ED. NOTE: Contemporary research is showing that Napoleonic infantry had more tactical flexibility than previously believed. Several nations used their third ranks as skirmishers. At need a unit would thin its ranks in order to cover an extended front. The following article provides some historical background on the subject of infantry tactics. -J.A. Many students of the Napoleonic Wars have written glowingly of the British preference for two-deep lines. Given that the British manuals of the period show regulations for three-rank formations, these writers compliment the British in their willingness to change to these more "sensible" two rank formations. In contrast, the French reputation suffers by the sustained use of three ranks. Some writers brand this choice as bordering on irrational. One should examine the context of these tactical choices. Both the French and the British armies used a two-deep line before the Napoleonic Wars. Indeed, they used this "thin line" at the same time during the the American Revolution. Sir William Howe adapted the use of two ranks in Boston for his British garrison, and the army continued to use this formation throughout the War. [1] The link to the French came through the American Army. The Comte de Rochambeau adopted two lines for his army during 1781 upon arriving in America in deference to the American custom of two ranks. [1] The French Army had evolved from a six-rank system used earlier in the War of the Spanish Succession to five ranks as set forth in the Orclonnance of 1703. In discussing this change, David Chandler notes "... in practise many French battalions formed only four-deep, and in some cases even three, owing the the exigencies of manpower shortages as the war continued its lengthy course." [3] By the time of the Seven Years War, the French had officially adopted the three-rank line in battle. At the same time, the Duke of Marlborough's British infantry battalions were formed in three ranks. While the British predated the French in the use of the three-deep line, other continental armies lagged behind both. For example, the Austrians did not adopt three ranks for the infantry until 1757. [4] During this period, the several military establishments were changing the method of delivering fire from a system using each rank to the platoon system. Generally ascribed to the Dutch, the platoon firing system had the advantages of control and concentration. The French adopted several methods of firing which departed from the fire by rank throughout the early Eighteenth Century. Late in adopting new methods, the Austrians retained the fire by rank system at the start of the Seven Years War. Meanwhile, weapons improved. The once prevalent Seventeenth Century plug bayonet fully gave way to the ring attachment, then later to a socket which firmly attached bayonet to musket. Thus the soldier was relieved of worrying over the bayonet's fit. The gradual introduction of the iron ramrod allowed for faster and more solid loading than was permitted with the wooden ramrod. Finally, shaping improvements in the touchhole facilitated priming the musket. This suggests the number of ranks could be reduced upon the increase in the total fire efficiency of the units. This total efficiency was improved when using a more advanced fire system and better weapons. Commanders expected a unit to hold a given amount of front. Without improvements in equipment or in techniques, the commanders could or would not make changes. Once improvements were adopted, however, the army could then risk reducing the number of ranks. The British Army faced the same tactical circumstances as their contemporaries. The established strength of a British company prior to the American Revolution was thirtyeight private men. [5] As England gathered its strength to bring its American colonies under firm control, the army was augmented on 15 February 1775 by adding twenty privates. [6] With the augmentation, the full strength British battalion - with detached light and grenadier companies - would have formed 464 men. Howe's battalions in Boston had less than three hundred men in the field. Incorrectly, one could infer Howe introduced the twodeep line to allow the officers to become familiar with their future frontage. Thus, when the recruits arrived, the units would be given a third rank. This was not the case. When reinforcements arrived, no third rank materialized. The two- deep line was used throughout the War. 1Indeed, when Howe returned to England, his replacement, Sir Henry Clinton, had the opportunity to change the tactical formation. He did not. He stated, "We have succeeded always [with] it; the enemy have adopted it; they have no cavalry to employ against it. Till a new enemy comes, I shall content myself with supporting it always with something solid." [7] Clearly, Clinton said he saw no immediate threat to the thinner formation. [8] With some reflection, the trend becomes clear. A battle line could have its ranks reduced, with improvements in the technology of muskets, with increases in the efficiency of fire, or even with a decrease in the enemy's capability. This tendency continues after the Napoleonic Wars as first breechloaders, then