The problems of fighting the American Indian in his native forests were of paramount importance to commanders serving in the New World. Braddock's defeat of 1755, due more to bad scouting and a failure to abide by basic principles of march security than to wearing red coats or standing about in the road, is the best known instance of Europeans proving unable to adjust to frontier conditions; there were many, many other "Fatal Overthrows". In 1765 a Philadelphia physician, William Smith, published an account of Colonel Henry Bouquet's successful expeditions against the Ohio Indians. Bouquet, a Swiss soldier of considerable resource and imagination, had conducted two campaigns in 1763-4; his victory at Bushy Run (Aug. 5-6, 1763) and bloodless march of the following year, were model Indian-fighting operations. Smith added a set of military papers to his narrative, based upon documents given to him by an unidentified "Officer of great abilities and long experience, in our wars with the Indians." These papers covered several areas, discussing Indian techniques of war and making comparison with Crassus, Caesar and other campaigns of Ancient Times. The most interesting part for the wargamer is Smith's invaluable presentation of plans for the conduct of an Expeditionary Force, heavily based on the example of Bouquet's campaigns. Note: the original Courier article is a reproduction of the text at the time, including the archaic font that elongates an "s" so that it looks like a "f", such as it is. In this MagWeb.com version, a regular "s" was used. Original spelling, though sometimes off today, was kept throughout. Finally, comments by Howard Whitehouse are in italics, while the original text is in regular font.--RL PREPARATION FOR AN EXPEDITION IN THE WOODS AGAINST SAVAGES It is not practicable to employ large bodies of troops against Indians: the convoys necessary for their support would be too cumbersome and could neither be moved with care nor protected. It would be better to fit out several small expeditions, than one too unwieldly: I will therefore support that a corps intended to act offensively shall not exceed the following proportions. Two regiments of foot: 900 One battalion of hunters: 500 Two troops of light horse: 100 One company of artificers: 20 Drivers and necessary followers: 280 In all 1.800 There are a few things to note here: 1. The 'Regiments' are small - 450 men at campaign strength. 2. By "Hunters" Smith seems to mean light infantry. in practical terms this might mean anything from trained regulars to Indian allies. 3. Smith advocates the use of light horse scouts, raised on the frontiers, and, ideally, each "provided with a Blood-hound, which would be useful to find out the enemies [sic] ambushes, and to follow their tracts." 4. No artillery is included. LOGISTICS The first article to provide is the provisions, and next the carriages. The daily ration of a soldier in the woods should consist of one pound and a half of meat (which requires no carriage) and one pound of flower, with a gill of salt per week. Upon that allowance 1800 men will require for six months or 182 days 326,600 lbs of Flour. Allowing one fourth for accident 81.900 Thus, for six months 409.500 lb. Flour. Meat for the same time with a fourth part more for accidents, or 2048 beeves at 300 lb. each or 614,400 lb. Meat Salt for 26 weeks 182 Bushells. The above quantity would serve the whole campaign. but one half would be sufficient to penetrate from the last deposit into the heart of the enemy's country : therefore he shall compute the carriages for this last quantity only. Every horse carries about ISO lb. neat weight, therefore, to carry flour for three months or 204,750 lb. will require 1365 horses. Smith seems to be advocating a "fill up when we get there" approach, which effectively halves the provision list. Even so, there are more slaughter beeves than soldiers in the convoy. TRANSPORT Horses for flour brought forward 1365 For 91 bushels of salt 46 Ammunition 50 Tents 50 Tools 50 Hospital 20 Officers baggage and staff 150 Total: 17.31 To reduce this exhorbitant number of horses, and the great expence attending it, I would propose for such parts of the country as mould admit of it to make use of carts, drawn each by four oxen, and carrying about 1300 lb. or six barrels of flour. The above quantity of 204,750 lb. will then be carried by 160 carts drawn by 640 oxen Spare oxen with the army 384 The number of oxen wanted 1024 By the above method, 3 or 400 horses would be sufficient to carry the baggage ammunition, tents, tools etc. Smith advocates the use of ox-carts, which hinges on a number of factors; 1; Cost; always a key consideration, especially when notoriously, er, "thrifty" colonial assemblies are expected to pay. 2; that the oxen can be eaten once their loads of flour are consumed, thus saving forage - often scarce in the woods, especially at