I recently received a letter from an individual who questioned the conclusions in my article (in Vol. VIII, #4) "Evaluating the British Army 1808- 1815". If you recall, I attempted to evaluate the British army and assign morale ratings by regiment by using a statistical analysis of desertion figures for 1811,1812, and 1813. My analysis was based on the numbers of deserters per regiment rather than the percentage of deserters by regiment which is the point brought up in this letter. The conclusion of that article was that there was no significant difference in the morale among the British Guard, KGL, or line infantry when viewed as groups. Individual units were, however, rated higher or lower depending on various historical and unique characteristics and actions. I will not say that this question did not cross my mind. It is a difficult point to address, however, because I do not have strength figures for every regiment and battalion during the periods of the analysis. Indeed, I do not hold strength figures of any significant portion of the army for more than one or two dates a year for the period and those are for units in the peninsula. Before beginning a mathematical analysis of the question of the "superior" morale of the British Guard, let us review a few facts about the British infantry, its recruitment, etc. First, the British Guard, in contrast to the French Old and Middle Guard, drafted men into their ranks directly from the street. The French Old and Middle Guard were veterans of specific numbers of campaigns and had a requirement specific numbers of years service in order to enter the Imperial Guard. The British Guard did not. In garrison the British Guard probably did receive superior rations and other amenities when compared to that of the line. I do not know that they were treated any better in the field, but it is not likely in view of the supply problems Wellington had in the peninsula. As a result, I would suggest that this would be a factor to support a superior morale, when a lower percentage deserted when in the field. On the other hand, a British soldier deserting faced a death sentence. As the French would way, "Pour encourager les autres", to encourage the others (I love that phrase). That is a very high risk to take and conditions must be pretty bad to cause someone to consider taking such a risk. To explore this question from a more empirical perspective I have generated some average strengths based on a few orders of battle and attempt, from that, to produce a percentage desertion analysis. These figures are by category of infantry only, i.e., line, KGL, and Guard, not by regiment. I have, however, increased the numbers of categories in order to address certain assumptions about the "superior" morale of such regiments as the fusilier and Highland regiments. THE KGL First, let's look at trends. The KG L shows a startling increase in desertions. This is, no doubt, due to the usual rigors of war, plus the gradual death of the original Hanoverian and the incorporation of German deserters from the French armies into the KGL to replace them. THE GUARD The trend of the Guard is terrible, but not as bad as the KGL. It appears to have increased 158% from 1811 to 1812. Then it declined slightly in 1813 to a point 116% above the 1811 figures. Indeed, the Guard's desertion rate is the worst of the four British categories in 2 of 3 years. THE HIGHLANDERS The Highlanders would appear to have never had very good morale. In 1812 their desertion rate is 34% worse than any other formation (in that instance the Guard). It is also interesting to note that by 1813 their morale has actually improved from its 1811 level This is quite possibly due to the transfer of several Highland regiments to Spain. Prior to 1813 only the 42nd and 79th were serving in Spain. By 1813, three to four more battalions were sent to the peninsula where it was harder to desert. THE FUSILIERS Based on the desertion figures, the 7th and 23rd (Fusiliers) appear to have been the most content formations (by category) in the British Army. Their figures are the most consistent over the three years and they have the lowest percentage of desertions in two of the three years examined. THE LINE What is surprising is that the line infantry closely parallels the fusiliers and stands second two of three years in the lowest percentage of desertions. It would appear to actually be happier than the Guard and the Highlanders which are generally considered to be the "crack" of the British infantry (before the Churkas arrived). No doubt life in the Guard was improved by an endless stream of spit-and-polish boot 2nd Lieutenants from upper classes, and sergeants attempting to impress those 2nd Lieutenants. The Scots can probably be viewed as an oppressed minority discontent with anything English. SUMMARY The suggestion that I should look at the various formations of the British Army by percentage of desertions rather than simply the gross numbers of desertions was an interesting challenge. My initial reaction was that it wouldn't refute my original conclusions and I still believe my original conclusions were right. However, someone might look at these figures and say that I was overly kind to the Guard and Highlanders. It would also be reasonable to say that I should have allowed for a steady decline in the value of the KGL on an annual basis. All three modifications to the original conclusions are justifiable based on the analysis provided in this letter. I would caution against this conclusion. There is a variable of questionable impact in this analysis. I have mixed the desertion rates of formations in the peninsula with those outside the peninsula. Remember how the original article showed the worst desertion rates by formations in Ireland, Scotland and England? It is impossible for me to project if 1.) it was equally terrible in the British army no matter where one was stationed, the only variable being how hard it was to desert, or 2.) service in the British army was terrible in the homeland and the British just loved to go to war. My money is on the first choice. The second question is though that desertion rates in England, Ireland and Scotland were higher, the strengths of those battalions were lower, since it is my understanding they served as depots feeding troops to the front. So, if the strongest units were in Spain and the weakest were in the UK my analysis has leveled that and concealed the impact of another set of variables. Again, location has an unusual and unaccountable impact on the analysis. One could then argue that the British won in the peninsula and that they still must be the superior army, deserving of higher morale ratings in various gaming systems. Certainly the British infantry performed well in the field, but those various battles need to be examined. My conclusion would be that the quality of generalship was the difference. We seem to forget that the British lost in the 1809 Walchern invasion and the British expeditionary force under the Duke of York in 1799 was badly beaten by the French revolutionary armies. One also tends to forget or overlook Moore's disastrous retreat to Coruna in 1808. In the latter, the British army collapsed. Deserters and stragglers fell left and fight. The Spanish peasantry actually turned on them because of the marauding and pillaging the British deserters perpetrated against them. Under Wellington the British tended to win because their general was superior to the French generals, he invariably fought defensive battles and only went over to the offense when he had superior numbers. Any analysis of the 1812-1814 battles will show that Wellington invariably had superior numbers when he attacked the French. Speaking against the supposed "superiority" of the British infantry is its officer corps. They bought their commissions and could, like Wellington did, buy their way up to general in a few years. A wealthy parent could buy a colonelcy for an infant without the child ever servinga day of active service. Non-noble gentlemen with large purses also bought their way into the military hierarchy and there was a process for simple gentlemen to gain commissions. Heaven forbid that one of the enlisted men should ever aspire to being an officer. In contrast, the French army serving under Napoleon promoted a very large percentage of its officers from the enlisted ranks. Before 1800 all officers were elected form the ranks. I have seen commissions for lieutenants dating from 1805-1806 that show them to be veterans of 10+ years and several campaigns as an enlisted trooper. Indeed, the numbers of officers required by the French army could never have been filled by the few schools and military academies that produced officers. It is my considered opinion that the victorious peninsular British army has wrapped itself in the genius of its general and unjustifiably assumed the mythical mantle of superiority and invincibility for every aspect of its existence. This myth has been perpetuated in America by the lack of nonBritish source documents and the general inability of Americans to read foreign language source documents. I will add that I would dearly love to find the desertion figures for the French army. I know they had a major problem with deserters. There were amnesties granted and a number of penal regiments established to process re-captured deserters and draft dodgers. Figures I once had indicated that those penal regiments processed about 20,000 men before 1812 as I recall. Nonetheless, the French army was a conscript army and significantly larger than the British army, so one can expect those problems. Back to Table of Contents -- Courier Vol. IX No. 5 Back to Courier List of Issues Back to Master Magazine List © Copyright 1990 by The Courier Publishing Company. This article appears in MagWeb.com (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com