Note: Popular American lore of the latter half of the 18th Century speaks derisively of British scarleted automatons being swept away by woods-wise and camouflaged foes during the French and Indian War and the American Revolution. Lore is often based on some fact, and the fate of Braddock's Army of 1755 and of the British column marching on Lex ington and Concord twenty years later bear witness to this. Such significant events however do not do justice to acquainting us with the total picture. More illumination is needed and thanks to Dan Beattie we can balance the images we have with a better understanding of how things were.
At right, "The Bloody Morning Scout": On September 8, 1755, 1,000 American provincial infantry and Indians commanded by Colonel Ephriam Williams were ambushed and routed while marching along a forest road south of Lake George, New York. Their French, Canadian and Indian opponents commanded by Baron Dieskau had been hiding within the forest canopy. Defeats such as these would contribute to new methods of waging war in North America. Theme Editor -- Bill Protz.
Dan wrote the following article several years ago and it appeared within M. Ultee's, Adapting To Conditions: War and Society in the Eighteenth Century in 1986. Reprint for use of The Courier was kindly granted by The University of Alabama Press. In 1755, the year of the disastrous Braddock expedition to the Forks of the Ohio, a young British officer, newly arrived in America, wrote home, "I cannot conceive how war can be made in such a country." [1]
The problems involved in campaigning in North America that confronted British commanders were formidable indeed. The basic military challenges of strategy and tactics, logistics and administration were present, of course. British generals had learned these elements of military science and art and had seen them practiced in Europe. The books and treatises on such subjects that they read were based on European models. Such skills would be needed in the conflict that would culminate in the conquest of Canada. But American conditions would demand change in the European practice of war in several important respects.
Difficulty of Vastness
Probably the greatest difficulties for commanders were posed by the vastness of the theater of operations. New England was larger than old England. In fact, England was only a bit larger than the Crown Colony of New York (including the lands of the Iroquois). A commander might have to control and supply forces separated by many hundreds of miles. The British Isles, the source of reinforcements, some supplies, and orders, was an ocean away. Furthermore, most of the area of campaigning was a virtually trackless and uninhabited wilderness.
The frontier regions of New York, Pennsylvania, or Nova Scotia were not like Flanders, Hanover, Silesia, or Italy. As Francis Parkman long ago pointed out, the real adversary of British commanders was the wilderness itself: having conquered it, they would find defeating the whitecoats in battle a comparatively easy task.[2]
But there were plenty of other problems in America besides distance and ruggedness of terrain. Among them were: Indian relations, aid from the provincials, coordination of operations with the Royal Navy, extra opportunities for desertion, local procurement of recruits and provisions, and maintenance of army discipline and health. All of these problems and others are closely related to the central question of how to move troops and supplies across a wilderness, how to operate in a non-European environment.
British leaders were not obtuse. They recognized the central problem early on; but like their descendants in World War I who wrestled with stalemate on the western front (the conundrum of overcoming trenches, machine guns, and artillery), they were not successful immediately. The forest beat many a commander between 1755 and 1763. The difficulties of campaigning in a wilderness explain in part the long string of British failures in the French and Indian War. Yet the degree to which the British army and its leaders adapted to the American environment explains in part why the years of frustration were eventually followed by the years of triumph.
Stereotypes
Many of the stereotypes of the British army in America derive from the Braddock campaign of 1755. Supposedly Braddock was a fool, unwilling to adapt to American conditions. He attempted to apply parade-ground maneuvers to a march across the wilderness and stupidly forced his men to fight in the European manner in terrain utterly unsuited to such tactics. [3]
This view of Braddock and his expedition is nonsense. The Newcastle ministry sent Braddock and two regiments to the New World to gain possession of the Forks of the Ohio and oust French trespassers elsewhere along the border between the British colonies and New France. As soon as he landed in Virginia, Braddock acted with vigor and skill to prepare an expedition. He was furious at the difficulties he encountered with penny-pinching colonial assemblies and crooked contractors.
Fortunately, he finally obtained the crucial wagons and drivers he needed through the help of Benjamin Franklin. The Crown also sent with him two understrength regiments from Ireland. Their ranks were filled with "drafts" from other units -- in other words, those soldiers undesired by their parent battalions. In America, poor-quality American recruits joined to increase each regiment's strength by 50 percent. Braddock drilled them hard, but they were far from being highly disciplined, well-trained, and tightly knit units when they began their march to the Forks of the Ohio. [4]
Braddock recognized that his force might well be attacked by enemy irregulars. He trained his troops in march security, created a second grenadier company in each battalion, lightened the gear that each soldier had to carry, and attempted to secure provincial backwoodsmen and Indians for the expedition. He could not see how undisciplined savages could be a threat to his army; he did perceive their usefulness as scouts. Only a few Indians could be persuaded to join him, however, and few stayed very long.
The general discovered that his instructions were confused and their designers ignorant of geography. He was ordered to take an unnecessarily arduous route to Fort Duquesne. His maps were grossly inaccurate. [5] He was supposed to lead an army over fifteen miles of wilderness when the reality was more than a hundred miles. It is no wonder he considered forgetting the whole thing. [6]
Marching
For a month his army marched toward its goal and built a military road as it went. The French at Duquesne looked for an opportunity to attack, but Braddock and his 2,500 men were ever on guard. [7]
That is, they kept up their guard in the manner of a European army until they were close to their object. With the French fort just ahead, the redcoats began to think their enemies had retreated without a fight. They relaxed their guard -- then the French and Indians struck them.
Braddock's defeat was not an ambush: the two forces collided. For two hours the British soldiers, eventually nearly encircled, fired through the smoke into the trees. They ignored the orders of some of their officers to use cold steel in the European manner. Overconfidence had been replaced by confusion and panic, and in the end they ran. The retreat was protected by Virginia provincials under George Washington, who heard the dying Braddock's assertion that the British would do better next time. [8]
Another expedition of 1755 was stillborn. Governor William Shirley of Massachusetts aimed to attack Niagara with two regiments just recruited in the colonies. He lacked organization skill, and his hired boatmen and provincial troops grumbled at the back-breaking toil of pulling themselves and their supplies up the Mohawk River Valley. Shirley was slowed and was finally halted at Oswego by the season of storms. Ill-trained, ill-equipped, ill-fed, and sickly, these two regiments would be captured en masse by the French the next summer.
