This wargame was fought using TSR's MODERN ARMOR rules (if these rules are no longer available, the game can be played with just about any 1:1 scale modern period rules), with 20mm figures and vehicles. Due to the large jungle area (see Map 1), an umpirewas used tofacilitate hidden movement. Each playercommander (two US/ARVN and three NVA/VC) was provided a map where all hidden movement, bunker locations, and ambush sites were noted. This map was checked by the umpire each turn. The entire game, from setup to breakdown, lasted three hours. Terrain The outline of the jungle was marked with chalk. The road and river were long pieces of felt. The river was fordable at no penalty by personnel, but was impassible to vehicles. The Special Forces camp was set on table in its entirety. ALLIED SITUATION Intelligence: The NVA (North Vietnamese Army) have built up their forces in the Son Te area. An attack can be expected at any time. Estimated army strength is one NVA battalion and 300-400 Main Force and Local VC (Viet Cong). The largest crew-served weapon likely to be encountered is the 120mm mortar. ALLIED FORCES At Son Te: US SF (Special Forces) "A" Team: 12 men with M16 rifles 2 M60 MGs 1 .50 cal. MG 1 106mm RR (recoilless rifle) 1 command radio ARVN (Army of the Republic of South Vietnam) Strike Force: 30 men with M16 rifles 3 M60 MGs 1 81mm mortar 1 command radio LP's (listening posts) deployed around Son Te - variable in number 4 antipersonnel bobby traps de- ployed around Son Te ARVN Artillery Section: 6 men with M1 6 rifles 1 105mm howitzer with 100 rds HE and 20 rds smoke At the village of Ben Duc: US Advisor Team: 6 men with M16 rifles 1 jeep with M60 MG 1 command radio ARVN Regional (RF) Company: 40 men with misc. firearms 2.30 cal. MGs 1 M8 Armored Car with 1 .50 cal. MG (on external AA mount), 1 37mm cannon, and 1 .30 cal. MG 2 M35 21/2 ton trucks 1 command radio Fire Support: 1 airstrike 1 light fire team (1 gunship and 1 observation helicopter) 2 105mm howitzers at Ben Duc Son Te Camp (Map 2) Six bunkers (four man capacity), six claymore mines (anti-personnel), one command bunker (eight man capacity) with an observation tower (two man capacity) on top, open weapons pits for the howitzer and recoilless rifle. Allied Objective Hold Son Te without taking more than 50% casualties from camp personnel. NOTE: All fire support relies on functioning radios for use. On each turn roll a D6; a 4, 5, or 6 indicates a working radio. Reinforcements from Ben Duc may not enter the play board until Son Te is under a definite attack (and not simply harrassing fire). NVA SITUATION Intelligence: The disposition of the entire allied force is known to the NVA players, including the exact position of all allied personnel and equipment except for the four listening posts and four small booby traps put out around Son Te by the ARVN Strike Force. NVA/VC FORCES NVA 8006 Special Assault Company: 100 men with AK47 rifles 10 RPG-2s (rocket propelled grenades) with two rounds each 5 RPD MGs 10 demolition charges 2 AT (antitank) mines 1 command radio 1342 Special Support Company: 30 men with SKS rifles 2 120mm mortars with 10 rounds 2 82mm mortars with 20 rounds 2 57mm RRs with 10 rounds 2 command radios 673R Local Force VC Company: 40 men with misc. rifles 2 RPG-2s with 2 rounds each 1 RPD MG 2 demolition charges 1 AT mine NVA Objective Establish a roadblock between Ben Duc and Son Te and inflict at least 50% casualties on the total allied force. ACTIVITIES PRIOR TO THE GAME Allied The Son Te commander was allowed to plot 21 artillery concentrations anywhere on the playing board. These were the size of the burst radii of two 105mm rounds. Only one concentration could be called each turn, but it had a 90% chance of landing in the concentration area. He was also allowed to place two-man LF's around Son Te. He elected to put four out, one each North, South, East, and West of the camp. Finally, the camp commander was allowed to place the four antipersonnel booby traps around the camp; one was placed South of the Southern LP, and three were placed around the bridge, in the edge of the jungle to the North, East, and West. NVA The NVA commander was told that he could place his forces anywhere on the playing board except within the camp itself. The two NVA companies were placed in an assembly area South of Son Te while the VC company set an "L"- shaped ambush at the bend in the road South of the bridge (Map 3). The two 57mm RRs were attached to the VC company. The two 120mm mortars were placed Southwest of Son Te and South of the river and the two 80mm mortars Northeast of the camp. Part of jungle canopy was cut away to allow the mortars to fire; they would only be observed from the air from directly overhead. The VC ambush conisted of one AT mine in the bend of the