These hypotheses seemed to us to be inconsistent with our general knowledge of the historical record. Forexample, Arrian's account of Alexander's victory at Guagamela indicates that even the defeat of an entire flank might not lead to a general rout, even of the less disciplined Persian army. Again in Arrian, it appears that Alexander's subcommanders had considerable latitude in deployment, while the commanding officer might in fact be in charge of only a small part of the actual action.
To further and more thoroughly examine the validity of this approach to the ancient wargame we examined both primary and secondary accounts of three of the most important battle sof the 5th and 4th centuries B.C. between hoplite Greek armies duringthe Peloponnesian, Corinthian, and Theban wars.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
The three battles examined are classical period hoplite confrontations which took place over a 40 year period from the late Peloponnesian war to the wars of Theban independence. Primary sources consisted of Xenophon's "Hellenica", Penguin Books 1979, Middlesex England; Thucydides"'The Peloponnesian War", Penguin Books 1972, Middlesex England; and Asclepiodotus "Tactics", Harvard University Press 1923, Cambridge Massachusetts.
Secondary works included Pritchett, W. Kendrick, "The Greek State at War", University of California Press, Berkeley California, 1985; Lazenby, J.F., "The Spartan Army", Bolchazy Carducci Publishers, Chicago Illinois, 1985 and Anderson, J.K., "Military Theory and Practice in the Age of Xenophon", University of California Press, Berkeley California, 1970.
THE BATTLE OF MANTINEIA
The Battle of Mantineia took place during the Peloponnesian war be tween Athens and Sparta in 418 B.C. The Athenians, in hopes of finall defeating the Spartans on land, built a powerful coalition of allies incluc ing the Mantinieans, Argives and Arcadians which in effect reduced the Spartans to one remaining ally on the Peloponnesian peninsula. When this ally, Tegea, was threatened in 418 by an Athenian advance from Mantineia to the north, the Spartan army was brought out in force. Initially the Athenians and their applies deployed on a commanding uphill position between Mentineia and Tegea to the south. The Spartans, under King Agis, were eager for action, but after closing "within missile range" decided against attacking the Athenians under such unfavorable circumstances.
In order to lure the Athenians to less dominating terrain, the Spartans proceeded to dam a minor river, flooding the Mentineian crops (talk about dicing for terrain!) and provoking the advance of the Allied army.
As illustrated in figure 1, the Spartans deployed six morai of about 1000 men each. (Thucydides appears to confuse the term lochos, a "demi-" morai with moral in his account.) King Agis, with 300 picked bodyguards was in the center. On the left, a lochos of older veteran soldiers was stationed with a unit of non-citizen helot soldiers, all armed as hoplites. On the extreme left was a unit called the Skiritai. Lazenby presents a strong argument that these troops numbered 600 strong (contrary to Phil Barker's opinion), and were armed as hoplites. Other authors have suggested that they were a lighter or more mobile peltast-like troop more suited to rough terrain combat. The Spartans were deployed 8 deep, presenting a front of 1000 shields over about 800 yards.
Opposing them were a similar number of Athenian and allied troops, Mantineians, Argives and Arcadians, as noted in figure 1.
Recent authors in THE COURIER suggest that the major problem among ancient period wargames is the lack of an historically accurate set of rules. They propose that in order to create a realistic simulation of ancient combat, several new restrictive principles should be adopted: first, a "main battleline rule" which prevents heavy infantry units from operating independently or gaps from appearing in their line; second, a rule severely limiting maneuver of infantry after initial deployment; and third, the defeat of the first army to lose one unit in its main line.
As the two sides now advance, each inclined slightly to its right, overlapping the enemy left. Thucydides suggests that this was the natural tendency for hoplite troops who tended to crowd to the right away from their unshielded side. King Agis, finding his left flank being overlapped now ordered the Skiritai and Brasideioi to "shift to the left" to cover the front of the Mantineians. A 200 yard gap was quickly created in the Spartan line as these troops extended to the left, and King Agis ordered two lochoi from the right to countermarch into the gap. However, the Spartan polemarchs in charge of the involved lochoi refused the king's orders (and were subsequently banished), and in the ensuing collision the Skiritai and Brasideioi were routed with heavy casualties. See Figures 2 and 3.
The defeat of two main battleline units did not result in the defeat of the Spartan army. As the two lines approached, the Argives facing the Spartan morai in the center fled, perhaps even before joining in melee. The Athenians on the far right were now outflanked to both right and left and were able to extricate themselves only because of the work of their small cavalry detachment.
The battle was still unresolved as it entered its final phase (figure 4). Each side had now routed its opponent on the right. But while the Mantineians participated in an uncontrolled pursuit, the Spartans allowed the Athenians to withdraw, and wheeled their own line to bear on the flank of the Mantineians and picked Argives and Arcadians. These troops attempted to retire, and were struck on the unshielded flank by the Spartans suffering nearly 1000 casualties to the units involved. The victorious Spartans suffered about 300 dead, mostly among the Spiritai and Brasedeioi.