Elsewhere
Elsewhere in New York Colony, William Johnson led a little army of psalm-singing New Englanders toward Lake George. A stronger army of French regulars, Canadians, and Indians pounced upon him; but he shattered their assaults and drove them off. Because his provincials had had enough of war, he had to give up any hope of capturing the French fort at St. Frederic (Crown Point). Only in Nova Scotia did one British offensive of 1755 bear fruit: General Robert Monckton captured Fort Beausejour. Meanwhile, from the Shenandoah Valley to the Upper Connecticut, a red sea of murder inundated the frontier as the French and Indians ravaged the farms and settlements of the backcountry. [9]
Shirley, now commander in chief of His Majesty's forces in North America, had few dependable forces to use in 1756. That year the frontiers were again aflame. Oswego fell, and the British government replaced Shirley with the Earl of Loudoun and more regulars. Loudoun did not last long. In 1757 he attempted to capture Fortress Louisbourg, the French Gibraltar of North America. Louisbourg guarded the entrance to the St. Lawrence and the French fisheries off the Grand Banks. For this expedition, Loudoun had over 14,000 redcoats and thirty-three war ships. The French advantages, in addition to their garrison at Louisbourg, included the wretched climate of Cape Breton Island and Nova Scotia and the indecision of Loudoun himself.
The British experienced yet another terrible year in 1757. Loudoun gave up before the stronghold of Louisbourg. The French seized Fort William Henry on Lake George and massacred part of its garrison of redcoats and provincials. The frontier of the British colonies was again pushed eastward by Indian raiders. Loudoun was replaced with General James Abercromby.
The next year, 1758, would see the last of the great disasters to British armies in the war and two great victories. Abercromby sent his fine army, the largest in the war, to a suicidal assault on the French Fort Carillon at Ticonderoga. But General John Forbes took possession of the Forks of the Ohio by the end of the year. Forbes' campaign against Fort Duquesne was even more systematic and slower than that of Braddock. With only a regiment and a half of regulars and 4,000 provincials, he built a road to victory. He discovered too that the wilderness was his main foe.
Instead of following Braddock's route, he approached the forks by way of Pennsylvania. He ordered his capable assistant, Lieutenant Colonel Henry Bouquet, to build a road westward, a road connecting fortified supply depots in the European manner. Forbes assembled his army and supplies in Philadelphia as Bouquet constructed the road. The French-led Indians grew discouraged and deserted their allies after failing to capture one of Bouquet's tough little forts. Before the end of the year, the Forks of the Ohio were British.
Jeffery Amherst, a new general picked by William Pitt for energy and intelligence, was assigned to take Louisbourg in 1758. He worked closely with the Royal Navy in the campaign and successfully landed his army on a well-defended coast, besieged Louisbourg and captured it. [10] Amherst was promoted after Louisbourg to overall command in America; his able subordinate James Wolfe became the leader of an expedition against Quebec in 1759.
Logistics
Over the preceding three years the British army in America had developed a sound logistical and transport system to cope with American conditions. The army also had experimented with various types of light infantry -- irregular and regular -- to enable it to counter the French and Indians. Together these two developments, the logistical system and the use of light infantry, mark how well England's Army had adjusted to wilderness campaigning in North America. The army that Jeffery Amherst led in 1759 and 1760 had acquired skills that allowed it to overcome its primary obstacles: distance and the American wilderness.
The greatest accomplishment of the cautious Loudoun was to put army supply and transport on a sound footing. Before he left England, Loudoun had conferred with the Duke of Cumberland, Henry Fox, and the Earl of Halifax about the failure of the Oswego campaign of 1755. [11]
A faulty supply system seemed most to blame. Accordingly, the ministry decided to place contracting for North America in the hands of three prosperous London merchants, Sir William Baker, Christopher Kilby, and Richard Baker. William Baker was supplying satisfactorily most of the troops in Nova Scotia, and Kilby had lived in Connecticut. The Crown signed a twelve-month, renewable contract with the firm of Baker, Kilby, and Baker on March 26, 1756; and on April 1, 1756, the firm began to operate. [12]
By the terms of the contract one of the partners was to handle matters in America, where many of the provisions would be procured. As security, the firm deposited £ 100,000 in London. In North America, the commander in chief set up several centrally located Crown storehouses. The contractors were obliged to have at all times enough provisions in these storehouses to support at least 12,000 men for six months. The provisions were to be wholesome, and the commander in chief would appoint inspectors under a commissary of stores and provisions to verify the contents of the storehouses. Unsuitable provisions were to be replaced immediately at the contractors' expense.
The firm would submit receipts for transportation expenses to the commissary of stores for reimbursement, and the Treasury in London would make monthly payments to the firm on the basis of certificates endorsed by the commander in chief and the commissary. The firm was paid sixpence per day per man fed, which would provide each private man a "ration" of one- seventh of the weekly allowance of "seven pounds of beef, or in lieu thereof, four pounds of pork, which is thought to be equivalent; seven pounds of biscuit bread, or the same weight of flour, six ounces of butter, three pints of pease, [and] half a pound of rice..." [13]
This system, with its main storehouses at New York, Albany, and Halifax, functioned well throughout the war, although the firm of Baker, Kilby, and Baker was replaced by another in 1760. Salted meat, peas, and butter generally came from Ireland and England. The other staples, as well as fresh meat, which was issued to the sick and for two days per week in winter to everyone, were obtained in the "provision colonies". [14]
Christopher Kilby was honest and hard-working and had agents in every large town and seaport. On September 3, 1758, he wrote Abercromby that the need for fresh pork "drove our searches thro't all the Neighboring Colonies and the back Countrys in pursuit of a supply." [15]
But even Connecticut -- the "Pork Colony" -- was barren. In his search for fresh meat and vegetables for the winter garrisons, Kilby discovered "from my own Experience throughout the Continent no one Individual has yet been found that can be depended for any Certain & Constant Supply of Provisions, for anytime or at any place." [16]
Robert Leake, commisary of stores and provisions, was an astute and suspicious guardian of the King's interests. [17] He was aided in part by young provincial gentlemen like Philip Schuyler, who were "of the posture" (i.e., high society) and who were lured by large salaries into serving the regulars as contractors of provisions on the theory that they were less prone to graft. All of this organization involved large responsibilities and big money. In 1756 and 1757 the firm of Baker, Kilby, and Baker supplied five million rations and was paid £ 123,409 11s. 10d. In 1758 they were paid £ 215,150 10s. 6d. because large numbers of provincials were fed that year. [18]
Transport
This supply organization could not have been successful without an efficient transport system. Loudoun created the efficient transport that paved the way to victory for Amherst. Two situations were involved -- transport overland and transport by water. In both cases dependability and honesty were required, and not often found, among the provincials who offered their services to the army. Wagons and carts were rented, along with their drivers, to work by day and distance. Even if dependable wagoners were obtained, cartage was extremely expensive. In 1756 shipping barrels from Albany to Lake George cost nearly half the value of their contents of food. [19]
The remedy was the establishment of a Crown-owned wagon corps, the first of its kind in the British army and one not duplicated until the Napoleonic Wars. [20]
Captain Gabriel Christie, assistant deputy quartermaster general, suggested the idea, and Loudoun accepted it in early 1757. The army built a wagon barn and stables at Albany. Fifty wagons and 110 horses were bought, and regular regiments supplied volunteers as drivers. The final establishment of the wagon corps was a director, subdirector, two assist ants, and fifty drivers. Loudon estimated that the Crown saved £ 3,400 over one six-month period by having its own wagon train. [21]
Standardization
He also hired ninety ox teams from Connecticut. Oxen were slower than horses, but they could pull heavier loads and were hardier. Loudoun also made a major effort to standardize the army's boats. Hitherto, transport boats came in various sizes and shapes, making packing and transport subject to the disparate sizes of the available vessels. Now the size of scows was standardized to thirty-eight by twelve feet, with a crew of five, and capable of carrying sixty barrels weighing thirty pounds each. Bateaux were to carry 1,500 pounds per vessel of twenty-five to thirty feet in length. [22]
Lieutenant Colonel John Bradstreet, deputy quartermaster general, was in charge of this standardization as well as general supervision of transport for the army. He had held the position since the time of Shirley's command. [23]
Shirley's inability to supervise logistical details or pick competent subordinates to do so had produced many errors; but one brilliant exception had been his choice in March 1756 of Major John Bradstreet to lead a corps of armed boatmen. Bradstreet had been lieutenant-govemor of St. Johns, Newfoundland; he knew how to handle provincials and how to master wilderness campaigning. He was Shirley's adjutant general, and Shirley felt he was just the man to organize the transportation of supplies. He was now ordered to raise forty companies of armed bateauxmen who could move supplies expeditiously across the wilderness and defend themselves if attacked. Each company had fifty men. A company of carpenters was also formed to cut away obstructions on the Mohawk River and Wood Creek.
