...,"those who analyze the tactics of a period using drill manuals of that period as a source are in danger of misinterpreting the facts ......" The relevance of drill regulations to the wargamer and historian attempting to understand any period's combat is contentious at best, but deserves a public review. There are diverging sides to the argument on the relevance of drill regulations. The first side suggests that they are "tactical" documents with little relevance in as much as they were regularly ignored and the officers did what seemed best for the circumstances at hand. The second side of the argument believes that they were not truly "tactical" documents and, though there were departures from the regulations, the regulations were written with the intention that they be followed as closely as possible for what they were intended. There is even a middle ground described by D. Graves in an article entitled "Dry Books of Tactics", U.S. Infantry Manuals of the War of 1812 and After. Military Collector & Historian, Autumn 1986. Mr. Graves says, "The author, however, would like to state at the outset that those who analyze the tactics of a period using drill manuals of that period as a source are in danger of misinterpreting the facts. Drill manuals were training aids; they are an indication of what can and perhaps should take place on a battlefield. But as it rarely does, the historian wishing to describe the tactics of a period is wise to study the drill manuals of the period with a very large grain of salt and in close combination with such other factors as training, motivation, terrain and leadership. This may seem like simple common sense, but only too often historians working in the field of tactical warfare have been led astray because of their reliance on official publications." Regulations When one searches out regulations on will find that there are four types of "regulations" that were issued. The first is official documentation from government printing houses and which have titles such as Rules and Regulations for the Formations, Field Exercise and Movements of His Majesty's Forces. These documents are invariably marked such that it is obvious they are official. In addition, the author(s)'s name(s) are never indicated as such. In some exceptional instances, where an official governmental panel was designated, i.e., the French Cavalry Regulation of 1805, this information can be found buried in the document. These documents always resulted from major reviews of the state's military system by very senior officers and were an attempt to rectify major known problems in the outgoing system. The second type of "regulation" are provisional field instructions that may or may not have been "officially published". They are sometimes known as "Standing Orders". These were always produced by army or corps commanders and issued to the units in their corps as a supplement or modification to other existing instructions, or as a complete revision of the "official" procedures that are awaiting publication. Numerous French corps commanders issued such instructions. The third type of "regulation" is the unofficial proposal document. The English during the period of 17801815 seemed to have tried to corner this market. These documents are easy to spot in that their author is indicated. Usually they are "dedicated" to some prominent military leader, such as the Duke of York, in hopes that he would be flattered and champion official adoption of the proposed regulation. These documents had no official standing, but could be adopted, as in the case of the British and the Rothemburg Regulations for the Exercise and Control of Rifles and Light Infantry on Parade and in the Field, London, 1798. These are often proposals based on practical combat experience or, in some cases, wild proposals advocating complete revisions of tactics based on some individual's reading of ancient Roman or Macedonian tactics. Mesnil-Durand's ideas on the "ordre prof ond" (column) falls into this category. They are "proposals" and must be taken with a grain of salt, but there is often valuable information to be gleaned from them. The last type of "regulation" is the compilation and clarification document. A number of these were written and sold to the public with titles like, "Questions on the Positions and Movement of a Company and a Battalion as Directed by the Royal Saxon Exercise Regulation for Young People who wish to become Officers", Smirk's "Review of a Battalion of Infantry Including the 18 Manoeuvers", and "School of the Cavalier by Questions and Responses". These documents do not generally have authors and will often state that they are based on specific, existing regulations. Though these are not always official government documents, they are drawn from them and usually do not include any "unofficial" documentation. Indeed, many contain illustrations from the official regulations and, in the case of Smirk's work, it is a clarification of Dundas' work and 18 manoeuvers, which became the "official" British regulation. The question of what is found in these documents is less complex. in the case of most regulations they provide a document for the complete training of raw recruits. They usually contain a number of "schools" which take the soldier from the simplest individual maneuvers through the most complicated battalion or, in the case of cavalry, regimental maneuvers. These are discussed in the text and the various executive commands are provided with complete explanations on how the maneuver is to occur. This is seconded in the better regulations with sets of