BACKGROUND In late 1880 the storms of unrest were gathering in the Transvaal region of South Africa. Freedom minded Boers were upset that their independence was not going to be given them by the newly elected liberal government headed by Gladstone (the future "M.O.G."). The liberals had promised independence before the election, but once in control determined to maintain the dependency of the Transvaal. The anarchic Boers had always been hard to govern, and they took offense at the presence of Imperial troops in their country and did not appreciate some of the techniques used by the local administration. In one incident, a tax collector had a non-paying Boer's wagon seized and held to auction, but local Boers seized it back and told the tax collector he was not welcome (or words to that effect). As a result of this and other rankling acts of the government, the Boers rose and proclaimed themselves a republic on December 13th, 1880. Their first act of war was to ambush a column of 273 men of the 94th Infantry. The attack took place on December 20th, while the 94th was on a routine march on the road to Lyclenburg. Fifty seven men were killed, over one hundred wounded and the rest captured. The commander of the regiment, Lt. Col. Anstruther, had not been aware that a state of war existed. The Boers then moved onto besiege the seven British garrisons in the Transvaal. The High Commissioner of the area was acting MajorGeneral Sir George Colley, who had just relieved Sir Garnet Wolesley. Colley was an experienced staff officer who had shown great ability in administration and organization under Wolseleyin the Ashanti campaign. He was also a personal friend of Sir Garnet's. Colley decided he must mountain expedition against he Boers with a two fold purpose: first, he had to relieve the most beleaguered garrison at Potchefstroom, and second, he must quickly inflict a defeat on the Boers so that residents of the neighboring Orange Free State and Cape Colony would be less likely to rise in support of the Transvaal. The Boer forces were about 7,000 strong, all well armed mounted infantry. The British had fewer than 2,000, with no regular cavalry. Before startingon his campaign, Colley pleaded for a regiment of cavalry to be sent to him. Sir Evelyn Wood was dispatched from the south with reinforcements, but Colley, outnumbered as he was, decided to go ahead with his attack. He felt tha the garrison at Potchefstroom would not hold out long enough, and the general feeling amongst the British Command was that the Boers would have no stomach for a stand up fight, and melt away in the face of serried British ranks.' Colley set forth in the middle of the rainy season along the only road to Potchefstroom. Soon he encountered the bulk of the Boer force entrenched across the road ata place called Laing's Nek.2 As Colley approached the position, to his left was the plateau of Majuba, and to his right was Deane's Hill. Between the two was a saddleslope of relatively easy gradient. The road bisected the saddle between the two hills (see map 1). Colley camped at Mt. Prospect that night and formulated his battle plan. The forces available to him were: 5 companies 2/58th 3 rocket launchers and 2 gattling guns with 120 Naval gunners 4 companies 3/60th (King's Royal Rifle Corps) 1 squadron mounted infantry. 6 artillery pieces All in all about 800 men. The squadron of mounted infantry was an improvised force The first troop contained many members of the 1st King's Dragoon Guards, but the second troop was made up of volunteers from the infantry and the Army Service Corps. This disparity would playa major part in the upcoming battle. THE BATTLE The next morning, January 28th, Colley advanced on the Boer positions leaving the gattlings and about 200 men from the infantry and Naval Brigade on Mt. Prospect to hold the camp. His plan was this: with the heights of Majuba being far too steep for an assault, he would concentrate his attack on Deane's Hill, hoping to take the high ground and force the uncovered Boers below to fall back. He would keep the object of his attack secret until the last minute, so that the Boers would not have time to get reinforcements into position. Accordingly, he would send the 58th forward through dead ground, unseen by the Boers, to attack Deane's Hill. To the right of Deane's Hill waas a conical hill, later to become known as Brownlow's Hill, after the leader of the British mounted infantry. On top of this hill was a small force of about 200 Boers. The mounted infantry was to advance to the right of the 58th, keeping between the infantry and the Boers on the conical hill. This way, when the 58th came into view of the Boers, the mounted infantry would be there in a position to deal with them and to keep them from firing into the rear of the British infantry. The Officer in Command, Brownlow, was given the option to charge if he saw fit. Colley set up his artillery on a ridge approximately 2000 yards from the Boerpositions and began to shell Deane's Hill. He send one companyof the 60th and two rocket launchers to the left to cover the road and support the attack on the hill. Three companies of the 60th remained in reserve. The attackers went forward. The 58th advanced safely through the dead ground but the mounted infantry got a little off track. Instead of advancing between the 58th and the conical hill, they advanced directly at the Boer positions. Major Brownlow, suddenly finding himself in front of the Boer position, was in an advance or retreat situation. He charged, but up a slope far steeper than Colley had intended. The charge was successful, but at a high cost, e specially amongst the officers of the first troop. The Boers were chased from their positions and went running towards their horses. The second troop then came up. Riding past the wounded and dead of the first troop, and fearing the worst, they turned around and rode back down the hill without firing a shot! The retreating Boers, noticing this, reformed and attacked the disorganized first troop, pushing it back off the hill. Having done this, they rode forward and took up positions on a spur and began firing into the backs of the 58th, advancing up Deane's Hill. The 58th, unable to maintain its formation while climbing up the steep hill, wavered. Then the Boers on top of Deane's Hill came out of their secure positions and started firing at the 58th. The officers of the regiment, accompanied by many of Colley's staff officers, were all mounted. They were thus easy targets for Boer marksmen and soon almost all were shot down. Leaderless and disorganized, fired on from two sides, the 58th had no choice but to retreat back to friendly lines. Seeing this, Colley sent the three companies of the 60th forward to cover the retreat and prevent a rout of his army. The 60th did well, and the