By the early summer of 1756, Bradstreet's American boatmen were bringing supplies regularly to Oswego; they also proved that they could defend themselves. The French and Indians, nine hundred strong, set an ambush on the Onondaga River, nine miles from Oswego, for a convoy of provisions led by Bradstreet in July 1756. Bradstreet took direct command once the fight began and, after several hours of indecisive Indian-style fighting behind trees, led his men in an assault on the enemy. The charge routed the French and Indians. Frontier skirmishing prevented disaster, but Bradstreet's European-style bayonet attack brought victory. But even with such a conscientious, intelligent, and skilled soldier as fiery-tempered Bradstreet in control, many things could go wrong on a long supply route.
Sloops carried materiel from New York City to Albany. Twelve miles above Albany was the key transit point of Half Moon, where everything being sent up the Hudson and Mohawk rivers had to be shifted to land carriage. [24]
If the barrels were being sent westward, wagons would haul them to Schenectady, where they would be transferred to bateaux for the journey up the Mohawk River. The trip to Oswego involved numerous portages where the boats and their loads were carried, or pushed across log rollers, to deep water. Northward from Half Moon, wagons hauled provisions and stores over a bad woodland road that crossed numerous ravines over rickety bridges before reaching the hamlet of Stillwater, twelve miles away. A usually muddy track led to Saratoga, five miles distant, but it was customary to use scows in the Hudson to reach that settlement. Wagons or ox carts were used between Saratoga and Fort Edward, a distance of fifteen miles, and between Fort Edward and the shore of Lake George, another sixteen miles. [25]
Obstacles
The obstacles included bad weather, equipment failures, the enemy, and human carelessness. Even if nothing extraordinary happened, it was a slow trek. At the beginning of 1758, Abercromby asked Bradstreet how long it would take to supply the twenty thousand provincials that he expected would gather at Lake George. Bradstreet answered precisely that the optimal time of transport would be three weeks, moving 5,760 barrels in a thousand bateaux, eight hundred wagons, and a thousand ox carts. [26]
It was extremely important to educate officers and civilians to the care that must be taken in transporting supplies and military stores. More than once, provisions were left to spoil in the open or in inadequate lean-tos at Schenectady, Stillwater, Saratoga, and Fort Edward. In September 1757, General Webb found a thousand barrels of flour at Saratoga ruined through exposure. Two hundred and fifty barrels were judged fit -- they had only about ten pounds of mildewed flour mixed in with good flour. [27]
Tail and Eyes
Loudoun and Bradstreet did much to systematize the logistical "tail" of the army; equally significant were the steps Shirley, Loudoun, and others took to find the keenest "eyes" for the British forces. By the end of 1758, John Bradstreet's dedication had resulted in a well-fed and supplied British army in America. Robert Roger's daring was giving British commanders more knowledge of the enemy than ever before. To many British officers, America was "an immense uninhabited Wilderness overgrown everywhere with trees... and underbrush, so that no where can anyone see twenty yards." [28]
Since "la petite guerre" was common in the American forest, British commanders followed the example of their European counterparts and looked to local inhabitants for irregular auxiliaries. But British generals were disappointed in the skirmishing abilities of Indians and provincials. They discovered that Indians were expert woodsmen but also that they were not amenable to the lightest discipline. Neither side in the war wanted the Indians as enemies, but as allies they pratically had to be left to their own devices, for they could not easily be restrained. And the British believed Indians were devastated by liquor -- "dissolute, enfeebled, and indolent when sober, and intractable and mischievous in the Liquour, always quarreling, and often murdering one another." [29]
Indians could be used as minor auxiliaries, or better, to teach whites woodland warfare, as the Duke of Cumberland recommended. [30]
Recourse was next made to frontiersmen, who might be hired to scout and to skirmish for the regulars. Gorham's rangers had been raised as early as 1750 in Nova Scotia, and they were still active. [31] But they were needed where they were, and Governor Shirley looked to the frontiersmen of New Hampshire and New York to help him in 1755. [32] One of them, Robert Rogers, a man bred to the woods, became their most effective leader and eventually commanded "His Majesty's Independent Companies of Rangers". [33]
Roger's Rangers
Roger's Rangers seemed for a time to blend the woodsmanship and endurance of the Indians with the discipline and dedication of more civilized soldiers. Soon after he replaced Shirley, Loudoun considered obtaining as many rangers as he could. "It is impossible for an Army to Act in this Country, without Rangers; and there ought to be a considerable body of them, and the breeding them up to that, will be a great advantage to the Country, for they will be able to deal with Indians in their own way. [34]
Rogers assumed command of four ranger companies at Fort Edward at the end of 1756. Soon he became the nemesis of the French partisans on the Champlain frontier in summer and in winter. The Champlain-Hudson River Valley system was a chain of rivers and lakes that lay like a dagger, double-pointed to strike at the heart of either Canada or New York. Its waterways were crucial for both the transport of materiel and the movement of raiders and regulars. But water routes froze solid in winter, and even though individuals could move on snowshoes and supplies could move on sleds to some extent, major military operations ceased between October and May. As in Europe, there was a definite campaign season of hard ground and warm weather. The regulars went into winter quarters in frontier posts or in towns nearer the coast while the provincial rangers based at Fort Edward harassed and observed the French.