illustrations that show every phase of the maneuver in question. Regulations very rarely contain any tactical doctrine, with the very notable exception of the Prussian 1812 series where a discussion on combined arms maneuvers is repeated in the infantry, cavalry and artillery regulations. Such complex questions as the process of infantry skirmish combat seem to not have been clearly documented in these "official regulations". That is far more likely to be found in documents such as General Duhesme's Essai Historique sur l'infanterie Legere. For that matter, of the three French, three British and one Hesse-Kassel light infantry regulations reviewed, the tactical discussion on skirmish tactics in battle they contain can be detailed in less than this paragraph. Only Davout's instructions provide any significant details on the how to or "tactics" of skirmish combat. We have already discussed the topic of process of updating regulations. This process occurred as a result of three things: 1. a major military disaster, i.e., Jena-Auerstadt, that forced the adoption of a new combat system, 2. a major philosophical change, i.e., Mesnil-Durand and Guibert debates, on the part of the army command that required a revision to the combat system, or 3. a change in weapons, i.e., machine guns, that dictated a change in combat systems. Please note the use of the words "combat system". The word "tactic" was carefully not used and with good reasons which will be explained later. Any of these three phenomena could trigger the writing of the four types of "regulations". indeed, the "unofficial regulations" are quite often the source document resulting in the second cause for regulation revision/ issuance. The last, and most important point is, what is the purpose of a regulation. It is in this topic where the answer to the significance of drill regulations lies. The official regulations generally provide combat systems. They do not usually provide tactics, though there are a few exceptions. The concept combat system does blur with the term tactic, but there are some distinctions that must be understood. The combat system is a set of building blocks. With these building blocks the officer in tactical control maneuvers his forces in order to execute the tactics with which he wishes to engage the enemy. It directs how they shall fire (system), but not when (tactic). It should be recognized that a tactic can dictate combat systems as much as a combat system dictates tactics. The combat system and the tactics are tightly interwoven. Either can change, but if it does it may or may not dictate a change in the other. Some systems may not mesh well with some tactics. When this occurs either the system is changed to allow the tactic, or the tactic is abandoned. The regulations teach the soldier how to march so he performs his maneuvers in a uniform manner. The most striking example of the purpose and relationship between the system and the common soldier is found in the army of Frederick the Great of Prussia. His soldiers were taught to be mindless machines that marched at precisely 75 paces per minute. Each marching pace had a precise distance that the soldiers were not allowed to vary. If his pace was 112" longer he was brutally punished. The goal of his regulations was to provide his senior officers with a machine whose movements could be mathematically precise and absolutely dependable. In the "Standing Orders", or official, unpublished revisions by corps or army commanders, one finds two types of information. The first is tactical information and directions as to how the corps/army commander wishes his subordinates to act in specific tactical situations. The second type of information/directions relate to interim changes to accommodate armywide revisions. The best example of the latter is to be found in the French Army. The Regulation of 1791 was written for a battalion of eight companies. On 18 February 1808 the French infantry was totally reorganized into battalions of six companies. If one tries to form a square designed to be formed with eight companies and one has only six companies, there is a problem. It is, therefore, obvious that the regulation had to be revised, but as alte as the 1811 edition, no official revision was made for this organizational change. These changes appeared in two forms 1. footnotes to the regulation put in by the editor who chose to provide a "semi-official" accommodation for the necessary changes, and 2. "unpublished" directions from the corps/army commanders. The explanatory "regulation" returns to the form of the "official regulation". It is, however, much more fundamental and generally requires as much clarification as possible on the "regulated" maneuvers. it could be best described as a "remedial reader" for the slow to learn. What Does It All Mean? But what does this all mean to the gamer and historian? it is my belief that the regulations provide the building blocks for the combat systems used in any period. The regulation teaches the soldier how to march, how to load and fire his weapon, how to maneuver in formation and how to react in specific situations. The official regulations are not tactical doctrines, but combat systems. They provide the fundamentals that are necessary if someone is to understand the tactics utilized in any period. If, for example, we are to understand why, prior to 1862, infantry used the "square" to defend itself against cavalry, we need only to understand that the period musket was inadequate to defend infantry in line against cavalry. However, this does not explain how infantry could be