the end of a campaign. The disadvantages of ox-carts are their slow speed and the need for careful road-cutting and bridging. Smith, however, suggests that "with troops accustomed to work" that road, bridge and raft building would not be a serious problem. A point that Smith does not mention is the relative lengths of each column. Assuming pack horses two abreast at a fairly tight 4 yards per animal, the horse column would be 3,462 yards long (almost 2 miles), while the ox-cart convoy, at 10 yards per vehicle in single file, would be 1,600 yards for the carts plus 7-800 for the pack horse contingent - some 30% less, and a considerable saving to a dangerously extended force. Smith shows the line of march with the carts 3 abreast, a feat not often possible in broken terrain. DEPLOYING THE COLUMN EXPLANATION of the four plans, Representing the different positions of our army in the woods. Smith shows four plans for these critical topics; 'Encampment', 'Line of March', 'Disposition to receive the enemy' and 'General Attack'. The camp (Fig. 1) forms a parallelogram, of one thousand by six hundred feet. Eight hundred men of the regular troops ( 1 ) can camp on four sides, which gives 24 feet to each tent, containing six men. The light horse (3) encamp within the parallelogram. The reserve (7) in the center. The provisions, ammunition, tools and stores (8) and cattle (9) are placed between the two troops of light horse and the reserve, The hunters (2) encamp on the outside diagonally at the four angles, being covered by redoubts (5) formed with kegs and bags of four or fascincs. Besides these four redoubts, another is placed to the front, one to the rear. and two before each of the long faces of the camp, making in all ten advanced guards of 22 men each, and 7 centries, covered if possible by breast works of fascincs or provisions. Before the army lay down their arms, the ground is to be reconnoitred and the guards posted, who will immediately open a communication from one to the other to relieve the centries and facilitate the passage of rounds. The centries upon the ammunition, provisions, head quarters, and all others in the inside of the camp are furnished from the reserve. The officers, except the staff and commanders of corps, encamp on the line with their men. The fires are made between the guards and camp and put out in case of an attack in the night. Smith makes special note of securing the corners of the compound. If artillery was present, it would generally be placed at the angles. If the camp was to be a permanent site, the ground would usually be cleared of trees for a distance of 1200 yards -- obviously a major undertaking. LINE OF MARCH, FIG. II Part of the hunters (2) in three divisions detaching small parties (5, 6) to their front and to their right and left to search the woods and discover the enemy. The artificers and as men (4) to cut a road for the convoy, and two paths on the right and left for the troops. One hundred and fifty of the regular troops (1) in two files, who are to form the front of the square; these march in the center road. Two hundred and fifty regulars (1) in one file by the right hand path: and 250 (1) by the left hand path, are to form the long faces. These are followed by 150 regulars (1) in two files, who are to form the rear of the square. The reserve (7) compos'd of 100 regulars in two files. The left of the hunters (2) in two files. The light horse (3). The rear guard (5) compos'd of hunters follows the convoy at some distance and closes the march. The scouting parties (6) who flank the line of march are taken from the hunters and light horse, and posted as in plan (Fig. 2) some orderly light horse men attend the General and field officers who command the grand divisions, to carry their orders. Two guards of light horse take charge of the cattle (9). The convoy (8) proceeds in the following order: The tools and ammunition following the front column. The baggage. The cattle. The provisions. The whole divided into Brigades, and the horses two abreast. DEFILES In case of a defile, the whole halt until the ground is reconnoitred, and the hunters have taken possession of the heights, The center column then enters in to the defile, followed by the right face; After them the convoy, then the left and rear face, with the reserve, the light horse. and the rear guard. The whole to take form again as soon as the ground permits. Smith shows a line of march in which the column has been shortened for security; this means a broader frontage, precluding the use of an existing road without a great deal of chopping trees on the march. No rate of progress is given, but Bouquet's 1764 expedition covered 5-15 miles daily, with 8-9 being about average. The plan shows the slaughter beeves in a very compact mass - in practice they must surely have taken up at least 500 yards in this formation. In 1755 Braddock's van, under