It seems to me that there are three main parts to this hobby of ours (historical miniatures in case anyone is confused). They are, in no particular order: miniature painting (and scenery design), rules writing, and scenario design. Too often the weak sister of the three is scenario design as we rush to finish the last unit for our current project (period) and then get on with the preparations for the next. Few things bother me more than a beautifully laid out table with tremendous figures (and well designed rules) that line up on either side and fight for the middle. Yawn.
I am the kind of gamer who tends to stick to one set of rules for a period (usually, but not always, homegrown) and learn it well so that in the gaming session I can concentrate on strategy and the scenario instead of having to incessantly look up how many inches unformed troops move over difficult terrain or other such nuts and bolts details, the learning of which is inevitable in gaming with unfamiliar rules. Once the gamer is freed of this demanding routine (i.e., having to constantly refer to the rules) by truly KNOWING a set of rules one can concentrate on what I believe is the ultimate pleasure of the cerebral side of our hobby: designing truly challenging and innovative scenarios. This philosophy as applied to the French and Indian War is the basis of this article.
Scenario Designer's Delight
This period of history can be a scenario designer's delight. The wilderness terrain, the division on both sides between European and Provincial troops, the personalities of the commanders, the unpredictability of the Indians, and the amphibious operations are some, but by no means all, of the compelling elements with which to play around. Surprise meeting engagements, ambushes, breakthroughs, and assaults on fortifications are historically appropriate as are many other types of actions. But before we delve into scenario ideas let's take a look at some of the physical and psychological factors involved and some suggestions for appropriate rules modifications.
First is the terrain. It was horrendously wild. Compared to the relatively settled and "civilized" countryside of England and France, the Ohio Valley was truly a vast and daunting wilderness. This was especially true for the first time French or British private who, we can certainly deduce, would exhibit in varying degrees the symptoms of what we would call culture shock. Add to this the neophytes' natural fear of the unknown and the almost supernatural dread that the first time private soldier from Europe must have felt for (in their view) the unfathomable and above all enormously savage Redman. The mind exaggerates our fears, especially of the unknown, producing a state of nervous agitation which might cause an advancing column of troops to break and run sooner than it would under other circumstances. We can also deduce that this mental condition would somewhat lessen through time as the men became more acclimated to their surroundings.
This situation is surely exacerbated by the physical difficulties this new wilderness presented to the movement of troops. When penetrating the interior the close knit linear formations of the European tradition simply didn't work (as Braddock's experience on the Monongahela amply proves) especially for the attackers. The penetrating force, if it did not include specially trained contingents, was channeled to advance in column along major trails, thus exposing its vulnerable flanks, or move at a snail's pace. This situation cannot have been reassuring to our private soldier just off the boat from England whose eyes could not see beyond the second or third tree but whose imagination populates the area with countless painted savages lusting for lifted scalps. Tremendous psychological forces are at work here.
If unfamiliarity exaggerates our fears then familiarity acts to control them. Thus the frontier dwelling colonist, lacking as he did the regulars' skill at close formation drill and such intangibles as tradition, had one thing over his European comrade in arms when it came to fighting in the backwoods. He was raised with the Indian threat and could psychologically cope with it. Also his tactics, honed since the 17th Century in the Alarms Companies, were an inevitable reaction to this experience. All of this made the Colonist-soldier (specifically those from the Indian frontier regions), even the lowly militiaman, better adapted than the proud Regular at the all important phase of this new warfare: Indian fighting.
Wargames
So how do we incorporate these ideas into our wargames? First is the physical dimension: Our tables should include lots of heavy woods and the movement penalties through same should be appropriately severe for regulars and light for colonial irregulars. Second is the psychological aspect: The first time a European unit is attacked by Indians it should have additional morale modifiers involved (this might be likened to elephants in ancient wargaming). These penalties would not, of course, apply to even the lowest class of colonial militia. Third is the tactical question: Allow colonial troops to accrue special modifiers when fighting in the woods or against Indians, modifiers which do not apply to European troops.
Now how about those Indians? How do we apply them to our wargames? Historical documentation is more lacking concerning Indians than for any other troop type in our period, so much of our work is guesswork. Generally we can say that they were usually classed with the militia in the military scheme of things, not very useful in an open fight but good for ambushes and the morale effect discussed above. We can safely conclude that they had a superior knowledge of the land and the ability to move about largely undetected by most white troops (at least the European ones).
