Influenced by the classics, as well as the epics of the silver screen, wargamers have a special fondness for the ancient period. Being what we are, this interest demands a mode of expression -- a game to be precise. Since the breadth of antiquity is enormous, reliable information is comparatively scant, and often controversial. Therefore, it is difficult for scholars and students to acquire a deep understanding of the battle systems employed in this period.
To represent these different systems in wargame form with any degree of accuracy is a herculean task. Designers who have previously made the attempt and provided us with games deserve our praise. Their only oversight is that most seem to be preoccupied with the details, gimmicks and less important characteristics of such warfare; this has diverted their attention from fundamental concepts far more important, better documented, and easier to simulate.
Another view is possible - one that would concentrate on the broad, tactical implications of the different systems employed, and to which the details of weapon class and armortypes are subordinate. Such a concept would represent a variety of systems, but for reasons of general familiarity, this article will concern itself with how the Greek, Macedonian and Roman methods could be represented.
PLANNING, MOVEMENT AND DEPLOYMENT
Due to the comparatively rigid style of combat practiced by these armies, generals in this period sought clear open spaces in which to do battle. Once two generals decided to give combat, the battle unfolded in several distinct phases. The first phase was the development of the general's plan of battle. In this era, the general often created his plan on the eve of the battle itself, taking into account the terrain features, and opposing battle systems. When the two armies faced-off on the following day, there was usually - though not always - sufficient distance between them to permit minor adjustments to their original dispositions. If not already deployed for combat, the individual units would maneuver to their designated positions in the battleline, where they would make their final battle deployments.
In a game, this first phase can be represented by a concept called the DeploymentTurn. Priorto this DeploymentTurn, plans are made and the initial troop dispositions are mapped. The battle units of the army are then set-up on the tabletop in columns of maneuver - a formation which would permit units to be moved in response to the enemy's dispositions. However, by the end of the Deployment Turn (perhaps turn two), the battle units of both armies are required to deploy into theirfinal fighting formations. Thus deployed, these units cannot subsequently alter their formations or angle of attack. At this point, the troops have become committed.
It should be noted that cavalry, light infantry, and other auxiliaries would be permitted a far greater degree of flexibility than the heavy infantry. Nevertheless, they too should be prevented from arbitrarily roaming about the battlefield by other mechanics which restrict their movement.
Limitations While these restrictions seem severe to players who have become accustomed to other rules, it is important to understand the limitations under which the individual units, and an army as a whole, moved across the ancient battlefield.
These limitations applied especially to the heavy infantry units which comprised the battleline "phalanx". Incumbered by the sheer density of their compact formations, these units, when deployed, were incapable of performing wheels and rapid maneuvers in response to unplanned-for occurences. For mutual protection, the individual unit moved in close proximity to each other, and never as truly independent units. Compounding these concerns were the products of a close-combat style of warfare; dust, fear, and confusion. To maintain control under these conditions, often, the collective battleline moved as a single body, strivingto present a solid and virtually impenetrable front to the enemy.
At this point, the second phase of the battle -the execution of the battle plan - has begun. To insure that the collective phalanx of heavy infantry units moves in the limited, but coordinated fashion described above, the following mechanic may be employed. The Main Battleline Rule, as it is termed, states that a unit of the heavy infantry battleline must operate within a pre-determined distance (expressed in inches) of a neighboring battleline unit. There are few exceptions to this rule.
By imposing this restriction, the overall battleline can assume a variety of formations, but the individual units which comprise it are prohibited from operatingas independent units. Visually, the armies end up looking very much like deployments depicted in the maps we study. A pleasant result is that a wargamer who studies the basic tactics of the period is better able to duplicate them in the game itself.
It is this representation of how the battleline actually moved which seems to be lacking in other prevalent rules. In these, I have observed with complete bewilderment, heavy infantry units capable of an independence and flexibility which rivals that of a British Guard company on parade ground maneuvers. Consequently, the player-general's battle plan is far less important, since his units can handily adapt themselves to the changing battle environment.
After a period of preliminary skirmishing, and if the advance of the battlelines has not been disordered in any way, the battle enters into its third and climactic phase.
