Napoleon: 'Who was that woman I saw you with last night?" Wellington: "That was no woman, that was the Black Watch." Mistaken identity was a common occurrence on the Napoleonic battlefield. It happened between friend and friend, friend and ally, and friend and foe. Given the confusing and terfifying conditions of combat, it comes as no surprise; indeed, such mistakes can be found in all wars in all eras. Yet we encounter on the Napoleonic tabletop an almost uncanny ability inherent in our lead solders to consistently distinguish between "us" and "them". Most Napoleonic wargamers have heard of some of the more famous cases of mistaken identity, such as the effect D'Erlon's unexpected appearance had upon the French left at Ligny. Let's examine a sampling of historical anedotes to see if we can use them to help us devise a few optional rules to increase the fog of war in this area. Assistant Surgeon William Dent of the 9th F oot wrote a letter from Gibraltar in November 27th, 1810 about an attack on a French-held castle: "The force we had (except the Spanish Regiment), was immediately brought within Musket Shot... during the Night the cannon had been landed and by daylight were ready to play on the Castle, but with little effect; about 2 o'clock,Lord Blayney, perceiving he could make little or no impression on the Place, was goingt to take up another position ... the French being dressed exactly like the Spaniards, cried out (Hispaniola) signifying they were Spaniards, which induced Lord Blayney to go up to speak to them, when they instantly laid hold of him fired a volley among the English and put the whole Army to the run.. [1] On May 7,1811, Edward Cocks was in command of a patrol: "Just between light and dark, skirmishing began in my rear and the intermediate men game galloping in, saying I must be quick or I should be taken, as a French column had come up to a crossroad in my rear, and one man said he had seen a squadron advancing at a gallop. Fortunately, he placed the squadron in a direction I knew was impossible it could be, and I was convinced the report was false. On riding back I found my reserve and some Spanish infantry, which had been thrown into Frenada, skirmishing with each other, each taking the other for French. I immediately sent off to prevent the alarm which the firing might have occasioned." [2] Captain Benjamin Lutyens of the 11 th Light Dragoons had been captured when he mistook French cavalry for his own reserve near the Guariana. Wellington himself was aware of such dangers and sorne of the reasons for them, as he succinctly expressed in a letter to Lt. Col. Henry Torrens, written from Freneda on November 6th, 1811: [1]"I hear that measures are in contemplation to alter the clothing, caps, &c., of the army. [1]"There is no subject of which I understand so little; and, abstractedly speaking, I think it indifferent how a soldier is clothed, provided it is in a uniform manner; and that he is forced to keep himself clean and smart, as a soldier ought to be. But there is one thing I deprecate, and that it any imitation of the French, in any manner. [1]"It is impossible to form an idea of the inconveniences and injury which result from having anything like them, either on horseback or on foot. Lutyens and his piquet were taken in June, because the 3rd hussars had the same caps as the French Chassuers a Cheval and some of their hussars; and I was near being taken-on the 25th September from the same cause. [1]"At a distance, or in action, colors are nothing; the profile, and shape of the man's cap, and his general appearance, are what guide us; and why should we make our people look like the French? A cock-tailed horse is a good mark for a dragoon, if you can get a side view of him; but there is no such mark As the English helmet, and, as far as I can judge, it is the best cover a dragoon can have for his head. [1]"I mention this, because in all probability you may have something to say to these alterations; and I only beg that we may be as different as possible from the French in everything. [1]"The narrow top caps of our infantry, as opposed to their broad top caps, area great advantage to those who are to look at longlines of posts opposed to each other" [3] An attack against Lierena in March, 1812 is described by Thomas Dyneley and William Swabey: "We arrived before the place at daylight the next morning, but by some unfortunate accident the Chasseurs Britanniques fired upon the 51st Regiment or the 51st fired upon the Chasseurs, it is not yet decided which were the aggressors, but certain it is that an assistant surgeon and two men of the 51 st were killed, and the paymaster, one officer and one man wounded.. This fire disturbed the garrison, and while we were dismounting they marched out on the other side of the town. We then advanced to within about 500 yards of the town and by order of Sir Thomas Graham (who commanded the whole) opened our fire upon what, he said, were troops forming in front. We were rather astonished at the fire not being returned, but at daylight we discovered we had been pounding away at a brick wall." [4] "... we advanced just before daybreak, sanguine and certain of success. Unfortunately, numbers of