road. Ten men, two 57mm RRs, and 1 RPD were placed in the short leg of the "L". The remaining 30 men with the two RPGs, two demolitions charges, and the command radio were in the long leg. They were ordered not to let any reinforcements from Ben Duc to get by them. NOTE: Movement through the jungle was considered normal for the NVA/VC as they would have found or made paths for their use prior to their assault. THE GAME The NVA commander decided to send a four man detachment to the Northern edge of the bridge with instructions to place the two AT mines on the shoulders of the road. in the process they tripped one of the ARVN booby traps, killing one NVA. The bobby trap in front of the Southern ARVN LP also went off, but no one was hurt. The two observers in the camp tower were able to see the smoke rising from the explosions, but they were unaware of the results. The SF Camp commander elected to withdraw his I-Ps at this point. As the I-Ps withdrew, a small arms firefight broke out between the advancing NVA and the Southern LP. After a brief exchange, the firing died down with no casualties on either side. The SF camp commander attempted to contact Ben Duc, but conditions were not good, and no radio communications were established. On the next turn the NVA moved into their attack positions South and West of the camp. Small arms fire broke out again with one ARVN KIA (killed in action). Radio contact was still not made with Ben Duc (die seems to have ones & twos on it!). The US advisors at Ben Duc could hear the small arms fire, but they thought the SF camp was conducting live firing practice! Contact was also attempted from Ben Duc, but also failed. The NVA attack force was now in position. The NVA commander made radio contact with his two mortar sections and both commenced firing on the camp. Heavy small arms and RPG fire was also directed at Son Te. The SF and ARVN defenders returned the fire with all available weapons. The camp commander was able to reach Ben Duc by radio (finally!) and called for concentration #1. He also asked for reinforcements f rorn Ben Duc, as a real attack seemed to be shaping up. The 105mm howitzer in the camp took a direct hit from an RPG which destroyed the gun, but luckily, the crew wasn't hurt. in the exchange of small arms fire, one ARVN and five NVA were KIA. On the next turn the US advisors at Ben Duc alerted their ARVN counterparts to prepare a reaction force to go to the aid of Son Te. unfortunately, the majority of the ARVN troops were scattered throughout the village and could notbegathered immediately. The artillery fired two rounds on concentration #1. The NVA however, had moved to the edge of the jungle and the rounds landed behind them. The NVA mortars continued to pound the camp. One bunker took a direct hit from a 120mm mortar round and all four ARVNs inside were killed. NVAsappers crawled forward to place their demolition charges under the barbed wire while both sides kept up a heavy small arms fire. Four ARVN and five NVA were killed by the intense volume of rifle and MG fire. The camp commander now had excellent radio communications and asked for the on-call airstrike. He specifically requested the aircraft to be armed with CBUs (cluster bomb units), hoping to catch the NVA as they crossed the open area next to the camp. He also requested that the artillery fire on concentration #14. During turn 6, the NVA sappers continued to crawl towards the wire. Two NVA mortar rounds had direct hits in the camp. One round landed inside the observation tower, killing both of the occupants. Another round destroyed the 106mm RR and killed two of the crew. Eight other NVA and five ARVN were killed by small arms fire. The reaction force at Ben Duc was finally getting organized. The Son Te commander was informed that the Ben Duc company would be on the road soon. He was also told that the airstrike was on the way. Artillery concentration #14 was fired but fell short, causing no casualties. The same concentration was called again. By now it was obvious to the SF camp commanderthat the main NVA attack was coming from the South and West. He decided to leave only one man in each of the bunkers in the North and East areas, shifting the rest to the thrteatened sectors. At last, the ARVN reaction force departed Ben Duc toward Son Te with the M8 armored car in the lead, followed by the two trucks filled with ARVN troops who had their weapons ready and aimed towards the jungle. Bringing up the rear of the column was the US advisor jeep. Each memberof the relief forcewas instructed to open fire atthefirst hintof an ambush. Meanwhile, back at the beleaguered camp, the first NVA sappers had reached the Western wire and succeeded in blowing a hole into the barrier. During the exchange of mortar fire, one NVA and two ARVN