Archery and sling-shot notwithstanding, battles in this period were decided by a process we call Melee. Since close-in fighting of this sort is strongly influenced by human emotions - fear, desperation and even elation, to name a few - historians have been hard-pressed to describe accurately the essential details of this mode of combat. The ever-present intangibles - accidents, luck and other unforeseen local events, only further muddy the waters. Truly, it is the wargamer's lament that all the veterans of Alexander's phalanx have long since died off.
FRONTAGE, DEPTH AND FLANKS
It has, nevertheless, been possible to quantify the broader, tactical considerations which proved decisive in providing victory. As the solitary controllerof his army, the ancient general was motivated to concern himself with these fundamentals first and foremost. These basic concerns are reducable to three primary considerations:
- 1. The Depth and corresponding Frontage of his battleline.
2. The tactical positioning of his units: angle of attack, and terrain considerations.
3. The overall fighting quality of his troops.
The concern for the Frontage and Depth of his army was foremost in the mind of the ancient general. His dilemma was to insure that his overall battleline was long enough to avoid being outflanked, but also deep enough to avoid being pierced. Until the advent of Epimanondas and the echelon attack, a general's frontage/depth options were to a large extent determined by the overall numbers of fighting men available to him. If outnumbered, he may very well lengthen his front to mask this effect, and to avoid being flanked. If he outnumbered his opponent, he could use this advantage to either overlap his opponent's line, or to match his enemy's frontage with a deeper formation. The optimum situation was to be both longer and deeper.
In a game, one may simulate the frontage/depth options in several ways. A battle unit (as opposed to skirmishers) always gets to fight with a numberof figures equal to its deployed frontage. There is no detailed formula for determining how the overlapping figures are permitted to fight. The wider a unit, or the overall line is, the more fighting soldiers can be brought to bear. However, the consequence is that more enemy soldiers are equally capable of replying.
Unit depth is not an arbitrary determination. All units in the game must deploy into an even number of ranks, as defined by their specific army organizations. Units which are deeper than their opponents receive special bonuses; the deeper they are, the greater their bonus. Another consideration is, by deepening the overall line, a greater concentration of units may be locally achieved.
Like his historical counterpart, the player-general's dilemma is to insure that an advantage in depth is not negated by an opposing advantage in frontage, and that is one of the principal skills of battleline handling. Working hand in hand with the frontage/depth mechanics, would be special procedures designed to bring about a rolling up of an enemy battleline, if it has been entirely overlapped by opposing battleline units
The angle of attack employed by opposing battlelines was often a decisive factor in determining victory. Since all battle formations were designed to engage the enemy with their stronger frontal aspect, the flanks of these massed units (especially the heavy infantry),were especially vulnerable. If enemy battle units struck them atan angle which did not coincide with this doctrine, a disaster was often the result. The greatest of the ancient generals were keenly aware of this and sought systematically to visit this calamity on their opponents.
Two methods are available to bring this about. The first method is linked to the final deployments of his battleline. Since after the aforementioned Deployment Turn, units of the battleline cannot wheel, and therefore must move straight ahead only, the careful general can set up a favorable angle of attack against his opponent's battleline. If all goes as planned, if the attack is timed properly and not in jeopardy of being compromised by enemy counter measures, an overlap of the opposing battleline is likely. A special mechanic called The Battleline Roll-up Maneuver is employed when a player has tactically, and entirely, overlapped his opponent's battleline. This rolling-up can best be understood in a three-turn process. During these three turns, the overlapping units are permitted special movement allowances to facilitate a flank attack.
If this maneuver is permitted to occur unchecked, the game should end abruptly. Of course, counter-developments, delaying tactics and other tactical countermeasures can thwart this maneuver. And that is where the player's generalship comes in.
Another, faster and more dynamic method of delivering flank attacks is for players to become proficient in the cavalry/auxiliary infantry combats. Such generals seek to break the enemy's supporting elements early, and descend on the open flank of the enemy battleline before his own heavy troops can be jeopardized.
Again, it cannot be overstressed, that because of the strict movement requirements of this concept, these turning maneuvers can only be the product of a sound original plan coupled with competent execution.
