One often-asked question about the Command Decision TO&Es is, "Where are the American flamethrowers?" After all, we've seen them in the movies, and we know that they were there somewhere, but exactly where has always been a little vague. Only in the Marine Corps can one find evidence of their existence in the official TO&Es.
The reason for this is due to a quirk in the organization of the US Army. Unlike most other countries of the world which saw the flamethrower as a weapon to equip one's assault engineers (sappers), the US took a different approach. Engineers in the US Army had a primary duty to construct and support, and were not to be used in the sapper combat role. Though the engineer units attached to the divisions were known as combat engineer battalions, they were not intended to fight in the front line unless absolutely necessary.
During the post-World War I era, the chemical warfare service of the US Army acquired the responsibility for such items as smoke generators, chemical mortars, flamethrowers, incendiary bombs (including what would become napalm), and of course the needed chemicals to carry out chemical warfare. Flamethrowers were not a high-priority item, and the so first US model, the M1, was not put into active service until the end of 1942. It was not very successful due to a lack of range, and had to be replaced with the M1A1. While that was a more effective flamethrower, it was disliked because its bulkiness made it difficult to carry. (I suggest that US flamethrower stands in 1943 and early 1944 not be allowed to run.) Finally, in mid-1944, the M2-2 came into service, a lighter and more effective flamethrower that was lighter than the M1A1, but had the same range.
The problem with American flamethrower usage is that while flamethrowers were present with all American divisions from November 1942 on, there are no trained operators. Each division had a small chemical warfare section attached to the divisional headquarters, which usually mustered two officers and from four to six enlisted men.
The commander of this section served as the divisional staff's chemical warfare officer, and was responsible for all chemical matters, including ensuring the divisions supply of chemical items such as smoke grenades, liaison with attached chemical mortar battalions and chemical decontamination companies ( is last is more important than it sounds, as these companies had the only portable hot showers in the ETO), and seeing that the divisions' personnel were trained in chemical protection. Each regiment/ battalion in the division was required to have an officer whose other duties included being designated as the UGO (unit gas officer), while each company had an UNGO (unit noncommissioned gas officer). The divisional chemical section had the duty of teaching and updating the UGO/UNGOs, who in turn were to pass this knowledge on to their units.
On top of this, the chemical warfare section often found itself used by the divisional HQ as additional staff. Since chemical weapons were not being used in this war, the staff often assumed that the chemical section obviously didn't have anything to do and was often given additional duties to carry out. When the division's chemical warfare officer was free, he could then attempt to see that crews for the flamethrowers were trained, and these weapons used in action.
In the ETO, flamethrowers were authorized on the following basis: Infantry Division-24, Airborne Division-15, Armored Division-18, Ranger Battalion--6, and each Combat Engineer Battalion-14. Additional weapons could be requested and issued but the problem of crews for the weapons was left up to the requesting unit. As a result, the usage record was discouraging. None were used in North Africa, once in Sicily, and rarely in Italy. (The weight problem of the M1A1 made it difficult to use in mountainous terrain.) It was a common practice for combat engineer battalions in the ETO to return their flamethrowers unused to chemical depots before they went into action.
As the war moved into northern Europe, things did not get better. For the invasion of Normandy, each of the D-Day infantry divisions was issued 150 flamethrowers, and instructions were issued for the training of crews. On D-Day itself, there is no record of any of them being used, and the 14th Chemical Maintenance Company, which landed in late June, recovered over 100 flamethrowers from the material salvaged off the beaches. On a return of stores held by the eight infantry divisions of the 7th Army in February 1945, two divisions reported having none, one division had four flamethrowers, three divisions reported having six, one division reported 12, and the last division had the same number, 34, as the other seven divisions put together.
Where flamethrowers are used in the ETO, there exists a divisional chemical warfare officer, and a corps chemical warfare officer, who are both willing to train the needed crews and work out the logistics. A major problem here was that while the flamethrowers were held at division, the fuel and maintenance elements were held at corps. When the 30th Division operated against the Siegfried Line in the fall of 1944, the divisional chemical warfare officer, in cooperation with XIX Corps, arranged for each infantry battalion of the division to be issued eight flamethrowers, and have infantry crews trained in their usage. His case, however, was the exception and not the rule. Given a choice between using flamethrowers or armor against German fortifications, armor was the choice in the ETO.
For CD games, American units in the ETO should not be armed with flamethrowers unless special circumstances otherwise dictate, i.e., an assault on a fortified position. They are not a weapon normally found in the field.
In the PTO, the situation was far different. While the same problems existed as far as lack of crews and with the equipment, the usage rate was far higher. The flamethrower was seen as a solution to the fact the Japanese were dug in, unwilling to surrender, and that all too often the terrain was unsuitable for the use of armor. If a such a position had to be destroyed, the flamethrower was one of the few weapons that could carry it out.
The combat engineer battalions in the Pacific were more willing to use the weapon than their counterparts in the ETO. The interaction between the Marines and Army also helped push usage as what one service learned, it was willing to share with the other. By October of 1943, the allotment of flamethrowers in the Southwest Pacific was raised from 24 to 60, with each infantry regiment allotted 12. Most divisions trained members of the Battalion Pioneer and Ammunition Platoon to serve as crewmen, and each infantry company was to have an additional four trained operators.
By 1944, Army divisions operating in the Central Pacific were issued with 141 flamethrowers, while the Marines had 81. (The Marines also were operating the first tank flamethrowers at this time, the Satan conversions.) As the usage rate went up, more and more operators came from infantry units in both the Army and Marine units. To make the best possible usage of the flamethrowers, veteran units in both services set up assault units to provide covering fire and supporting elements.
By 1945, the Marines had increased the number of flamethrowers to 243 per division, but the actual number in combat did not increase. Only 81 flamethrowers were assigned to the infantry battalions, with the remainder going to the engineers, and to the battalion/regimental supply sections. For every flamethrower used in combat, at least one was held in reserve. This ensured that damaged and out-of-fuel weapons could be replaced as soon as possible, keeping the assault platoons in action.
The Army worked around this problem by having chemical maintenance platoons attached at the divisional and even regimental level to allow for increased usage and refueling. By the final battles in 1945, the flamethrower was a standard battalion weapon, and impressed by the success of the Marines flame tanks, especially the M-4 conversions, the US Army borrowed 54 of them to form the 713th Tank (Armored Flamethrower) Battalion for service on Okinawa.
The Marine usage of flamethrowers is already covered in Armies of World War II, Volume 1. For the US Army in the Pacific, I suggest the following:
1. From mid 1943 on, allow all combat engineer battalions to have one engineer-flamethrower stand per company.
2. Starting in 1944, each Army infantry battalion in the Pacific should consider its Ammunition and Pioneer platoon as a flamethrower stand. Army divisions with a rating of ExperiencedorVeteran may have in addition an assault flamethrower stand per infantry battalion. This functions as a flamethrower stand, and conducts small arms fire as if it were a paratrooper stand.
Bibliography
United States Army in WWII, The Chemical Warfare Service: Chemicals in Combat: Brooks E. Kleberand Dale Birdsell, Office of the Chief of Military History, Washington, DC, 1966
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