiments had received special equipment needed in pillbox assault, such as flamethrowers and explosive charges..." (page 45). "While awaiting D-Day, the regiments rotated their battalions in the line, so that all might undergo refresher training in fundamental tactics, in assault of pillboxes.... In one battalion... only one man remained after four months of warfare who had any experience in operating a flamethrower" (page 255, 30th division).
Several examples follow of use by the 30th division of flamethrowers "Special pillbox assault teams were organized and equipped w itl flamethrowers, bangalore torpedoes, beehives, and pole and satchel demolition charges..." (page 287, 18th infantry, 1st division ). "Whenever the enemy proved particularly tenacious, the riflemen used the other weapons at their disposal, including demolitions an, flamethrowers, employed by two man teams attached to each compar. headquarters" (page 310, 26th infantry). Pages 542 and 553 give w further examples of British crocodile tanks attached to support US infantrymen. An additional reference is found in Ardennes, Battle of the Bu1ge where Crocodiles were attached to CCR/2nd Armoured division.
So what generalizations as a whole can be made? It would apply that the army viewed the flamethrower as a specialized weapon to be used primarily vs. fortifications and occasionally in urban fighting. In these circumstances, they appear to have been used and relied up, fairly heavily, except in the Third Army. As stated previously in CPQ, combat engineers did not normally use flamethrowers. Rather, it was the ordinary riflemen who were given special training. Therefore, the use of flamethrowers in game scenarios should generally be restricted to situations where the US Army is assaulm fortifications. Where such is the case, consideration should be giver allowing one infantry stand in each rifle company to be designated possessing a one-squirt flamethrower capability, reverting back to standard infantry stand after its single squirt. Possible, but less frequent, use could be made of attaching a British crocodile platoon to a US infantry battalion.
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© Copyright 1995 by Greg Novak.
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