Curiously, in other systems the reward for turning an enemy battleline is the horror of watching a phalanx unit execute a simple left face to defend itself - often in the very turn in which the flank attack is being delivered! If ancient battlelines could have responded this effectively, there would have been little need for support troops such as the peltasts, to protect their flanks.
FIGHTING QUALITIES AND BATTLE SYSTEMS
When we analyze the inherent fighting quality of a body of soldiers, we must study the overall battle system of which they are a part. This is because victory is often a product of superior generalship, and a more efficient battle handling system. Since the "winners" write the history books, it becomes easy to perceive the defeated as qualitatively inferior in all respects. Occasionally this was true; usually it was not.
The Macedonian armies of Phillip and Alexander were dominant principally because of vastly superior generalship, but also because of a more sophisticated tactical system. Their Greek and Persian opponents were disciplined, well-armed soldiers with a long tradition of martial success. To believe that the Persians carved out their empire with masses of untrained levy is absurd. When the Persians faced the Macedonians, they had added highly professional Greek mercenaries to theiralready powerful cavalry arm. These soldiers fought superbly against the phalanx in reality, and do so in the game as well. If not for the genius of Alexander, the outcome of those famous battles may well have been reversed.
Later, the Roman systems became so effective that they didn't require brilliant generalship to dominate their enemies. Still, many of their opponents, such as the Carthaginians and Macedonians, contained fighting units of very high quality. These units gave a fine account of themselves historically, and this too should be reflected in the game.
In a game system, the effectiveness of an army is reflected by both the battle system it uses, and the intrinsic fighting quality of the individual units. For example, the Sassanid and Gothic armies of the fifth-sixth century would contain large, well-armed units of cavalry. Unit for unit, they are equal to or stronger than their Byzantine opponents. Yet, the overall Byzantine system must provide certain tactical advantages.
To demonstrate these advantages, we again return to the concept of the Deployment Turn. Unlike their opponents, the Byzantines are given the option of deploying at any point in the game. This flexibility, coupled with organizational advantages, enables them to cope more efficiently with their opponents. As shown later, an army organization method serves to represent and define the various tactical systems represented.
Similarly, the Roman tactical systems of the Republic, and those of the Marian reforms are represented as being distinctly different from those employed by their opponents. Because of special mechanics which simulate their multi-line approach to battle, the Roman legions are unique and not simply heavy infantry in different uniforms. Players who ignore the advantages of their system may very well find themselves in a situation like Cannae. In other prevalent games, the Roman maniples and cohorts move and function exactly as any other heavy infantry units; the sole difference being defined by the weapons and armor employed. By not rep resenting these fundamental battle-system differences, designers have done their games a great disservice.
When simulating the fighting quality of theirwargame units, these same designers seem compelled to represent every possible weapon type and piece of armor ever used. As a consequence, these games tend to deteriorate the action into a weapon versus armor subgame. Wargamers, therefore, purchase only those "killer" armies whose weapon types and armor classes are the current rage. If the purpose was to simulate WW-2 tank combat, the "weapon" versus armor approach might be justified. Concrete statistics are available to help represent that mode of combat. However, it is difficult to believe that the subtle differences among the many different weapons available to ancient armies could be quantified with a similar degree of accuracy.
First, because these weapons possessed different characteristics such as length, weight of impact, etc., each had an optimum striking distance at which their maximum effect was achieved. As a melee degenerated from the shock of initial impact to fighting of a more confused nature, the effectiveness of each weapon necessarily changed. As a further complication, the varying densities and usages of battle formations altered the effectiveness of even the same basic weapon type. Hoplite phalanxes, Persian spearmen, and Pictish mobs all carried spears of approximately the same lengths, yet the effects produced by each formation were very different.