caught out of square. Only an analysis of the marching (combat) system can reveal that. It also does not reveal why some nations used the "bataillons masse" (Austria), or did not use the colonne serre (France), and other variations on the solid square that were called out in their regulations (England, Prussia and Russia). Time and motion studies of the official regulations can only provide part of that answer. The rest must come from the "unofficial regulations" of corps/army commanders or memoirists. Another example of the importance of studying drill regulations can be found by studying formations and their interaction with marching systems. Napoleonic infantry formed in ranks that were separated by as little as 13 inches. When they marched their legs literally went underneath the man in front of them. The result of this is that only veteran troops would be trained and relaxed enough to do this with ease. Militia or raw drafts were likely to be very slovenly in their formations and probably had tremendous difficulties executing any maneuvers because they were afraid they would collide with the other men in their company. indeed, the Prussian 1812 regulation speaks to this problem very directly. The French and Prussians marched with a stiff leg which would have made this a complex process and the Russians used a goose step, making it even more difficult. Without reading the regulation one would never know this. Certainly the manner of marching got slovenly in combat. As the formations were designed for the "stiff legged" parade marching system, once the fundamental marching pattern got slovenly the men would have had to open up. As they opened up the formation became looser and faded rapidly away from its desired formation. As a result, any unit that marched in broken terrain, under fire, or at a high speed for any length of time would have to stop and redress its ranks or it would become totally unformed. Numerous memoirs repeatedly show this to be the case. This also explains why units did not move around the field at a fast walk all day. First, the stiff legged march would be impossible and incredibly fatiguing. Secondly, the unit would have lost all semblance of formation. To the gamer this is important because his formed infantry battalions cannot be treated as if they were wheeled vehicles capable of driving around the battlefield at 20 mph all day. To both the gamer and historian it explains why the small rearguard formation or sudden counterstrike by fresh troops was able to stop many pursuits of a beaten army. The pursuer became unformed himself and was unable to resist a formed enemy. Bottom Line The bottom line is that it is very difficult to understand any period's tactics without understanding the building blocks that formed its foundation. if the gamer/historian is unaware of small details the explanations for various larger events become unclear or, seemingly, unreasonable. And, it is important to note that when one bases their analysis of a system 150 years old on what they experienced in their military service they are making a lot of assumptions that may be ill considered. Little innovations like machine guns, land mines, high explosive artillery shells, etc., have changed the combat systems such that any attempt at interpolation backwards is fraught with questionable assumptions. Webster's Dictionary defines "regulation" as "a rule or order having the force of law issued by an executive authority..." It is not reasonable to think that generals would spend years developing systems and codifying combat systems into regulations if they did not demand that they be followed. No executive in any endeavor spends hours writing directives and procedures if he has no desire or concern if they are followed. obviously regulations were issued and men schooled in the execution of those regulations with the anticipation that only under the most unusual circumstances would they be varied from by the executing bodies. Remember, these regulations are not, for the most part, tactical doctrine. And the use of initiative by individuals lower than battalion commanders unless on outpost duty or in skirmish formation, was severely frowned upon. When the battalion commander gave an order he expected it to be done in a specific manner. He didn't have to worry about directing the activities of men beyond the sound of his voice. He made the decisions and told his men what to do knowing that they would do it in one specific manner. if there was something that might make the execution of a maneuver difficult he would be where he could see it (he was generally mounted) and make the appropriate decision. If he chose to make a variation in the maneuver, the regulation provided him with the tools (commands) to make that variation. it should also be realized that many drills called out in the regulation were not intended for combat, but were solely for the parade and inspections by the inspector General. In my view the study of drill regulations provides us with the only accurate, general time machine we have. It allows us to go back in time and see exactly what was expected of the period's soldiers. There were variations from the regulations that occurred, but they were the exception, not the rule. Those who advocate differently are, in my opinion, seeking material in documents that are not designed to reveal what they seek. Back to Table of Contents -- Courier Vol. VII #5 To Courier List of Issues To MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1987 by The Courier Publishing Company. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com