As for their behavior, I postulate that they were generally erratic and highly unpredictable and thus hard to control from a military standpoint. They might hold their ground or attack as a commander wanted or suddenly launch an unauthorized charge or leave the field entirely seeking plunder of some sort. The run of the mill militia that had been fighting in European armies for millenia also had this characteristic but such behavior could usually be foreseen by their commanders to a much greater extent than the commander of the Iroquois or Seneca.
On the wargame table we can simulate the above simply. Before a game sketch out the terrain and allow the Indian commander(s) to set up, on map, anywhere on the table before the other players set-up/enter. French or British allies of the Indians may or may not know their locations at the players/game-master's discretion. These hidden Indian units will remain hidden until they: 1) voluntarily move; 2) shoot; or 3) are "run into" by enemy units. At such times they are placed on table and will be visible for the rest of the game (believe me, this is much more manageable than trying to allow them to become hidden again during the game). During the "Iroquois Terror" scenarios that Dale Wood and I have put on this set up was quite effective in slowing down and intimidating the British/colonial player who had to advance the length of the hoard to reinforce a besieging force against a French fort. If they simply marched contemptuously onward exposing their flanks (as Braddock did), they were usually hacked to pieces (as Braddock was). If, however, they sent a significant quantity of colonial troops out as flank guard skirmishers they usually did much better as the hidden Indian units were spotted before outflanking the main column.
To simulate the unpredictability of the Indians in these scenarios the game master rolled one 6 sided die for each Indian unit each turn. On a roll of "1", the unit in question, hidden or otherwise, would become filled with "bloodlust" and immediately charge the closest enemy unit in sight. This would occur on a roll of "1 " or "2" if the unit in question was facing the flank or rear of an enemy or an enemy in poor morale.
While in a state of "bloodlust" Indian units received additional morale and melee modifiers which lasted until the conclusion of the melee phase. On a roll of "6" the Indian unit would go into "plunderlust" and immediately march to the closest settlement and commence plundering and ravaging until the game master, by die roll, determined that they had had enough. This produced an exciting game and definitely made the Indians either game goats or game breakers.
In one memorable scenario an excellent use of all those Colonial women figures was found. During an assault on a British/provincial held stockade by French and Indian forces, the local camp followers were put to the task of loading muskets for the men on the ramparts. As long as they were engaged in this task the British/provincial forces involved could cause no less than 1 casualty no matter that their die roll (i.e., if they rolled "0" it became "1"). If however they were put to some other task, like putting out a fire caused by the flaming arrows of the Indian hordes, the men lost this advantageous modifier. Women figures could possibly be used for bandaging up wounded figures, herding livestock, or even "manning" the ramparts when things get really desperate.
Certain aspects of role playing are not altogether inappropriate in a wilderness setting. In one of our "Iroquois" scenarios, the game master (in this case Dale), placed a Jesuit priest figure in a farmhouse. British troops were advancing in the face of hidden French and Indian units and if they happened upon the Jesuit figure he would reveal the location of some or all of the hidden enemy units.
Another instance of a type of role playing is to give each of the unit commanders a goal in addition to the overall goal of winning the scenario. This was done in one instance by placing Daniel Boone in charge of one unit of colonists and giving him fictional antipathy to a certain Indian Chief figure commanding an enemy Indian unit. The players commanding these units were given individual "glory points" if they killed or captured the other regardless of which side won the scenario. This "game within a game" feature added greatly to the intrigue of the scenario.
With the release of 25mm sailing ships by various companies, a new type of scenario is now possible: combined land and sea operations. Our "Iroquois Terror" scenarios took on a new, expanded look after Dale added his small fleet of sloops to the action. We now had a situation where a French held coastal fort was threatened on the landward side by columns of British and Colonial troops and on the seaward side by bombardment by British ships of war and detachments of elite British troops dispatched by boat. French land batteries traded shots with the British ships as the French commander was forced to make difficult decisions on deploying his meager number of battalions. Should he bring the regulars to defend the shore and leave the landward flank to be guarded by Quebec militia and Indians or concentrate on the columns advancing by land and leave the coast essentially unprotected, etc. This opened up a whole new type of scenario for us and the visual effects that can be achieved here are truly exciting.
These are just some of the things the scenario-designer can do with this exciting period of our past. A well designed scenario takes time to set up but can be one of the most rewarding aspects of wargaming and the French and Indian War offers a lot with which to work. Let history provide the background but allow the limits to be set only by the imagination.
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