Among the forgotten units of the US Army in World War II was the "cannon company" assigned to each infantry regiment. Frank Chadwick and I have had many interesting discussions about these formations, which are very atypical of policies of the US Army. Several years ago I wrote letters to the Infantry Museum at Fort Benning, and the Artillery Museum at Fort Sill, asking each for whatever information they might have on these formations. My answers were identical in thought but not quite words. The Artillery Museum suggested that I contact the Infantry Museum, as the "cannon companies" belonged to the Infantry, and really weren't artillery. The Infantry Museum suggested that I should contact the Artillery Museum as the "cannon companies," while on paper belonged to the infantry, really weren't infantry at all, but belonged to the artillery. I've been collecting information ever since on these units, and so will attempt to pass on what I know. The "cannon or howitzer company" started life at the end of W WI as the holding company for the 3" Stokes mortar and the 37mm infantry guns that had been assigned to the infantry regiment headquarters. In skimming though copies of the Infantry Journal from the 1920s and early '30s, I was surprised how many officers felt that such a unit was needed. The infantry officers of WWI felt that the field artillery was not responsive at all to their needs, and that some type of infantry-controlled weapon was needed. The famed Westervelt Board, which determined the artillery requirements of the US Army after World War I, and which was responsible for the superb American artillery of World War II, included a requirement for a 2.5" "infantry accompanying gun" firing a 10-pound shell, among weapons needed by the American Army. The adoption of the 81mm mortar and its placement in the battalion's weapons company removed the mortars from the "cannon company." The new organized Antitank company was issued the new 37L53 AT gun, and the old 37L21 disappeared from active service, removing that weapon. Thus in late 1940/early 1941, the "cannon company" temporarily disappeared from service, having lost all of its weapons. The official policy of the United States Army as laid down by General Marshall was that the combat elements would determine policy and weapon procurement, and that the staff in Washington would not be allowed to make changes on their own. In World War I, Marshall remembered all too well that continued changes ordered by the staff in weapons and organization meant that the front line troops either never saw the needed weapons, or were forced to keep adopting to changes that meant no sense to them. The only exception to this was that the Army Ground Forces were under orders to reduce the sizes of units to increase manpower reserves, and cut down on shipping space. Lieutenant General Lesley McNair, the commander of Army Ground Forces, was faced with the task of organizing and reorganizing American units during the first three years of the war. McNair believed in keeping the American divisional formations as small as possible, and supported the "pooling" of supporting units as tank, tank destroyer, or AA battalions rather then attaching them to divisions. He waged an ongoing campaign to cut what he felt were "unneeded" subunits. In light of his views, the cannon company story becomes more interesting. The TO&E for the infantry regiment approved to take effect as of April 1, 1942 restored the cannon company to the infantry regiment. The new company was to have two T-19 105mm howitzer motor carriages (105mm howitzers on halftrack mounts), and six T-30 75mm howitzer motor carriages (75mm howitzers on halftrack mounts). This is represented in CDII as the following: Cannon Company, with: 1 command stand 1 jeep 1 T30 HMC 1 medium ammo truck with trailer and AAMG 1 support stand In view of the actual make-up of the formation, I would argue for either one T19 HMC and one 730 HMC, or two T30 HMC in place of the one T30 HMC allowed by Frank. The Germany infantry gun company with an actual strength of six 75L12 infantry guns, and two 150L11 infantry guns, is allowed one 75L12 model and one 150L11 model, so I will argue that the Americans should have the same benefit. This organization has seemed to me to be an excellent choice, as itgave the infantry regiment the needed firepower in a self-propelled format. This organization served in North Africa and Sicily with the 1st, 3rd, 9th, and 45th Infantry Divisions. The American experiences in these campaigns with the cannon companies was not what might have been expected. The HMCs had not proved to be as successful as wished in combat, though this may have been due to a combination of terrain and the inexperience of the American soldiers. The HMCs were not easy to hide, and there were questions as to the proper placement of the weapons, either forward as direct fire weapons, or to the rear as support weapons. It should be also noted that it is at this time on the advice of the troops that served in North Africa that the following ocurred: Tank destroyer battalions were changed from an all self-propelled weapon corps to one where half of the battalions were to have towed weapons; That the Ordnance Department's push for a better light tank to replace the M3/M5 was postponed on the grounds that one was not needed; That the Ordnance Department's push to upgun the M4 was also postponed on the grounds that the 75mm was adequate for its purpose.  