led horses and all the staff got to the front, and the enemy's patrol firing, they galloped back in great confusion, and in such numbers that they were taken for the enemy's cavalry charging and fired at accordingly, by which unfortunate mistake an assistant-surgeon of the 31 st, a sergeant and two men were killed, and a lieutenant and paymaster wounded; but worse than all, the enemy was alarmed and the enterprise frustrated. Our guns came into action by General Graham's order at a dark wall supposed to be an enemy's column;. we fired nine rounds before the General would be convinced of his mistake. " [5] We should note that Graham left the army temporarily inj July, 1812 due to an eye disorder, which may have affected his vision at this time! Colonel Ludwig Wolzogen describes Leipzig on October 16,1813: "At about five o'clock General Count Merveldt thought he recognised Bianchi's division through the brushwood on the far side of the Pleisse by the Dolitz estate... Prince Aloys Liechtenstein and I drew his attention to the fact that these troops coming into view were definitely not Hungarians in blue trousers, but. French soldiers. However, Merveldt, through being shortsighted and eager, kept to his decision... Accompanied by a solitary cuirassier orderly... he gave orders that nobody was to follow him..." [6] Merveldt was captured about a half a mile away by the blue-trousered French. However, his captors had also mistaken the character of the force they were facing, as reported by one of the men who took Merveldt, Girod de I'Ain, an aide-de-camp to General Curail: "When I reached a plateau and gained a fairly extensive view, I saw some distance ahead of me several columns of i nf antry wearing grey great-coats... At first I though this must be Poniatowski's corps in retreat, so I rode conficlentlyfor~va until, when I came to the edge of a sunken road, I suddenly spotted, a few yards away, an Austrian column f fili ng silently along this same road. As you can imagine, I turned sharply round and galloped back to warn General Curail of my discovery." [7] On the same Saturday Captain Jean-Louis Rieu tells us: "Meanwhile the Prussian infantry battalions were approaching so close, thanks to their artillery support and our immobility, that their ranks merged into our own, so much so that a sergeant-major named Mourgue took them to be French on account of their blue cloaks which were like those we wore. He went unofficially towards one of these battalions to warn them that they were firing inopportunely at their companions and was very lucky to get away with being grabbed by the scruff of the neck..." [8] Captain von Reuter commanded a Prussian battery at Ligny: "... suddenly I became aware of two strong lines of skirmishers which were apparently falling back on Lis from the village of St. Amand. Imagining that the skirmishers in front of us were our own countrymen, I hastened up to the battery and warned my layers not to direct their aim upon them, but to continue to engage the guns opposite. In the meanwhile the skirmishers in question had got within three hundred paces of the battery.' "I had just returned to the right flank of my command, when our surgeon, Zinkernagel, called my attention to the red tufts on the shakos of the sharpshooters. I at once bellowed out the order 'With grape on the skirmishers!'." [9] At Quatre Bras, Sergeant James Anton of the 42nd says: "Marshal Ney, who commanded the enemy, observed out wild unguarded zeal, and ordered a regiment of lancers to bear down upon us. We saw their approach at a distance, as they issued from a wood, and took them for Brunswickers coming to cut up the flying infantry; and as cavalry on all occasions have the advantage of retreating foot, on a fair field, we were halted in order to let them take their way until a German orderly dragoon galloped up, exclaiming 'Franchee! Franchee!'... We instantly formed a rallying square Our skirmishers having been impressed with the same opinion that these were Brunswick cavalry, fell beneath their lances, and few escaped death or wounds; our brave colonel. fell at this time... Captain Menzies fell..." [10] Ensign Macready's company of the 30th had an anxious moment: "After scrambling through a thick plantation, we found ourselves close to a body of men with whose uniform we were unacquainted. A -wood stretched in front of and half a mile beyond them, and over it was a heavy cloud of smoke, with birds flying in all directions and squealing about it. We loosened our ammunition, loaded, and went up to these men. They belonged to the Nassau Contingent..." [11] While retreating from the battle of Waterloo, in Captain Robinaux's regiment: "We were shot at occasionally from the rear, and several frightened soldiers, looking behind them, saw our Polish lancers, mistook them for English cavalry, and shouted: 'We are lost!' The rumor spread down the column and soon we were thrown into complete disorder." [12] Finally, we examine Cavalie Mercer's now famous encounter with Prussian and Belgian artillery at Waterloo: I had now, for the first time, a good view of the field. On the ridge opposite to us dark masses of troops were stationary, or moving down the intervening