machine guns, are introduced. For example, in 1882, British battalions formed for the attack with a third of the men in the first line at three-pace intervals between soldiers. Although used against the Egyptian Army under Ahmed Orabi, the front was very thin indeed. Granted, another third of the men was in a similar line three hundred yards back and the remainder were found in reserve still another three hundred yards further back. [9] Consider Clinton's comment about the cavalry threat. As the Americans did not possess a strong cavalry arm in 1778 when he took command, he did not need to counter them. Later, in 1781 when Sir Banastre Tarleton's force is run through at Cowpens by Colonel Washington's cavalry, Clinton brands the two-deep line "flimsy" and says he never liked it. Clearly a small cavalry force meant far more among the weaker armies maneuvering in the South than he had anticipated. During the Napoleonic Wars, generals also pondered these same alternatives. The Duke of Wellington consciously maneuvered in the Peninsula to neutralize the overwhelming French cavalry advantage by carefully choosing terrain. Where he could not pick proper geographical placements, he used his own cavalry to thwart the mounted threat. As the cavalry contingents changed, both in quantity and quality, the British operations became less dependent on taking a hilltop position. By the time of Salamanca in 1812, his infantry had sufficient protection from their own cavalry to march boldly into the plains. Wellington had, as Clinton said, ii something solid". The Union Brigade further emphasized this point at Waterloo. Astute terrain choice, and later the adequate manipulation of combined arms, permitted the perpetuation of the two-deep line. The French had a different situation. The 1780 use of two lines had political overtones. Absent this, Rochambeau controlled the placement of his force throughout the campaign in America. Later, by the time of their own Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars, the French could not assume appropriate terrain would be available to cover their infantry from mounted threats. Their armies would fight in Holland, Germany, Italy, Austria, Russia, Portugal and Spain. Nor in the larger context of central Europe, could the French insure the nearness of sufficient friendly cavalry to cover their infantry. Subtle and skilled generals might not be available to attend to these details. Further, the revolutionary column covered by skirmishers had emerged as the French operational method. The voltigeurs provided fire support and cover to the mobile columns. A steady enemy might force the column to open into a line, but the earnest hope was for the enemy to break prior to this necessity. A general could maneuver a column more efficiently with sub-units of three ranks than with sub-units elongated by a two-deep line. Of course when Emperor Napoleon became pressed for manpower in 1813, he attempted to reduce the line by a rank. ultimately, this reflected in the same pressures Louis XIV had experienced earlier. In all the prior years of campaigning, Napoleon had found little occasion to change. Considering the desired infantry tactics on the battlefield and the need for insuring a sufficient counter to the cavalry threat, the French use of three ranks appears reasonable. FOOTNOTES [1] 1 Sir Henry Clinton, The American Rebellion, ed. William B. Willcox (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1954), p. 95 n. [2] Evelyn M. Acomb, The Revolutionary Journal of Baron Ludwig von Closen, 1780-1783. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1958), p. 92. [3] David Chandler, The Art of Warfare in the Age of Marlborough. (New York: Hippocrene Books, Inc., 1976), p. 115. [4] Christopher Duffy, The Army of Maria Theresa: The Armed Forces of Imperial Austria, 1740-1780, American ed. (New York: Hippocrene Books, Inc., 1977), p. 77. The Grenadiers had adopted three ranks prior to 1757. [5] Edward E. Curtis, The Organization of the British Army in the American Revolution. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1926), p. 4. [6] Sir John Fortescue, ed., The Correspondence of King George the Third, Vol. III. (London: MacMillan and Co., 1928), pp. 168 and 175. Lord Barrington to the King, War Office, January 25,1779, p. 168. Lord North to the King, 115 February 1775], p. 175. [7] Sir Henry Clinton, The American Rebellion, p. 95 n. [9] Early in the War, the Americans adopted this open line. Their later use of the Prussian system of tight elbow-to- elbow files often became overly enthusiastic. General Anthony Wayne advanced with these tight files at Green Springs, Virginia in 1781. The troops became hopelessly disordered when they reached a wood. Cornwallis's infantry counterattacked and easily drove off the Americans. [9] Lieutenant-Commander Casper T. Goodrich, Report on the British Naval and Military Operations in Egypt, 1882. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1885), p. 95. Back to Table of Contents -- Courier Vol. VII #1 To Courier List of Issues To MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1986 by The Courier Publishing Company. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com