Again, since the rule was that the troops in the field would determine the policy, these changes went into effect, only to be overruled on the basis of future experience. As part of a proposed reorganization of the infantry division made effective on September 1, 1943 for troops in the United States, the "cannon company" was changed to a battery of six towed 105L16 pack howitzers. The 105L 16 had been built as a lightweight 105 for use by the airborne units, and was felt to be the proper weapon for the cannon companies. It was lightweight, could be broken down if needed, and took up less shipping space. The new organization in terms of CDII is: Cannon Company, with: 1 command stand 1 jeep 1 gun crew stand (ds) 1 105L16 pack howitzer 1 medium truck 1 medium ammo truck with trailer and AAMG 1 support stand The problem with the 105L 16 turned out to be the fact that it was rarely if ever used for direct fire, and under the RCT system that paired an artillery battalion to an infantry regiment, it was not needed for indirect fire. As a result, most regiments in the ETO found little use for the cannon company as intended. It was often tied with the RCTs artillery battalion as an extra battery. In some cases, the cannon company was converted to other purposes, as is the case of the 90th Division, which used captured German 120mm mortars to reequip the cannon company as follows: Cannon Company, 90th Infantry Division, with: 1 command stand 1 jeep 3 gun crew stand (ds) 3 120mm mortars 3 medium truck 1 medium ammo truck with trailer and AAMG 1 support stand Interestingly enough, cannon companies in the Pacific fought under a different TO&E then used in Europe. The cannon companies of 37th Infantry Division on Bougainville were equipped with the 75mm pack howitzer in place of the 105mm. Before they left in late 1944, the cannon companies were equipped with the M-7 Priest SP 105mm. For the invasion of the Philippines, the 7th and 24th Infantry Divisions had their cannon companies equipped with M-8 HMC. The 27th, 34th, and 96th Infantry Divisions were equipped with the M-7 Priest. The other infantry divisions in the Philippines were equipped with either the M-7 or M-8 HMC, but I have not been able to determine which. As a number of these divisions later served on Okinawa, that would indicate that they were using the M-7s and M-8s there as well. Therefore, cannon companies in the Pacific in late 1944 and 1945 should be organized as follows: Cannon Company, Pacific (late 1944 on), with: 1 command stand 1 jeep 1 M-7 or M-8 HMC 1 medium ammo truck with trailer and AAMG 1 support stand According to Shelby Stanton's Order of Battle, US Army, World War II, the only armored field artillery battalions to serve in the PTO were the 426th, 427th, and 428th, which arrived in the Philippines in July of 1945. Therefore, those pictures of M-7s in action from before that date would have to be from the regimental cannon companies. Starting in early 1945, the US Army began to plan a revised TO&E for the infantry division. In a survey of divisional officers, all agreed that the cannon company should continue, the only real question being what the company should be. Tossing out the Pacific Division which thought that the 37L53 made a wonder weapon, the consensus was that a self-propelled weapon, preferably a tank, was needed. The final proposal for the cannon company called for a short tank company with three platoons of three vehicles: Cannon Company, with: 1 command stand 1 jeep 2 M-4A3 105 1 medium ammo truck with trailer and AAMG 1 support stand As an aside, at one point in 1945 the US Army was looking at a proposed infantry division with its own tank battalion (71 tanks), a cannon company with 17 M-4A3 105 tanks (51 tanks), and a regimental antitank company, with 17 M-26 tanks (51 tanks). It was pointed out that this would give the standard infantry division 173 tanks at a time when the standard armored division had 272 tanks. The solution was to reduce the cannon company and antitank company from 17 tanks to nine tanks, giving the new division a TO&E of only 125 tanks. The division as adopted was never formally put into service. By the outbreak of the Korean War, the cannon company was replaced by a 4.2" mortar company, and the antitank company was replaced by a full strength tank company. Back to Table of Contents -- Command Post Quarterly # 5 To Command Post Quarterly List of Issues To MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1994 by Greg Novak. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com