Loudoun had second thoughts about the rangers in 1757; they were extremely expensive, and they were not even regulars. [35] Loudoun was apparently attentive to the advice of Cumberland: "'till Regular Officers with men they can trust, learn to beat the woods, & act as Irregulars, you will never gain any certain intelligence of the Enemy, as I fear, by this time, you are convinced that Indian intelligence and that of the Rangers is not at all to be depended upon." [36]
When he returned from Louisbourg, Loudoun was determined to convert two companies of each battalion into rangers and possibly to form a separate corps. He invited "gentlemen volunteers" from the regulars to accompany Rogers on his forays and to learn ranging from a master. This plan lasted only two months. The regulars were then ordered back to their units, for Loudoun had discovered another alternative. [37]
Light Infantry Regiment
Loudoun now decided to form a regular regiment of light infantry. It was the first instance of this in the British army, which, compared to the other European powers, had been tardy in creating regular light infantry to assist and complement the regular battalions. Prussia had its jaegers and freikorps, Austria its pandours and grenzer, and France its chasseurs. [38]
The opening move was made by ambitious Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Gage of the Forty-fourth Foot. He proposed to raise a weak battalion of five companies on his own and to be reimbursed if the Crown approved. Both Loudoun and the King gave their approval, and Gage gained his colonelcy in the summer of 1758. [39]
Loudoun and his commanders were beginning to realize the limitations of provincial rangers. Experience revealed that only Rogers could control them -- but not all the time. Like Indians, they were excessively fond of rum and went out on patrol only when it pleased them. They also had a tendency to riot when exposed to regular discipline. Yet they were expanded to nine companies, including one of Christian Mahican Indians from Stockbridge, Massachusetts, for the campaign of 1758.
Perhaps most significant was the adaptation of the regular battalions. In 1756, at the urging of several Swiss soldiers of fortune in the British service, the Crown decided to raise in Pennsylvania and New York a sort of foreign legion for American service. It was a regiment of German- speaking Americans of four battalions, with many foreign officers. They were trained "to fire at Marks, and in order to qualify them for the service of the Woods, they are to be taught to load and fire, lyeing on the Ground and kneeling. They are to be taught to march in Order, slow and fast in all sortes of Ground. They are frequently to pitch & fold up their Tents, and to be accustomed to pack up and carry their necessaries in the most commodious manner." [40]
But the new regiment, the Sixtieth Foot or Royal Americans, was not a light infantry unit. [41] It was dressed like the regulars but without lace on its uniform. All the regiments in America were being trained to skirmish by this time and, if an ambush erupted, soldiers followed the orders to "tree all". [42] British officers began to recognize the value of patrolling both to keep enemy Indians at a distance and to acclimate their men. [43]
"Plough Men"
In the summer of 1758 one officer wrote: "You would laugh to see the droll figure we cut. Regular and Provincials are ordered to cut the brims of their hats off. The Regulars as well as the Provincials have left off their proper regimentals, that is, they have cut their coats so as to scarecely reach their waist. You would not distinguish us from common plough men." [44 ]
In addition, other efforts were made to adapt the troops to their environment. The troops carried in their haversacks thirty pounds of meal, which they cooked for themselves. Knapsacks often were discarded, and the soldiers wore blanket rolls like the rangers. In June 1758, ten rifles were issued to each battalion to arm the best marksmen. [45]
The model for regimental adaptation was the Fifty-fifth Foot, and the model of personnel adaptation was its colonel, George Augustus, Viscount Howe. Howe made his regiment over in the image of the rangers; its uniform, however, remained the traditional red. An observant young woman remembered that
As a result of these changes one soldier could write in 1758 that "The art of War is much changed and improved here. I suppose by the end of the summer it will have undergone a total Revolution... Our hair is about an inch long;.., hats... are worn slouched... Coats are docked... The Highlanders have put on breeches... Swords and sashes are degraded, and many have taken up the Hatchet and wear Tomahawks." [47]
Thus the army that Loudoun left owed much to his flexibility and attention to detail, even if Abercromby thought military affairs were more backward at Loudoun's departure than when he first appeared. [48] Amherst, as commander in chief, was indebted to his predecessors for his improved army of 1759. The major challenge that he faced was to use this army, now adapted to American conditions, to best advantage.
Two Large Maps (Crown Point, Formation), very slow: 188K
Amherst took measures that winter to check the activities of French and Indians near his cantonments. [49] He ordered that a pursuit force of rangers always be ready at Fort Edward. He wrote of the Indian raiders: "Once overtaken they are very easily beat, and they won't like returning again..." [50] Gage was less sanguine than Amherst, as he wrote to Lieutenant Colonel Frederick Haldimand in February: "I don't imagine we shall ever overtake them by a pursuit in the Woods. The only chance to come up with them in my opinion is not to pursue but to send a Party to take a sweep around and try and hit them." [51] Gage also wrote to Amherst at the same time that Haldimand:
Effective
When led by Rogers, the rangers could be very effective. On March 3, 1759, Rogers led a picked force of 358 men, consisting of 52 Iroquois Indians, 169 light infantry of the Royal Americans, 47 men of the Royal Regiment (Second Battalion/First Regiment of Foot), and 90 rangers, to scout Fort Carillon at Ticonderoga. Lieutenant Diedrich Brehin, an engineer attached to the First Battalion of the Sixtieth Foot, accompanied the party. Brehin spent most of one moonlit night flat on his stomach in the snow on a mountain overlooking Fort Carillon. He sketched the fort and later crept up to a new French log barrier replacingthe one Montcalm had built to thwart Abercromby. There Brehin examined the fort at close hand. The ensuing raid was a big success; only a few men were lost, though others were severely frostbitten. [53]
The party returned with five scalps, five prisoners, and valuable information about the fort, despite having been twice pursued by the enemy. The conduct of the British Indians with Rogers was less than admirable. Half of the original force of Indians had disappeared on the course of their well-lubricated journey from the Mohawk Valley to Fort Edward. On the return trip, the Indians shot a Highland sentry in the leg.