Thus, despite rather shaky maneuvering, the Spartans obtained a major victory; as Thucidides notes, they were thoroughly bested in terms of skill, but not in manhood.
I would agree that the rather simplistic victory conditions in "Tactica" do not always comport with what occurred in actual battles, just as the lack of real maneuver restrictions in WRG result in unrealistic situations on the tabletop. Under WRG the Argives and Arcadians would simply have faced the threat and avoided disaster, something they were apparently incapable of in actuality. Part of the Spartans' success was nonetheless due to maintaining the bulk of their battle line intact as graphically depicted in the diagrams. - ED.
BATTLE OF THE NEMEA RIVER
The battle of the Nemea River took place 24 years later during the Corinthian War. This pitted Spartaand several minorallies includingthe Mantineians against a recovered Athens, Thebes, Euboea, Corinth, and the Argives. A Spartan army under the regent Aristodemos approached Corinth from the west, along the south shore of the Gulf of Corinth; while the Corinthians and their allies approached from the east. The two armies camped about one mile apart. The Spartan army consisted of 5 moral of about 1000 men each, and 13,000 allies. The Athenians and Corinthians may have numbered several thousand more.
On the morning of the battle the Spartans appear to have been somewhat surprised atthe advance of the enemy, but completed theirdeployment without apparent difficulty. Each side occupied a front of about 1200 yards. The Spartans may have deployed 12 deep, while the majority of the Athenian/Corinthians may have deployed much deeper, foreshadowing their tactics at Koroneia and the more famous battle of Leuktra. Initial deployments are depicted in figure 5.
As the two sides now advanced, each again came to overlap the enemy ont the right flank. Secondary sources have suggested that the Spartan morai may have even wheeled to the right and then reformed facing the enemy to deliberately accomplish this overlap. It is uncertain at just which point this maneuverwas begun, although it was completed by the time the forces were within 200 meters. At this time, after sacrificing a goat, the Spartans undertook yet a further maneuver, breaking off the troops who had overlapped the Athenians on their right and forming a new line at angles to the first, so as to be better able to take the Athenians in the flank. This is depicted in figure 6.
The battle now took a familiar if not predictable course. On the Spartan left, the Spartan allies were overcome by the Boeotians. Nevertheless, the loss of several main battleline units did not result in the defeat of the Spartan army. The Athenians were not simply overlapped as at Mantineia, but were struck in the flank by the redeployed Spartan phalanx with heavy losses. Once again the Spartans seem to have curtailed their pursuit, and struck the retiring Argives, Corinthians and Thebans on their unshielded side inflicting heavy losses.
Commentators have suggested that the Spartans appeared to be willing to sacrifice even half of their battle line to secure a later advantage. One wonders how the Athenian commanders now felt about taking up position on the left of the battleline!
This battle further points out the extreme vulnerability of the flanks (which in turn suggests the tactical necessity to maintain an unbroken line) and the inability of troops to simply change their facing to prevent a devastating flanking maneuver. Under WRG one often sees whole armies maneuvering as individual units, not in a solid line, and units freely changing their facing to prevent being flanked. The above 2 battles, as well as the next, suggest this was not the case in actual hoplite warfare. - ED.
THE BATTLE OF LEUKTRA
The battle of Leuktra took place 13 years after Nemea in 381 B.C., during the war of Theban independence. The Thebans, along with other Boeotians numbered about 7000; the Spartans had 4 moral of about 1,000 each and 3000 allies including Phokian peltasts, and an additional 1,000 cavalry.
The Spartans deployed with their allies on the left. The Thebans however positioned their best troops on their left, directly opposite the Spartan morai. Anecdotes by Plutarch indicate that this time, the Thebans intended to confront the Spartans directly, perhaps by a direct assault where their king was likely to be present.
Such confidence in confronting Spartan hoplites might seem unusual, but in fact, in two previous engagements, at Koroneia during the Corinthian war in 394 B.C., and at Tegyra in 387, Theban hoplites fighting in depth had broken through Spartan hoplites. Plutarch further notes that the Thebans felt their troops to be superior to the Spartans in melee due to their strenuous wrestling practice in the gymnasium. In contrast, the Spartans are reported to have disdained much practice in weapons drill and to have placed much more emphasis on maneuver.
Further details concerning Leuktra are controversial. The Spartans appear to have deployed 12 deep, while the opposing Thebans deployed perhaps up to 50 deep. Primary and secondary sources dispute whetherthis included the so-called Sacred Band in front of the phalanx, or if these troops supported the Theban flank to the left. Lazenby strongly argues for the former, and notes that the latter interpretation far exceeds the available evidence.