Thomas Gage, notably failed to cover the hill to the right of their march, with disastrous results. DISPOSITION TO RECEIVE THE ENEMY, FIG. (3) The whole halt to form the square or parrallelogram, which is done thus. The two first men of the center column stand fast at two yards distance. The two men following them step forward and post themselves at two yards on the right and left. The others come to the front in the same manner, till the two files have form'd a rank which is the front of the square. The rear face is formed by the two file leaders turning to the center road, where having placed themselves at two yards distance, they face outwards and are followed by their files, each man posting himself on their right or left, and facing towards the enemy the moment he comes to his post. As foon as the front and rear are extended and formed, the two longfaces, who have in the mean time faced outwards, join now the extremities of the two fronts of the square. TO REDUCE THE SQUARE The right and left of the front, face to the center, where the two center men stand fast. Upon the word "march" these step forward and are replaced by the two next, who follow them and so on; by which means that front becomes again a column. The rear goes to the right about, and each of the two center men leads again to the side paths followed by the rest. While the troops form, the light horse and each division of the convoy take the ground affigned to them within the square. as if they were to encamp, and the horses being unloaded. two parrallel lines will be formed, with the bags and keg of provisions, to cover the wounded and the men unfit for action. The hunters take post on the most advantageous ground on the outside and skirmish with the encmy till the square is form'd: which, upon receiving their orders, they retire within the square where they take their powt as in Fig. (3). The small parties of rangers (5) who have flanked the line of march, remain on the outfide, to keep off the enemy and observe their motions. When the firing begins the troops will have orders to fall on their knees to be left exposed till it's thought proper to attack. The four faces, form'd by the regular troops, are divided into platoons chequer'd. One half, composed of the best and most active soldiers, is called the first Firing, and the other half the second Firing. The eight platoons at the angles are of the Second Firing in order to preserve the form of the square during the attack. It is evident that, by this disposition, the convoy is well covered and the light troops, destined for the charge, remain concealed: and as all unexpected events during in engagement are apt to strike terror, and create confusion among the enemy. It is natural to expect that the savages will be greatly disconcerted at the sudden and unforseen eruption, that will soon pour upon them from the inside of the square: and that, being vigoroufly attacked in front and flank at the same time, they will neither be able to resist, nor, when once broke, have time to rally to make another stand. This may be effected in the following manner. GENERAL ATTACK, Fig. IV The Regulars (1) stand fast. The hunters (2) sally out in four columns, through the intervals of the front and rear of the square, followed by the light horse (3) with their blood hounds. The intervals of the two columns who attack in the front and of those who attack in the rear, will be closed by the little parties of rangers (5) posted at the angles of the square, each attack forming in that manner, three sides of a parrallelogram. In that order they run to the enemy (X) and having forced their way through their circle, fall upon their flanks: by wheeling to their right and left and charging with impetuosity. The moment they take the enemy in flank, the First Firing of the regular troops march out briskly and attack the enemy in front. The platoons detached in that manner from the two short faces, proceed only about one hundred yards to their front, where they halt to cover the square. while the rest of the troops who have attacked pursue the enemy, till they are totally dispersed, not giving them time to recover themselves. Notice that Smith advocates a double line at two yard intervals rather than the 3-deep, 22" frontage of the regular drill books. The sudden counterattack clearly reflects the battle winning tactic at Bushy Run. One wonders whether this plan isn't a mite too complex for any troops other than disciplined regulars with plenty of woods experience; could a newly raised Provincial unit have carried it through? Or a King's Regiment fresh off the boat? The sick and wounded, unable to march or ride, are transported in litters made of flour bags, through which two long poles are passed, and kept asunder by two sticks tied across beyond the head and feet to stretch the bag. Each litter is carried by two horses. These remarks might have