Although Rogers was anxious to use one or two companies of Stockbridge Indians in the campaign of 1759, Gage was less impressed with their abilities. He informed Amherst that "These Indians were last Campaign a great Nuisance to the Army, and did no manner of service; some People say they were not properly managed, I own myself ignorant of the management that is proper for those Gentry; can only say that neither orders or Entreatys could prevail on them to do service, always lying drunk in their Hutts, or firing round the camp." [54] Amherst nevertheless gave permission for two companies of Stockbridge warriors to be raised for the rangers, though he had his doubts about using any Indians. He wrote Gage that
Major Rogers began early in 1759 to recruit his rangers to full strength for the opening of the campaign. Amherst put advertisements in newspapers and wrote colonial officials calling for volunteers for the rangers. Recruits began slowly to join Rogers in March; by the beginning of May he had reassembled most of his corps. Joseph Gorham's rangers, the best and least expensive of the ranger organizations, according to Amherst, had remained in service in Nova Scotia over the winter. [56] Despite his use of over 1,000 rangers in New York alone in 1759, Amherst did not discard the concept of regular light infantrymen.
New Drill
During the winter the regulars were taught a new type of drill that had been imported from the army of Frederick the Great. [57] Although this development may appear to imply that the army was becoming more European and more formalistic in its training, it was really a sign of flexibility of outlook. The footsore musketeers of the Prussian King had for three years fought off far greater numbers of their enemies, partly by having better generals, partly by having better tactics and training. No wonder that their allies should try to emulate them.
At the same time, the British generals in North America had seen the need for "light-armed foot" as a result of their own experiences in the New World. Amherst strongly approved of the idea of light infantry. In February 1759 he ordered one-tenth of each regular battalion formed into a light infantry corps. [58] An officer on Amherst's staff wrote of the decision: "We have chosen out one hundred men from each regiment, and pitched upon the officer to act this year as light infantry; they are clothed and accoutered as light as possible and in my opinion are a kind of troops that has been much wanted in this country. They have what ammunition they want, so that I don't doubt but they will be excellent marksmen. [59]
To facilitate the movement of light infantrymen through the brush. Amherst ordered in May that they be equipped with carbines in place of muskets. [60] Like the rangers, the light infantry were trained to "swing pack" at a moment's notice and move swiftly through the wilderness; in addition, they possessed the discipline and staying power of regulars. Amherst was also pleased to note that American volunteers had quickly filled up the depleted ranks of Gage's light infantry. He remarked that "the Yankees love dearly a brown coat." [61] In terms of light infantry, the army was well prepared for the campaign of 1759.
Two Large Maps (Crown Point, Formation), very slow: 188K
Pitt's great plan for the campaign of 1759 was ambitious in scope and objective. He ordered Amherst to advance into the heart of Canada after capturing the stronghold of Fort Carillon; Wolfe was to seize Quebec; other commands would assist. Pitt desired nothing less than the conquest of Canada in 1759. Spring was a time of preparation -- no offensive could be launched until the provincials had assembled after spring planting. The regulars drilled, the rangers scouted, supplies and equipment were readied and moved forward. At the beginning of May, Amherst began to mass his army of 5,500 regulars and 5,000 provincials above Albany. [62] The last of the colonial contingents would arrive six weeks later, much to the annoyance of the impatient Amherst.
At about this time Amherst introduced for the first time in the British army the celebrated two-deep "thin red line" formation that would often be seen in the American Revolution, and would win undying fame in the Peninsular War, at Waterloo, and at Balaclava. By standing order, Amherst told his troops to reduce their firing lines from three ranks to two because "the enemy have very few regular troops to oppose us, and no yelling of Indians, or fire of Canadians, can possibly withstand two ranks, if the men are silent, attentive, and obedient to their officers."[63]
Major Robert Rogers's corps of rangers was ready to take the field with a fresh strength of 800 men. Unhappily, many rangers were new to irregular warfare. Amherst complained to Gage, his able assistant: "they are the most unknowing for every part of the Service that is to be conceived, at their rate of going on they must always be beat, I have tryed to rub them up and show them the way to march in woods for those I have had with me know nothing of the matter."[64] Nevertheless, Rogers supplied valuable information about the French at Carillon. His rangers were constantly skirmishing with the French Indians and bushlopers after warm weather returned.
Amherst was much more concerned, of course, with the forwarding of supplies and troops to the camps and posts above Albany -- most of which was the task of Bradstreet's bateaux corps. Bradstreet had had great difficulty finding volunteers for his transport service. Lured by the high bounties of provincial regiments and repelled by the hard labor of the transport network, colonial volunteers were scarce in 1759.[65] The upshot was that there were only enough bateauxmen to provide transport for an expedition against Niagara led by General John Prideaux. Amherst was obliged to resort to an expedient of 1758: having combat troops, particularly provincials, carry forward their own provisions in stages. This scheme had not been very successful the previous year. The troops were overworked, many provisions had spoiled, and many draft animals had been ruined. Since the provincials despised such grueling labor, desertions increased.
As the tempo of the campaign quickened, problems increased. Heavy rains in May turned the roads to seas of mud and swept from the shore line of the Mohawk River a number of bateaux and whaleboats inexpertly stored by provincials in 1758. Quick action by Amherst saved most of the river craft from plunging over Cohoes Falls. Amherst gave orders reminding the army of the need for constant vigilance: "all detachments will keep out Flanking Partys whether they come in Batteaus or march as the commanding officer will judge necessary, that it may not be in the power of any Skulking Party of the Enemy to surprise and scalp any that are careless."[66] As ever, the troops were drilled in alternate firing and in marksmanship.
Amherst's army, well supplied and well trained, moved down Lake George in late June and easily took Forts Carillon and St. Frederic. Prideaux and his successor, Gage, captured Niagara. In each offensive, the supply system worked well. The French did have a surprise for Amherst on Lake Champlain: a fleet of four vessels. That tiny flotilla was enough to smash an unprotected British armada of bateaux and whale-boats. Amherst had no recourse but to build warships of his own to gain control of Champlain. He worried constantly about Wolfe's progress before Quebec, but he could neither send aid nor put more pressure on the French. Gage, having taken Niagara, disobeyed Amherst's orders to move on to Montreal. While Amherst built ships he also rebuilt Fort Carillon and renamed it Fort Ticonderoga. He built a strong new fort at Crown Point as well. These posts would be key supply depots in the eventual conquest of Canada.