Whatever the initial disposition, it is generally agreed that as the two sides approached the Spartans attempted some complex maneuver. Unfortunately, they attempted to perform this behind a screen of their own cavalry, which was defeated by the Theban horse and driven back into their own infantry. The Theban phalanx appears to have hit the Spartans disordered, and at the halt; the most dreaded condition for troops to be in according to Thucydides, except of course for being outflanked.
The nature of the Spartan maneuver is controversial, but still of great interest. Lazenby argues strongly that the Spartans intended both to outflank the Thebans (whom they had trouble beating toe to toe), but also intended to perform the maneuver known as the anastrophe, to increase the depth of their phalanx. See figure 7.
The Spartan King, Kleombrotos, and most of his bodyguard, were apparently killed at contact, but the Spartan line seems to have held for some time before breaking. Despite the magnitude of their defeat, Spartan casualties were only 10-15% of those involved, and the Thebans chose not to attack the Spartan camp or the remaining army after they had retired to higher ground.
DISCUSSION
Implications for the Ancient Rules Dispute
We have examined three important battles between Greek hoplite armies during the 5th and 4th centuries B.C. Characteristics of these engagements include the failure of the defeat of single units in the main battleline to result in the defeat of an army; a propensity for Spartan commanders to order complex maneuvers in the face of the enemy, sometimes leading to disaster; and the appearance of a large gap in the main battleline -- on at least one occasion due to misinterpretation of orders, followed by an attempt to create another gap in the line which was prevented by an act of insubordination. These examples from major battles contradict the hypotheses put forward by Conliffe to form the basis for a more realistic ancient wargame.
One of the most apparent weaknesses of the WRG rules is their failure to enforce historical organization of units even where that organization is fairly well known. Generals are free to have 500 or 2000 man cohorts in their Roman armies without penalty for example. The designer had hoped that the rules system as a whole would encourage commanders to adopt historical organizations and tactics, but this in our experience is not always the case.
On the other hand is the rule design question of banning specific maneuvers for which no historical precedent may be found. Were these maneuvers banned by regulation, by practicality, or simply by good sense? Clearly, maintaining an unbroken line during an advance is good tactics as is avoiding overly complex maneuvers; but as our examples show, good sense does not always prevail on the battlefield.
In addition, recent authors in THE COURI ER have criticized the grand tactical WRG rules for allowing infantry to maneuver "like a British Guard battalion on parade". Yet, the Spartan army spent over twice as much time at close order drill as the British Guards, so this may not be unrealistic. Similarly, critics have attacked WRG forallowing pike units to turn 90 degrees and charge. Why would such an absurd rule persist in edition after edition? Could it be that it is because the only surviving manual or phalanx tactics written states emphatically that this is the first maneuver which should be taught to the infantry so that they will not be taken helplessly from the side? Since such a maneuver figures so prominently in the drill book, should its use be banned on the gaming table?
The reference to the only surviving battle manual is presumably Asclepiodotus ' Tactics" which the author notes earlier. A review of my own Leob Classical Library copy did not disclose such a reference, although the facing maneuver is listed along with several others. The translators go on to note that this work was written after phalanx warfare had all but disappeared and these "tactics" were largely the subject matter for lectures by philosophers and theorists. No reference is of course made to actual battles or maneuvers in this work. As to the actual list of maneuvers the footnotes indicate that much of the confusion in terms was due to the fact that such discussions had lost all contact with the drill-ground. Now I may well have missed something, but I am not the only one to share such views. Duncan Head in "Armies of the Macedonian and Punic Wars" states that there was no technique to face a phalanx to the flank (p. 47). Simon MacDowall makes a similar observation in his rules "Marathon to Manzikert". Likewise, other rules such as the Newbury "Fast Play Rules for Ancient Warfare" and the "Hoplite and Hellenistic Warfare" rules appear to share such a view. The command system of the time was based on file leaders and to a lesser extent file closers initiating these maneuvers. Facing to the flank and presenting an equally effective fighting capability obviously does not lend itself to this system. At best one would have a disordered group of individuals, which would appear to be extremely vulnerable and which appears to have been the case in the above battles. Nevertheless, the author raises some interesting and valid points. "Tactica" is based upon some good concepts of ancient warfare but goes astray in trying to provide an abstract competition format with such things as fixed army lists and victory conditions instead of simply providing a framework for historical simulations. - ED
In conclusion, perhaps the worst fault in any rules writer is a failure to accept constructive criticism. While we applaud the general concept of Conliffe's "Tactica", I hope that these examples will suggest some changes in the constraints placed on the Spartan army compared to their less well-drilled opponents, resulting in a more historically accurate simulation of hoplite period combat.
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