plain... Whilst thus occupied with our front, we suddenly became sensible of a most destructive flanking fire from a battery which had come, the Lord knows how, and established itself on a knoll somewhat higher than the ground we stood on, and only about 4OO or500yards a little in advance of our left flank. The rapidity and precision of this fire were quite appalling. Every shot almost took effect, and I certainly expected we should all be annihilated... we had pointed our two left guns towards the people who were annoying us so terribly... I signed for my poor troop - it was already a wreck We had scarcely fired many rounds at the enfilading battery when a tall man in the black Brunswick uniform came galloping up to me from the rear, exclaiming, 'Ah! mine Gott! - mine Gott! vas is it you doos, sare? Dat is your friends de Proosians; A you kills dem!'... to pacify him I ordered the whole to cease firing Psieu came our friends' shot, one after another and our friend himself had a narrow escape from one of them.'Now, sir,' I said...'tell them the moment their fire ceases, so shall mine.'Still he lingered, exclaiming,'Oh, dis is terreebly to see de Proosien and de Inglish kill vonanoder!' At last darting off I saw no more of him. The fire continued on both sides, mine becoming slacker and slacker, for we were reduced to the last extremity, and must have been annihilated but for the opportune arrival of a battery of Belgic artillery a little on our left, which, taking the others in flank nearly at point blank, soon silenced and drove them off.. "These Belgians were all beastly drunk, and, when they first came up, not at all particular as to which way they fired; and it was only by keeping an eye on them that they were prevented treating us, and even one another. The wretches had probably already done mischief elsewhere - who knows?" [13] Though only a brief and incomplete survey, I think there are some useful points that emerge. First major causes of mistaken identity seem to be one or more of the following: 1. Time of day 2. Smoke 3. Clothing confusion 4. Fear/Stress/Fatigue 5. Assumptions about troop location There are also some minor, probably less common contributory factors: 1. Deliberate deception 2. Nearsightedness 3. Drink Surprisingly, distance doesn't seem to make as much difference as one would think it should. That is, once the error has been made, getting closer doesn't help until it is almost too late. Undoubtedly, the closer one is when initial identification takes place, the more chance of getting it right - but once the mind is satisfied, the individual can get very close before discovering his error. It wasn't just the nearsighted Merveldt; Blayney was taken, Rieu's sergeant nearly was, and Ain had a speedy horse. Even Wellington was almost captured! We find that among the artillerists, guns could be brought to 400-500 yards, be accurate enough to wreck Mercer's battery or hit a brick wall, yet still have mistaken identity. Apparently, the Belgians got even closer. Note also that Mercer did not cease firing until the Prussians stopped shooting at him, even though he had been told they were Prussians. So even if mistaken identity is partially cleared up, casualties can still continue. Wolzogen recognized the French at about 800-900 yards. However, when a wrong identification was made by the infantry, we see the two sides well within musket range or under fire in a couple of our examples before the correct identity was established. There were also two close calls; Anton's "rallying square" (which was too late for the skirmishers) and the skirmishers who got within 300 paces of the Prussian battery. Had the surgeon been less observant, what might have resulted? On the tabletop, one can look at the painted uniforms to recognize units,or at least, can see which player is pushing the unit around to know if it is a friend or a foe. Yet Macready's men didn't recognize Nassauers; Anton thought the enemy to be friendly Brunswickers, and blue cloaks made Prussiand and French appear similar. Some Prussian Landwehr units were clothed in basically French-style uniforms, It would seem sensible that those brigaded with or used to others with a foreign uniform would be less likely to make such a mistake. It is not only foreign uniforms to consider. One must remember that on campaign uniforms do not remain pristine. They become ragged, dirty and disheveled. In addition, soldiers also wear parts of uniforms or clothing from any source if it is better than their own, even if it comes from the enemy. Greatcoats can also increase the chance of misidentification, as happened here with the Poles and the Austrians. Still uniform distinctions can be very important, such as the red tufts at St. Amand and the blue trousers at Leipzig, but Wellington makes the point that at a distance or in action it is more the profile or shape of the cap and general appearance, rather than the color that is important. Many Napoleonic wargames do not take into account the time of day, or, if they do, use it only as a convenient point to begin or end a battle. Yet at Llerena a few staff and led horses bore a terrific resemblance to a French cavalry charge! Mercer's battery was in action