On the morning of September 13, 1759 Montcalm discovered that Wolfe and his English Army had climbed the bluffs of the Saint Lawrence River behind Quebec. Montcalm was outnumbered nearly 2 to 1. All of the English were regulars, while half of his French forces were militia. Yet after collecting his forces, Montcalm attacked the English. His attack was, in some ways, an act of desperation for he knew that Quebec could not withstand a military siege (especially considering the type of artillery the English had available, i.e., an army siege train plus over half of the English Navy). Downey's book gives a good general description of the nature of the construction of New France (Canada) stone fortifications. The walls were outwardly impressive, but militarily unsound. [1]
Quebec had no provisions for cannon facing landward and the walls were not strong enough to be conveniently modified to hold them, i.e., a cannon position on Quebec's walls could also be defined as a breach. [2]
Quebec had already been badly battered by the British Fleet and the English camp across the river. So Montcalm advanced, was defeated, and Quebec fell, but his army escaped for they fled not to Quebec but across the St. Charles River to Beauport. From there they circled inland to Montreal.
Aside from the troops who fought at Quebec there were three other regular battalions at Montreal: 2/La Reine, 2/Berry, 3/Berry, plus two composite battalions of marines. Montcalm's successor, DeLevis, decided that the best thingto do was to reopen communications to France by taking Quebec. He anticipated a similar action by the French Navy to open the St. Lawrence which never came.
While a great victory had been won by the English at Quebec, the situation was far from ideal. Victory meant a winter of isolation in enemy territory while the fleet which had made the British invulnerable to French attacks had to leave for the winter. [4]
The city had already been, for most practical purposes, under siege forsome time. The fleet left food for the winter but none of itwas fresh and the countryside had been stripped by the French for themselves. Plus foraging was dangerous due to the number of French and Indians still in the area. The locals had been disarmed, but could still provide information and assistance to the enemy. Accommodations were primitive since bombardments had destroyed much of the housing and disease had broken out. Finally, of course, the French were bound to come, for if they didn't retake the city there was no hope for New France in 1760.
There were also artillerymen, but DeLevis neglects to mention numbers. New France had two companies of colonial artillery [7] (one at least of which would have fallen with Quebec), the army artillerymen who accompanied the infantry [8], plus the sailors on the ships wintering at Montreal. So there was no lack of trained gunners. For the advance on Quebec only 13 guns were initially available and only three of these were mobile enough to be present at the battle. Noting artillery usage for the period and location, a rough guess of DeLevis' artillery strength would be that no more than 100 gunners were along with the army (somebody had to hold the forts below Montreal). There may also have been a large number of unarmed French Canadians (to dig trenches and drag guns). When all was ready and the ice on the river had broken up, DeLevis' army embarked by water for the trip to Quebec. It was the 20th of April, 1760.
A lucky accident gave Murray timely warning of the approach of the French, although he must have expected action by the French at any time. On April 26th, one of the French artillerymen was lost while the French were landing and was plucked from the water by the British. [9]
On the basis of information obtained from the artillerist, Murray decided on a reconnaissance in force. The British had ten regular battalions available (15th, 18th, 35th, 43rd, 47th, 48th, 58th, 2/60th, 3/60th, 78th).
[10]
Plus there was a battalion of light infantry [11], a company of rangers and a volunteer battalion (made up of colonial pioneers sent to Quebec to help improve the fortifications over the winter.
[12]
The average size of each English battalion was about 300 men (see Table 2). The 43rd is noted as being exceptionally weak which is a shame as it was one of the best units in the army before embarking for Quebec.14 The civilians of Quebec were ordered to evacuate the town for security reasons during the last week of April. Murray planned to make a strong post at St. Foy to block the advance of the French, but illness and a large storm prevented this from happening earlier than the 27th. Early on the 27th, learning that DeLevis was at Lorette (about 6 miles from Quebec), Murray sent part of the army out on a reconnaissance. There were three columns: the 35th Regiment was sent via Sillery to support the outpost at Cap Rouge, Murray with the grenadiers, the light infantry and the 15th Regiment with two guns marched to St. Foy, and the 28th, 47th and 58th with 8 guns followed as support. Murray reached St. Foy before the French arrived in force and a firefight broke out. Bourlemaque and a scouting party were driven from the town. Murray summoned the reserve column into town as the French approached. The superior position and fire power of the English prevented the French from advancing on the town, but the English, in danger of being surrounded by a superior force, were forced to retreat. At any rate the reconnaissance verified that the French were indeed comingand in great numbers. On the basis of the action at St. Foy Murray estimated that there were 10,000 French. DeLevis indicates he had less than 7,000 soliders of which only about 4000 were involved in the fight on the 27th. [15]
Or to quote Murray, "Our little army was in the habit of beating the enemy." Murray must also have had a good idea of the number of French regulars available to DeLevis and known that his force would be at least on par there. Plus after the performance of the French Army at the battle in September, it would not have been hard for Murray to discount their ability to defeat him. Third, even if he lost, Quebec would be secure until help arrived since duringthe wintera row of blockhouses had been built along the main wall to make it defendable. Fourth, if he won, the war in Canada would be over. The French would be forced to surrender because retreat even back to their ships at Saint Augustine (12 miles) would be costly in the existing mud. Finally, another defeat of the magnitude of the first battle would assure his name a place in history.
Soon the morning of April 28, 1760 Murray with every able bodied man in
Quebec marched out to meet the French. The English were formed into three brigades. The first brigade under the command of Col. Burton consisted of the 15th, 48th, 58th and 2/60th. The second brigade under the command of Col. Fraser consisted of the 28th, 43rd, 47th and 78th. The reserve brigade under Col. Young had the 35th and 3/60th. The light infantry covered the north flank and the rangers and volunteers the south.
