Greg Novak
After the Battle of France was finished, the German General Staff issued a detailed questionnaire to each divisional, corps, and army commander. The goal of the questionnaire was to evaluate the campaign, identify problems, and suggest solutions. When the forms were returned to the General Staff, the answers tended to be honest and forthright about what went right and what went wrong in the recent campaign. Interestingly enough, many of the officers called for a revision of the German Infantry Division's organization and equipment. One of the most vocal voices for reorganization belonged to General Gunther von Kluge, commander of the 4th Army in the recent campaign. He, with the help of his chief of staff, Brigadier General Kurt Breenecke, pointed out that the victory in France had been won under special circumstances, i.e., poor French morale, complete air superiority, etc. This campaign should not be taken as proof that the German Army was correct in all of its assumptions, especially on its organization. To remedy this situation based on the experiences in France and Poland, von Kluge and Breenecke proposed a new organization for the Infantry Division. To start with, the infantry regiments were to be reorganized as follows: Proposed 1941 Infantry RegimentRegimental Headquarters, with:
1 kubelwagen 1 staff radio truck 1 recon motorcycle infantry stand IVth (Support) Battalion, with:
1 kubelwagen Supply Column, with:
1 baggage wagon 1 general supply wagon 1 field kitchen wagon 1 ammo wagon #13 Antitank Company, with:
1 kubelwagen 2 gun crew stands 2 50L60 AT guns 2 light trucks 1 SP 50L60 AT gun #14 Infantry Gun Company, with:
1 gun crew stand (ds) 1 150L11 Infantry gun 1 limber 1 ammo wagon 1 support stand #15 Engineer Company, with:
1 engineer flamethrower stand 1 engineer stand 1 supply wagon 3 Infantry Battalions (I TO III), each with:
1 support stand 1 baggage wagon 1 general supply wagon 1 field kitchen wagon 3 Infantry Companies, each with:
2 infantry stands 1 weapons stand Machinegun Company, with:
1 gun crew stand 1 75L12 infantry gun (battalion gun) 1 limber Notes 1. The 50L60 AT guns were not named in the new organization, however the report pointed out that the 37L45 was unsuitable for the tasks assigned to it and it needed to be replaced by a heavier weapon. 2. The provision for a IVth Support Battalion would allow the regimental commander more control of the battlefield while ensuring that these elements remained under command. The size of the IVth Battalion was to be increased by having a full engineer company assigned to each infantry regiment instead of a platoon. 3. The 8cm mortars were to be transferred to the reformed weapons platoons in the infantry companies and replace the 5cm mortars. They in turn were to be replaced by a 75L 12 infantry gun section in the machinegun company. This would allow the infantry companies more firepower, while ensuring that the battalion would still have access to long-range firepower if needed. In addition, the 75L12 could be used for direct fire if needed. The Divisional Engineer Battalion was to remain at the same size, but was to have all three engineer companies and the headquarters elements motorized instead of just the first company. The divisional antitank battalion was to be reorganized as follows: Proposed 1941 Antitank BattalionBattalion Headquarters, with: 1 command stand 1 kubelwagen
1 kubelwagen 1 support stand 1 light baggage truck with field kitchen 1 general supply light truck 1 medium ammo truck 2 Antitank Companies, each with:
1 kubelwagen 2 gun crew stands 2 50L60 AT guns 2 light trucks 1 SP 50L60 AT gun Assault Gun Company, with: 1 StuG AA Company, with:
1 kubelwagen 2 gun crew stands 2 20L113 AA guns 2 light trucks 1 SP 20L113 AA gun Notes 1. Again, the 50L60 AT guns were not named in the new organization, but the need for the 37L45 to be replaced by a heavier weapon was again stressed. 2. Some first line infantry divisions were lucky enough to have an AA company assigned to their antitank battalion. The proposal offered here was to make that an armywide policy, as well as convert one platoon from towed weapons to SP. The Divisional Artillery was to be reorganized and upgraded as follows: Proposed 1941 Artillery OrganizationDivisional Artillery Headquarters
1 kubelwagen 1 staff radio truck Divisional Headquarters Battery, with:
1 baggage wagon 1 general supply wagon 1 field kitchen wagon Light Artillery Regiment
1 kubelwagen 3 Light Artillery Battalions (I TO III), each with:
1 mounted FO stand Headquarters Battery, with:
1 support stand 1 baggage wagon 1 general supply wagon 1 field kitchen wagon 3 Firing Batteries, each with:
1 gun crew (ds) 1 105L28 howitzer 1 limber 1 ammo wagon 1 support stand Medium Artillery Regiment
1 kubelwagen Medium Howitzer Battalion
1 FO stand 2 kubelwagens Headquarters Battery, with:
1 medium baggage truck 1 medium general supply truck 1 medium truck with field kitchen 3 Firing Batteries, each with:
1 gun crew (ds) 1 150L30 howitzer 1 heavy tractor 1 medium ammo truck with trailer 1 support stand Support Battalion
Headquarters Battery, with:
1 support stand 1 medium baggage truck 1 medium general supply truck 1 medium truck with field kitchen Firing Battery, with:
1 kubelwagen 1 gun crew (ds) 1881,56 AA guns 1 heavy tractor 1 medium ammo truck with trailer 1 support stand Firing Battery, with:
1 gun crew (ds) 1 105L52 gun 1 heavy tractor 1 medium ammo truck with trailer 1 support stand Observation Battery, with:
1 kubelwagen 1 staff radio truck 1 sound ranging stand 1 flash observation stand 1 medium truck Notes 1. The artillery reorganization set up a divisional artillery command section and two artillery regiments. The 1st Regiment was to be the light, or direct support, regiment, as usually each of its battalions would be assigned to work with an infantry regiment. The 2nd Regiment was to be motorized and serve as the general support artillery elements. 2. The 2nd Regiment's organization called for one medium howitzer battalion and one support battalion. The support battalion was to help with counterbattery and direct fire missions. The 105L52 gun battery would fire on data reported to it by the observation battery. The 88L56 battery was to be used for direct fire missions, and not for AA fire. During the campaign in France, several formations found it necessary to use 105L28 howitzers as infantry guns attached directly to infantry battalions to deal with pillboxes, French tanks, etc. The 88L56 with its flat trajectory and accuracy was felt to be a much better weapon for this purpose. ReconThe divisional recon battalion was also to be reorganized. During the 1940 campaign, most divisional commanders felt that the recon battalion was too weak and too slow to serve its needed purposes. The solution that was adopted was to strip off whatever transport they could from the division, and use that to mount the recon battalion, and any augmentations of the recon battalion that they had space for. The vehicles used for this task lacked the ability to move cross country, as most were commandeered supply vehicles. The reinforced recon battalions found themselves unable to bypass any road blocks or fortified villages, thus making them roadbound. Citing the need for these elements to keep moving, it was recommended that they be motorized with cross country vehicles whenever possible. The suggested 1941 recon battalion was to have: Proposed 1941 Reconnaissance Battalion
1 kubelwagen 1 staff radio truck Headquarters Company, with:
1 kubelwagen 1 support stand 1 light baggage truck with field kitchen 1 general supply light truck with trailer Armored Car Company, with:
2 recon SdKfz 222 Motorcycle Company, with:
2 motorcycle recon infantry stands 1 motorcycle MMG stand Motorized Company, with:
2 recon infantry stands 1 MMG stand 4 light trucks Heavy Company, with:
1 kubelwagen 1 engineer stand 2 gun crew stands 1 50L60 AT gun 1 75L12 infantry gun (battalion gun) 3 light trucks Notes 1. The Armored Car and Motorcycle Companies would give this recon battalion an increased ability to move cross country. The addition of the engineer stand would help allow the wheeled vehicles of the battalion to bypass enemy-held areas. 2. Again, the 50L60 AT guns were not named in the new organization, but the need for the 37L45 to be replaced by a heavier weapon was again stressed. Field Replacement BattalionsLast, the report called for a return to divisional control of the Field Replacement Battalions. The units were held at the Army level, and sent forward as needed. By returning to divisional control, these replacements would be where they were needed when they were needed, and not arrive until sometime later. The field replacement battalions would have an organization similar to the following: Proposed 1941 Field Replacement Battalion
1 support stand 1 light baggage truck with field kitchen 1 general supply light truck with trailer 3 Infantry Companies, each with:
4 infantry stands 1 MMG stand Light Weapons Company, with:
4 specialists stands Specialist Company, with:
2 specialists stands NOTES 1. This is a sample organization, and is based upon the fact that most casualties would be inflicted on the infantry stands. 2. The light weapons specialists were to be used for the crews of the mortars, infantry guns, AT guns, and similar weapons. The specialist company provided signal personnel, field artillery crews, etc. To carry out the proposed reforms, the size of a German Infantry Division would have had to been increased to some 20,000 men, and either a reduction in the overall number of divisions would have to made, or additional men called into service. More important, based on the current German industrial output, it would have taken well over a year to produce the needed items, assuming that no new campaigns were fought in the meantime. The decision to invade Russia in 1941 put an end to these plans. The German Army found itself first ordered to release needed workers back to the armaments industry for work on aircraft and warships. Then some 40 additional infantry and armored divisions were to be raised, even though the needed equipment was not there. The gaps were filled by using captured enemy weapons and vehicles, by stripping items away from existing units and by just not having the needed items. The need to fill up the new divisions resulted in the existing replacement battalions being depleted of their officers and men. Thus, in any prolonged campaign, the needed replacements would not be there to keep the field units up to strength. As a result of the build up, the German Infantry Divisions which marched into Russia in 1941 were less well equipped than those who had marched into France the year before! BIBLIOGRAPHYForgotten Legions: German Infantry Policy 1918-1941, S. J. Lewis, Praeger, New York, 1985. Back to Table of Contents -- Command Post Quarterly # 5 To Command Post Quarterly List of Issues To MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1994 by Greg Novak. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com |