almost to tne end of the day, so poor light may have helped muddle identification. Cocks' affair took place "between light and dark". It is a fair assumption that mistaken identity is more likely near dawn or dusk than at other times of the day. (Weather conditions such as rain or snow, or just an overcast and dark day, are probably contributory factors also). Even fewer wargamers depict the effects of smoke in their games, often due to the playability problems involved, but smoke was a major obstruction to vision in general as well as disrupting proper identification. People often make assumptions that later turn out to be wrong. Such assumptions are very understandable and based upon the data (which may be faulty) available to the observer at the time. It is interesting to note the frequency of such assumptions in such a brief survey as outlined above. For example, Merveldt may have waved off warnings because he expected friendly troops to be where he now saw troops. Reuter had knowledge of a friendly regiment in his area; therefore, when he saw troops we now know to have been enemy soldiers, he assumed they were friendly because they were where he "knew" his side to be. Anton's companions assumed the attacking caval ry were Brunswickers; their actions seemed completely logical and consistant until the British skirmishers were run down. Cocks was fortunate, but still he relied upon his "knowledge" of logical troop positions to realize that the report of the French cavairy had to be false. At Llerena, apparently, horses coming from the "wrong" direction had to be French. Therefore, correct or incorrect knowledge of past, current or anticipated dispositions can also affect a commander's identification of a body of troops. Another serious factor to consider is stress. Such stress can be intensified when unde fire. Fear, fatigue, and responsibility all increase the chance of misidentification. Cocks' men were in a hurry to get back to avoid "being taken"; the men outside of Llerena were trying to launch a surprise attack quietly without being discovered; Rieu was being shot at. Robineau's unit was retreating. Elsewhere Mercer describes himself as fatigued and under mental stress. Units in the thick of it don't have the time nor the inclination to "make sure" - its shoot first, and ask questions later. Deliberate deception such as happened to Blayney is on record in several instances, but this didn't happen very often. Many writers also describe opponents as inebriated at times, but this is hard to verify. However, after reading about Mercer's Belgian "friends", one may wonder whether or not the idea deserves more credence! Near-sightedness such as General Graham suffered from is perhaps a more common occurence, but still a minor factor. (One of my favorite examples involves Major-General Bock When he received an order to charge the enemy. He assented, but had to add, "You will be good enough to show us the enemy." See my recent articles in THE PW REVIEW for a collection of anecdotes on the subject.) Mistaken identity can be used for any level of Napoleonic wargaming Some factors, such as inebriation or deliberate deception, are probably best suited for skirmish gaming, or where an umpire is present or where there are characters with different attributes or personalities. In mid-level games, there might be more chance for the units to come within combat distance before detection, while in large battles it may be more appropriate to limit commander initiative or reaction to enemy moves on some kind of random basis to indicate mistaken identify. A die roll may be made, for example, any time troops with a different uniform first come into sight of a commander such a roll might be modified according to the amount of light or the distance to the enemy. If the observer is under fire there might be more chance of a false ID. Using this concept, however you may choose to structure it, will detract from your game's playability. However, you'll also find that you increase the "fog of war" in your game, and in doing so, will probably have a lot of fun at the same time! REFERENCES [1] A Young Surgeon in Wellington's Army, Compiled by Leonard W6odford, Unwin Brothers Ltd., Old Woking, 1976. Page 23. [2] Intelligence Officer in the Peninsula, Julia Page, Spellmount Ltd., Tunbridge Wells, 1986. Page 105. [3] Wellington at War 794-1815, edited by Antony Brett-James, MacMillan and Co. Ltd., London, 1961. Pages 222-223. [4] Letter Written by Lieut.-General Thomas Dyneley, arranged by Colonel F.A. Whinyates, Ken,Trotman, London, 1984. Page 18, [5] Diary of the Campaigns in the Peninsula for the Years 1811,12 and 13, by Lieutenant William Swabey, edited by F. A. Whinyates, Ken Trotman, London, 1984. Pages 80-81. [6] Europe Against Napoleon, Antony Brett-James, MacMillan and Co. ltd., London, 1970. Page 133. [7] Ibid., page 134. [8] Ibid, pages 144-145. [9] The Hundred Days, Antony Brett-James, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1964. Page 76. [10] Ibid., pages 58-59. [11] Ibid., page 62. [12] Ibid., page 173. [13] Journal of the Waterloo Campaign, Cavalie Mercer, Praeger, New York, 1970. Pages 177-180. 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