been extended to many other cases that may occur in the course of a campaign or of an engagement, but it hoped this sketch will be sufficient to evince the necessity of form: alteration in our ordinary method of proceeding in an Indian war. Smith's papers reflect a radical change in outlook that had developed over the previous ten years of hard backwoods fighting. While the entire work was never adopted as official policy, and may not have been widely read, it serves as a compilation of different approaches worked out by a number of British commanders - not only Bouquet, but Howe, Forbes, Bradstreet and others - to deal with the distinctive conditions of the American frontier. WARGAMING THE "EXPEDITION IN THE WOODS AGAINST SAVAGES" This section is Whitehouse's work. Italics is no longer needed.--RL Clearly the usual kind of miniatures wargame isn't going to really address the issues of column warfare in the American backwoods. This is an alternative approach which will, I think, get us closer to the heart of the matter. We need one or more umpires, to control the Wild Savages and the universe in general. All the players will serve as British and American officers, and may be given individual briefings, preferably contradicting one another, to ensure an appropriate spirit of non-cooperation. We don't want this to be too easy, do we? The players are given their model soldiers, at a 1/20 scale this means: 45 regulars 25 'hunters' 2 mounted scouts 1 artificer 87 packhorses or 8 ox-carts and 15-20 packhorses 102 slaughter-beeves 14 drivers, sutlers, servants, etc. Now,in most games we tend to think of the frontage of our toy soldiers as being important, the depth less so. This won't work here! What we need to do is rethink the problem. If a figure represents 20 men in a single double or triple rank at all times the depths are all wrong. Let us say, however,that on the march he represents 4 men abreast by 5 men deep; at 2yards per man for an 'easy march' that means our figure ought to be 10 yards deep. Thus if a 15mm figure has a 1/2" base, our ground scale is 1" to 20 yards; in 25mm it might be 1" to 10 yards. Now, since our men are all marching in fours, you'll have to decide whether you want them to follow that nice, pre-cut trail - all the figures strung out in single file at enormous length - or make a safely (?) compact column too wide for the road. Set out the figures in various positions to see how long 2 miles of packhorses really is; even if you possess a fifteen foot wargames table, you probably won't feel very positive about your chances of keeping the Shawnee out of the general's wagon of home comforts! The umpires let the players experiment with march, and equally important, camp layouts. Once they feel they know what they are doing, they are ready for The Table. Now, this isn't your average wargames table. What we need here is two tables placed end to end, to create a long, thin board. The road, or direction of march, runs down the center, with forest on either side. At various points there are terrain features - a defile, a river crossing, a clearing, a settlement - but mainly it's The Woods. The players are told to deploy into their chosen march order or camp formation on a selected site; they are given a time limit, preferably an increasingly short one, to lay out the figures. The umpire, in his role as chief scout for the Injuns, looks over the deployment and decides whether to attack; if he does,he places his own figures for battle; if not the column moves on to the next terrain feature. If we have the luxury of a second umpire, he follows behind the column changing the terrain; then, when we reach the end of the table, we start over at the beginning. What will happen, of course, is that the column either has to cross a particularly nasty obstacle, or it gets careless. Having each player place his own pieces helps with this effect. The Shawnee aren't going to attack when the force is cohesive and fully self-supporting, of course; the assault comes when the expedition is most stretched. To this end the umpires are encouraged to add 'little jokes' for one or more of the players - broken down wagons, fallen trees, possible sightings of Indians. With two minutes maximum, say, to move fifty assorted models and an umpire who keeps placing model Indians off in the lichen to the left, it is easy to forget to keep the rearguard exactly 400 yards, or whatever, from the main body. Then it's time for the fun to begin, anclyou find out whether your plans possess any merit whatsoever. I trust, gentlemen, that you will retain your scalps!! Reference: "An HISTORICAL ACCOUNT of the EXPEDITION againstthe OHIO INDIANS in the year 1764, under the command of HENRY BOUQUET, Esq & cetera & cetera" by William Smith, Philadelphia, 1765; reprinted by University Microfilms Inc., Ann Arbor; 1966. 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