Boers were halted, no doubt content with their victory. His plan having failed completely, Colley fell back to Mt. Prospect to lick his wounds and wonder what went wrong. British losses were about 170 killed and wounded, mainly in the 58th, and mainly killed. Boer losses were negligible. The assault of the 58th was the last time a British regiment carried its Colors into battle. After Laing's Nek, Colley went on to two more humiliating defeats at Ingogo and Majuba. He was killed during the rout from Majuba. He could have escaped, but he knew it was all over for him after his string of defeats, so he remained behind to the last, shot at short range by a Boer rifleman. One week later, on March 4th, Evelyn Wood arrived at nearby Newcastle with reinforcements, but Gladstone's radical cabinet was intent on peace. Wood was only able to negotiate a peace treaty, signed on March 23rd, giving the Transvaal full independence. REFIGHTING THE BATTLE Set Up The Battle of Laing's Nek was refought in 25mm scale using "Imperialism" by Lynn Bodin. The battlefield was contracted slightly to fit on a 4'x6' board. A 25 yards per inch scale was assumed when translating reality to the game. The Geo-Hex terrain system was used to simulate the battlefield and it worked admirably. See map 2 for the battlefield. The forces available were organized as follows. Set up locations are shown on the map. BRITISH 2/58th 10 stands 3/60th 8 stands Mtd. Inf. 4 stands Arty. 3 stands, 12 gunners Rockets 2 stands, 4 gunners BOERS conical hill 4 stands Deane's Hill 16 stands (can be organed in 1 or 2 groups) Victory Conditions To win, the Boers have only to hold Deane's Hill The British must take Deane's Hill and ensure no Boers occupy the conical hill. They don't have to take the hill just make sure there are no Boers on it. The British must accomplish their objectives within 15 turns, otherwise Boer reinforcements will show up and make the capture of Deane's Hill impossible. Special Rules At the start of the battle, all Boers are placed back from the crests of the hills they are on. This is to simulate the secure positions they had set up for themselves. They are considered in hard cover no matter what formation they are in. As long as they remain in their positions they may only be fired on by troops on the same level with them. The Boers may not move out of their positions until British troops come within 24 inches. They may then advance to the crest and fire normally. But, since it would be unreasonable to assume the Boers would stay in their positions forever, starting on turn five they may roll to see if they can move out. On turns five and six, if the Boer player rolls a 1 or 2 on a six-sided die, he may move. On turn seven he may move if he rolls a 1-4. The Boer movement restrictions are automatically lifted on turn eight. To simulate the dead ground of the real battlefield, any advance by the British up the dry stream bed is considered out of sight of the Boers and circumvents the 24" rule for Boer movement. The Wargame Battle The British attack started out much the same as the original battle, with the guns moving forward to just this side of the stream bed and commencing to fire on the large Boer position. The rockets and the 60th crossed the stream to the left and covered that flank. The mounted infantry crossed the stream in the center and took up position between the two arms of the stream, facing Deane's Hill and remaining well out of rifle range. The 58th advanced straight on the conical hill. With half the battalion in skirmish order providing covering fire, the other half charged up the hill and chased off the Boers, but not without losing two stands! Finishing off the remaining Boers with another volley, the 58th reformed and began marching down the hill. Meanwhile, on the left the Boers on Deane's Hill were getting upset over the pounding they were taking from the British artillery. On turn seven the Boer's left their position and advanced down the hill. The mounted infantry charged in an attempt to slow the Boer advance and give the 58th time to cross the board and get in position. The charge went home, but the mounted infantry was almost completely destroyed. However, they accomplished their objective and the 58th and 60th were now within rifle range. For two turns the Boers traded volleys with the British battalions, forcing back the already hit 58th. Some good shooting by the British artillery and a lucky hit by the rocket battery (the only hit by the rocket battery!) combined with the two volleys of the infantry proved too much for the decimated Boers and they were forced to withdraw from the battlefield, leaving Deane's Hill open for occupation. ANALYSIS The effective British artillery bombardment won the game. Had the Boers been fresh when they advanced down the hill (as it was, they were down four stands), they might well have shot up the British regular units so badly they would have had to withdraw, as happened in the real battle. But the combined fire of the British units put the Boer losses over 60%, causing them to retire from the battlefield in accordance with the "Imperialism" rules. In the actual battle, the British were much dismayed by the apparent total lack of effect of their artillery. It was hard to see the effects on the Boers in their secure positions, but the Boer leader, Joubert, later wrote "The opportunity for the English artillery was too great and we suffered severely." Unbeknownst to the British, the Boers were becoming demoralized, and Joubert himself was nearly killed by artillery fire. The rout of the 58th did much to improve Boer morale and confidence, and as they stormed down Deane's Hill in pursuit of the English their fear of artillery vanished in victory fever. Laing's Nek provided this crucial psychological turning point for he Boers. They learned not to become demoralized after taking a few losses; that victorywas still obtainable. They became more like a trained army. Their confidence was to tell in the next two battles of this campaign and even in the war of 1899-1902. Had Colley defeated the Boers at Laing's Nek, the course of history in South Africa might well have changed drastically. 1. As it happened, all 7 garrisons survived the sieges against them. 2. just a few miles from Hlobane, site of Zulu war disaster. BIBLIOGRAPHY Beckett, I.F.W. Victoria's Wars (History in Camera). Shire Publications Ltd., Aylesbury, 1974. Farwell, Byron, Queen Victoria's Little Wars. Harper and Row, New York, 1972. Maxwell, Leigh. The Ashanti Ring. Secker and Warburg Ltd., London, 1985. Back to Table of Contents -- Courier Vol. IX No. 1 Back to Courier List of Issues Back to Master Magazine List © Copyright 1989 by The Courier Publishing Company. This article appears in MagWeb.com (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com