Only by mid-September were the British vessels ready. They easily out maneuvered and took the French craft. Two obstacles remained: the French fort at Isle-au-Noix and the storms of early autumn. Amherst learned at this time that Wolfe had captured Quebec, but most of its defenders had escaped to Montreal and possible to Isle-au-Noix. With total victory in sight, Amherst reluctantly postponed the conquest of Canada until 1760.[67] While his army was halted at Lake Champlain, Amherst decided to remove one troublesome military factor in this and future campaigns. Angered at the constant pinprick attacks of the Abenaki Indians, the most numerous Indian allies of the French, he decided to destroy their main village of St. Francois (St. Francis), near the St. Lawrence. He told Robert Rogers to take 200 rangers and "Remember the Barbarities that have been committed by the enemy's Indian scoundrels. Take your revenge, but don't forget that, though those dastardly villains have promiscuously murdered women and children of all ages, it is my order that no women or be killed or hurt."[68] The rangers were delighted "to chastise these savages with some severity."[69] For years the St. Francis Indians had terrorized the New England frontier; many rangers had lost kin and friends to the Abenakis.
Crossing 200 miles of wild terrain to get to St. Francis was difficult even for the rangers. One-quarter of their strength melted away because of sickness, lameness, and injuries, even before reaching St. Francis. But they did surprise the Indian town, kill between 100 and 200 inhabitants, and burn the place down. Rogers lost only two men in the massacre; he lost many more on the way home by not exercising more discipline over his raiders. Before stumbling into the Connecticut Valley settlements, one- third of his hungry men fell prey to enraged pursuers and to starvation. Yet the raid was a great success. It dealt a sharp blow to the morale of the French and their red allies. There were no sanctuaries now: Amherst's raiders could penetrate deep into Canada.
Amherst formed another anti-Indian expedition in early 1760 to punish the Cherokees who were attacking the frontiers of the Carolinas and Virginia. He sent south a crack force of 1,300 regulars, including 400 Highlanders. The Highlanders may have welcomed the sight of the mountains in Cherokee country. Their commander, Colonel Archibald Montgomery, was undoubtedly glad to have such sturdy mountaineers in his force. The expedition punished the Cherokees but discovered that it had only enough pack horses to carry either provisions or the British wounded. In these circumstances Montgomery decided to rejoin Amherst. The skillfully led expedition was thus a failure, and its retreat actually encouraged the Indians. Another expedition the following year would settle the matter.
The skill of the British army in crossing the wilderness was never more obvious than in 1760. Amherst ordered a three-pronged advance on what was left of French power at Montreal. One army, under Amherst himself, advanced up the Mohawk, across Lake Ontario, and down the St. Lawrence to Montreal. Another pincer advanced on Montreal from Quebec. A third took Isle-au-Noix and approached Montreal from the south. All three armies gathered outside the crumbling walls of the city within a forty-eight-hour period.[70] New France surrendered on September 8, 1760.
The last campaign of the war went so smoothly, with few casualties and little delay, that it is easy to underestimate it. Seventeen thousand regulars and provincials crossed hundreds of miles of wilderness to meet at Montreal. It was a British logistic triumph. The rangers, Iroquois, and light regulars who came to Montreal show that it was also a victory fo the use of auxiliaries in American campaigns. Both bateauxmen and light troops eased the passage of the regulars and provincials.
There would be other campaigns ahead even though New France had fallen. The French still held Martinique and other valuable sugar islands, and the Spanish would be attacked at Havana. The Cherokee were to be chastised. In 1763, the colonial frontier would be set alight by Pontiac's uprising. In the campaigns and in later ones in America and Europe, the British army would profit from its adaptation to wilderness conditions.
The British army met problems in the French and Indian War unlike any in the Old World. New and extraordinary logistical and tactical problems had to be solved to enable to army to cross rugged terrain and great distances. The men in the ranks, already accustomed to grueling labor, rigid discipline, and the ravages of camp diseases, had to overcome their fears of Indians and the oppressive presence of the American forest. The army that entered Montreal in triumph in 1760, took Havana in 1762, held out at Detroit and Fort Pitt, and won at Bushy Run was still basically a European army, using European weapons, tactics, organization, and administration. Like the redcoats at Minden, the troops in America wore red and carried flintlock muskets. Unlike their comrades in Europe, they took aim at their opponents. Battalions formed up in ranks at Quebec and Ticonderoga and Louisbourg in formations not very different from those at Dettingen and Fontenoy. Fighting alongside the British in America, however, were troops that made warfare there different: rangers, Indians, combat boatmen, and regular light infantry. Those auxiliary troops, irregulars, smoothed the way across the wilderness for the regulars and permitted them to fight decisive battles in the European manner -- the only way technology and training allowed.
Intelligence and logistics, the probing feelers and extenuated tail of an army, were developed to let the forces of George II and George III crawl through the forest to victory. A way had been found to make war in such a country.
1. Lee McCardell, Ill-Starred General: Braddock of the Coldstream Guards (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1958), p. 180.
This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web.
-- BILL PROTZ
"Lord Howe always lay... with the regiment which he commanded and which he modelled in such a manner that they were ever after considered an example to the whole American army... Above the pedantry of holding up standards of military rules where it was impossible to practice them, and the narrow-spirit of preferring the modes of his own country... Lord Howe laid aside all pride and prejudice, and gratefully accepted counsel from those whom he knew to be best qualified to direct them." [46]
Two Jumbo Maps (Crown Point, Formation), extremely slow: 448K
"will use all means to Chastise them when they next make their appearance: but I despair of this being done by Rangers, judging from the many pursuits of those people after the Indians during my service in this Country, in which they have never once come up with them. The Light Infantry of the Regiment headed by a briske Officer with some of the boldest Rangers mixed with Them, to prevent their being lost in the Woods, will be the most likely people to Effect this service." [52]
"I know what a vile brew they are and I have as bad an opinion of lazy rum drunking scoundrels as any one can have, I shall however take them into His Majesty's Service for this next campaign, to keep them from doing mischief elsewhere, and as I am in hopes we shall to act offensively and successfully, they may be of more service than what they have hitherto been. The French are afraid of them, and though they have but very little reason for it, it will be right not only to keep up their terror but to increase it as much as we can, which the name of numbers will do, and I shall for that reason engage as many of them as I can for the ensuing campaign." [55]
Two Jumbo Maps (Crown Point, Formation), extremely slow: 448K
Notes
2. Francis Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe, 2 vols. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1911-12).
3. For example, a widely used American history college text: "Brave but aged, wise in the ways of European warfare but unused to the American woods, Braddock wore out his men by having them cut a long military road through the forest to Fort Duquesne, and he exposed them to attack from the tree-hidden enemy by marching them in the accepted European formation. Seven miles from the fort he ran into a French and Indian ambush." Richard Current, T. Harry Williams, and Frank Freidel, American History: A Survey. 4th ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1975).