To represent in elegant wargame mechanics this ever shifting weapon effectiveness would be quite a task. Consider also that armies of the ancient period often did not possess a uniformity of equipment as do modern armies. This was true partly because the concept of weapon obsolescence was not the same as it is now, but also because only the most advanced nations could even consider such a degree of standardization. Consequently, individual soldiers within the same unit could be found possessing different armor and weapons. It comes as no surprise that the most respected historians tend to evaluate troop effectiveness from a doctrinal and systematic viewpoint first, and a weapon and armor viewpoint second. Before the advent of the machine-gun, I'm aware of few victories that were attributed to a single weapon-type alone.
Consider: was it the pilum which brought about Roman battlefield superiority or was it superior training, leadership at the lower levels and an organization designed to exploit these advantages that made them dominant? Attempts to create "imitation" legionaires by arming soldiers in a similar manner did not produce an equivalent success. This was partly true because of insufficient numbers, but also because the armies of Pontus operated with a different battle system and overall organizational structure.
It becomes clear that the effectiveness of any weapons system is undeniably related to the soldiers who use it, and influenced by the overall battle system to which they belong. These systems are more important and easier to quantify than a tiresome representation of theoretical weapon effectiveness. Simple weapons, employed by trained soldiers, operating within a superior system, will usually bring victory. Nevertheless, it is hard for many wargamers who play the weapon-oriented games to understand how the Assyrians and Persians could have created dynasties, when the basic melee weapon was a simple spear.
Because of the aforementioned fallacies of weapon analysis alone, battle units should be given a more simple and basic evaluation of their fighting worth. This general evaluation would take into account fighting spirit, training, officership and also general armament. Many of these characteristics can be embodied in a single mechanic called Fighting Value, which is a very simple expression of the aforementioned factors. Other, equally vital ingredients are represented by: Unit Size, which simulates mass; Morale, which simulates resilience, and positional determinants, such as depth and angle of attack - both of which are the products of organization and generalship.
SPECIAL TACTICS
The mechanics of this wargame system should reflect the unique ways certain troop types were capable of being used. Forexample, the peltasts of Alexander's army were often used in close cooperation with his cavalry units. Since the Macedonians were usually outnumbered in cavalry by the Persians, this combination enabled them to cope with the Persian advantage. A peltast unit and a nearby cavalry unit are permitted to occupy the same physical space and fight together against an opposing mounted unit.
The specific advantage is that while the Persian cavalry formation must divide any casualties it causes against both the Macedonian cavalry unit and the supporting peltast unit, the Persian cavalry formation receives casualties form both the Macedonian cavalry and peltasts.
The disadvantage to this tactic is that since the game represents the peltasts dual ability to fight both as a massed unit and as a skirmisher, the player who employs his peltasts in the massed role sacrifices their skirmishingability. This means that those nasty Persian skirmishers may roam free - shooting up the phalanx with ruthless abandon. A phalanx that has taken this punishment will not fight as well against the Hoplite battleline of the Persian army. Therefore, it requires sound playerjudgement to determine in which role he will employ his peltasts.
WINNING AND LOSING
When the opposing lines clash the outcome is determined by the qualitative factors of Fighting Value, Morale, and Unit Size, supplemented by the tactical advantages of depth/frontage and superior angle of attack. How the player general has planned and executed his concept is the principal determinant of victory. This simple formula yields a satisfying and logical combat resolution.
Regardless of the degree of supposed "reality" embraced, a wargame must generate excitement and be fun to play. Most wargamers play games primarily for these reasons, although many are loathe to admit it. To meet these requirements, this sytem can assume that most units are willingto enter combat, and thatthey will fight until incapable of doingso - a not unreasonable point of view. When key units do break, the consequences are readily apparent. There can be no action in the game which does not push a battle into a more advanced stage. Every charge delivered, every casualty inflicted, impels the game towards its climactic finish.
In playing a game based on these concepts, only a single simple chart need be used. Numerous morale checks, for every conceivable reason should be avoided. The mechanics of movement, missile fire, morale and melee must represent a return to basics. They are designed that way to keep the players' eyes and attention focused on the tactical tabletop and not some lengthy list of factors and modifiers. There should be no bookkeeping of any kind.