The mill was held by 5 companies of French grenadiers and the fighting was fierce. In the end the mill was cleared and only 18 grenadiers retreated.
The commander of the light infantry was wounded and the troops pursued the grenadiers into the main French line and were driven back with very heavy losses. In the meantime, the two main lines came into range and began a firefightwhich caused the French to begin to give ground mainly due to the profusion of English artillery (20-22 guns). The first crisis came when the English lights were scattered into the area between the two main lines and the English right flankwas exposed. Murray committed the 35th to the north. For close to two hours the armies battered each other. The English slowly pushed the French back towards the woods. In the end however the French numbers told the story. The French right began to work their line around the English left flank which was held by the rangers and the volunteers. Outnumbered locally 5 to 1 or more the rangers and volunteers were brushed aside and McDonald, the battalion commander, was killed. As the English left flank came under attack, it began to crumble. In danger of being outflanked and annihilated Murray decided to retreat. The slight slope the British had advanced down now became a major obstacle due to the mud and snow. All but two of the guns were spiked and abandoned, i.e., the number of men needed to haul them safely up the slope would have effected the safety of the force as a whole.
The French began to cautiously chase the enemy. Murray's main body was probably not in danger, but large numbers of stragglers and wounded were. Luck again shone on the British as the French advance was held up for 10 minutes by a nearly empty British outpost redoubt (part of the outlying works Murray had built to protect the city).
The French captured close to 20 light field pieces (a welcome supplement to their siege train). The English losses were reported at 41 officers and 255 men killed, missing or captured and 89 officers and 724 men wounded. [17] DeLevis reported 833 men and officers killed and wounded. [18] It also does not include the losses at Saint Foy the previous day. Murray cites French losses for the spring campaign at 3,000. [19]
Once again the city came under formal siege. But the French progressed slowly due to the conditions and before they were ready to begin to shell the city in earnest the British fleet returned. The British had also sufficiently improved the walls of Quebec to the point that they were able to mount cannon to contest the French guns. [20]
DeLevis commented that had a French ship been the first one up the Saint Lawrence the citywould have been his. I tend to doubt this. Murray knew the English fleet would be back in force for the summer campaign. He probably would expect that few French ships might try to slip past the blockade. The effect of a French ship on the garrison morale might have hurt, but the effect on the outcome of the siege would have been minimal. At any rate the first ship up was the English Frigate Lowestoft on May 9th. She was followed starting on May 15th by the rest of the English fleet. [21]
Soon after the French withdrew to Montreal. On September 6, 1760, Amherst, Murray and Haviland converged on Montreal and forced the French to capitulate three days later. [22] DeLevis wanted to withdraw west and continue, but was overruled by the Governor. The conquest of New France was finished and the English began planning attacks on their next French targets in the Caribbean.
THEME EDITOR'S NOTE: Tom thoughtfully provided uniform information for the British and French. However, since the lead article of this theme issue is on British uniforms, we only present Tom's piece on the French next. - BILL PROTZ
With the fall of Quebec in 1759, Montreal was the only major French outpost left in New France and the situaton there was desperate. In 1760 the city would be threatened on three sides: by Amherst moving northeastwards from Oswego; by Haviland moving north from Crown Point, and by Murray coming southwest from Quebec. Montcalm's Fabian tactics the previous year had given Montreal time. He had delayed the main British thrust, led by Amherst, by putting warships on Lake Ontario. Amherst dared not advance on Montreal if his supply lines could be cut by the French Navy. This delayed Amherst until his army built ships to counter the French naval threat. Wolfe was also held at bay at Quebec until just before the British Fleet had to leave the Saint Lawerence for the winter. The British plan of 1759 had been to hit Quebec and Montreal simultaneously and thus split the French defenders. On the other hand, even after the disaster at Quebec, the majority of the French forces were still intact. The regular regiments which had fought at Quebec were not in bad shape and their grenadier and picket companies had not been in the battle. [3]
DeLevis had the winter to prepare for his attack. His first step seems to have been to distribute his regulars evenly among the remaining battalions (some marines may have been used as well). This gave each battalion about 300 men. In addition each of the regiments was given about 200 militia to fill the ranks. All told he had ten battalions (the 5 from Quebec, 3 from Montreal and 2 of Compagnies Franches de la Marine (CFdIM). He divided these into five brigades of 2 battalions each. In addition there were about 200 cavalrymen, 300 Indians, and about 300 extra Montreal militia (see Table 1), plus DeLevis converged his grenadiers into a battalion of ten companies. [5]
That night Murray decided that he should fight a battle even though outnumbered. He has several reasons for this. First, relief was imminent; the British fleet should return in a few weeks at the most. Even if the French slipped a ship or two up the river first, they would be overwhelmed by the British fleet when it arrived. (n.b. the French Navy considered the Saint Lawrence impassable by all but medium frigates and smaller. The British Navy thought the river easier to sail than the Thames). Second, his army had already defeated these same French once and had done it in a manner that would have left a nasty impression on the enemy troops.
They met as the French emerged from the woods onto the Plains of Abraham. The English deployed on a slight rise overlooking the plain. Murray, having caught the French undeployed and in march order, attacked the French in the hopes of catching them in disarray. However, due to the mud and snow, his advance was very slow and he took almost 30 minutes to close with the main French line. The fighting started at the north end of the field where the light infantry attacked Dumont's mill. [16]
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