4. On the Braddock campaign, see: Lawrence H. Gipson, The British Empire Before the American Revolution, 10 vols. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1946-70), vol. 6: The Years of Defeat; Paul E. Kopperman, Braddock at the Monongahela (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1976); McCardell, Ill-Starred General; Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe; and Stanley Pargellis, ed., Military Affairs in North America, 1748-1765, Selected Documents from the Cumberland Papers in Windsor Castle (New York: D. Appleton-Century, for the American Historical Assocaition, 1936). The best general works on the French and Indian Wars are Gipson, British Empire; Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe; Pargells, Military Affairs; and Douglas F. Leach, Arms for Empire: A Military History of the British Colonies in North America, 1607-1776 (New York: Macmillan, 1973).
5. Pargellis, Military Affairs, pp. 82, 85.
6. Winthrop Sargent, ed., A History of the Expedition Against Fort Duquesne, in 1755 Under General Edward Braddock (Philadelphia: Historical Society of Pennsylvania, 1855), pp. 16ff.
7. Pargellis, Military Affairs, pp. 129ff.
8. Benjamin Franklin, Autobiography, ed. Frank Pine (New York: Garden City, 1916), p. 268.
9. The most complete and most dry account of the campaigns of this war is Gipson, British Empire.
10. For Louisbourg, see J. S. McLennan, Louisbourg, from its Foundation to its Fall (Sydney, Nova Scotia: Fortress, 1969).
11. Stanley Pargellis, Lord Loudoun in North America (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1933), p. 67.
12. Text of the contract: War Office 34 (Amherst Papers; hereafter cited as WO), vol. 69.
13. John Knox, An Historical Journal of the Campaigns in North America... (1769) 3 vols., ed. Arthur C. Doughty (Toronto: Champlain Society, 1914), 1:1.
14. The Middle Atlantic colonies.
15. Christopher Kilby to James Abercromby, September 3,1758, WO 34, vol. 69.
16. Ibid.
17. Leake was perhaps too suspicious. In 1757, Kilby proved that many of the provisions condemned by Leake were fit. Pargellis, Lord Loudon, p. 295.
18. Ibid, p. 292
19. Ibid, p. 297
20. Colonel RH. Beadon, The Royal Army Service Corps, a History of Transport and Supply in the British Army, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1931), is deficient for the eighteenth century. George C. Shaw, Supply in Modern War (London: Faber and Faber, 1938), is archaic but interesting. Of greater application is Michael Glover's superb book, Peninsula Preparation: The Reform of the British Army, 1795-1809 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), which has chapters on supply, administration, training, and other vital functions of the army. King Lawrence Parker, "Anglo-American Wilderness Campaigning 1754-1764: Logistical and Tactical Developments" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1970), is interesting. Recent, provocative, but covering this period only briefly (pp.26-39), is Martin Van Creveld, Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977).
21. Loudoun Papers, Henry t. Huntington Library, 1723 and 3214.
22. Ibid, 1342. See the Francis Parkman Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society, no. 43, p. 30, for the sizes of British bateaux. A large bateau carried two barrels of salt pork, four barrels of flour, one barrel of peas, on firkin of butter, and one barrel of rum as a standard load. The barrels were of various sizes, accordingto the items they held. The weight of the provisions was 1,732 pounds. Loudoun Papers, 1342.
23. SirJohn St. Clair was the deputy quartermaster general in American from 1755 to 1757. MajorJames Robertson held the position temporarily from March to December 1757, when Bradstreet assumed the title. A quartermaster general was in overall control of supplying the army with provisions, arranging for quarters, and organizing troop movements. "Deputy" was the highest title for the role given in North America.
24. The Hudson had rifts about Half Moon. Cohoes Falls, with "the roar of a Storm at Sea heard from the Land in the dead of Night," near the mouth of the Mohawk, made a portage necessary. The quotation is from Thomas Pownall, A Topographical Description of Such Parts of North America... (London: J. Almon, 1776), p. 35
25. Loudoun Papers, 4371, gives a good description of this route in 1757. Twenty thousand pounds of provisions were needed to feed a battalion of a thousand men for one week. Eleven or twelve bateaux and twice as many wagons were required to convey this amount from Albany to Lake George. The trip took six days. Loudoun Papers. 2549.
26. Pargellis Lord Loudoun, pp. 298-99.
27. Loudoun Papers, 4397.
28. General John Forbes, Writings of General John Forbes, Relating to His Service in North America (Menasha, Wis.: Collegiate, 1938), p. 123.
29. Benjamin Franklin, "A Treaty held with the Ohio Indians, at Carlisle, In October, 1753", in The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, ed. Leonard W. Labaree (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959-), 5:107.
30. Cumberland to Loudoun, October 22, 1756, in Pargellis, Military Affairs, p. 251. On the Indians, see: Wendell S. Hadlock, "War Among the Northeastern Woodland Indians," American Anthropologist, n.s., 49 (1947): 204-21; John Mahon, "Anglo- American Methods of Indian Warfare, 1676-1794," Mississippi Valley Historical Review 45 (1 95B-59): 254-75; John Tebbel and Keith Jennison, The American Indian Wars (New York: Harper Brothers, 1960); Harry Turney-High, Primitive War (Colum bia: University of South Carolina Press, 1949); and Daniel F. Worcester, "The Weapons of American Indians," New Mexico Hisforial Review 20 (1945): 227-38.
31. Joseph Gorham's rangers served the Crown until 1765. They were later known as the "North American Rangers" and served at Quebec in 1759 and 1760, at Havana in 1762, and at Detroit in 1763. In 1761 Gorham became the only American ranger officer to be awarded a regular commission. Joseph Gorham's father had led a ranger company in Nova Scotia from 1744 to 1750.
32. William Shirley, Correspondence of William Shirley, Governor of Massachusetts and Military Commanderof North America, 1731-1760, ed. Charles H. Lincoln (New York: Macmillan, 1912), pp. 453-59. Robert Rogers, Journals of Major Robert Rogers..., ed. Franklin B. Hough (Albany: J. Munsell's Sons, 1883), pp. 14-15.
33. The best written, if biased, account of Rogers's life is John R. Cuneo, Robert Rogers of the Rangers (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959). A more detailed account is in Burt B. Loescher, The History of Rogers' Rangers: The Beginnings, 1755- 1758 (San Francisco: Burt B. Loescher, 1949), and in idem, Genesis, Rogers' Rangers... 1758-1783 (San Mateo; Burt B. Loescher, 1969). Rogers's journals are valuable and literate and contain his famous maxims for ranger warfare. Refer also to "Joshua Goodenough's Old Letter," ed. Frederic Remington, in Harper's New Monthly Magazine 95 (1897): 878-89, for a personal account of ranger life and prints of the rangers by Remington. Goodenough wrote at one point (p. 880): "they would always fight well enough, though often to no good purpose, which was not their fault so much as the headstrong leadership which persisted in making them come to close quarters while at a disadvantage."