Ancient battles were fought, won, and lost in a manner quite different from any subsequent eras. Many an ancient battle (especially those of the Greek and Macedonian conflicts) was characterized byastalemateof sorts, until a single dynamic action broke the deadlock and finished it. It often occured that the defeat of a single battleline unit produced such a conclusion. Primarily, this was because many of these armies utilized a mono-line concept, and when a part of their line was defeated, panic quickly put the rest of it to flight.
Later, the Roman three-line, echelon method provided a flexible battleline and a systematic use of reserves. Here, the defeat of part of the line did not mean the loss of the battle. Local initiative was encouraged, which was one reason why the Romans did not require brilliant generalship at the top level to be successful. The Carthaginians too, used a variation of this multi-line system. Of course, the armies of the ancient near east had recognized the value of reserves long before.
The game must provide logical reasons for winning and losing, based on the systematic considerations described above. Consequently, players must not simplytally up the body countat the end of a numberof turns to see who has won. The game should take into account the key battle units inherent in each army and draw specific victory conditions based on the limitations of the system employed. For example: while the loss of a single heavy infantry unit may cause a Greek army (with its mono-line concept) to lose the game, multiple units (maniples and cohorts) of the Roman armies must be broken in order to bring about an equivalent defeat. While this may imply that the Romans are mc -- effective in the game (as they were in reality) care must be taken to give both sides an equal chance of winning. Having clear-cut victory conditions, based on the loss of a variable number of key units, defines the simulation better and produces great excitement.
ARMY ORGANIZATIONS VS. POINT SYSTEM
When not re-enacting a specific battle scenario, a wargame calls for a method of producing evenly matched armies. Most wargames employ a point system for "buying" their armies. The supposition is that a point system permits all armies to fight equally, and at times the system works. Not unlike ordering from a Chinese menu, players can pick and choose theirtroop types - customizing their armies to combat every opponent. The individual army lists, from which these troop types are chosen, often span a thousand years; the overall army lists, which supply "eligible" opponents, cover several millenia.
There are several areas where the point-system method runs aground. First, its major premise that the method produces universally fair games is simply not true. Even when historical opponents from the same era do battle, there can occur mismatches which produce inelegant games. A fine example of this would be a Roman/Parthian game. Here, the systems are so incompatible that a boring game is difficult to avoid unless players enjoy shooting up slow-moving infantry in amusement park fashion.
It is true that by arbitrarily plopping difficult terrain on the table one can neutralize the Parthian cavalry advantage. But to force the Parthian cavalry to fight in densely-terrained environments is equally absurd, since one can only wonderwhy they would offer battle underthose conditions. To simulate such a battle as a hypothetical scenario or to representthe entire Parthian War in a high-level campaign is valid, but is it really the type of game we want to play?
An even more serious problem results when trying to represent battles between armies from widely separated eras. It is difficult enough for game designers to simulate battles between actual opponents. To quantify all the theoretical factors which would be present in battles between armies of different millenia is virtually impossible. I'm not sure whether it's sad or humorous that novices in our hobby sometimes believe that the Normans actually fought the armies of ancient Assyria. Then again, there are those who find the prospect intriguing.
To solve some of these problems, complete armies can be pre-designed, based on some of the major battles of the era in which they fought. They should be designed to fight against their historical opponents only and their specific army organizations must not be subject to modification in any way. In addition, armies must be paired against opponents which were designed to fight in the same basic terrain. Players should not worry that an arbitrary major woods will simply sprout up in the center of the table.
Although this method is more limited than the point system, it gives the armies a familiar identity, which defines their battlefield options in the game. The troop types represented in the organizations should be few in numberand basic in theirusage. Players would therefore be motivated to concentrate on the tactics characteristic of the army, rather than worry about how a points system is likely to be exploited. Despite the consistency in army organizations, games between even the same two armies would create new challenges each time.
ED. NOTE: The author of this article has written a set of Ancients rules based on these concepts, Tactica, soon to be published. He and his "staff" are currently working on how to make the game suitable for tournament play - they welcome any suggestions. In the next issue THE COURIER will present a battle played with these rules between the Macedonian Army of Alexander and the Persian Army of Darius. Sounds great! Perhaps I will get to use my Egyptian Army again. They have been gathering dust since the 4th Edition! - DICK BRYANT
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