were KIA. Five NVA sappers were killed by small arms fire before they could lay their demolition charge next to the Southwest wire. The shift by the camp defenders was completed and concentration #14 once more fell short. By this time, exactly half of the camp's defenders had been killed. The Son Te commander realized that the camp was about to fall. He issued orders to his remaining personnel that as the NVA attack came in they were to retreat to the Northeastern area and then into the jungle. He attempted to contactthe Ben Duc force but his radio wentout again. He was able to reach the FAC (forward air controller) who said that the air strike, two Skyraiders, would soon be on station. Turn 8 found the third NVA sapper group reaching the Southern perimeter of the camp and succeeding in blowing another hole in the barbed wire. The NVA commander ordered his force to mass for the final assault into the camp. Eleven NVA were killed by small arms and mortar fire. One of the 120mm mortars scored another direct hit on a bunker, killing the four US inside. The Ben Duc reaction fotce entered the playing area and all members searched the jungle edge for signs of an ambush. in the distance, they could see the bend in the road. Radio communications were still out between them and Son Te. Overhead, the FAC was on station, but he also could not raise the Son Te commander. He briefed the two Skyraiders that if no contact was made with the ground force, they would abort their mission. On the ground, inside the smoking remains of the SF camp, the commander orders his few remaining men to exfiltrate to the Northeast after destroying their .50 cal. MG and 81mm mortar. On the last turn, the AT mine exploded underneath the armored car as it reached the bend in the road, while at the same time, the two 57mm RRs fired and hit the M8. All six ARVN on board were killed. The ambush was sprung. Eleven ARVN troopers were also killed by the initial VC small arms fire. The rest of the ARVN returned the fire and charged the ambush, throwing hand grenades. The US advisor jeep was out of the kill zone and began firing into the flank of the ambush. The VC recoiled from the sudden attack and fell back into the jungle leaving twelve dead behind. At the SF camp, the NVA charged into the openings in the wire while the camp defenders broke contact and fled into the jungle. The camp commander was able to contact the FAC who was told that the Southeastern part of the camp was in enemy hands. The FAC ordered the two Skyraiders to make their passes firing 20mm cannon and dropping their CBUs. The NVA attack was caught by the airstrike at the edge of the camp. When the smoke cleared, eighteen of the NVA were dead and the rest were streaming back into the safety of the jungle. SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS Allied losses included 31 of the 42 camp defenders, and 17 of the 46 Ben Duc relief force members, for a total of 48 casualties, or 54%. Equipment destroyed included one 105mm howitzer, one 106mm RR, three M60 MGs, one .50 calibre MG, one 81 mm mortar, and the M8 armored car. NVA/VC losses included 48 of the 130 NVA and 19 of the 40 VC for a total o 67 asualties, or 39%. No equipment was destroyed or captured. Based on the pre-game objectives, the NVA/VC achieved their mission, while the US/ARVN failed, as they lost 74% of the personnel at the Son Te camp. Where did the Allies go wrong? This game was extremely realistic in execution (I know because I survived several actions similar to this one). The only thing the camp commander could have tried that he didn't was to make use of the light fire team. With the poor radio communications, it's doubtful that it would have arrived in time to cloany good. Losing the howitzer and RR support early in the game didn't help at all. The US/ARVN players did as much as they could under the circumstances; it simply wasn't enough. The NVAYVC players deployed their troops well and carefully planned their attack. As it turned out, they didn't hold the camp, but they certainly made a mess of it. If I were to do this again, I would use 1/300 scale figures and equipment such as those produced by GHQ and Heroics and ROS. In playing this game, it is strongly recommended that simple rules and an umpire be used. The smaller scale would allow a larger playing area and easier figure movement. With such a playing area, one could locate the village of Ben Duc on the game table, thus providing the NVA/VC with the option of attacking the village or ambushing the road or both, in addition to attacking the camp. Back to Table of Contents -- Courier Vol. VII #6 To Courier List of Issues To MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1987 by The Courier Publishing Company. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com