34. Loudoun to Cumberland, November 22, 1756, in Pargellis, Military Affairs, p. 269.
35. Pargellis, Lord Loudoun, p. 303.
36. Cumberland to Loudoun, December 2, 1756, in Pargellis, Military Affairs, pp. 25 5-56.
37. Pargellis, Lord Loudoun, p. 304-05.
38. John C. Fuller, British Light Infantry in the Eighteenth Century (London: Hutchin son, 1925), is vague, very brief, and unreliable, but it is the only book on the subject. For a stimulating essay on the doctrinal legacy of light infantry development, see Peter Paret, "Colonial Experience and European Military Reform at the End of the Eighteenth Century," Journal of the Institute for Army Historical Research 37 (1959): 47-59. The best account of the role of British light infantry in America is in Eric Robson, "British Light Infantry in the Eighteenth Century: The Effect of American Conditions," Army and Defense Quarterly 62 (1952): 209-22.
39. Pargellis, Lord Loudoun, pp. 304-05; WO (Amherst Papers), bundle 46a, has Gage's proposal to Loudoun of November 1757, and Gage's orders to raise the unit are in bundle 72; Forbes, Writings. pp. 216-17. The Eightieth Foot had brown jackets rather than red.
40. Loudoun Papers, 2421, cited in Pargellis, Lord Loudoun, pp. 299-300.
41. Lewis Butler, The Annals of the King's Royal Rifle Corps, vol. 1, "The Royal Americans" (London: Smith, Elder, 1913), makes the mistake of calling the Royal Americans light infantry. He confuses the earlier unit with the Sixtieth Foot when it was a crack light infantry unit in the Napoleonic era. The four battalions of the Sixtieth never were considered light infantry, were not trained as such, and were never used as such. In addition, they later had light infantry companies as did other line battalions. While it is true that James Prevost, commander of the Fourth Battalion/ Sixtieth Foot, urged in May 1757 that American units be raised and trained in light infantry style, including the use of whistles and Indian-chasing dogs, there is no evidence that the plan was ever accepted or that Prevost made such innovations in his own battalion. Prevost to Cumberland, "Memoire sur la Guerre d'Amerique", in Pargellis, Mililary Affairs, pp. 337-40.
42. Pargellis, Lord Loudoun, p. 300.
43. Memorandum of General John Forbes, written at New York, December 18, 1757, in Forbes, Writings, p.24. A few months later, when leading his army across the wilderness to the Forks of the Ohio, Forbes wrote to Lieutenant Colonel Bouquet of the First Battalion/Sixtieth Foot (in ibid., p. 125): "I must confess in this country, wee must comply and learn the Art of Warr, from Ennemy Indians or anything else who have seen the country and Warr carried on in it."
44. Letter of anonymous officer at Flatbush, Long Island, June 13, 1758, in Cecil P. Lawson, A History of the Uniforms of the British Army, 5 vols. (London: Peter Davies et al., 1940-67), 4:77-78.
45. Norreys Jephson O'Connor, A Servant of the Crown in England and North America, 1756-1761... (New York: D. Appleton-Century, 1938), p. 96.
46. Ann Grant, Memoirs of an American Lady..., 2 vols. (London: Longman, Hurst, Rees, and Orme, 1809), 1:199-200.
47. Dr. Richard Huck-Saunders to Jan Ingenhousz, May 18, 1758, microfilm copy in the Ingenhousz letters, American Philosophical Society, Philadelphia.
48. Abercromby to General Lawrence, Governor of Nova Scotia, April 30, 1 758, Abercromby Papers, Henry E. Huntington Library, San Marino, Califomia.
49. Amherst to Gage, February 10,1759, Amherst Letters, vol.4, William J. Clements Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan.
50. Ibid.
51. Gage to Haldimand, February 20, 1759, Gage Letter Book, Clements Library. Gage assured Major Clephane, who was in charge of Fort Stanwix, that men who captured or killed Indian raiders would be weel rewarded. "Prisoners are troublesome. I look upon these partys as so many assassins, not soldiers, therefore they have no quarter." Gage to Clephane, March 16, 1759, Gage Letter Book.
52. Gage to Amherst, February 18, 1759, ibid.
53. Rogers's journal of this expedition, his examination of the prisoners, and Brehm's description of Carillon are in WO 34, vol. 46A.
54. Gage to Amherst, February 24, 1759, ibid.
55. Amherst to Gage, February 20, 1759, Amherst Letters, vol. 4, Clements Library. Amherst also wrote to Gage a month later: "Capt. Jacobs has behaved just like him self and all the drunken good for nothing tribe, I hate them all, but as things are they may do some good by doing mischief of which we have a great deal to do [to] be at par with the French." Amherst to Gage, March 26, 1759, Amherst Letters, vol. 4, Clements Library.
56. Amherst to Charles Lawrence, March 9, 1759, WO 34, vol. 46A.
57. Amherst, "General Orders," December 13, 1758, Amherst Papers, Public Archives of Canada, P58. Translations of the Prussian infantry regulations were published in London in 1754 and 1757. The best book on the training of the British army in this period is J.A. Houlding, Fit for Service: The Training of the British Army, 1715-1795 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981).
58. Gage to Amherst, February 24, 1759, WO 34, vol. 46A.
59. Captain RogerTownshend to Major Robert Rogers, February 26,1759, in Rogers, Journals, ed. Hough, pp. 97-98.
60. Amherst to James Furnis, comptroller of ordnance in North America, May 5, 1759, WO 34, vol. 79.
61. Amherst to Ligionier, January18, 1759, Amherst Slipcase, Clements Library, and Public Archives of Canada, P11.
62. Gage Papers, American Series, vol. 2, Clements Library.
63. Knox, Historical Journal, 1:487-88.
64. Amherst to Gage, June 6, 1759, Amherst Letters, vol. 4, Clements Library.
65. Bradstreet to Horatio Gates, August 21,1759, Gage Papers, American Series, vol. 3, Clements Library.
66. Amherst to Captain Robert Prescott, June 14, 1759, WO 34, vol. 80.
67. For details see Daniel J. Beattie, "General Jeffery Amherst and the Conquest of Canada, 1758-1 760" (Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1975; published version, Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1976); and Jeffery Amherst, The Journal of Jeffery Amherst..., ed. John C. Webster (Toronto: Ryerson, 1931).
68. Robert Rogers, The Journals of Robert Rogers, ed. Howard H. Peckham (New York: Corinth, 1961), p. 144.
69. Ibid.
70. Amherst, Journal, p. 247.
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